



**EMOTIO, AFFECTUS, SENSUS...: O OSJEĆAJIMA
U POVIJESTI NA JADRANSKOM PROSTORU**

*EMOTIO, AFFECTUS, SENSUS...: EMOTIONS
IN THE HISTORY OF THE ADRIATIC*

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IRATO ANIMO: PERFORMING ANGER IN LATE MEDIEVAL ISTRIA

*Sed inter haec sollerter sciendum est quod alia est ira,
quam impatientia excitat, ali quam zelus format.
Illa ex uitio haec ex uirtute generatur.*
(Saint Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, book 5, chap. 82)¹

Josip Banić

UDK 340.114:616.89-008.444.9](460.341:459.57)“653“

The author analyzes the performances of anger in the context of interpersonal confrontations in the communities of late medieval Istria subjected to Venice. The first part of the study outlines the theoretical, methodological and conceptual framework within which the study is embedded, demonstrating that the European Middle Ages inherited a moral tradition that saw anger as both a condemnable and praise-worthy emotion. The second part presents the results of the analysis of over a hundred cases of interpersonal conflict in which the performance of anger played a seminal role. The author concludes that the role of anger in these societies was intimately tied to defending one's personal honor and upholding the existing social hierarchies. Although anger did not acquire a more pronounced legal dimension, it was still tacitly tolerated by the Venetian authorities if it was deemed that it had been properly performed by following a set script of personal confrontations.

Keywords: emotions, emotional communities, anger, ritual of conflict, Istria, Late Middle Ages, Venice, podestà, justice administration

Ključne riječi: emocije, emotivne zajednice, bijes, ritual sukobljavanja, Istra, kasni srednji vijek, Venecija, podestat, administracija pravde

Prelude

It was on the Sunday of 9 January, *anno Domini* 1446, that a vicious brawl broke out beneath the civic loggia of Poreč (Ital. Parenzo), a coastal city of Istria that had been under the dominion of the Most Serene Republic of Venice since the mid-13th century.² The fight

1 I dedicate this paper to Professor Mirjana Matijević-Sokol who taught me paleography and trained me to read medieval Latin manuscripts. Without her *consilium, auxilium et favorem* neither this study nor my PhD at the CEU would be possible. Gregory's quotation is cited from *Moralia in Job*, 3 vols., ed. Marc Adriaen, Corpus christianorum: Series latina 142–143A–143B (here 142), Turnhout: Brepols, 1975, vol. 1, 278. The passage can be loosely translated as “For herein should be keenly borne in mind that there are different angers: one is aroused by impatience, the other is inspired by zeal. The former is born of vice, the latter of virtue.” Unless otherwise noted, all the translations into contemporary English are my own.

2 The following is a narrative reconstruction of a court case registered in the acts of the podestà (rector) of Poreč Matteo Gradonico featured in Hrvatski državni arhiv u Pazinu [The Croatian State Archives in Pazin], HR-DAPA-5: Općina Poreč [the Commune of Poreč], box 1: *Acta potestatis Parentii Mathei Gradenici, 1444–1446* (hereafter: *Acta potestatis Parentii*), fol. 285r–v. The city of Poreč voluntarily subjected itself to Venice in July of 1267 (formally accepted by the Venetian Great Council on 27 July) during a war between the counts of Gorizia (backed by the Commune of Koper) and Gregory of Montelongo, the patriarch of Aquileia and the ruling margrave of Istria who was unable to defend Poreč when it was attacked by Koper in the summer of 1267, thus prompting the city's submission to Venice. On all of this, see

erupted between a Martin, the son of late Henry the Slav, and a master carpenter called Christopher (this and all the other cases mentioned in the text are edited *in extenso* in the appendix that is published separately in digital format by *Fontes Istrie medievalis*, fontesistrie.eu/separata/Anger_IPB9_Appendix.pdf).³ According to several written accounts of their scuffle, produced both by the brawlers themselves as well as by three eyewitnesses, the duo met by the seashore of Poreč. The carpenter approached Martin, asking him to settle his debts toward the commune by paying the money to him, as the very city owed him around twenty pounds of pennies for some work that he had been officially contracted for.⁴ Martin briskly replied that he would do no such thing as Christopher himself owed money to the communal granary (Lat. *fonticum*, Ven. *fontego*). Notwithstanding the initial refusal, Christopher remained adamant in his effort to receive money directly from Martin. It was at this point that the tempers of both men began rapidly changing as insults began hurling around the civic loggia.⁵ According to Martin, it was Christopher who first accused him of lying with a standard expression “you lie in your throat” and Martin retaliated with the same accusation followed by a curse of hundred bloody stools.⁶ It was the invocation of this noxious curse—standard insult uttered across the communities of central and northern Italy and, according to Bolognese humanist Sabadino degli Arienti, the first Italian

Katja Puppe, *Der lange Weg nach Istrien: Die venezianische Unterwerfung der Halbinsel, vornehmlich am Beispiel Kopers (1279-1349)*, PhD dissertation, Leipzig: Fakultät für Geschichte, Kunst- und Orientalwissenschaften der Universität Leipzig, 2017, 33–48, esp. 37 and fn. 191 for the submission of Poreč; Roberto Cessi, ed., *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia*, vol. 2, Atti della Assemblea costituzionali italiane dal Medio Evo al 1831, 3/1: Parlamenti e Consigli Maggiori dei Comuni italiani, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1931, 55, doc. 46. Note on place names: all Istrian toponyms have at least two names, one Italian and the other Slovenian and/or Croatian. In order to avoid constant repetitions of both versions of a place name, a toponym will regularly be given in the language of the modern nation state that the respective place belongs to in the present day. The first mention of any toponym with two official names will always feature both names. Note on personal names: all the personal names are given in their anglicized form. Thus, an individual appearing in the primary sources as *Henricus Slavus* or *Iohannes de Parentio* will be rendered as Henry the Slav and John from Poreč, respectively. Excepted from this convention are all the historical figures whose personal names have been standardized in anglophone scholarship in their non-anglicized forms, which is the case for all the Venetian noblemen who are regularly referred to in standardized Venetian forms of their names. These forms are standardized according to the pool of personal names featured in *Rulers of Venice*, ed. Benjamin G. Kohl, Andrea Mozzato and Monique O’Connell, rulersofvenice.org [last access: 2 October 2020].

- 3 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 285r. The entire case, like the majority of others referenced in the paper, is edited *in extenso* in the appendix as case 1. Due to the limited space accorded to each author of these conference proceedings, I was unable to physically attach the appendix to the paper. Therefore, the appendix is available only in a digital format and it is freely consultable at fontesistrie.eu/separata/Anger_IPB9_Appendix.pdf [last access: 25 November, 2020].
- 4 Note on the names of currencies: all the names of coins and moneys of account are translated into English: Lat. *libra (denariorum) parvorum* = Ven. *lira di (denari) pizoli* = Eng. a pound of pennies; Lat. *solidus (denariorum) pravorum*, Ven. *soldo di (denari) pizoli* = Eng. a shilling of pennies; Lat. *marcha (denariorum)*, Ven. *marca (de denari)* = Eng. a mark. The relations between these currencies are the following: 1 pound of pennies = 20 shillings (of pennies) = 240 pennies; 1 mark = 8 pounds of pennies = 160 shillings (of pennies) = 1920 pennies. Bernardo Maria De Rubeis, *De nummis patriarcharum Aquileiensium dissertatio*, Venice: Giovanni Battista Pasquali, 1747, 68–69.
- 5 E.g. “Va ti fa foter!” See case 1 in the appendix.
- 6 “Tu menti per la gola!” ... “Tu menti! Ti, che te vegna cento chagasangi!” ... “Et cum manu aperta admenavit, et si non se retraxisset, dedisset alapam.” See case 1 in the appendix. On the syntagm “mentire per la gola,” a standard expression used to call someone a liar recorded throughout medieval Italy, at least from the 13th century onwards, and even in other non-Romance speaking territories (such as German-speaking lands), see Giuseppe Patota, “Mentire per la gola,” *Lingua e stile*, 48/2, 2013, 155–176.

curse picked up by the foreigners—that triggered physical violence.⁷ Martin tried to slap the carpenter who somehow managed to evade his darting open palm. As a response to this attack, Christopher reached for a knife that he had underneath his robes, threatening to seriously harm his opponent. Luckily, the passersby quickly intervened, retaining both men from further injuring each other. The fight, however, was far from over. In a bid to even the playing field, Martin ran to his house to grab a large kitchen knife of his own. Returning to the streets, he found Christopher by the shop of Peter the barber and posited a rhetorical question of whether he would like to continue their skirmish. The two men brawled across the streets of Poreč until Martin eventually managed to hit the carpenter with a rock straight to the head, a knockout shot that left Christopher bloodied and lying on the floor as the conflict finally came to a close.⁸

Historicizing Anger: Theory and Methodology

This episode of extreme public violence is but one of many similar cases that were presented daily to civic rectors across the European continent during the High and Late Middle Ages, the only difference being the quantity and quality of surviving primary sources and the modality by which such conflicts were being recorded.⁹ Traditionally, these episodes had been interpreted as mirrors into the highly unstable emotional psyche of medieval women and men whose mental state was, the old argument goes, crucially different from those of modern, 19th- and 20th-century counterparts.

The most prominent perpetuator of this interpretative scheme remains the acclaimed Johan Huizinga. In his classic monograph on the culture of late medieval Europe, the lyri-

7 Trevor Dean, *Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 117. “[D]ixe [il cuoco tedesco] – O lupi, avete voi già divorate tutte le lasagne ch’io ve detti? Che ve venga el cacasanguè! – prima blasma che imparano li alamanni quando in Italia vengono.” Sabadino degli Arienti, *Le porretane*, ed. Giovanni Gambarin, Bari: Laterza & figli, 1914, 277, novella 46.

8 See case 1 in the appendix.

9 See e.g. Nella Lonza, “*Coram domino comite et suis iudicibus*: Penal Procedure in Early Fourteenth-Century Dubrovnik,” *Criminal Justice History*, 15, 1994, 1–38, esp. 19–20; Xavier Rousseaux, “Crime, Justice and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Times: Thirty Years of Crime and Criminal Justice History,” trans. Kevin Dwyer, *Crime, History & Societies*, 1/1, 1997, 95; Andrew J. Finch, “The Nature of Violence in the Middle Ages: An Alternate Perspective,” *Historical Research*, 70/173, 1997, 249–268, esp. 256–257; Trevor Dean, *Crime in Medieval Europe: 1200-1550*, London: Pearson, 2001; Nella Lonza, “Tužba, osveta, nagodba: Modeli reagiranja na zločin u srednjovjekovnom Dubrovniku” [Settling disputes in medieval Dubrovnik by court proceedings, revenge or out-of-court settlement], *Analiz Dubrovnik*, 40, 2002, 57–104, esp. 85 and table 4; Claude Gauvard, “Violenza,” in *Dizionario dell’Occidente medievale: Temi e percorsi*, ed. Jaques Le Goff and Jean-Claude Schmitt, Turin: Einaudi, 2003, 1204–1212; Stuart Carroll, *Blood and Violence in Early Modern France*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, esp. 83–108; Dean, *Crime and Justice*, esp. 168–181; Ermanno Orlando, *Altre Venezie: Il Dogado veneziano nei secoli XIII e XIV (giurisdizione, territorio, giustizia e amministrazione)*, Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2008, 268–288, esp. 269–273; Andrea Zorzi, “I conflitti nell’Italia comunale: Riflessioni sullo stato degli studi e sulle prospettive di ricerca,” in *Conflitti, paci e vendette nell’Italia comunale*, ed. Andrea Zorzi, Reti Medievali E-Book 14, Florence: Firenze University Press, 2009, 7–43; Daniel Lord Smail, *The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264–1423*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, 89–132; Gordan Ravančić, “Rhythm of Crime in a Medieval City: Example of Dubrovnik,” in *Our Daily Crime: Collection of Studies*, ed. Gordan Ravančić, Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2014, 73–101, esp. 76; Petra Vručina, “Uvreda i fama publica u kasnosrednjovjekovnim istočnojadranskim komunama” [Insult and fama publica in the late medieval eastern Adriatic communes], *Povijesni prilozi*, 54, 2018, 39–64; Luca Campisi, “Prassi giudiziaria a Vercelli nel XIV secolo,” *Studi di storia medioevale e di diplomatica*, n.s., 2, 2018, 131–150, esp. 139.

cal Dutch historian provided what was to become a landmark interpretation of personal conflicts, from petty brawls to impulsive murders, that plagued the European societies during the Middle Ages. The catalyst to such behavioral patterns, argued Huizinga, lay in immature, “childlike” emotional states of individuals living in medieval Europe, their “most painful supersensitivity” with untamed passions and emotions bewilderingly rising and “spilling-over”, assuming control of individuals and prompting violent behaviors to the detriment of their fragile societies.¹⁰ For the Belgian medievalist, the people at this point in history had still not learned to control their emotions.

Huizinga’s interpretation markedly influenced the writings of another great medievalist whose studies would leave an indelible mark on the medieval studies, the French historian Marc Bloch. In his landmark publication *Feudal Society*, Bloch echoed Huizinga’s arguments in a chapter on “the models of feelings and thoughts” where he wrote of “emotional instability of medieval man,” their “irrationality,” “nervous sentiments” due to “perpetual insecurity” and poor diet, all of which led to “a primitive lifestyle,” without moral and social conventions that would repress emotional outbreaks.¹¹

Simultaneously to Bloch, Huizinga’s famous interpretation would be majestically continued by a renowned German sociologist and the author of another scholarly classic, Norbert Elias in his study on *The Civilizing Process*. Continuing where Huizinga stopped, Elias aimed to ascertain the exact period in history when the emotions finally became “tamed”, as well as the underlying factors that brought about this crucial “taming.” The German sociologist pinpointed the courtly culture of Early Modern Europe as the main catalyst for such a change of control over one’s emotions, a top-down process that slowly began transforming societies across the continent.¹²

10 E.g. “The distance between sadness and joy, between good and bad fortune, seemed to be much greater than for us; every experience had that degree of directness and absoluteness that joy and sadness still have in the mind of a child.” [...] “[D]aily life received the kind of impulses and passionate suggestions that is revealed in the vacillating moods of unrefined exuberance, sudden cruelty, and tender emotions between which the life of the medieval city was suspended.” ... “During the fifteenth century the immediate emotional affect is still directly expressed in ways that frequently break through the veneer of utility and calculation.” Johan Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996 [originally published as *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* in 1921], 1–2, 15, 226. Unfortunately, I was not able to procure the newest English translation of Huizinga’s book, published under the title *Autumntide of the Middle Ages: A Study of Forms of Life and Thought of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries in France and the Low Countries*, trans. Diane Webb, ed. Graeme Small and Anton van der Lem, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2020.

11 E.g. “This [referring to perpetual insecurity] was probably one of the principal reasons for the emotional instability so characteristic of the feudal era, especially during its first age. A low standard of hygiene doubtless also contributed to this nervous sensibility.” [...] “[V]iolence was an element in manners. Medieval men had little control over their immediate impulses; they were emotionally insensitive to the spectacle of pain, and they had small regard for human life, which they saw only as a transitory state before Eternity; moreover, they were very prone to make it a point of honour to display their physical strength in an almost animal way.” [...] “[T]he laity also shared the emotionalism of a civilization in which moral or social convention did not yet require well-bred people to repress their tears and their raptures.” March Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols., trans. L. A. Manyon, London: Routledge, 1989 [originally published as *La société féodale*, 2 vols., Paris: Albin Michel, 1939–1940], vol. 1, 73, vol. 2, 135.

12 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edward Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000 [originally published as *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation: Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*, 2 vols, Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1939], esp. 168–169.

Due to the massive, global popularity the three renowned scholars attracted in the course of the 20th century, cases such as the brawl between Martin and Christopher were instinctively seen as undisputed confirmations of Huizinga's model that remained dominant for decades to come.¹³ This interpretative paradigm came to be known as the so-called "hydraulic model" due to emotions being likened to fluids, uncontrollably "spilling-over" when aroused beyond the point of control, a threshold that was dangerously easy to (b)reach.¹⁴

There were, however, scholars who bravely swam against the tide, appealing for a more nuanced approach to the study of emotions and their enactments across various societies. For example, already in 1938 Lucien Febvre emphatically called upon his fellow historians to focus their attention on emotions as "contrary to what is thought when they are confused with mere automatic responses to the external world, they [emotions] have a particular character which no man concerned with the social life of other men can any longer disregard."¹⁵ For this programmatic article that was ahead of its time, Febvre is nowadays rightly dubbed as the "father of the history of emotions."¹⁶

In essence, Febvre anticipated a shift from the essentialist-universalistic to social-constructionist view of human emotions: the former accentuates the biological determinant of emotions resulting from the millennia of human evolution, a factor that is assumed to be universal to mankind across cultures and ages; the latter stresses the emotions' socially determined dimension, focusing primarily on the fact that the manifestations of emotions are always (de)coded within a specific society.¹⁷ As the 20th century was coming to a close, the social-constructionist paradigm was steadily gaining ground in social sciences and hu-

13 On Huizinga see e.g. Peter Arnade and Martha Howell, "Introduction," in *Rereading Huizinga: Autumn of the Middle Ages a Century Later*, ed. Peter Arnade, Martha Howell and Anton von der Lem, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019, 11–21. On Bloch, see Katherine Stirling, "Rereading Marc Bloch: The Life and Works of a Visionary Modernist," *History Compass*, 5/5, 2007, 525–538, esp. 531. On Bloch's reception of Huizinga, see Myriam Greilsammer, "A Late and Ambivalent Recognition: (The Autumn of) Johan Huizinga and the French Historians of the *nouvelle histoire*," in *Rereading Huizinga*, 275–307. On Elias and the heuristic value of his *Civilizing Process* the debate is still ongoing: see for example Hans Peter Duerr, *Der Mythos vom Zivilisationsprozeß*, 5 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988–2002; Gerd Schwerhoff, "Zivilisationsprozeß und Geschichtswissenschaft: Norbert Elias' Forschungsparadigma in historischer Sicht," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 266, 1998, 561–606; Pieter Spierenburg, "Violence and the Civilizing Process: Does it Work?" *Crime, History & Societies*, 5/2, 2001, 87–105; Andrew Linklater and Stephen Mennell, "Norbert Elias, the Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations—An Overview and Assessment," *History and Theory*, 49/3, 2010, 384–411.

