Abstract of a thesis submitted in Michaelmas Term, 1979, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by David Whitton, Wolfson College.

The thesis is an examination of the political behaviour in Rome of the dynastic Tuscan popes and of the Reform Papacy. The narrative sources for diverse reasons over-emphasise the discord between the Papacy and the local nobility, and interpret it in terms of the reforming policies of these later popes and their attempt to break the power of the local nobility as a means of assuring their independence and their concern to recover usurped lands and rights. The documentary evidence suggests that this was not the case. The popes made little consistent effort to exclude local influences from their own elections and no real effort to restore their own territorial position at the expense of the nobility. A series of detailed chapters concerning the leading noble families shows that they were only sporadically hostile to the popes, who secured their support by gifts of office and money, and the recognition of their property rights. Equally the popes were assisted by the fragmentation of the older and more powerful families which left scope for the advancement of newer families and made such opposition as did arise less dangerous than it might have been. The most serious opposition is likely to have been directed primarily against the House of Canossa rather than the reform popes. The work also investigates the extent to which the popes were obliged to rely on assistance from the Normans of Southern Italy to control Rome, and concludes that the alliance was of limited significance. In the final chapter it is suggested that the evolution of the Curia did not exclude local influences from the Papacy, and the prevailing trends in papal policy, essentially conciliatory, are summarised.
PAPAL POLICY IN ROME, 1012-1124

Abstract of a thesis submitted in Michaelmas Term, 1979, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by David Whitton, Wolfson College.

This thesis is concerned with the political behaviour of the Tusculan and reform popes in Rome during the eleventh and early twelfth centuries. This period witnessed an immense development in the standing of the Papacy from a shadowy primacy to the effective headship of the Western Church, and this development was attended by a prolonged and violent conflict with the kings of Germany over the control which the popes wished to establish over the Church. It remains an open question how far that conflict was linked with the reforms within the Church with which the Papacy was associated.

Historians have tended to interpret the local policy of the reform popes in terms of this conflict, emphasising the extent to which these popes freed themselves from local influences and broke their local opponents. This interpretation is implicit in much of the contemporary source material for, as is seen in the first chapter, almost all of the contemporary narratives over-emphasised the hostility, latent and open, between the popes and the local nobility. Often they were written far from Rome, and were limited in their interest as well as their knowledge. Some were written with clearly polemical intentions, above all Bonizo of Sutri's Liber ad Amicum which was written largely to justify and excuse Gregory VII after his expulsion from Rome. Many writers outside Rome were mainly interested in Roman events because of the lights and shadows which they might cast upon papal elections, and thus upon obedience to the pope, and this makes some of their information
dubious. The same is true of one of our most detailed local accounts, that by Cardinal Pandulf.

As it happens, there has survived a very considerable body of documentary evidence which helps cast some further light on the relations between popes and nobles. Much of it is charter evidence from individual churches and monasteries around Rome. From these it is possible to understand the structure and interests of many but not all of the leading Roman families. Some of the developments which they reveal — occasional confiscations and renunciations, but also the granting of leases on favourable terms — are unlikely to have been minutely controlled by the popes. On the other hand the general trends which they reveal can be taken as some indication of papal policy in so far as they were allowed to occur. The area around Rome was the property corporately of the Church but individually of numerous churches and laymen, and the very fact that there is extremely little evidence for direct action by the Papacy itself as distinct from the churches which together constituted the Roman Church is itself illuminating; it suggests that we are likely to find an altogether less dynamic picture than that common among historians.

The first chapter is devoted to the problems of evidence just summarised. The succeeding chapter looks at the papal elections of the period. Here it is suggested that the elective process was comparatively informal, and that attempts to define it in a way which excluded local interests, as in the Election Decree of Nicholas II, did not gain much observance. Local lay influences can be seen in almost every papal election during the period with the exception of the nominations made by the Emperor Henry III, and there it is likely that the nominations won some degree of local support, perhaps
in opposition to the Tusculan alternative; otherwise the German control could not have survived even until the minority of Henry IV.

The five chapters which follow constitute the main and most novel part of the thesis. In them the relations between the popes and most of the main Roman noble families are examined; of the leading families, only the Corsi are excluded, through lack of sufficient evidence. The Tusculans, Colonna, Stephanians, Octavians, Pierleone, Frangipane, and Tebaldi all receive detailed attention, as do two individuals, Count Gerard of Galeria and Cambius de Praefecto. Historians have tended to write in a somewhat generalised way about these families on the implied assumption that they formed large kinship groups. Thus