14 See e.g. Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions*, New York: Anchor Press, 1976, 138–50. One of the most prominent examples of blind adherence to Huizinga's thesis of emotional instability of medieval men is Robert Muchembled, *Popular Culture and Elite Culture in France, 1400–1700*, trans. Lydia Cochrane, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985.

15 The article was originally presented in 1938 at a conference on "Sensibility in Man and Nature;" it was published in 1941 in "La Sensibilité et l'histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?," *Annales d'histoire sociale*, 3/1–2, 1941, 5–20; and subsequently translated into English as "Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past," in *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, trans. K. Folca, ed. Peter Burke, London: Harper & Row, 1973, 12–26, quotation on 14.

16 Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 41–42; Rob Boddice, "The History of Emotions," in *New Directions in Social and Cultural History*, ed. Sasha Handley, Rohan McWilliam and Lucy Noakes, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, 46.

17 The classic study remains Claire Armon-Jones, "The Social Functions of Emotion," in *The Social Construction of Emotions*, ed. Rom Harré, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 57–82. Cf. Febvre's words in "Sensibility and History," 14–15 where he writes of emotions as "controlled in the same way as ritual."

manities. This scholarly sentiment was echoed, for example, by the great American anthropologist Clifford Geertz who stressed that “[n]ot only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts in man.”¹⁸

A pioneering study on the historical aspects of an emotion followed in 1986 in which the Stearnses—a historian and a psychologist—analyzed the changing societal attitudes toward anger in the communities of the USA from the Early Modern Era all the way to their present day.¹⁹ In this classic monograph, the authors coined the concept “emotionology”: “the conventions and standards by which Americans evaluated anger—and the institutions they developed to reflect and encourage these standards.”²⁰ According to the Stearnses, the emotionology in the USA began changing from the mid-18th and 19th centuries onwards as its repression at home and workplace began to be actively propagated. The study thus demonstrated how societal standards governing the expression and reception of anger are susceptible to change over time, confirming Febvre’s thesis that historians have a lot to contribute to the discussion on emotions.

This research paradigm remained largely on the margins of medieval studies until the late 1990s when a bold and a uniquely creative American medievalist almost single-handedly ushered in a new era of the history of emotions. Barbara H. Rosenwein first explored the historiographical landscape of the study of emotions in 1998 when she edited a volume dedicated to anger.²¹ It was with this publication that a veritable revolution in the study of behavior displayed by Martin and Christopher in 15th-century Poreč officially commenced. Rosenwein would continue down the road of emotion history by publishing several landmark publications in the years to come, the seminal of which is her *Emotional Communities* where she outlined the methodology behind her approach to the study of emotions in past societies.²²

Appropriating both the social-constructivist and the cognitivist views, Rosenwein defines emotions as socially determined judgments and appraisals that hinge “on our values, goals, and presuppositions—products of our society, community, and individual experience.”²³ In order to unmask and investigate the social framework within which emotions were enacted and interpreted, Rosenwein devised a concept dubbed “emotional community”: “group in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions.”²⁴ According to Rosenwein, the researcher investigating emotional communities

18 Clifford Geertz, “The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind,” in *The Interpretations of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 81.

19 Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America’s History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

20 Stearns and Stearns, *Anger*, 14.

21 Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., *Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

22 Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

23 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 191.

24 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 2.

seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling, to establish what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them (for it is about such things that people express emotions); the emotions that they value, devalue, or ignore; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.²⁵

Thus, the attitude toward different emotions—their enactment, reception and evaluation—is determined by the societal norms, customs and inherited systems of dispositions—their *habitus* to employ Pierre Bourdieu's famous concept.²⁶ Such a research paradigm, therefore, posits the study of emotional discourse firmly within the domain of historiography.

Anger in particular has prominently enjoyed the attention of historians, even before the full onset of the “emotional turn.” From the 1980s to the present day, the issue that garnered the most attention has pertained to the morally polarizing feature of anger.²⁷ Thus, the authors such as Averill, Potegal and Novaco, Dixon and, most recently, Rosenwein as well, all delineate how the emotion that present-day anglophone speakers would dub “anger” received different, often diametrically opposite treatments from various authors writing in diverse traditions. For example, the stoics, championed in this aspect by Lucius Annaeus Seneca, utterly shunned anger, believing it to be “a bestial, destructive vice.”²⁸ According to the first author of a philosophical treatise dedicated entirely to *ira*, there were absolutely no redeeming qualities to anger, “an abhorrent and disfiguring vice,” and the only remedy against it was “to reject straightway the initial prickings of anger, to fight against its first sparks, and to struggle not to succumb to it.”²⁹ The Roman senator's definition of this emotion mirrors his attitude:

[A]nger is a brief madness: for it's no less lacking in self-control, forgetful of decency, unmindful of personal ties, unrelentingly intent on its goal, shut off from rational deliberation, stirred for no substantial reason, unsuited to discerning what's fair and true, just like a collapsing building that's reduced to rubble even as it crushes what it falls upon.³⁰

Seneca's stoic attitude toward anger was subsequently adopted by several prominent early Christian authors such as Martin of Braga, Gregory of Tours, Evagrius the Solitary and

25 Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions,” *Passions in Context*, 1/1, 2010, 11.

26 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, 52–65.

27 The pioneering study was James R. Averill, *Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion*, Springer Series in Social Psychology, New York: Springer, 1982, esp. 55–101. Rosenwein's *Anger's Past* was the precursor to the emotional turn in medieval studies (cited in fn. 24). A concise outline of varying attitudes toward anger, both historically and anthropologically, is given in Michael Potegal and Raymond W. Novaco, “A Brief History of Anger,” in *International Handbook of Anger: Constituent and Concomitant Biological, Psychological, and Social Processes*, ed. Michael Potegal, Gerhard Stemmler and Charles Spielberger, New York: Springer, 2010, 9–24. Finally, a monograph on the history of anger has recently been published by Rosenwein, sketching the “conflicted history” of this emotion from the age of Buddha to the present-day. Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Anger: The Conflicted History of an Emotion, Vices and Virtues*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020. The overview that follows is largely informed by Rosenwein's latest book.

28 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, “De Ira,” in *Luci Annaei Senecae Dialogorum libri duodecim*, ed. Leighton Durham Reynolds, Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 44, book 1, chap. 5. The translation is taken from Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, trans. Robert A. Kaster, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010, 18.

29 Seneca, “De Ira,” 40, book 1, chap. 1, and 47, book 1, chap. 8; translation from Seneca, *Anger*, 14, 21.

30 Seneca, “De Ira,” 39, book 1, chap. 1; translation from Seneca, *Anger*, 14.

Prudentius—all of them believed that anger, as a negative, mind-clouding emotion that leads to reckless violence, should be avoided and combated, most notably by patience, self-reflection and daily meditation.³¹

At the same time, another school of thought on anger coexisted and it was gradually gaining ground as the Late Antiquity faded into the Middle Ages. Beginning with Aristotle, who in turn developed the ideas of Plato, anger was not viewed as an exclusively negative emotion.³² While it had the potential to impair rational thinking and invoke needless violence, there was also a different, more positive side to anger—the key was moderation and correct circumstances:

[B]oth fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence.³³

According to Aristotle, both the excess of anger (irascibility) as well as its deficiency are to be denounced. Only “[t]he man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised.”³⁴ Moreover, there were situations in which anger was not only a positive response, but an obligatory one if the individual was to preserve his social standing, status and the respect of his peers:

For those who are not angry at the things they should be are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; for such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and to put up with insults to one’s friends is slavish.³⁵

Aristotelian view of anger was subsequently adopted in Late Antiquity as the Patristic Era Church fathers faced the conundrum of reconciling the “angry,” “vengeful” God of the Old Testament with the peaceful, non-violent teachings of Jesus Christ.³⁶ For example, the advisor of Emperor Constantine the Great and the author of the treatise “On the Anger of God” (orig. *De Ira Dei*), Lucius Lactantius wrote of two types of anger: a damnable one springing from the desire for revenge, and a “just one”—*ira iusta*—wielded by God for the

31 Rosenwein, *Anger*, 37–38, 101–102.

32 Rosenwein, *Anger*, 26–28. See also, Harris

33 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Barnes Jonathan, trans. W. D. Ross, The Revised Oxford Edition, Bollingen Series 71/2, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 25, book II, chap. 6. All Aristotle’s works will be cited from this edition.

34 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 60, book IV, chap. 5.

35 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” 61, book IV, chap. 5.

36 Michael C. McCarthy, “Divine Wrath and Human Anger: Embarrassment Ancient and New,” *Theological Studies* 70, 2009, 845–874; Rosenwein, *Anger*, 97–110.

preservation of his laws and the natural order of things.³⁷ This God's anger, argues Lactantius, is natural both for God and humans alike since "it is natural for a good person to be moved and aroused by the sin of another," and he even defined anger as "a movement of the mind arising to the restraint of offenses."³⁸ This divine fury, in turn, inspires *just anger* that is manifested when "we rise to punishment, not because we have been injured, but in order that discipline be preserved, morals corrected, and license suppressed."³⁹ Finally, Lactantius concludes, there are two types of anger:

[T]he anger which we call fury or rage ought not even exist in man because it is completely vicious; but, that anger, on the other hand, which has to do with the correction of vices ought not to be taken from man, nor can it be taken from God because it is both useful and necessary for human affairs.⁴⁰

This revolutionary conceptualization of anger was appropriated by Saint Augustine of Hippo who also envisioned two types of anger—the base-conceited negative one and the positive, divine anger. However, he also argued that humans too could be stirred by the just anger of God: "God's anger, then, is the emotion which occurs in the mind of someone who knows God's law, when it sees that same law being transgressed by a sinner. Through this emotion in the souls of the just many things are avenged."⁴¹ Arian theologians also embraced this argumentation, even going as far as "correcting" the Gospel of Matthew: "Everyone who is angry with his brother *without cause* [interpolated part] shall be liable to judgment," and adding "[t]herefore whoever gets angry with cause will not be liable."⁴² Thus, in the writings of an anonymous 5th-century Arian theologian, conventionally termed Pseudo-Chrysostom, anger was also accorded a positive role, necessary for the upholding of God's laws and orderly society:

For if there is no anger, teaching will be of no use, nor will judgments be necessary, nor will criminal actions have to be held in restraint. Therefore just anger is the mother of discipline. Those who get angry with cause not only do not sin, but unless they get angry, they do sin, because irrational patience sows seed of vice, nurtures negligence and encourages not only the wicked but also the good to do evil. Although a wicked

37 McCarthy, "Divine Wrath," 861–864; Rosenwein, *Anger*, 103–104.

38 Lactantius, *De Ira Dei / La Colère de Dieu*, ed. Christiane Ingreteau, Sources Chrétiennes 289, Paris, Cerf, 1982, 180, chap. 17/20. The English translation is taken from Sister Mary Francis McDonald, trans., *Lactantius: The Minor Works, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation* 54, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965, 102.

39 Lactantius, *De Ira Dei*, 180, chap. 17/20; McDonald, *Lactantius*, 101.

40 Lactantius, *De Ira Dei*, 180, chap. 17/20. Translation taken from McDonald, *Lactantius*, 102.

41 Saint Augustine of Hippo, *Ennarationes in Psalmos*, ed. Clemens Weidmann, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 93/1A, Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003, vol. 1: *Psalmi 1–32*, 74, Psalmus 2, chap. 4; the translation is taken from McCarthy, "Divine Wrath," 868.

42 Pseudo-Chrysostom, "Opus imperfectum in Matthaum," in *Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Graeca*, vol. 56, ed. Jacques Paul Migne, Paris: J. P. Migne, 1862, col. 690. Cf. the Gospel of Matthew, chap. 5, verse 22: "Ego autem dico vobis quia omnis qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit iudicio." *Biblia sacra vulgata*, ed. Robert Weber and Roger Gryson, 5th ed., Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007, 1532. The translation is taken from Manlio Simonetti, ed., *Matthew 1–13*, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: New Testament 1a, Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2001, 102.

person may be rebuked, they are not made to change their ways; but a good person, unless they are rebuked, will come to ruin because evil rather than good prevails in their bodies. Anger with cause is not anger but judgment.⁴³

Even Pope Gregory the Great—the mind behind the revision of the classic “Seven deadly sins” who saved a prominent place for anger in that scheme as an emotion responsible for “brawls, swollen minds, insults, clamors, angry outbursts, and blasphemies”—ultimately admitted to an alternative, just face of anger.⁴⁴ Thus, when the Merovingian-era monk Barontus narrated his near-death experience, he had no trouble depicting St Peter—who argued with the demons for the monk’s souls—as “stirred up by anger,” even threatening to hit the fiends with his massive keys if they would they not relent.⁴⁵

Finally, the teachings on the two faces of anger, one condemnable and the other virtuous, received ultimate legitimation through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the most influential of the medieval theologians.⁴⁶ According to Thomas, who was heavily inspired both by Aristotle as well as by Pseudo-Chrysostom, anger was a vice: “it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil,” but it could also be a virtue if it “is directed against vice and in accordance with reason”—this type of *ira* Thomas dubbed “good,” “zealous anger.”⁴⁷ Moreover, it is a natural human response: “anger is more natural to a man than concupiscence is, since anger involves reason more than concupiscence does,” writes Thomas, “[f]or each thing naturally rises up against what is contrary to it and harmful.”⁴⁸ Following in Aristotle’s footsteps, Thomas sees anger as arising from a “disdain” (orig. *parvipensio*), a perceived unjust injury to a person’s “excellence” (orig. *excellencia*), and thus “every instance of harm inflicted on us is such that to the extent that it detracts from our excellence, it seems to involve disdain.”⁴⁹ Anger, in this scheme, is a desire for “just

43 Pseudo-Chrysostom, “Opus imperfectum,” col. 690, homilia 11. I have slightly modified the translation taken from Simonetti, *Matthew 1–13*, 102, namely in changing the gender exclusive pronoun “he” into the inclusive one “they.”

44 Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, vol. 3, 1610, book XXXI, chap. 88; the translation is appropriated from Rosenwein, *Anger*, 102. For Gregory’s just anger, see fn. 1.

45 Barontius, “Visio Baronti monachi Longoretensis,” in *Passiones vitaeque sanctorum aevi Merovingici*, ed. Bruno Krusch and Wilhelm Levison, *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptorum rerum Merovingicarum* 5, Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1910, 387. The episode is discussed in Rosenwein, *Anger*, 54.

46 Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, esp. 268–286; Rosenwein, *Anger*, 88–91.

47 “[Ira] trahit rationem a sua rectitudine: unde habet rationem mali. Alio modo consequetur: prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus movetur contra vitia secundum ordinem rationis. Et haec est ira bona: quae dicitur ira per zelum.” Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII*, vols. 4–12, ed. Leonine comission, Rome: Vatican Polyglot Press - Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 1882–1906, vol. 10: *Secunda secundae Summae theologiae: A questione CXXIII ad questionem CLXXXIX*, 272–273, question 158, article 1. The translation is taken from The Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., *The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas in English*, 22 vols., London: Burns Oates and Washburn, 1911–1925, vol. *Second part of the second pars: Questions 141–170*, 192, question 158.

48 Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 6: 295, pars 1–2, question 46, article 5. The English translation is taken from Alfred J. Freddoso, *New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae*, (work in progress) <https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques46.pdf> [last access: 1 November 2020].

49 “Et ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, in quantum excellentiae derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.” Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 6, 301, p. 1–2, question 47, article 2. The translation is taken from Freddoso, *New English Translation*, <https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques47.pdf>

retribution” “in response to something that has been done unjustly.”⁵⁰ However, one must be ever vigilant not to let anger take the over the reins of rational reasoning. Thus, anger can be both evil and good, depending on the circumstances and “the right reason”:

[E]vil is found in a passion in respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise.⁵¹

Thus, the European Late Middle Ages (which shall be roughly delineated here as a period between the 14th and the end of the 15th century) largely appropriated this modified Aristotelian view on anger, seeing it as both a negative and a positive emotion. For example, Dante Alighieri dedicated an entire circle of hell to those overindulgent in anger, dividing those aggressively expressing anger—“muddy people in that bog, all naked and with looks of rage,” “smiting each other not with hand only, but with head and chest and feet, and tearing each other piecemeal with their teeth”—from those who merely harbored it passively—the “sul-len,” submerged under the water “who sigh and make it bubble at the surface.”⁵² At the same time, Dante’s *Paradise* was not devoid of anger: St. Peter himself professes to “often blush and flash with anger” due to the Church’s trafficking in dishonest privileges and he even offends the papacy by calling the bishops of Rome “rapacious wolves in shepherd’s pastures.”⁵³

Moreover, the concept of “just anger” even entered legal terminology, becoming invested with the power to exculpate the culprits—or at least mitigate their sentence—if their deeds were deemed to have been made “in accordance with reason.” Thus, Paolo de Castro (c. 1360–1441), a prominent legal scholar and the author of hundreds of juridical *consilia*, argued that a husband has every right—an obligation even—to attack the man who is having an affair with his wife.

[F]or such insults that he [the lover] was doing [to the husband] [...] it is not customary to launch a complaint in front of the judge other than by base and impotent men

[last access: 1 November 2020].

50 “[I]ra appetit nocumentum alterius, in quantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi: et ideo intantum quaerit vindictam, in quantum videtur esse iusta. Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est iniustum factum: et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub ratione iniusti.” Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 6, 301, p. 1–2, question 47, article 2. The translation is taken from Freddoso, *New English Translation*, <https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques47.pdf> [last access: 1 November 2020].

51 “[I]nvenitur malum in aliqua passione secundum quantitatem ipsius, id est secundum superabundantiam vel defectum ipsius. Et sic potest malum in ira inveniri: quando scilicet aliquis irascitur plus vel minus, praeter rationem rectam. Si autem aliquis irascatur secundum rationem rectam, tunc irasci est laudabile.” Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 10, 272, p. 2–2, question 158, article 1. The English translation is taken from *The “Summa Theologica”*, 191.

52 Dante, *Divine Comedy: Inferno*, trans. Charles S. Singleton, Bollingen Series 80, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, canto VII, lines 109–114 (first citation) and lines 118–120 (second citation), 76 (Italian original), 77 (English translation).

53 Dante, *Divine Comedy: Paradise*, trans. Charles S. Singleton, Bollingen Series 80, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, canto XVII, lines 52–57, 304 (Italian original), 305 (English translation). I have somewhat modified Singleton’s translation who translated the phrase “ond’ io sovente arrosso e disfavillo” as “whereat I often blush and flash.” A better translation is the one provided by Allen Mandelbaum: “for which I often blush and flash with anger.” Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum, Everyman edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, 508. Cf. Rosenwein, *Anger*, 54.

who do not care about the respect of men and the public since, according to popular opinion, great shame could follow from this, seeing that those men who do not take revenge with their own hands, but wait to be avenged by the judge, are considered base and cowardly. Not to mention that even judges do not usually do justice in such cases, but they jeer and scoff and laugh. So, the husband had good cause for not going to the judge, but rebuffing the insult on his own authority.⁵⁴

For Paolo de Castro, such an attack was considered a mandatory defense of one's *excellentia* and it thus constituted a type of anger “deserving of praise” in Thomas Aquinas' words.

The high and late medieval juridical culture, however, also appropriated the other, negative side of anger—*ira*—as a temporary madness. This Seneca-inspired view of anger resulted in insults and attacks made *irato animo* to be treated more mercifully than those done with “a clear head.” For example, Bartolomeo da Saliceto, a famed late medieval Bolognese jurist, supported the legal opinion that offenses committed “out of anger” should be judged more leniently as he conceptualized the emotional state of *iracundia*—especially in the form of a “just indignation”—as a mitigating factor.⁵⁵ This juridical stance, that the penalties for quarrels involving insults and physical violence should be mitigated if the crime was committed by those of “enraged spirit,” found its way into the medieval statutes of Italian communes in the form of a legal syntagm *irato animo*.⁵⁶ This was also the case in Istria where the 15th-century statute of Buzet (Ital. Pinguente) prescribes a punishment of one mark of shillings for a strike launched *irato animo*; for any other strike that does not draw blood, the prescribed punishment is set at two marks of shillings.⁵⁷ Thus, the juridical maxim *iracundia minuit delictum* categorized a crime as spontaneous, “attributable to a sudden impulse of anger,” and not premeditated.⁵⁸ From High Medieval Italy, this juridical stance spread across the Latin Christendom.⁵⁹

54 [D]e talibus iniuriis quales ipse faciebat [...] non solet querela proponi coram iudice nisi per viles homines et impotentes, qui de verecundia penes homines et vulgus non curant cum secundum iudicium vulgarium non parva sequeretur ex hoc verecundia quia reputarentur viles et cornuti qui propriis manibus de talibus se non vindicat sed expectant per iudicem vindicari. Sed nec iudices de talibus solentius reddere, sed truffari et chachinari et ridere. Unde iustam habuit occasionem maritus si ad iudicem non habuit recursum, sed propria auctoritate disposuit iniuriam repellere.” Paolo di Castro, *Consilia sive responsa*, vol. 2, Turin: Eredi Nicolò Bevilacqua, 1580, 133, consilium 277 (192 in older editions). The English translation is partly taken (and slightly modified) from Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 121.

55 “[I]racundia minuit delictum.” Bartolomeo da Sacileto, *Super Digesto veteri*, Lyon: Claude Servain, 1560, 167, chap. De divortii et repudiis. “Iustus dolor movens quem ad delinquendum mitigat poenam.” Bartolomeo da Sacileto, *Lectura super novem libris Codicis*, vol. 4, Frankfurt: Lazarus Zetzner, 1615, col. 961, lectura super nono Codicis: Ad legem Iuliam de adulterio. On the mitigating circumstances in the writings of medieval glossators, see Woldemar Engelmann, *Die Schuldlehre der Postglossatoren und ihre Fortentwicklung: Eine historisch-dogmatische Darstellung der kriminellen Schuldlehre der italienischen Juristen des Mittelalters seit Accursius*, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1895, 112–126, esp. 117 for Bartolomeo da Sacileto.

56 Antonio Pertile, *Storia del diritto italiano dalla caduta dell'Impero Romano alla codificazione*, 2nd ed., vol. 5: *Storia del diritto penale*, Turin: Unione tipografico-editrice, 1892, 147; Tancredi Gatti, *L'imputabilità: I moventi del reato e la prevenzione criminale negli statuti italiani dei secoli XII-XV*, Padua: CEDAM, 1933, 106-120.

57 *Buzetski statut / Statuto di Pinguente*, ed. Nella Lonza and Branka Poropat, Kolana od statuti / Collana degli Statuti 4, Buzet: Humaniora, 2017, 338, article 27 (hereafter: *Statuta Pinguenti*).

58 Matteo Moro, “La repressione dell'ingiuria fra legislazione statutaria e prassi giudiziaria (secoli XIII-XV),” *Bollettino storico vercellese*, 47, 2018, 23.

59 For some examples from German-speaking lands, see Allyson F Creasman, “Fighting Words: Anger, Insult, and “Self-

Naturally, as the difference between the two types of anger lies in whether the (desire for) retribution (*vindicta*) is “justly” provoked or not and whether the retaliation is proportionate to the offense (*parvipensio*), clearly differentiating between what constitutes a *iusta ira* as opposed to the condemnable one was more often than not open for debate and contested.⁶⁰ In any case, in the Middle Ages (and in our present-day) anger was (and remained) a highly polyvalent, complex emotion whose ambiguous status has been spawning fertile soil for debates, litigations and controversies.

Due to its complex and multifaceted nature, Dixon has recently proposed that historians shun the term “anger” altogether as there is no one, universally applicable English word that could cover the vast range of emotions that various cultures across time and space conceptualized with various terms (*orgē, mēnis, ira, furor, Zorn*, etc.). Thus, argues Dixon, “the reification of ‘anger’ as a singular transhistorical emotion should be avoided.”⁶¹ Instead, Dixon proposes a pluralist viewpoint that would focus on various “angers” and their constituent elements: “words, categories, narratives, metaphors, images, moral beliefs, religious attitudes, visual representations, bodily responses, behaviours, public performances, subjective experiences, feelings and testimonies.”⁶² Rosenwein took issue with Dixon’s approach and criticized him decontextualizing a complex emotion such as anger—“Dixon’s method tends to reify the components themselves, snatching them from their lived environment,” argued the medievalist.⁶³ Thus, Rosenwein does not see a problem in discussing “anger”—in singular—from a pluralistic perspective, advocating to approach the topic of anger “by looking at it as an integrated whole of attitudes, behaviours and uses” that can be—both synchronically as well as diachronically—multifarious and discrepant.⁶⁴ The fact that medieval ecclesiastics fostered two diametrically opposite views on anger—as a deadly sin and simultaneously as a just reaction aimed at upholding God’s laws—all the while using only the term *ira* further corroborates this point.⁶⁵

Help” in Early Modern German Law,” *Journal of Social History*, 51/2, 2017, 272–292, esp. 283; Susanne Pohl-Zucker, “Hot Anger and Just Indignation: Justificatory Strategies in Early Modern German Homicide Trials,” in *Emotion, Violence, Vengeance and Law in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of William Ian Miller*, ed. Kate Gilbert and Stephen D. White, *Medieval Law and Its Practice* 24, Leiden: Brill, 2018, 25–48, esp. 29–31. For England, see Elizabeth Papp Kamali, *Felony and the Guilty Mind in Medieval England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 93–122, esp. 108.

60 Cf. Thomas Aquinas’ definition of anger: “ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi” which Freddoso translates as “anger is a desire to harm another under the concept just retribution.” Aquinas; Freddoso, Q 47, <http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques47.pdf> [last access: 1 November 2020].

61 Thomas Dixon, “What is the History of Anger a History of?,” *Emotions: History, Culture, Society*, 4, 2020, 1–34, esp. 27 (quotation) and 28 where the author summarizes his conclusion that “[t]here have been multiple languages of furious feeling, concepts of vengeance and passion, and conventions of enraged facial and bodily performance, all of which form part of a complex and plural ancestry for our modern emotional lives.”

62 Dixon, “What is the History,” 31.

63 Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Angers Past and Present,” *Emotions: History, Culture, Society*, 4, 2020, 35–38, here 36.

64 Rosenwein, “Angers Past,” 38.

65 Rosenwein, “Angers Past,” 38.

Case Study: Late Medieval Venetian Istria

As evident from this brief historiographical outline, the previously narrated episode of interpersonal violence channeled through a public performance of anger becomes a premium grist for the historian's mill.⁶⁶ As there is no study dedicated to the emotional discourse of anger in premodern Istria, the present contribution aims to illuminate the role and position of this polyvalent emotion within the emotional communities of this peninsula during the Late Middle Ages by investigating a number of episodes similar to the brawl between Martin and Christopher. Unfortunately, even though Istria was jurisdictionally divided during this very period between a Venetian and Austrian territory, the quantity and quality of surviving primary sources does not allow for such an investigation of the societies subjected to House Habsburg.⁶⁷ Thus, all the case studies come from the towns and cities subjected to the *Dominium Veneciarum*. Various episodes of violent outbursts catalyzed through (the performance of) anger are featured in the registers of the chanceries of Istrian rectors, the so-called acts of the podestàs (orig. Lat. *acta potestatis*, Ital. *atti del podestà*). These officials were elected in Venice by the Great Council from among the Venetian nobility and delegated to urban communities subjected to the *Serenissima* for a fixed term (usually twelve, sixteen or twenty-four months) with the main task of preserving the peace and promoting both the interests of the capital as well as the well-being of the communities entrusted to their management, primarily through the administration of justice.⁶⁸ It must be noted that the Venetian delegated rectors were not university trained lawyers; they administered justice according to the communal statutes and, most importantly, "according to their good conscience."⁶⁹

66 The metaphor is shamelessly borrowed from Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods," 17.

67 For the territories subjected to the (arch)dukes of Austria in Istria—inherited from Count Albert III of Gorizia in 1374—see Camillo de Franceschi, *Storia documentata della Contea di Pisino*, ed. Carlo de Franceschi, Venice: Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria, 1964, 35–43 and 390–391, doc. 7. Following the Venetian takeover of the Patriarchate of Aquileia in 1420–1421, the Peninsula was effectively divided between Venice and the House of Habsburg. See Josip Banić, "The Venetian Takeover of the Margraviate of Istria: The Modality of a Passage (with Eight Previously Unedited Documents in the Appendix)," *History in Flux*, 1, 2019, 41–77, esp. 70–71 for the jurisdictional map of Istria.

68 With the notable exception of Friuli, this was standard Venetian practice in all their subject centers. On Venetian delegated rectors, see Alfredo Viggiano, "Aspetti politici e giurisdizionali dell'attività dei rettori veneziani nello Stato da terra del Quattrocento," *Società e Storia*, 65, 1994, 473–505 (for the *Terraferma*); Gian Maria Varanini, "Gli ufficiali veneziani nella Terraferma veneta quattrocentesca," *Annali della Scuola normale superiore di Pisa: Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*, ser. IV: Quaderni: *Gli ufficiali negli stati italiani del Quattrocento*, 3, 1997, 155–180; Monique O'Connell, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, 2–3, 39–56 (focuses exclusively on the *Stato da Mar*, excluding Istria); Benjamin Arbel, "Venice's Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period," in *A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797*, ed. Eric R. Dursteler, Leiden: Brill, 2013, 146–150; Orlando, *Altre Venezie*, 161–177 (for the Venetian Dogado); Ermanno Orlando, *Strutture e pratiche di una comunità urbana: Spalato, 1420–1479*, *Schriften zur Balkanforschung* 2, Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti – Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2019, 235–241 (for the Venetian Dalmatia; note that in many Dalmatian communities, like Split for example, the rector was not called podestà, but count). For the term of office of Istrian rectors delegated by Venice, see Alessandra Rizzi, ed., *Le commissioni ducali ai rettori d'Istria (1382–1547)*, Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie: Testi 3, Rome: Viella, 2017, esp. 121 for Poreč (serving a term of 12 months), 77, n. 71 for Piran (serving a term of 16 months), 107, n. 177 for Novigrad (serving a term of 16 months), 137 for Rovinj (serving a term of 16 months). The podestà of Buzet originally served a term of four years; see Banić, "The Venetian Takeover," 67–68, doc. 6.

69 Varanini, "Gli ufficiali veneziani," 162. See for example, the ducal instructions to the podestà of Poreč regarding the administration of justice: "Omni autem a te querenti, rationem facies secundum usum dicte terre, et ubi usus tibi defecerit

The books of Istrian rectors, however, are preserved very partially for the medieval period. With the exception of Koper (Ital. Capodistria) whose archive was unavailable for consultation until very recently, the only surviving acts of Istrian podestàs before the 16th century are those of Poreč (1444–1446), Rovinj (Ital. Rovigno) (1433–1434), Buzet (1457–1462), and Novigrad (Ital. Cittanova) (1492–1493).⁷⁰ It must be noted that neither of these four places, two of which—Poreč and Novigrad—the seats of bishops and thus cities proper in the medieval sense of the word (Lat. *civitates*), were particularly populous when compared to their central and northern Italian counterparts: Poreč is estimated to have had between 2000 and 2500 inhabitants in the second half of the 15th century, Rovinj around 1200, Novigrad between 600 and 900 (but around 1200 if its entire district is included), and Buzet between 500 and 700.⁷¹ Although these books are few and the urban centers they deal with are small, they nonetheless make for excellent primary sources, providing an unparalleled insight into the public performance of anger and its reception in the respective Istrian communities. The numerous court cases featured in these acts usually cover the entire judicial process: from the accusation or denunciation, to the defense of the accused, the testimonies of witnesses, and, finally, concluding with the official verdict of the delegated podestà.⁷² The

dices secundum bonam conscientiam et iudicabis.” Rizzi, *Le commisioni*, 122.

70 Besides the already cited acts of the podestà of Poreč Matteo Gradonico that cover the period between 1445 and 1446, featuring 93 verdicts in *criminalibus*, a large part of them with the accompanying accusation, defense and witness testimonies, these are the other surviving *acta potestatum Istrie* from the Middle Ages (up to 1500): the oldest is the book of acts of the podestà or Rovinj Lorenzo Zane from 1433–1434 that is, unfortunately, preserved very fragmentarily, containing but 11 verdicts, again not all of them accompanied with the corresponding accusations, defenses and witness testimonies; Hrvatski državni arhiv u Rijeci [The Croatian State Archives in Rijeka] (hereafter: HR-DARI), JU-95: Općina Rovinj [the Commune of Rovinj], box 1: *Volumetto nobil uomo ser Lorenzo Zane podesta di Rovigno negli anni 1433 e 1434* (hereafter: *Acta potestatis Rubinii*); fragmentarily preserved, but containing 57 court cases of which 55 featured together with all the processual minutes—accusation, defense, testimonies—is the book of acts of the podestà of Buzet Simone Ferro covering the period from 1457 to 1462; HR-DARI, JU-67: Općina Buzet [the Commune of Buzet], box 2: *Atti del cancelliere del Comune del Pinguente Giovanni Niccolò del fu Christoforo de Oderzo, 1457–1462* (fascicles 6 through 9 contain accusations, denunciations, defenses and testimonies; hereafter: *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*) and box 4: *Sudske presude koje je izrekao buzetski podestat Simon Ferro 1462* [judicial verdicts promulgated by the podestà of Buzet Simone Ferro in 1462] (the title is wrong as the verdicts cover the same period as those in box 2, that is from 1457 to 1462; these sentences once formed part of the same book of acts, but were at some point separated and stored in different boxes; hereafter: *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 2*); finally, the acts of the podestà of Novigrad Lorenzo Zane are preserved in 874 folios of paper in 33 fascicles of which fascicles 30–32 contain criminal processes, but, highly unfortunately, without the podestà's final verdicts; HR-DAPA-4: Općina Novigrad [the Commune of Novigrad], box 1: *Acta cancellariae Emoniae, 1492–1494* (hereafter: *Acta potestatis Emonie*). The archive of the Commune of Koper was unavailable for consultation ever since the Second World War when it had been transferred from Koper to Trieste and then to the Biblioteca Marciana in Venice. It was only recently that the archive transferred to State Archive in Venice (*Archivio di Stato di Venezia*), but it was not immediately freely available for consultation. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic has made it impossible to consult the seven surviving volumes of the acts of the podestàs of Koper for this particular study, a detriment that shall be rectified in the near future in a respective contribution. Raffaele Santoro, “L'Archivio antico di Capodistria all'Archivio di Stato di Venezia,” conference paper delivered in Venice at the 6th international conference *Venezia e il suo Stato da mar / Venice and its Stato da mar*, 22–24 February 2018.

71 Egidio Ivetic, *La popolazione dell'Istria nell'età moderna: Lineamenti evolutivi*, Collana degli atti 15, Rovinj: Centro di ricerche storiche Rovigno, 1997, 68–72. For a comparison with Italian cities, see Maria Ginatempo and Lucia Sandri, *L'Italia delle città: Il popolamento urbano tra Medioevo e Rinascimento (secoli XIII–XVI)*, Florence: Le Lettere, 1990, esp. 92–93 for the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region and 95–102.

72 Thus, they contain all the phases of the official judicial process of the era (barring appeals that were recorded by the Venetian appellate jurisdictions). On the judicial process in the High and Late Middle Ages that was practiced in the central and northern Italy, including Venice and its subjects in Istria, see Elena Maffei, *Dal reato alla sentenza: Il processo*

books of the *cathaveri* of Piran can be added to this collection, even though the criminal offences featured in these books cover only serious injuries and feature only the sentence of the delegated rector, without the entire judicial proceeding.⁷³ Due to the nature of the primary sources, not only the aspects of ritualized public performances of anger may be investigated, but also its treatment by the Venetian-delegated rectors.

The present study aims to investigate the performances of anger through Rosenwein's conceptual lenses on a number of case studies drawn from the cities and towns of Istrian peninsula during the late Middle Ages.⁷⁴ Rosenwein's approach will also be favored over Dixon's and the emotion under scrutiny will be regularly translated as "anger", all the while bearing in mind the various contexts in which it is performed and evaluated. Specifically, the contribution aims to uncover the social catalysts that triggered anger and angry behavior, the modalities of performances of this emotion, its reception and evaluation by the local inhabitants of Istrian towns and cities, as well as by their respective delegated rectors in charge of administering justice. It therefore endeavors to offer an insight into two mutually complementary dimensions of emotional communities of late medieval Venetian Adriatic: the emotional discourse of local populace who performed anger as a "socially shaped response to events that [were] socially defined as significant;" as well as its reception and (re) evaluation by the Venetian authorities tasked with the preservation of peace, who had to assess and adjudicate these potentially dangerous performances.⁷⁵ As such, the study offers a unique insight into the "conflicted history" of anger from the viewpoint of late medieval "lost peoples of Europe" subjected to a paragon of the so-called "jurisdictional states" of the European *Quattrocento*—the Republic of Venice.⁷⁶

criminale in età comunale, Polus: Fonti medievali italiane 1, Rome, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2005, 71–74 (types of processes: *per accusationem* and *per inquisitionem*), 77–79 (accusations), 82–84 (inquisitorial processes) 95–101 (testimonies and investigations), 123–131 (verdict); Massimo Vallerani, *Medieval Public Justice*, trans. Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Canon Law 9, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012, 73–113; Orlando, *Strutture e pratiche*, 258–263.

73 Pokrajinski arhiv Koper [Regional archive of Koper], SI PAK PI 9: Komuna Piran [the Commune of Piran], *Libri cathaveriorum*, 13 vols., 1354–1534 (hereafter: *LC*). The officials elected by the communal council of Piran to serve as *cathaveri* were responsible, among other things, for the collection of debts owed to the commune. Camillo De Franceschi, *Origini e sviluppo del Comune di Pirano*, Poreč: Gaetano Coana, 1924, 48.

74 Since the publication of *Emotional Communities*, the field of the history of emotions has grown considerably as has the number of analytical concepts and viable methodological approaches to the topic. The most comprehensive overview of the current approaches to the history of emotions is Rüdiger Schnell, *Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte? Aporien einer History of Emotions*, 2 vols., Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2015, esp. 1: 259–405 (overview of main trends in scholarship up to 2011), 506–508 (on Rosenwein's "emotional communities" approach). See also, Barbara H. Rosenwein and Riccardo Cristiani, *What is the History of Emotions? What is History?*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018; Plamper, *The History of Emotions*, esp. 67–74 for Rosenwein's approach.

75 The quotation comes from Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, 14.

76 The syntagm "lost peoples of Europe" was coined and used by Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero as the title of a monograph featuring seminal publications written within the microhistorical paradigm. The title echoes microhistorical methodology of focusing on the non-elite strata of societies, the everyday "small" peoples whose fates are lost in traditional historical analyses. Edward Muir, "Introduction: Observing Trifles," in *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe*, ed. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, vii–xxviii. The concept of the "jurisdictional states" (Ital. *stati giurisdizionali*) stems from the notion of "composite states" as delineated by John H. Elliott in his classic study "A Europe of Composite Monarchies" published in *Past & Present*, 137, 1992, 48–71. The best

Anger's Stage: The Rituals of Confrontation

Returning to the brawl between Martin and Christopher that took place throughout the public space of Poreč—underneath the civic loggia and across its streets—several important aspects come to light when the entire episode is inspected through the analytical lenses of the contemporary history of emotions and compared with other similar cases of everyday violence. Namely, the entire episode can be broken down into several “acts” of a scripted play, a “ritual of confrontation” that guided the performance of anger. This play, performed across the communities of premodern Europe, was famously elaborated by Claude Gauvard, Charles Vevers Phythian-Adams and Rainer Walz, historians working on late medieval French, English and German primary sources respectively.⁷⁷ According to these historians, “modes of physical signalling” were embedded in “a well-defined and highly formalized code containing an exaggeratedly wide-ranging symbolic vocabulary.”⁷⁸ Inscribed within this code of conduct was also the ritual of confrontation: a “fairly regular and oft-repeated sequence of definable phases as each situation escalates.”⁷⁹

This “sequence” begins with a provocation—an interlude that sets off the entire play—continues with the verbal threats, insults and taunts; finally, in some cases, the sequence escalates to the third phase: actual physical violence performed not to injure or kill—even when weapons were drawn, one would usually attack with the pommel, not the blade of the sword—but to invite external intervention through which the performers are separated and the sequence ends.⁸⁰ The entire “ritual of confrontation”, concludes Phythian-Adams, “represented the institutionalization of acceptable physical and, indeed, verbal violence” that served the purpose of regulating and constraining the acts of upholding and defending one’s honor.⁸¹

Similarly to Phythian-Adams but with a greater stress on the notion of honor, Walz elaborated his concept of “agonal communication”—a shared system of interplay in which “every interactant fearfully tried to defend his or her honor and mistrustfully gauged each utterance and action of others for possible assaults to that honor.”⁸² Here Walz echoed the sentiment of Gauvard, who dedicated ample attention to the notion of honor opening the chapter on interpersonal violence with the statement: “honor is at the heart of violence.”⁸³

treatment of the concept of jurisdictional states is Maurizio Fioravanti, “Stato e costituzione,” in *Lo Stato moderno in Europa*, ed. Maurizio Fioravanti, Bari, Laterza, 2002, 3–36, esp. 8–9 for the definition.

77 Claude Gauvard, *De Grace especial: Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age*, vol. 2, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991, 707–745; Charles V. Phythian-Adams, “Rituals of Personal Confrontation in Late Medieval England,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 73, 1991, 65–90; Rainer Walz, “Agonale Kommunikation im Dorf der Frühen Neuzeit,” *Westfälische Forschungen*, 42, 1992, 215–251.

78 Phythian-Adams, “Rituals,” 72.

79 Phythian-Adams, “Rituals,” 76.

80 Gauvard, *De Grace especial*, 707–719; Phythian-Adams, “Rituals,” 78–84.

81 Phythian-Adams, “Rituals,” 80, 82, 88, 90 (quotation).

82 Walz, “Agonale Communication,” 232–235; Gerd Schwerhoff, “The Dark Side of Community: Early Modern German Witch Hunts,” in *Potency of the Common: Intercultural Perspectives about Community and Individuality*, ed. Gert Melville and Carlos Ruta, Challenges of Life: Essays on Philosophical and Cultural Anthropology 3, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016, 215 (from where the quotation is taken).

83 “L’honneur est au coeur de la violence.” Gauvard, *De Grace especial*, 705.

Thus, all three historians conceptualized the episodes of interpersonal violence as scripted performances and influenced a generation of scholars working on the history of violence and criminality, in the ambit of late medieval and Early Modern Europe most notably Trevor Dean and Gerd Schwerhoff, the former focusing on Italian, the latter on German urban societies.⁸⁴ Equally importantly, however, Gauvard, Phythian-Adams and Walz, as well as their followers, posit the concept of honor as a seminal factor in their analytical approaches, a notion that is intimately interconnected with anger.

The classic scholarly treatment of the complex notion of honor was famously penned by the renowned British anthropologist Julian Alfred Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers: “honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.”⁸⁵ As such, convincingly argues Pitt-Rivers, honor can be lost and gained, challenged and vindicated; this discourse of honor permeates, to a greater or lesser degree, all cases of interpersonal violence as any such conflict may be interpreted as ultimately stemming from one’s obligation to defend/uphold their honor.⁸⁶ In the words of Schwerhoff, “a central function of the semantics of honour,” is its ability to “homogenize the heterogeneous motives by translating them into a common language.”⁸⁷ Honor can thus be easily likened to Thomas Aquinas’ notion of excellence.⁸⁸ Moreover, the notion of honor is intimately linked with the medieval concept of *fama* in its narrow meaning of personal reputation—“the public talk that continually adjusts honor and assigns rank of standing” to an individual.⁸⁹ The “law of honor” is therefore an obligatory backdrop against which all the performances of anger and rituals of confrontations are set upon.⁹⁰

84 Trevor Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 168–181; Gerd Schwerhoff, “Social Control of Violence, Violence as Social Control: The Case of Early Modern Germany,” in *Social Control in Europe*, vol. 1: 1500–1800, ed. Herman Roodenburg and Pieter Spierenburg, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2004, 220–246. See also, Sharon T. Strocchia, “Gender and the Rites of Honour in Italian Renaissance Cities,” in *Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy*, ed. Judith C. Brown and Robert C. Davis, London: Longman, 1998, 52–60.

85 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. Jean G. Peristiany, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965, 21.

86 Pitt-Rivers, “Honour,” 29; Gauvard, “*De Grace especial*,” 705–706, positing honor as the origin on violence: “L’honneur est donc un bien qui doit être âprement défendu. Quand il ne peut plus être ni respecté ni reconnu, la situation devient conflictuelle. Nous sommes là aux origines de la violence et du crime;” quotation on 706). Claudio Povolo likens honor to “a deeply buried nerve that animated conflicts.” Claudio Povolo, “Liturgies of Violence: Social Control and Power Relationships in the Republic of Venice between the 16th and 18th Centuries,” in *A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797*, ed. Eric R. Dursteler, Leiden: Brill, 2013, 518.

87 Schwerhoff, “Social Control,” 234.

88 For a discussion of Thomas’ concept of excellence, see also Jan Rippentrop Schnell and Diana Fritz Cates, “Rethinking Anger as a Desire for Payback: A Modified Thomistic View,” *Religions*, 10, 2019, 11–14.

89 The medieval term *fama* was highly polysemic. Beside the meaning given above, it could also refer to “rumor,” “idle talk,” and “memories.” On the concept of *fama* see, Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, “Introduction,” in *Fama: The Politics of Talk in Medieval Europe*, ed. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, 1–8, esp. 3–4 for its connection to honor (and for the quotation) and 10 where the connection between *fama* and honor in medieval Italy is most explicitly made: “The most common terms, not wholly equivalent to *fama*, are *onore*, *onestà*, and the like. To say that he is a man of honor (*uomo d’onore*) is saying that he has good *fama*.”

90 Penetrating analyses of the role of honor in animating violent conflicts are featured in Claudio Povolo, *L’Intrigo dell’Onore: Poteri e istituzioni nella Repubblica di Venezia tra Cinque e Seicento*, Verona: Cierre, 1997, esp. 355–412. On honor more

Although neither of the above-introduced historians operated within the field of the history of emotions, their methodologies nonetheless present highly potent analytical trajectories for inquiries into the emotional communities and, more specifically, the performances of anger. The main reason behind this harmonious overlap between the two scholarly paradigms lies in the fact that both the historians of emotions as well as the social historians studying everyday violence approach the phenomena of interpersonal conflicts as scripted performances acted out according to socially determined systems of values and norms. Moreover, as an emotion catalyzed and molded within these societal structures, anger is inextricably tied to the notion of honor—an interpersonal, socially constructed system of prerogatives to respect and social positions—that sets off and catalyzes its performances. Finally, the principal heuristic potential of appropriating the “ritual of confrontation” as an analytical tool in the context of this study is twofold: on the one hand the concept allows for an intuitive classification of the various patterned performances of anger based on the completion of the respective acts of the play, while on the other it serves to categorize the verdicts of Venetian rectors based on this systematization.

Act 1: Overture

The performance of anger in the ritual of confrontation regularly begins with an “overture”—an act that is decoded by one of the actors as harmful to their social standing, as injuring their honor. In Aquinas’ words, this opening act would be played out by the *parvipensio* directed against one’s *excellentia*. This overture can take many forms: it can be actualized in the form of an immediate verbal or physical action such as an utterance deemed offensive or a physical action like a slight push or the grabbing of one’s arm. In these cases, the overture will catalyze the conflict to the next stage more easily if performed in a public setting where one’s injury of social standing can be perceived by a larger audience—streets, squares and, most prominently, taverns.⁹¹ In the presented case from 15th-century Poreč, the overture was the public disclosure of each other’s debts on a civic square. This type of overture based on one’s financial standing—most often in the form of public proclamation of one’s debts, especially if the money is owed to one of the participants of the play—is a very common theme.⁹² For example, a Blaise Pasqualini confronted a Paschal de Semo and his wife Ursa in the tavern of Bastian the Slav in Rovinj, asking them when they would settle their debts toward him for the shoes he had bought for them in Vodnjan. The couple

generally, see also Frank H. Stewart, “What Is Honor?,” *Acta Histriae*, 9, 2000, 13–28; James R. Farr, “Honor, Law, and Custom in Renaissance Europe,” in *A Companion to the Worlds of the Renaissance*, ed. Guido Ruggiero, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, 124–138.

91 Schwerhoff, “Social Control,” 229; Ravančić, “Rhythm of Crime,” 92.

92 E.g., Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 168; Strocchia, “Gender,” 53. On economic reputation as an important and integral part of one’s *fama* in late medieval Italy, see Giacomo Todeschini, “La reputazione economica come fattore di cittadinanza nell’Italia dei secoli XIV-XV,” in *Fama e publica vox nel medioevo. Atti del convegno di studio svoltosi in occasione della XXI edizione del Premio internazionale Ascoli Piceno (Ascoli Piceno, Palazzo dei Capitani, 3-5 dicembre 2009)*, ed. Isa Lori Sanfilippo and Antonio Rigon, Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 2011, 105–118.

retaliated with insults and a tavern brawl soon broke out.⁹³ In Poreč, a Iuri Sabac publicly spoke how Nicholas Mozal owed him money, prompting the very Nicholas, who overheard these words from his balcony, to storm off into the street and aggressively confront the slanderer.⁹⁴

Other common themes of these overtures include various rights to pastures and the usufruct of land. These are often motivated by damages committed to one's fields by unknown perpetrators, and the actors go on to deduce the potential culprit on their own. For example, a Julian de Sisto went to inspect the damages incurred on his vineyards in Pical in the district of Poreč where he was accompanied by a Preto Peio and Andrew from Pical, the duo that at the time served as the communal estimators.⁹⁵ When he was confronted with the fact that nobody had seen the perpetrators, Julian's frustration grew: "You lie in your throat that you did not find anybody! And I want you to pay me out of spite toward those who put you in this office!"—at least these are the words that Preto put in his mouth.⁹⁶ Naturally, a brawl broke out immediately after. Other examples include the rights to pasture when two actors meet on the same field. For example, a Thero de Maure and Marin from Beram met on the pastures in the district of Rovinj, the former bringing his sheep, the latter his cows. At one point, Marin shooed Thero's cows to make way for his sheep to leave the field. This action, whereby Marin dared to command his cows, greatly infuriated Thero and the ritual of confrontation started that very instant.⁹⁷

The most common setting for this overture, however, is a tavern or its immediate vicinity—"prime location where masculinity was asserted and tested."⁹⁸ There, even a slight physical contact, let alone an utterance that could be interpreted as *parvipensio*, could rapidly lead to the initiation of the ritual of conflict. In the tavern of Tonse Drasich in Buzet, George the draper asked George Rubeus to give him a jug of wine that he was holding in his hands, believing it to be his; Rubeus replied that the jug, as a matter of fact, was not his.⁹⁹ Punches began raining down soon thereafter. In Novigrad, Martin from Ljubljana bought a one shilling worth of wine in the tavern of Mark Gingaro and placed it on his table. Moments later, Stephen Bresano entered the tavern, sat at Martin's table and asked him to make a little bit of space by moving his jug of wine. This request was obviously deemed inappropriate and Martin retaliated by spilling the wine on Stephen's woolen shoes. The retaliation was quick to follow and the ritual of conflict was quickly propelled to its final

93 *Acta potestatis Rubini*, 63r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 2 in the appendix.

94 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 272v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 3 in the appendix.

95 On the communal estimators (orig. Lat. *extimatores communis, officio extimarie*) in Poreč, see *Statut grada Poreča (statutum comunis Parentii) iz 1363. godine* [The statute of the city of Poreč (statutum comunis Parentii) from the year 1363], ed. Mirko Zjačić, Monumenta historico-iuridica slavorum meridionalium 18, Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1979, 41–43, book 1, article 16 (hereafter: *Statuta Parentii*).

96 "Tu menti per la gola che tu ebi trova nessun! E voio che tu me pagi al despeto de chi t'a messo in questo offitio!" *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 269v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 4 in the appendix.

97 *Acta potestatis Rubini*, fol. 57v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 5 in the appendix.

98 Dean, *Crime in Medieval*, 23.

99 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 139r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 6 in the appendix.

phase.¹⁰⁰ That this apparent oversensitivity to insults might be a consequence of overindulgence in alcoholic beverages is definitely a very sound hypothesis.¹⁰¹

Taverns were also the privileged spaces for games of dice and cards where men gambled for wine and money—a perfect setting for the performance of the confrontation play. For example, Gregory from Roč (Ital. Rozzo) and Pause Traskanovich were playing cards for money in the tavern of Simon Slamnich in Buzet. At one point, Gregory believed he had won the game whereas Pause thought they had played to a draw. When Gregory tried to put his hand on the money the overture was officially over and violence commenced in full force.¹⁰² A much graver fight took place in the tavern of Martin of Voldrich in Rovinj where men gambled for wine. At one point, Nicholas of Philip demanded that Bastian the Slav pay him his due by relinquishing a bottle of wine that he had apparently lost; Bastian was very reluctant to do so, but Nicholas insisted, prompting the loser of the round to decode this behavior as an overture to a conflict. As Bastian reached for his knife, Nicholas retaliated by quickly picking up a rock. The opening acts of the play soon progressed into violence that ended with a broken orbital bone.¹⁰³ Finally, a unique conflict took place in Poreč during the game of dice that involved Jacob from Senj and Simon called De Iuanci. The men gambled for money and wine until Simon attempted to snatch two shillings from Jacob. The two men quickly began arguing and Simon—“moved by anger”—unsheathed a bread knife and sliced Jacob under the throat.¹⁰⁴ In his defense, Simon simply stated that they had both been drunk.¹⁰⁵ The episode is unusual because it did not take place in a public setting, but inside a private house where the two players gambled alone by themselves. Nonetheless, it illustrates nicely how the effects of gambling catalyzed through alcoholic intoxication animated anger-fueled violence.

There are many more examples of tavern brawls and gambling games gone awry such as these, but the cases presented here demonstrate convincingly enough that *taberne*, especially in conjunction with gambling, were indeed the preferred stages for such performances of anger.¹⁰⁶

Finally, it must be noted that there are other types of overtures: those that are not triggered by immediate actions, but by past events that merely catalyze into the ritual of confrontation when the individuals meet in a public setting. The motives behind such overtures are usually difficult to decipher as the judicial records do not explicate them in any

100 *Acta potestatis Emonie*, fol. 691v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 7 in the appendix.

101 Gauvard, “*De Grace especial*”, 714; Schwerhoff, “Social Control,” 229.

102 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 167v–168r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 8 in the appendix.

103 *Acta potestatis Rubini*, fol. 59v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 9 in the appendix.

104 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 243r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 10 in the appendix.

105 “Constitutii ambo in cancellaria confessi fuerunt ad invicem se percuisse quia erant ebrii.” Case 10 in the appendix.

106 For more such examples from the medieval Venetian Dogado, see Gherardo Ortalli, “Il giudice e la taverna: Momenti ludici in una piccola comunità lagunare (Lio Maggiore nel secolo XIV),” in *Gioco e giustizia nell’Italia di Comune*, ed. Gherardo Ortalli, Ludica: Collana di storia del gioco 1, Rome: Viella, 1993, 49–70.

detail—they are “hidden transcripts” in James C. Scott’s meaning of the term.¹⁰⁷ For example, Bartholomew the tanner verbally attacked friar Anthony, the schoolmaster in Poreč, calling him a renegade Franciscan, a rotten rogue, accusing him that instead of teaching the children, he makes them clean his house and he even threatened to hit him.¹⁰⁸ The judicial transcripts do not reveal the reason behind this altercation, but a witness testimonial uncovers that the two men had a history back in Piran: “You do not know him as I do back in Piran” said Bartholomew to Jacob de Facina.¹⁰⁹ The podestà’s chancellery, however, decided not to delve further into their backstory, or at least not to officially record it. Another example comes from the public square of Buzet where Maticus Margonich charged at Leonard from Carnia, carrying a rock and flailing a short sword while screaming “Furlan! Rogue! I will teach you now since you are here!”¹¹⁰ Nothing more is recorded and their prior dealings that obviously frustrated Maticus to the point where he wanted to beat Leonard remain unknown.

Although the backstories to these conflicts will remain shrouded in mystery, they nonetheless reveal that a play of anger-fueled conflict could also be triggered by long lasting, harbored grudges that jumpstart the entire ritual when the actors cross paths in the appropriate, public setting.

Act 2: Indirect violence

Following this prelude, the confrontation reaches the stage of the so-called “indirect violence:” insults and intimidations such as the clenching of fists or the drawing of weapons. For Martin and Christopher, this part of the play was enacted through the insults of calling each other liars by way of a standard phrase “you lie in your throat,” followed by yet another typical curse of “may you shit blood a hundred times.” This phase of the ritual ended as Martin attempted to slap his adversary, prompting Christopher to unsheathe a weapon—a “central threatening gesture in the dramaturgy of a conflict.”¹¹¹

The vocabulary of this second act has occupied the attention of historians for decades, generating a rich bibliography on the topic of verbal insults and the so-called “fighting words.”¹¹² Contextualized more broadly, Istrian examples conform to the patterns found

107 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 3–5 and 27 where the concept of hidden transcript is defined as “discourse-gesture, speech, practices—that is ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of subordinates by the exercise of power.” See also, Tomislav Popić, *Krojenje pravde: Zadarsko sudstvo u srednjem vijeku (1358. – 1458.)* [Tailoring justice: Zadar’s judiciary in the Middle Ages (1358–1458)], Zagreb: Plejada, 2014, 27–32 for an exemplary application of Scott’s concepts to medieval justice administration, in this case, the civil court of Zadar.

108 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 263r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 11 in the appendix.

109 “Tu non lo cognosi como lo cognoso mi a Piran.” Case 11 in the appendix.

110 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 147v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 12 in the appendix.

111 Schwerhoff, “Social Control,” 230.

112 The following is not an exhaustive bibliography on the topic, but a selection based on the author’s discretion. Peter Burke, “Insult and Blasphemy in Early Modern Italy,” in *The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 95–109; Daniel R. Lesnick, “Insults and Threats in Medieval Todi,” *Journal of Medieval History*, 17, 1991, 17–89; Claude Gauvard, “Conclusion,” *Atalaya 5: L’Invective au*

elsewhere in Latin Christendom during the same period: men insulted other men by attacking their courage and honesty whereas women resorted to insults pertaining to sexual morality—the attacks were thus directed at the seminal aspects of one’s honor, gendered as it was.¹¹³ The most common insult that would regularly open act two of the performance was the accusation of lying. It has already been demonstrated how it escalated the conflict between Martin and Christopher on the streets of Poreč, between Blaise and Paschal in the tavern of Rovinj, and between Iulian and the communal estimators of Poreč in Pical, but similar cases are a multitude in the analyzed documentation.¹¹⁴ Regularly, the phrase used for accusing someone of lying was the standard “you lie in your throat” expression.¹¹⁵ This is also the most common “opener” of the new phase of the conflict in the cases studied by Gauvard, Lesnick and Dean.¹¹⁶

Other common insults among men featured invectives damaging one’s courage, the most prominent of which being “coward” (orig. *poltron*) and “traitor” (orig. *traditor* or *proditor*).¹¹⁷ Another regularly appearing insult in this context is “rogue” or “scoundrel” (orig. *ribaldo*) and “bastard” (orig. *bastardo*).¹¹⁸ Finally, men preferred to insult one another by attacking each other’s sexual prowess or the sexual conduct of their female family members: “cuckold” (orig. *becco*) and other allegations of cuckoldry are also prominent in the studies of primary sources as well as “son of a whore” (orig. *fiol de putana*).¹¹⁹ For example, two sailors, Benedict Sacerna and Peter Scarpa, met underneath the loggia by the coast of Poreč (the very same place where the altercation between Martin and Christopher began). Unfortunately, the precise overture to this play cannot be determined, but the two men knew each other as both worked as helmsmen (orig. *pedoti*) and they both initially sat next to each other to share a meal. Even though the exact trigger of the conflict is not recorded, act two of the play commenced with Benedict calling Peter “a great cuckold because men

Moyen Âge: France, Espagne, Italie, 1995, 249–258; Gauvard, “*De Grace especial*,” 715–734; Strocchia, “Gender,” 53–60; Sandy Bardsley, “Sin, Speech, and Scolding in Late Medieval England,” in *Fama*, 145–163; Trevor Dean, “Gender and Insult in an Italian City: Bologna in the Later Middle Ages,” *Social History*, 29/2, 2004, 217–231; Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 113–134; Nicole Gonthier, *Sanglant Coupaul! Orde Ribaude! Les injures au Moyen Âge*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007; Elizabeth Horodowich, *Language and Statecraft in Early Modern Venice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 91–125; Vručina, “Uvreda i fama,” 43–58.

113 The literature on masculine and feminine honor is also abundant. A concise and penetrative analysis, based on case studies drawn from Early Modern Venetian *Terraferma*, is featured in Povolò, *L'intrigo*, 356–362 for women and 362–374 for men.

114 See cases 1, 2, 4, 6, 15 and 19 in the appendix.

115 Patoto argues that the phrase “significava accusarlo di mentire attraverso l’organo che, per metonimia, indicava uno dei sette vizi capitali, era stato il primo peccato dell’uomo ed era, anche per il senso comune, la quintessenza stessa della mancanza di misura e controllo.” Patoto, “Mentire,” 168–169.

116 Gauvard, “*De Grace especial*,” 717; Lesnick, “Insults,” 77; Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 114 and 116 for a vivid example of the insult at work. See also Vručina, “Uvreda i fama,” 50.

117 For “poltron” see cases 7 and 20 in the appendix. For “traitor,” *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 264v, reporting how a John from Vrsar screamed after Mathew and John from Hum “Ei traditor! Tu ha assassina mio fio!” On the insult “traitor,” see also Lauro Martines, “Ritual Language in Renaissance Italy,” in *Riti e rituali nelle società medievali*, ed. Jacques Chiffolleau, Lauro Martines, and Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’Alto Medioevo, 1994, 60–61.

118 For “ribaldo,” see cases 11, 12 and 20 in the appendix. For “bastard,” *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 125r reporting how Ianus Codeya insulted Sfetina Tramontana at the gates of Buzet by telling him “Va cativo bastardo!” Two insults were combined when Peter Talzich attacked Sfetina Tramontana in Buzet, calling him “poltron e ribaldo.” See case 20 in the appendix.

119 See cases 13 and 15 in the appendix.

sleep with his wife.” Peter uttered a classic insult: “You lie in your throat!” The ritual of confrontation progressed in a standard sequence from there.¹²⁰ A twist on this theme of offending the women of one’s man family is an insult hurled on the streets of Buzet when Sfetina Tramontana called Peter Talzich “a son of priest,” inferring his mother’s sexual infidelity and promiscuity.¹²¹

These insults demonstrate what constituted ideal masculinity in the minds of late medieval Istrians: courage, integrity, honesty and sexual potency combined with taking care that the women of their family behave properly. Thus, common insults were aimed at attacking precisely these ideal traits. Consequently, “just anger” had to arise from these *parvipensiones* in order to vindicate one’s *excellencia*.

Conversely, when women played a role in the play of conflict the insults flung at them—either by other women or by men—regularly attacked different traits, mainly their chastity, fidelity and sexual morality. Virtually the only insult uttered in this context is “whore” (orig. *putana* or *meretrix*), coupled with various allegations of their sexual misconduct. For example, a salvo of insults was fired on the street of Buzet in an altercation involving Jelena, the wife of master Vidus from Ljubljana, and Ambrig the shoemaker. This is also one of the cases in which the overture remains a hidden transcript, but whatever set off the ritual of confrontation, the insults that marked act two of the play were exemplary of invectives attacking man’s and woman’s honor respectively. According to Ambrig, it was Jelena who started with the insults, calling him “a son of a rotten whore.” The shoemaker was quick to retaliate by calling the woman “a whore and a donkey.”¹²² The ritual finished there and Jelena launched a formal accusation to the podestà, demanding justice for the suffered insults.

Another illustrative example of women’s anger at work also comes from Buzet. Margarita accused Agnes Muta for calling her a *meretrix* and demanded justice from the podestà of Buzet. When Agnes came to defend herself, she did not deny the deed, proclaiming how she saw the very Margarita underneath a blanket with her cousin Jacob Flegovich. The judicial records, however, reveal the entire story, including the overture. Namely, Margarita first accused Agnes’ son of damaging her fields with his lambs. This was the overture that jumpstarted act two of the play as Agnes quickly retaliated by attacking Margarita’s reputation, telling everyone how her “legs were tied” with her cousin.¹²³ With this insult, Agnes simultaneously tarnished Margarita’s honor while augmenting the reputation of her cousin, for sexual promiscuity was a highly regarded masculine trait.¹²⁴ More importantly, the

120 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 281r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 15 in the appendix.

121 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 136v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 20 in the appendix.

122 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 148r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 13 in the appendix.

123 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 126v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 14 in the appendix.

124 “Se infatti nella donna il ritegno e l’atteggiamento riservato costituivano implicitamente i segni esteriori della propria purezza sessuale, nell’uomo le caratteristiche della sua mascolinità, quali il coraggio e la potenza sessuale, dovevano essere manifestate apertamente, altrimenti il suo onore sarebbe stato messo in discussione.” Povoio, *Lintrigo*, 362.

accusation of sexual promiscuity threatened to diminish Malgarita's *fama*—a notion that functioned as a judicial category because the depositions done by *persone male fame* held much less sway in the courtroom than those presented by those of good repute.¹²⁵

An insult somewhat unique to Istria is a type of verbal attack based on one's perceived socio-linguistic background. Namely, two brawls featured a first act whereby one of the actors insulted another by calling him a "Slav." The already introduced confrontation between the sailors Benedict and Peter that took place beneath the loggia of Poreč featured this very insult in act two of their play: "Fucking *Schiavo!*" was the curse uttered by Benedict before he hit his colleague with a loaf of bread.¹²⁶ Another example of this invective at work is a brawl between Anthony the Slav from Zadar and George Niger of Corfu that took place at the harbor of Rovinj.¹²⁷ The two sailors worked on a ship captained by Micheletto Galvani and their overture began as the ship docked. Although the sequence of events is difficult to reconstruct based on summary and contradicting depositions, it seems that George took issue with Anthony's handling of the anchor. At that point, the sailor from Corfu uttered the words: "What are you doing Slav?!"¹²⁸ Even though Anthony's byname was Slav, he immediately understood that the utterance was channeled through anger and came in the form of an insult.¹²⁹ Thus, the Zadran retaliated: "Damned be who awaits you at home!"¹³⁰ This was enough for George, obviously Anthony's superior at Galvani's ship, to unleash a barrage of insults and threats: "Oh treacherous Slav! I will kill you and throw you in the water!"¹³¹ At first, Anthony yielded, kneeling in front of George, kissing his feet and asking forgiveness; George, however, would have none of it as he began pounding away at his inferior with a wooden club.¹³²

Such insults that would be dubbed "ethnic invectives" in present-day scholarly discourse are indeed not exclusive to Istria; one finds them all over medieval Europe.¹³³ However, the fact that the word "Slav" could be honorably worn as a byname on the one hand—as in Henry the Slav, Bastian the Slav, John the Slav etc.—but uttered as an insult on the other, is characteristic only for the frontier regions such as Istria where the Slavic population in-

125 On *fama* as a judicial category, see Thomas Kuehn, "Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence," in *Fama*, 27–46, esp. 30–31.

126 "Que Benedictus postquam cenavit dicens: 'Schiavo futuo!' Et admenavit de uno pane." Case 15 in the appendix.

127 *Acta potestatis Rubini*, fol. 54v–55r. The records of the case are edited in extenso in the appendix; see case 16 in the appendix.

128 According to Anthony: "Verum esse quod erat in navigio, et aptabat angollum. Et dictus Georgius existens in terra exclamabat dicendo: 'Quid facis Sclabone?'" Case 16 in the appendix.

129 This is reflected in the wording of Anthony's defense: "Et credendo dicto Georgio quod ei diceret iniuriam dictus Antonius." Case 16 in the appendix.

130 According to George: "Antonius Sclabonus marinarius dixit sibi: 'Mal viazo chi in cha' ve aspeta!'" See case 16.

131 "[D]ictus Antonius venit ad navigium et cepit sibi dare de uno ligno super brachiis et spatullus dicendo: 'O Sclabone proditor! Ego interficiam te et proiciam te in aqua!'" Case 16 in the appendix.

132 Dicens etiam dictus Antonius, quod semper pettebat quod dimiteret stare amore Dei, et ter proicit se contra eum genibus flexis osculando pedes illius, ut dimitteret eum stare, qui numquam voluit sed dicebat: "Sclabone vollo interficere te!" Case 16 in the appendix.

133 Claire V. Weeda, *Images of Ethnicity in Late Medieval Europe*, PhD dissertation, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2012, 195–224; Claire V. Weeda, "Ethnic Identification and Stereotypes in Western Europe, circa 1100–1300," *History Compass*, 12/7, 2014, 586–606.

tersected and mixed with the Latin-Romance and/or Germanic.¹³⁴ Interestingly, this type of invective is only found in maritime Istrian communes—in this case only in Poreč and Rovinj—but not in continental ones, such as Buzet. This distribution can be interpreted by conjectural demography: the majority of Buzet’s population spoke some variants of Slavic language as their mother tongue—in etic terms one would infer they were of Slavic ethnicity—hence the insult held no sway there; this was not the case in Poreč or Rovinj where the Latin-Romance vernacular-speaking population constituted a large percentage of the overall population and where the native speakers of Slavic languages could be conceptualized as the “Other.”¹³⁵ It must be noted that this conjecture does not in any way postulate that the identities rooted in what would be dubbed “ethnic categories” in present-day scholarly discourse played the most prominent roles in the collective identification of medieval population of Istria. On the contrary, the primary sources attest that the main type of collective identities expressed by the peoples of Istria in the Late Middle Ages was that of belonging to a certain urban commune, town or a village community.¹³⁶ What the insult “Slav” does indicate is that an idea of Slavic “otherness” existed in Istria—and one would infer throughout the Adriatic region in general—even in the medieval period.¹³⁷

In this historical setting—the medieval Eastern Adriatic, dotted with vibrant urban centers along the coast that were by necessity linked, to greater or lesser degree, to Venice—the ethnonym “Slav” could very well be a synecdoche for non-urban, rural folk engaged in land tilling and cattle breeding.¹³⁸ A similar reading of this ethnonym is also proposed by scholars dealing with Venetian Albania as a line from the 14th-century statutes of Shkodër “se trovasse Sclavo oy Arbaneso voy Scutarino cum piegare” is translated as “if a farmer, a hill dweller, or a citizen of Shkodër is found with sheep.”¹³⁹ In that way, the invective “Slav”

134 The quoted examples have either already been referenced in previous footnotes or they are featured in the appendix. For other examples of the byname “Slav” in Istria, in this case in medieval Piran, see Darja Mihelič, “Die Bezeichnung der Slawen und Romanen in Istrien,” in *Personennamen und Identität: Namengebung und Namengebrauch als Anzeiger individueller Bestimmung und gruppenbezogener Zuordnung: Akten der Akademie Friesach „Stadt und Kultur im Mittelalter“*, Friesach (Kärnten), 25. bis 29. September 1995, ed. Reinhard Härtel, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1997, 363–379.

135 Scholarly literature on the process of “othering” is copious, as are the various definitions of this social phenomenon. For example, Nikolas Coupland defines it as “the process of representing an individual or a social group to render them distant, alien or deviant.” Nikolas Coupland, “‘Other’ Representation,” in *Society and Language Use*, ed. Jürgen Jaspers, Jef Verschueren and Jan-Ola Östman, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2010, 241–260, quotation on 244. See also, Devika Chawla, “Othering and Otherness,” in *The International Encyclopedia of Intercultural Communication*, ed. Young Yun Kim and Kelly L. McKay-Semmler, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

136 I have written summarily on that in “Pinguente: Bastione inespugnabile dell’Istria continentale,” in *Buzetski statut*, 177–180; a more comprehensive study on this topic is forthcoming. Istria in this aspect conforms to collective identification practices standard in the so-called Italy of the communes. François Menant, *L’Italia dei comuni (1100-1350)*, La storia: Temi 19, Rome: Viella, 2011, 194–207.

137 This ethnic duality of the region is discussed in detail in Egidio Ivetic, *Un confine nel Mediterraneo: L’Adriatico orientale tra Italia e Slavia (1300-1900)*, Rome, Viella, 2014.

138 According to Coupland, the othering would be a product of social stereotyping: a process of othering by “selective focusing on salient cultural traits and investing them with iconic status.” Coupland, “‘Other’ Representation,” 248.

139 Lucia Nadin, ed., *Statuti di Scutari della prima metà del secolo XIV con le addizioni fino al 1469*, Rome: Viella, 2002, 111, article 84, and 193 for Pëllumb Xhufi’s interpretation of these terms. See also, Grabiela Rojas, “Space: A Proposal for the Interpretation of Albanenses in Skhodra’s Medieval City Statute,” *Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU*, ed. Ildikó Csepregi and Kyra Lyubyanovics, Budapest: Central European University, 2020, 154–159.

assumes the semantic dimension most similar to that of a “peasant” in the most derogatory sense of the word: “filthy, subhuman, and comical, the reverse of the civilized and courtly,” according to Paul H. Freedman.¹⁴⁰ Thus, city dwellers and seafarers could belittle each other by calling one another *Sclaboni* or *Schiavi*. The fact that the words *Schiavon* or *Sclabon* were very similar to the Italian vernacular noun *schiaivo*, as in slave, certainly facilitated the semantic pejoration of the ethnonym.¹⁴¹ This polyvalence of the word prompted the putative insult “Slavs! You are all dead!” that the Genoese supposedly hurled at the Venetians in 1258 after the Battle of Acre, at least according to the chronicler Martin da Canal.¹⁴² Among the local population of frontier regions such as Istria and Dalmatia that featured both Latin-Romance and Slavic population in daily contact and interaction, the term *Schiavo* could very well be used without any offensive connotations, especially in jest.¹⁴³ Moreover, Lodovico Ariosto had no problem designating the entire Adriatic as the “Slavonian Sea,” obviously not employing the ethnonym in a derogatory sense.¹⁴⁴ In any case, the term *Schiavo* or *Sclabone*—when uttered in the correct manner, to the right person and in the appropriate setting—seemed to have been quite potent anger-invoking invectives in Poreč and Rovinj as both rituals of confrontations in which it had been uttered quickly progressed to the third act of the conflict drama.

140 Paul H. Freedman, *Images of the Medieval Peasant*, Figurate: Reading Medieval Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, quotation on 157.

141 Cf the two entries in the *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana*, vol. XVII, ed. Salvatore Battaglia, Turin: UTET, 1994, s.v. “SchiavoI,” 998–999 and s.v. “SchiavoII,” 999–1000; the first entry refers to slaves and slavery, the second to “che è proprio della costa orientale dell’Adriatico o delle regioni circostanti della Schiavonia o Slavonia.” Another play “on the linguistic ambiguity Slavo-schiavo,” is reported in Reinhold C. Mueller, “Aspects of Venetian Sovereignty in Medieval and Renaissance Dalmatia,” in *Quattrocento Adriatico: Fifteenth Century Art of the Adriatic Rim*, ed. Charles Dempsey, Villa Spelman Colloquia Series 5, Bologna: Nuova Alfa, 1996, 51: “Zara zarattini e compra i nostri schiavolini,” uttered in the context of Venetian purchase of Zadar (and other Dalmatian places under the *potestas* of King Ladislas of Naples) in 1409.

142 “Hesclavons, vos estes trestuit mors!” Martin da Canal, *Les estoires de Venise: cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275*, ed. Alberto Limentani, Civiltà veneziana: Fonti e testi, serie 3a, 3, Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1972, 170, pars 2, chap. 13. Thus, I find Morreale’s translation lacking as it robs the original term of its polysemy. Cf. Martin da Canal, *Les Estoires de Venise*, trans. Laura K. Morreale, Archivio del Littorale Adriatico 12, Padua: Unipress, 2009, 65: “Slaves, you are all dead.”

143 This argument is based primarily on my intuition, but there are recorded 20th-century testimonies of Istrians and Dalmatians who corroborate this informed inference. Cf. the words of an Antonio V., born in Zadar in 1935: “Noi non avevamo questo rapporto di conflitto con loro, con gli slavi. Io so che i nostri [dicevano]: stai zitto sciaivo! Si diceva queste cose, che poi sciaivo era una cosa sotto i romani... Lo schiavo era il contadino che lavorava. Mentre loro, gli slavi, prendevano proprio gli schiavi, perché tra tribù si schiavizzavano, loro han sempre vissuto di queste cose. La storia lo dice. C’era questa cosa... Ma anche in Istria e a Fiume c’era—mi sembra—questo modo di parlare: stai zitto sciaivo! Come i meridionali, che noi li chiamavamo pignol, che vuol dire fantoccio, [per dire] uno venuto dall’Italia. C’era questa cosa, però si scherzava da una parte e dall’altra, nelle osterie si cantavano le canzoni italiane e le canzoni slave.” Interview recorded in Enrico Miletto, *L’Esodo istriano-fiumano-dalmata in Piemonte: Per un archivio della memoria: Le testimonianze*, 4th ed., Turin: L’Istituto piemontese per la storia della Resistenza e della società contemporanea “Giorgio Agosti”, 2011, 87. For other examples of “ethnic humor” in the Middle Ages, see Nicolino Applauso, *Curses and Laughter: The Ethics of Political Invective in the Comic Poetry of High and Late Medieval Italy*, PhD dissertation, Oregon: University of Oregon, 2010, 121–122.

144 “Come Apennin scopre il mar schiavo e il tósco.” Lodovico Ariosto, *Orlando furioso*, in *Orlando furioso secondo l’edizione del 1532 con le varianti delle edizioni del 1516 e del 1521*, ed. Santorre Debenedetti and Cesare Segre, Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1960, 84, canto IV, verse 11, line 6. English translation in *Orlando Furioso: A New Verse Translation*, trans. David R. Slavitt, Cambridge MA, Belknap Press, 2009, 48.

Act 3: Direct violence

Finally, the third stage of the conflict involves physical violence and bloodshed, usually ending by way of external intervention. It must be noted that only a percentage of all the rituals of conflict reach this final act. For example, out of total of fifty-seven conflicts recorded in Poreč, thirty-nine ended in direct violence; in Buzet there are thirty-nine recorded confrontations, but only fifteen of them progressed to the final act of the play; whereas in Rovinj, where only a total of eleven court cases survive for the entire fifteenth century, ten out of ten registered confrontations ended in physical violence. This part of the act is also highly gendered as there is not a single record of women ever progressing the ritual of conflict to its final stage in the investigated primary sources—anger channeled through physical fighting was obviously a performance reserved exclusively for men.

The attacks featured in this phase include strikes of various kinds, pulling by the hair, dragging one to the ground, stomps and the use makeshift weapons: most prominently rocks, but also bottles, pieces of wood, kitchen cutlery and tools of various sorts. Again, the conflict between Martin and Christopher nicely exemplifies the variety of attacks that could be featured in act three of such plays: Martin ended act two with an attempted slap, Christopher responded by drawing a bread knife that he had underneath his robes; in the end, the knockout blow came from a hurled rock.¹⁴⁵ Since communal statutes banned the carrying of weapons inside the city walls, the actors performing act three of this play had to get creative.¹⁴⁶ This creativity with which everyday objects could be repurposed as weapons comes to full display in the brawl between Benedict Sacerna and Peter Scarpa. As was noted, the two men began quarreling while dining together underneath the civic loggia of Poreč. Right after the insult “you fucking *Schiavo!*” was hurled, Benedict smacked Peter with a loaf of bread in the head. Peter retaliated in the same fashion and the ensuing “bread fight” left Benedict bloodied and with an open wound on his head.¹⁴⁷ Sometimes, however, strikes from such improvised weapons incurred much more grievous injuries. Christopher was fortunate enough that a rock he hurled at Martin’s head did not seriously harm his opponent. John the Slav was not so lucky. In a brawl that broke out over gambling in Piran, John fired a rock at Maliz the Slav that hit him straight in the head, cracking his skull and leaving him dead on the spot.¹⁴⁸

A strike that enjoyed a special status was a slap (orig. *alapa*), an attack that had the most pronounced disciplinary function and as such greatly diminished the honor of its unfor-

145 Case 1 in the appendix.

146 E.g. *Statuta Parentii*, 156–157, book 3, article 36: De pena portantium arma per civitatem Parentii; Pietro Kandler, ed., *Statuti municipali di Rovigno*, Trieste: Lloyd Austriaco, 1851, 102, book 3, article 5: Che non si possi portar arme (hereafter: *Statuta Rubini*); *Statuta, leges ac iura Communis terrae Pirani*, trans. Niccolo Petronio, Venice: Giovanni Antonio Rampezetto, 1606, 37, book 2, article 14: De portantibus arma (hereafter: *Statuta Pirani*). The statutes of Buzet and Novigrad do not contain such a rule. Cf. *Statuta Pinguenti*, 334, article 22: De insultu facto cum armis; Jakov Jelinčić and Nella Lonza, eds., *Novigradski statut / Statuto di Cittanova*, Kolana od statuti / Collana degli statuti 3, Novigrad: Humaniora, 2014, 464, articles 7–8 (hereafter: *Statuta Emonie*).

147 Case 15 in the appendix.

148 *LC I*, fol. 210r–v. The verdict is edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 28 in the appendix.

tunate recipient.¹⁴⁹ Even some Istrian statutes had special articles dedicated exclusively to this particular hit: a fine of twenty pounds of Venetian pennies for anyone daring to strike someone “with a slap or slaps that is called *poglušnica* in Slavic” is prescribed by the statute of Labin.¹⁵⁰ This was the strike that started act two of a tavern brawl in Novigrad, and the one that ended the entire performance. Stephan did not hide the fact that he slapped Martin as he proudly admitted to doing so due to the spilling of the wine; Martin, however, hid the fact that he was slapped and simply reported being hit.¹⁵¹ Since the final podestà’s verdict is not preserved, it remains unknown whose version of the strike was eventually recorded in the officially promulgated judgment that was read aloud, in *volgare*, in the town’s square “to everyone’s knowledge.”¹⁵² Did the rector’s chancellor make it known to the public that Martin yielded to a slap? Or was it decided to spare the accuser of further damage to his honor by omitting this detail from the official verdict? For example, the podestà of Buzet Simone Ferro and his chancellor John from Oderzo were not so considerate toward those who yielded to an *alapa*: the official verdict that was read aloud on the square of Buzet contained this very detail, how Sfetina Pecarich slapped Iuan Codeya who, in turn, did not retaliate.¹⁵³

Researchers studying rituals of conflict in medieval Italy and elsewhere showed that in those cases where weapons had been drawn, the strikes would usually come from the hilts, not the blades.¹⁵⁴ Thus, the point was not to seriously injure or even kill one’s opponent, but simply to hurt them to the point where they would yield. This practice is also attested in Istria. For example, Preto Peio hit Dominic with a hilt of his javelin and then proceeded to threaten to pierce him in an effort to make him flee.¹⁵⁵ There were, however, plays in which the actors deviated from the script. Anthony the Slav pierced the chest of his assailant in the heat of the battle, leaving George Niger bleeding on the ground and in danger of losing his life.¹⁵⁶ A drunk Jacob from Senj sliced open the neck of Simon with a bread knife, nearly killing his gambling partner.¹⁵⁷ Finally, a tavern brawl in Rovinj resulted in a Martin of Shkodër piercing a Dussa from Albania five times with a sword, fatally injuring his opponent.¹⁵⁸

149 Pertile, *Storia del diritto*, vol. 5, 591–592.

150 “[S]i quis percuteret aliquem alapam vel alapas que Sclavonice dicitur poglusniza per iniuriam unam vel plures in castro Albone, solvat et solvere debeat pene nomine facta querela coram rectoribus libras XX Venecialium parvorum. Camillo De Franceschi, “Statuta communis Albonae,” *Archeografo triestino*, ser. 3, 32, 1908, 210, book 3, article 31. The word *poglusniza* comes from Croatian adjective “gluh” meaning deaf. Thus, *poglušnica* would literally translate to a strike that makes one deaf.

151 Case 7 in the appendix.

152 This practice is known from the acts of podestàs of Buzet, Poreč and Rovinj. E.g., “Lata, data et sententialiter promulgata fuit suprascripta sententia et condemnatio corporalis per prefatum dominum potestatem, et vulgarizata et lecta per me Iohanem de Parentio notarius et cancelarius suum, currentibus annis Domini MCCCCXXXIII, indictione XI, die XVIII septembris, presentis ser Nicolao quondam ser Andree, ser Adamo quondam ser Antonii, Iohanem quondam Thome, et aliis multitudine copiosa.” *Acta potestatis Rubini*, fol. 67r.

153 “Nullis aliis verbis sequitis, [Sfetina] admenavit unam alapiam super fatiem dicti Iuani.” *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 2*, fol. 7r.

154 E.g. Dean, *Crime and Justice*, 169.

155 “[C]um trunco gavarine admenavit et iunxit dictum Dominicum super speltum. Postea cum punctis gavarinarum ostendebant eis per modum quod oportuit eis retrocedere.” Case 4 in the appendix.

156 Case 16 in the appendix.

157 Case 10 in the appendix.

158 *Acta potestatis Rubinii*, fol. 66v–67r. Only the verdict is recorded and it is edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 29

The analyzed primary sources reveal that there were certain men who were much quicker to escalate the play to its final act than other. For example, a Vanto de Gravisi—the father of Niccolò, the future marquis of Petrapilosa—did not hesitate to seriously beat people up in the taverns of Piran even for the slightest acts that he decoded as *parvipensiones*, such as putting hands on his jug of wine.¹⁵⁹ In Poreč, a John de Luna was particularly aggressive in his performances of anger, cracking the faces of his opponents and even trying to impale them on a spear for the slightest deeds that he decoded as injurious to his honor. For example, he punched, dragged to the ground and stomped a Dominic de Lutter in a tavern in Poreč for an undisclosed reason.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, as several people danced in a tavern in Poreč, a John the carpenter slipped and “slightly touched” De Luna. This was a good enough overture for De Luna not only to initiate the ritual of confrontation, but to catalyze it directly to act three of the play as he punched the carpenter in the face, leaving him bleeding from his mouth.¹⁶¹ Finally, a Matthew de Facina publicly accused John de Luna in front of the gates of Poreč that he unlawfully took his oxen to pasture to an off-limits field. John promptly replied that he indeed had a license from the podestà himself granting him access to this particular grazing field. Matthew apologized, but for De Luna the damage was already done. John quickly began insulting Matthew and soon escalated the play to act three by throwing a rock at him and perusing him with a spear.¹⁶²

De Luna’s counterpart in Buzet was Sfetina Tramontana, another man who particularly aggressively defended his honor and maintained his *fama*. Unlike De Luna, however, Sfetina followed the script more closely; if the opponent relented in the phase of indirect violence, Sfetina would not progress the play to act three. Thus, in a verbal altercation with Iuan Codeya, Sfetina was quick to draw a sword and dare his opponent to face him. When Iuan failed to do so, the play ended in its second act.¹⁶³ However, when the opponent was ready to play along, Sfetina’s attacks were brutal. Thus, when Sfetina and Primus Pengarich met in a tavern, the two began arguing over each other’s animals. According to Sfetina, it was Primus who first approached him, telling him how his pigs and chicken were damaging

in the appendix.

159 E.g. “Vantum Andree de Gravisi, quia percussit Petrum de Segna famulum Petri ser Pertogna pluries de pugilo quod exivit ei sanguis per nasum et horem, condenatus in libris III.” *LC 1*, fol. 3v; “Vantum quondam Gravissi de Pirano, quia percussit Antonium de Lorso de Glugia habitorem Venetiarum cum pugno super faciem sinistram cum sanguinis efusione uno vulnere, quia exportaverat certos denarios vini quod biberat in taberna, condenatus in libris decem parvorum.” *LC 1*, fol. 3v and fol. 19v. On the De Gravisi family, see Domenico Venturini, *Il casato dei marchesi Gravisi*, Poreč: Gaetano Coana, 1907.

160 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 252v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 17 in the appendix.

161 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 259r. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 18 in the appendix.

162 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 294v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 19 in the appendix.

163 From the accusation: “Ianus Codeya habitator Pingeunti constitutus in canzellaria Comunis querebantur exposuit quod dum die suprascripto [XXII septembris, 1457] fuisset ad portam parvam, ubi fuit custodie, et ibi sederet Sfetina Tramontana, qui ibi erat dicere habuit dicto Iuano querellanti: ‘Vuodo la mia chaxa!’ Qui Iuanus respondit: ‘Nihil habeo agere cum ista domo.’ Dicendo dictus Tramontana versus dictum Iuanum: ‘Va cativo! Vai zo!’ Et dictus Iuanus respondit dicto Tramontana: ‘Va cativo bastardo!’ Nullis aliis verbis, cepit unum gladium et voluit dare dicto Iuano, dicendo: ‘Io te amazero ti, o tu me amazera mi!’ Quare petit per vos magnificum dominum potestatem procedi debere secundum quod iustitia postulat et requirit.” *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 125r (accusation, defense and the testimony of a witness); *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 2*, fol. 191r (podestà’s verdict).

his property and that he wanted a share of their meat once they were brought to slaughter. According to Primus, Sfetina replied with a threat: “Someone has broken my cockerel’s leg. If you happen to know who did it, I would like to break his leg,” indirectly accusing Primus and threatening him. The transcripts do not record the words that were uttered after this exchange, but act three was ushered in with Primus punching Sfetina in the nose. At this point, Tramontana unsheathed a sword, ready to aggressively avenge this affront to his honor. The brawl that ensued saw Sfetina brutally massacre Primus, slicing him open in two different places and leaving him bloodied on the floor.¹⁶⁴

The biographies of particularly aggressive men such as John de Luna, Vanto de Gravisi and Sfetina Tramontana illuminate another aspect of the ritualized performance of anger. Namely, by overplaying their parts in conflict plays—by overreading social interactions with the intent of finding *parvipensiones*, by rushing to progress the play into new acts and, finally, by acting out the phase of direct physical violence with vicious brutality—these men were actively upholding their *fama*, grooming their reputations as “men not to be messed with.” This was not an easy task to accomplish. First, to uphold their reputation as “tough guys,” they had to continually perform their anger publicly and readily take part in rituals of conflict because *fama* has to be regularly “fed”.¹⁶⁵ Second, they had to walk a fine line between seriously beating up their opponents and actually killing them; their anger had to be carefully managed, its bursts controlled, lest they end up banished and/or sentenced to death by the Venetian authorities. Finally, they had to count on being reported to the podestà who would regularly punish their behavior with a monetary fine, an expense that they had to be able to cover in order to keep their reputation intact. Thus, the *fama* of a “guy not to be messed with” was gained through the performance of anger, but it came with an upkeep, a veritable “tax” on those (over)demanding honor. Sfetina, for example, failed to pay for this upkeep as the fine of twenty-five pounds of pennies for butchering Primus remained unpaid.¹⁶⁶ Venetian officials decided not to deal with the matter legally by sequestering his assets, but by way of other, extrajudicial methods at their disposal. One day, as Sfetina was relieving himself by the small gates of Buzet, two men serving in the retinue of podestà Simone Ferro—Niccolò Ferro and squire John Grandò—picked the local browbeater up and tossed him in a ditch.¹⁶⁷ Sfetina suffered a broken leg from the fall and

164 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 149r–149v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 21 in the appendix.

165 Fenster and Smail, “Introduction,” 4.

166 This is known from the fact that the official verdict is not crossed out and there is no note on the margin specifying the day the podestà received the money. Since the notes on the margins of this manuscript date deep into the late 15th century, it is clear that Sfetina did not pay the fine.

167 Here is the entire accusation, the only recorded part of the lawsuit that, as it seems, was never processed: “Die 24 mensis novembris. Ser Sfetina Tramontana, existens in domo in lecto super palmento, presente Marcho Victoris iudex et me cancellario, denunciavit et cum querella acusavit nobilem dominum Nicolaum Ferro et Iohannem Grandò, armigerum domini Christofori de Tolemino, in eis, de eis, et super eis quod dum dictus Sfetina ivisset mingendum, prout faciant homines sub porta parva, et ibidem invenisset dictos ludentes, ambo ceperunt dictum Sfetinam querellantem et procerunt ipsum Sfetinam deorsum <ex quadam rippa>, ex quo dictus Sfetina fracta fuit sibi una tibia. Quare petit iustitiam et hoc probare intendit per Perosam Margonich, ser Martinum Persich, Martinum Persich (sic, two times), Chirinum

he even launched an official accusation against the two men with podestà Ferro, but most importantly, he suffered a tremendous blow to his *fama* as he could not cash the check his anger had been writing.

Epilogue: Podestà's Office

Finally, some performances of anger end with an epilogue: a legal process adjudicated by the delegated Venetian podestà. It should be noted that only a percentage of all such dramas of conflict end with the rector's involvement; whether that percentage constitutes a minority or the majority of all such rituals of confrontation is impossible to ascertain. However, the fact that a number of court cases involving interpersonal violence began not by an accusation from one of the parties involved in the brawl, but by a denunciation of either a communal feldsher or one of the members of the podestà's retinue, leads to the conclusion that a considerable percentage of anger-driven scuffles concluded without any involvement of the incumbent Venetian rector.¹⁶⁸ Thus, the performances that did end up being reviewed by the delegated podestàs constitute what Eduardo Grendi dubs "exceptionally normal" cases: they were extraordinary in some aspects—otherwise they would not have been presented in front of the podestà, recorded in writing and adjudicated—, but they were embedded within workaday interactions of ordinary people in a quotidian setting.¹⁶⁹

Since the only types of rituals of conflict available to historians' analyses are precisely these "exceptionally normal" cases, it should be borne in mind that there was always an element in each of them that in some way, to a greater or lesser degree, deviated from the standard script of performing anger. For example, those cases that were denounced to the podestà by the members of his retinue or by the communal officers regularly involved a deviation in terms of the gravity of the incurred physical injuries. Venetian law obliged the communal doctors to report all grave wounds deemed to be the result of violence to the civic authorities, and this was heeded in Venetian Istria as well.¹⁷⁰ This is, for example, how the legal process between George Niger from Corfu and Anthony the Slav from Zadar commenced in Rovinj.¹⁷¹ Processes that were started by an involved party's formal accusation, however, could involve a variety of perceived deviations: the gravity of offenses that were believed to be disproportionate to the *parvipensio* could be one of the reasons, but more often than not, the main motive behind a personal accusation would lay in the perceived deviation from the very script. Virtually all the accusations brought by the actors of

Berenich." *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 171v.

168 For example, from a total of 57 verdicts regarding various types of interpersonal violence promulgated by the podestà of Poreč, 11 were denounced by communal officials.

169 Edoardo Grendi, "Micro-analisi e storia sociale," *Quaderni storici*, 35, 1977, 512.

170 Cessi, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio*, vol. 2, 268. See also, Guido Ruggiero, "The Cooperation of Physicians and the State in the Control of Violence in Renaissance Venice," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 33/2, 1978, 156–166, here 158.

171 Case 16 in the appendix.

the play themselves feature the line “no other words exchanged” or “without showing any respect,” thus implying that the “rules of the game” were broken and that the physical (or verbal) assault came out of thin air—unjustly.¹⁷² It is only when the defense and witness testimonies are heard that the personal assault in the vast majority of these cases assumes the contours of the standardized ritual of confrontation.

Thus, it was the podestà’s job to evaluate and discern which of those cases played out according to the script and which of them did not; which of them vindicated the *parvipensio* appropriately and which of them involved a disproportionate amount of violence. For example, a mundane bar brawl such as that between Martin from Ljubljana and Stephan Bresanus in Novigrad had all the elements of the classic ritual of confrontation: the *parvipensio*, the verbal insult (*poltron*) and the physical violence (*alapa*) that ended the performance. Yet, Martin, the loser of the confrontation, presented the case as Stephen’s violent attempt to unlawfully take away his jug of wine coupled with a strike that came out of nowhere. It was only when Stephen’s side of the story was heard that it became clear that the case in point was in fact a standard performance of anger in a conflict play. The podestà, however, had to decide which story to back up. In the end, it was Stephan who was found guilty and condemned to a fine of two pounds. Thus, physical violence, interpreted as detrimental to public order, was punished and Martin got his *vindicatio* through the rector’s administration of justice.¹⁷³ Whether Martin’s honor and *fama* were revindicated in front of his fellow citizens of Novigrad is doubtful, especially if bearing in mind the words of the jurist Paolo de Castro on what kind of men leave personal matters in the hands of the judges.

The adjudicated fine illuminates another important aspect of these public performances of anger. Namely, the penalty was very low, less than half of that prescribed by the communal statute.¹⁷⁴ The same trend is evident in Poreč, Rovinj and Buzet as well: those cases where the podestà discerned that the confrontation went down according to the script—that a *parvipensio* justified a retort, that this vindication began with verbal insults and only then progressed to violence that was, in turn, proportionate to the attack on one’s honor—the adjudicated fines were minimal, almost symbolic. For example, Simone Ferro regularly punished the actors who first opened acts two or three of the play with either one or two pounds of pennies respectively. Out of thirty-nine rituals of confrontations, only four were punished with a fine greater than three pounds and the only fine exceeding five pounds was Sfetina’s sentence of twenty-five pounds of pennies for nearly killing Primus. The statute of Buzet prescribed much heftier fines, ranging from four pounds for verbal offences

172 Cf. for example, the wording of Gregory’s accusation against Paul Trascanovich: “[S]ic ludendo, [Gregorius] volebat trahere ad se postam, quia vicerat et valent acciperat postam ad se, et magister Paulus – nullis aliis verbis – admenavit conpugno super fatiem et cum pedibus super persona ipsius querellantis.” However, the defense and witness testimonies tell a different story. Case 8 in the appendix.

173 Case 7 in the appendix.

174 Namely, five pounds of pennies for an attack without weapons and without shedding blood. *Statuta Emonie*, 462, book 6, article 4.

to sixteen pounds for various attacks.¹⁷⁵ Thus, a “standard tariff” was at play: if the drama ended with act two and the cases ended up on the podestà’s desk, the actor who propelled the ritual to this phase of indirect violence was punished with one pound of pennies; if the play ended with physical violence that was proportionate to the *parvipensio*, the actor who initiated act three would be punished with two pounds of pennies. A similar tariff was at work in Novigrad and Poreč—possibly even in Rovinj, although this is difficult to ascertain due to the quantity of surviving primary sources—with the only exception that Poreč was a bit “more expensive” than the other two: performers who stopped at act two were punished with one or two pounds, whereas those that propelled the play to act three incurred a pecuniary fine ranging from three to five pounds of pennies. The differences in tariffs can be ascribed to different standards of living and overall economic standing of the citizens of these two communes, but the fact remains that a tariff was at work that featured much more lenient fines than those prescribed by the communal statutes.¹⁷⁶

For the sake of proper contextualization of these fines, it must be noted that, for example, in 1444 a contracted fisherman in Poreč received a yearly wage of twelve golden ducats, that is 68 pounds and 8 shillings according to contemporary conversion rates.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, a day’s work in the fields of the marquises De Gravisi in the district of Petrapilosa next to Buzet was valued at fifteen shillings, thus three quarters of a pound.¹⁷⁸ A monthly wage for an unskilled worker in the salt pans of Piran ranged between ten and twelve pounds a month in 1413.¹⁷⁹ Finally, skilled professionals such as public notaries and doctors earned significantly more. For example, the Commune of Poreč contracted the services of a doctor Vitus de Cataniis from Urbino, promising him a yearly salary of one hundred golden ducats, that is five hundred and seventy pounds of pennies.¹⁸⁰ As for expenses, a jug of wine in a tavern cost a shilling, a bullock in Poreč in 1447 cost sixteen pounds of pennies and a livestock unit such as a sheep or a goat could reach a price of thirty-two shillings.¹⁸¹ Thus, persons who were not considered poor would most certainly be able to afford to pay a fine ranging between one and five pounds of pennies. Consequently, the right to anger was a

175 *Statuta Pinguenti*, 330, article 15, and 338, articles 27 and 28.

176 The statute of Poreč does not feature a part dedicated to criminal law as that aspect of justice administration was firmly in the hands of the Venetian delegated podestà. A lone article does state, however, that an attack shedding blood is to be punished with twenty-five pounds of coins. *Statuta Parentii*, 203, book 3, article 101.

177 Zoran Ladić, ed., *Registri porečkih bilježnika Henrika de Artizanibus (1433. – 1434.) i Antuna de Teodoris (1435. – 1449.)* [The registers of the notaries of Poreč Henry de Artizanibus (1433–1434) and Anthony de Teodoris (1435–1449)], *Spisi istarskih bilježnika 2: Spisi porečkih bilježnika 1*, Pazin: Državni arhiv u Pazinu, 2018, 86–87 doc. 52. For the conversion rates, see Reinhold C. Mueller, *Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice*, vol. 2: *The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, 1200–1500*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 623, table D 1.

178 Mirko Zjačić, ed., *Notarska knjiga Martina Sotolića (Registrum imbreviaturarum Martini Sotolich notarii Pinquentini) 1492.-1517. godine* [Notarial register of Martin Sotolic (Registrum imbreviaturarum Martini Sotolich notarii Pinquentini) 1492–1517], *Monumenta historico-iuridica slavorum meridionalium* 18, Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1979, 373–374.

179 Flavio Bonin, *Piranske solne pogodbe (1375–1782)* [Piran’s salt deals (1375–1782)], Ljubljana: Arhivsko društvo Slovenije, 2011, 28, doc. 6.2.

180 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 33r.

181 Ladić, *Registri porečkih bilježnika*, 97–98, doc. 60, and 159–160, doc. 105.

privilege reserved for those who had the means to pay for it and one is led to believe that the majority of citizens could indeed afford to pay these minimal fines.

Deviations from the Script

The cases that were punished with a fine greater than the “standard tariff” were regularly those that in some way deviated from the script: they skipped an act, avenged an injury disproportionately violently or affronted a person above their social standing.

For example, Andreolo de Luna struck Anthony Claudus from Rovinj with a jug in a tavern in Poreč for an undisclosed reason. According to the accuser and three eyewitnesses, Andreolo said absolutely nothing to Anthony before violently attacking him.¹⁸² Thus, the script was not respected and the promulgated fine reflected this deviation: Andreolo was punished with six pounds of pennies.¹⁸³

Most numerous deviations from the script are those in which the administered physical punishment exceeded the tolerable limits of violence, especially in relation to the suffered *parvipensio*. Sfetina’s butchering of Primus for a classic tavern altercation exemplifies this practice perfectly, but there is a multitude of similar, less extreme examples. Thus, in the case of a tavern brawl between Nicholas of Philip and Bastian the Slav that took place in a tavern in Rovinj, the former was punished with a fine of ten pounds and the latter with four pounds of pennies due to the incurred injuries, namely the broken orbital bone that required feldsher’s interference.¹⁸⁴ For comparison’s sake, a regular tavern brawl in Rovinj was punished with three pounds, similarly to the tariff of Poreč.¹⁸⁵

It was already Aristotle who argued that one cannot be angry at their superiors due to the fact that they cannot be gainfully attacked.¹⁸⁶ This line of thought was supported by the Venetian podestàs as well in a bid to uphold the existing hierarchies of power and social *status quo*. For example, when Bartholomew the tanner verbally attacked friar Anthony the schoolmaster, this affront was not tolerated in the same manner as other, “standard” performances of anger that ended in act two. Thus, Bartholomew was punished with a fine of ten pounds of pennies, five times higher than the “standard tariff” for *verba iniuriosa*. The podestà’s verdict even details the reasoning behind such a high fine: “seeing that friar Anthony is a revered person, we condemn [Bartholomew] in these writings to a sentence of ten pounds of pennies by the virtue of our discretionary power.”¹⁸⁷ Similar was the case of Blaise the son of Tonse Marich who dared to strike his own father with a rock. In es-

182 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 286v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 22 in the appendix.

183 Case 22 in the appendix.

184 Case 9 in the appendix.

185 Nicholas of late John got into an argument with Henry of late Mondini over a chest that was thrown in a well. When act two ended, Nicholas hit Henry with a bottle. This classic ritual of confrontation was punished with a fine of three pounds for the man who opened act three, in this case Nicholas. *Acta potestatis Rubini*, fol. 61v.

186 [N]o one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power.” Aristotle, “Rhetoric,” 38, book 1. See also, Averill, *Anger*, 81; Rosenwein, *Anger*, 194.

187 Case 11 in the appendix.

sence, this conflict between father and son followed the classic script of the play: Tonse hit a horse on its behind with an axe; Blaise, who was obviously emotionally invested with the horse, saw this action as a *parvipensio* and opened act two by calling his father a fool; the two began arguing and the play ended in act three as Blaise hurled a rock at his father's head.¹⁸⁸ Thus, a standard tariff would prescribe a fine of either two or three pounds. Blaise, however, was punished with five pounds of pennies, as he dared to attack his superior, his own father nonetheless. Podestà Simon Ferro explained his reasoning in the publicly read verdict: “moreover, that Blaise hit the said Tonse Marich, his father, deserves to be punished with a much greater fine than if he had hit some other person outside of his household.”¹⁸⁹

On the other hand, the podestàs supported performances of “just anger”—in Lactantius' sense of the term, as an emotion arising “in order that discipline be preserved, morals corrected”—directed at one's inferiors: masters at their servants, husbands at their wives.¹⁹⁰ Thus, when Martin de Brigna, a servant of Francino from Višnjan, accused his very patron of punching him and hurling a rock at him, the case was processed, but ultimately dismissed. The conflict in fact played out according to the script: Francino began milking Martin's cow without his permission; Martin decoded the act as a *parvipensio* and approached his master saying “you have made yourself the master of my animals!”; act two ended with Martin putting his hands on a dagger, a threatening gesture; finally, Francino ushered in act three and beat up his servant.¹⁹¹ In a standard setting, Francino would be charged for this performance a standard tariff of three to five pounds. However, since he performed anger at his inferior who dared to challenge his better, the case was dropped and Francino was absolved.¹⁹² Much in the same way, Paul Iedrezich was not punished for beating his wife *irato animo*.¹⁹³ In cases such as these, anger was considered as “disciplining”, and therefore non-detrimental to public order and, consequently, non-condemnable.¹⁹⁴

Finally, some Venetian podestàs upheld a gendered emotionology whereas others did not. For example, the podestà of Buzet Simone Ferro punished Agneta for calling Margarita a whore with a harsh fine of four pounds of pennies, four times the standard tariff for men.¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, this practice is not attested in Matteo Gradonigo's administration of justice. This podestà of Poreč punished women charged with *verba iniuriosa* with lesser

188 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 164r–164v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 23 in the appendix.

189 Case 23 in the appendix.

190 See fns 39–40.

191 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 257v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 24 in the appendix.

192 This is known by way of two facts: first, there is no note on the margin next to the accusation that usually indicates the promulgated fine; second, there is no official verdict in the *Sententie criminalis* section of the book.

193 *Acta potestatis Pinguenti 1*, fol. 178v. The records of the case are edited *in extenso* in the appendix; see case 25 in the appendix.

194 Literature of women's position in the patriarchal societies of the European Middle Ages is abundant and Istrian communities are no exception in this context. See for example, Ermanno Orlando, “Cultura patriarcale e violenza domestica,” in *Violenza alle donne: Una prospettiva medievale*, ed. Anna Esposito, Franco Franceschi and Gabriella Piccinni, Bologna: Il Mulino, 13–36.

195 Case 14 in the appendix.

finis: one pound of pennies instead of the regular two pounds adjudicated to men.¹⁹⁶ Even the podestà of Rovinj, who had to adjudicate the lone case of a woman participating in a tavern brawl, did not resort to higher fines to women. Instead he punished Ursa the same way he punished her husband Blaise Pasqualini, with two pounds of pennies. The official verdict did state that the verdict was promulgated in order “to provide an example to other women that they should not and dare not altercate or engage in brawls, which are a cause of great evil, especially with men.”¹⁹⁷ Thus, gendered emotionology was enforced more rigidly only by some Venetian rectors.

Anger vs. Hatred

The delegated podestàs differentiated between violence driven by anger and that stemming from a rather different emotion: hatred. Namely, anger was conceptualized as a sudden burst of emotion directed at vindicating a personally suffered injury. As such, one could not be angry at people with whom there was no prior contact.¹⁹⁸ Thus, when Matthew from Hum and Paul Jacob the shoemaker verbally assaulted Bonaldus from Vrsar in a tavern in Poreč for no other reason than simply for him being from Vrsar, taunting him and his friend with the words “traitors and thieves from Vrsar!” and threatening him with unsheathed daggers, the conflict could not be conceptualized as one performed through anger. Consequently, the podestà’s sentence featured a unique line reserved for such non-anger-driven confrontations: “roused by the devil.”¹⁹⁹ The adjudicated fine was also a bit higher than the usual tariff for indirect violence, three instead of the standard two pounds of pennies.

Moreover, anger was conceptualized as a momentary burst and the violence committed *irato animo* therefore had to be spontaneous, born on the spur of the moment. Accordingly, if a confrontation featured a premediated assault, it could not be interpreted as a standard performance of anger. For example, both Martin of Shkodër and John the Slav planned their assaults on their victims, waiting for them in ambush with arms in their hands. Such attacks do not fit the profile of anger-driven violence and this was recognized by the podestàs: the official sentences of both men featured the same line as Matthew’s verdict: “spiritu diabolico instigato.”²⁰⁰ Since Martin of Shkodër and John the Slav killed their victims, both men were sentenced to death by beheading.²⁰¹ Even premeditated attempts at

196 There are only two such cases: Martina the wife of Mathew Sepich was punished with one pound for insulting master Peter the barber with the insult “you are a son of a whore” (“Magistrum Petrum, qui iniuriabatur dicte Martine, dicendo: ‘Putana!’ Martina respondebat: ‘Tu he ben fio de una putana!’”). *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 244r (accusation and defense), fol. 292r (verdict); and Billoca was punished with the same fine for insulting Colleta, the wife of Raphael the town crier with the insult “traitor.” *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 265r (accusation) and fol. 295r (the verdict).

197 Case 2 in the appendix.

198 “Anger is always concerned with individuals—Callias or Socrates—whereas hatred is also directed against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot.” Aristotle, “Rhetorics,” 62, book 2, chap. 4; Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 6, 297, part 1–2, question 46, article 7, reply to objection 3.

199 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 301v. The records of the case are edited in extenso in the appendix; see case 27 in the appendix.

200 Cases 28 and 29 in the appendix.

201 In John’s case, the sentence was indeed carried out. Martin, however, had escaped from the prison in Rovinj; thus, he was

violence were punished more harshly. A Francis de Varga planned to assassinate Bertolutto the cobbler and his son Anthony in Poreč for some undisclosed reason, most probably perusing a *vendetta*. He secretly climbed the walls of Poreč at night, but he was caught before he managed to launch his attack. For this premediated assault, De Varga was banished from Poreč for ten years.²⁰² Thus, the Venetian rectors clearly differentiated between violence that resulted in the performance of anger and that which was born from a different emotion, one “much worse and much more grave than anger”: hatred.²⁰³

***Irato animo* as a Legal Category**

The very word “anger,” however, was rarely invoked in the official records. The contemporary words and phrases for anger—*ira*, *furor*, *irato animo*, *furore ductus*, et cetera—appear extremely rarely in the official records. Interestingly, when they do crop up, they are regularly invoked not by the defendant as is usually the case in other late medieval and Early Modern European regions, but by the accusers.²⁰⁴ For example, Julian from Sisto accused his attacker Andrew of charging at him with a javelin *irato animo*; he certainly did not choose to employ this word in order to alleviate the charges he was pressing against him.²⁰⁵ This specific use of this emotion word demonstrates that anger was not conceptualized as a mitigating factor in the communities of late medieval Venetian Istria. This was not the case in Venetian *Terraferma* dominions such as Vicenza. There, as was masterfully narrated by Claudio Povolo, anger was employed as a legal category in order to mitigate one’s punishment for a violent crime.²⁰⁶ Thus, when Marcantonio Trissino defended himself in court for the assassination of Giulio Cesare Trissino, his main strategy was to point out that the murder had not been premeditated, but that it had come on the spur of the moment, born out of an explosive outburst of anger when he laid his eyes on his father’s murderer.²⁰⁷ In the end, anger was indeed recognized as a mitigating factor and Marcantonio was not sentenced to a capital punishment, but merely confined to Bergamo for four years and banished from all the lands between Mincio and Piave—a sentence that was ultimately lifted by the Venetian *luogotenente* of Friuli.²⁰⁸

Marcantonio’s defense would not work in 15th-century Venetian Istria. The lone example of the phrase “out of anger” used in someone’s defense in an attempt at exculpation comes

perpetually banished from the town and, if caught, he was to be beheaded. Cases 28 and 29 in the appendix.

202 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fol. 302r. Only the podestà’s verdict is recorded and it is edited in extenso in the appendix. See case 30 in the appendix.

203 “Unde manifestum est quod odium est multo deterius et gravius quam ira.” Thomas Aquinas, “Summa theologiae,” vol. 6, 296, part 1–2, question 46, article 6.

204 Rosenwein, *Anger*, 74–75 for some examples from England and German-speaking lands.

205 Case 4 in the appendix.

206 Claudio Povolo, *Furore: Elaborazione di un’emozione nella seconda metà del Cinquecento*, Nordest nuova serie 145, Verona: Cierre, 2015, 33–49.

207 Povolo, *Furore*, 94, 98. Giulio Cesare murdered Ciro in front of his son Marcantonio who was at the time around twelve years old. Povolo, *Furore*, 63–65.

208 Povolo, *Furore*, 49. On the Venetian *luogotenente* of Friuli, see Roberto Giummolé, “I poteri del *luogotenente* della patria del Friuli nel primo cinquantennio 1420–1470,” *Memorie storiche forogiuliesi*, 45, 1962–1964, 57–124.

from Therus de Maure, but even here the invocation of this syntagm backfired as the man ended up sentenced to a fine greater than the one prescribed by the standard tariff: ten pounds instead of the standard three for a petty brawl; the podestà even explicated his stance: “considering the great contumacy of the said Therus, who so angrily and disgracefully hit the aforesaid [Marin].”²⁰⁹ Therefore, accusing someone of acting *irato animo* was much more often conceptualized not as a mitigating, but as an aggravating factor. That is, anger was seen as an emotion erupting only in those cases where the performance deviated from the script. In this way, the conceptualization of anger in late medieval Istria came close to the view of Pseudo-Chrysostom who argued that “[a]nger with cause is not anger but judgment.”²¹⁰

Ultimately, however, it was in the podestà’s discretion to decide whether the ritual of confrontation was played by the script or not. For example, Jacob de Facina accused Mathew Boldon of indirect violence, threats and insults, and one of the eyewitnesses produced by the accuser confirmed that “the said Matthew came at that instant and *irato animo* insulted the said sir Jacob with many dishonorable words.”²¹¹ Upon reviewing the entire episode and hearing Mathew’s defense, the podestà discerned that this was in fact a textbook example of a ritual of confrontation that stopped in its second act: Jacob was caught slandering Mathew by bringing up the sad state of his olive groves, Jacob heard him, interpreted the act as a *parvipensio* and launched a counterattack in the form of indirect violence.²¹² Since the ritual did not progress beyond the second act, Mathew was punished with a standard fine of two pounds of pennies regardless of the fact that the verdict parroted how he threatened the accuser *irato animo*.²¹³ Similar is the case in which Paul Iedrezich was accused of beating his wife and his brother *irato animo*. When the podestà had heard Paul’s defense and the eyewitness accounts, he concluded that Paul had not struck his brother, but only beaten his wife. Therefore, he was acquitted of the charges as his *ira* was conceptualized as “a righteous one.”²¹⁴ Thus, whether or not the emotion word had been uttered in the court, it was ultimately up to podestà to decide whether the performance of anger had been enacted “according to reason” or not.

Before concluding, it must be noted that the performances of anger dealt with in this paper are just one specific type of the enactment of this complex emotion; it is safe to infer that different coexistent varieties of *ira* were performed differently. Mother’s love-inflected anger at her toddler’s disobedience, a teenager’s sorrow-ridden anger due to unrequited love, or a citizen’s frustration-driven anger at the Venetian Senate for not sending the syn-

209 Case 5 in the appendix.

210 See fn. 43.

211 *Acta potestatis Parentii*, fols. 279v–280r. The records of the case are edited in extenso in the appendix; see case 26 in the appendix.

212 Case 26 in the appendix.

213 Case 26 in the appendix.

214 Case 25 in the appendix.

dics to Istria for over nine years most certainly manifested in other ways.²¹⁵ Alas, the available primary sources allow an insight only in this one, specific context of the performance of anger—the rituals of interpersonal conflict.

In this aspect, the people of late medieval Venetian Istria performed anger in much the same way as their counterparts in other parts of Latin Christendom, that is, by playing a part in the dramaturgy of conflict according to a set script. These performances played out in a typical context outlined already by Thomas Aquinas: anger was a temporary emotion that came in bursts, aroused by a *parvipensio* to one's *excellencia* with the aim of vindicating the suffered injury through "a just retribution", always in the form of violence. An important role in directing these performances was played by the Venetian delegated podestàs who were alone in charge of adjudicating the cases of interpersonal anger-fueled conflict and deciding in which cases the anger was "just" and in which it was not. Through their promulgated fines, the rectors upheld a specific emotionology: violence channeled through anger was always punished if the action had been performed between people of equal status; it was punished more harshly if one dared to attack their better; and it was wholly tolerated if one was "disciplining" those socially beneath them. If violence was deemed disproportionate to the suffered injury, especially if cold weapons were used and blood was shed, the pecuniary fines were high, discouraging people from performing anger "more than right reason demands."²¹⁶ However, those cases that were judged as "played according to the script"—the majority of them—were punished with very small, symbolic pecuniary fines. This leniency reveals that the apparent intolerance toward this emotion was but a thin veneer masking a more open attitude toward *ira* and its role in upholding social hierarchies and order. Thus, the conflicted attitude toward anger emerges in late medieval Venetian Istria as well: *ira* was simultaneously an object and a means of social control.²¹⁷ Anger was also a medium for upholding and defending one's personal honor and *fama*, but it came with an upkeep in the guise of the rectors' promulgated pecuniary fines; performing this emotion productively was a commodity that needed to be paid for.

Unfortunately, the analyzed primary sources cannot answer the question of the discrepancy between Ferro's more markedly gendered emotionology and the two other podestàs

215 "Item cum sint anni octo quod syndici non fuerunt ad partes Istrie et fideles nostri essent valde contenti quod irent." Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Deliberazioni, Misti, reg. 48, fol. 18r. The syndics (orig. *sindici*) were "extraordinary officials" intermittently delegated to Venetian dominions "to investigate the conduct of regular officials," that is, the regularly delegated rectors. Monique O'Connell et al., eds., *Rulers of Venice, 1332-1524: Governanti di Venezia, 1332-1524: Interpretations, Methods, Database*, New York: ACLS Humanities, Glossary, s.v. "Sindici." <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.90021> [last access: 1 November 2020].

216 "Et sic potest malum in ira inveniri: quando scilicet aliquis irascitur plus vel minus, praeter rationem rectam." Thomas Aquinas, "Summa theologiae," vol. 10, 272, p. 2–2, question 158, article 1.

217 On the concept of social control, best defined as "all forms by which historical agents define deviant behavior and react to it," see Peter Spierenburg, "Social Control and History: An Introduction," in *Social Control*, vol. 1, 1–10. The definition comes from Martin Dinges, "The Uses of Justice as a Form of Social Control in Early Modern Europe," in *Social Control*, vol. 1, 161. Gerd Schwerhoff famously argued that violence in premodern Europe was simultaneously an object and a means of social control; I have extended his argument to the performance of anger. Schwerhoff, "Social Control," 238–239.

evaluation of female anger. Whether Ferro's attitude toward women's performance of anger stemmed primarily from his own disposition and world views, or if it was mainly influenced by the local population who advised him in these cases cannot be inferred. The only possible way to tackle these questions is to analyze several books of different rectors serving in the same commune in close temporal proximity. Such analysis would also shed more light on other quintessential aspects of Venetian justice administration in their late medieval dominions, namely the question of who influenced the functioning of the criminal justice system more profoundly: the distinguished locals who served as advisors and upheld the values of the community, or the individual Venetian nobleman who enforced his own worldviews upon the subjected commune. For late medieval Istria, the only case study that would allow such an investigation is Koper and this is the direction which future research ought to be directed toward.

Finally, in the Istrian communities subjected to Venice anger did not acquire a pronounced juridical dimension as it did in the regions of *ius commune*. Similar was the case in the nearby Trieste where anger was also not conceptualized as a mitigating factor.²¹⁸ This situation can be ascribed to Venetian influence as the *Commune Venetiarum* famously shunned the juridical tradition of the *ius commune* and the *promissio maleficiorum* of Jacopo Tiepolo did not treat *ira* as a specific legal category.²¹⁹ However, with the 15th-century Venetian expansion over the communes steeped in the judicial culture of the *ius commune* such as Verona, Vincenza, Brescia and Padua, Venice slowly began appropriating their legal traditions.²²⁰ Thus, a hypothesis stemming from this inference is that anger would indeed acquire a juridical dimension in Istria during the Early Modern Era due to Venice's gradual acceptance of the legal culture of *ius commune*. This hypothesis can be tested by analyzing an immensely rich and under-researched treasure trove of primary sources, hundreds of books of the acts of Istrian podestàs that are preserved for Novigrad, Labin, the Captainate of Rašpor and Koper dating from the sixteenth century onwards.²²¹

218 Miriam Davide, "La giustizia criminale," in *Medioevo a Trieste: Istituzioni, arte, società nel Trecento*, ed. Paolo Cammarosano, Rome: Viella, 2009, 230.

219 Iacopo Bertaldo, *Splendor Venetorum civitatis consuetudinum*, ed. Francesco Schupfer, Bologna: Monti, 1901, 13; Lamberto Pansolli, La gerarchia delle fonti di diritto nella legislazione medievale Veneziana, Milan: Giuffrè, 1970, 13, 21. *Promissio maleficiorum* is edited in numerous editions of Venetian statutes. See for example, *Statutorum, legum ac iurium ducali Domini Venetorum*, ed. Rizzardo Griffo, Venice: Evangelista Deuchino, 1619, 129–139, esp. 132, article XI on violent attacks. On Tiepolo's *promissio*, see Giorgio Zordan, *Lordinamento giuridico veneziano*, Padua: Imprimerie, 2005, 154–155.

220 James S. Grubb, *Firstborn of Venice: Vicenza in the Early Renaissance State*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, 28–46.

221 The books of acts of the podestàs of Novigrad and Labin are held in the Croatian State Archives in Pazin, HR-DAPA-4 and HR-DAPA-2 respectively. The acts of the podestàs of Koper are held in the State Archive in Venice and they are indexed in Francesco Majer, *Inventario dell' antico archivio municipale di Capodistria*, Koper: Cobol & Priora, 1904. The acts of the Captains of Rašpor are held in the private archive of the Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria in Trieste. See Grazia Tatò, *Guida al patrimonio documentario della Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria (secc. 13.-20.)*, Quaderni 3, Trieste: Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria, 2017, 51–70.

SAŽETAK

Irato animo: Performanse gnjeva u kasnosrednjovjekovnoj Istri

Autor analizira performanse gnjeva u kontekstu interpersonalnih konflikata u zajednicama kasnosrednjovjekovne Istre pod vlašću Venecije. Prvi dio rada određuje teorijski, metodološki i konceptualni okvir na kojem se istraživanje temelji te svjedoči kako je europsko srednjovjekovlje naslijedilo moralnu tradiciju koja je gnjev doživljavala kao emociju dostojnu prijezira, ali i vrijednu hvale. Drugi dio donosi rezultate analize više od stotine slučajeva interpersonalnih konflikata u kojima su performanse gnjeva odigrale presudnu ulogu. Autor zaključuje da je uloga gnjeva u tim društvima bila usko povezana s obranom osobne časti i očuvanjem postojećeg društvenog poretka. Premda gnjev nije dobio naglašeniju pravnu dimenziju, mletačke su ga vlasti ipak prešutno tolerirale ukoliko se smatralo da je pravilno izveden uz pridržavanje točno određenog scenarija osobnih sukoba.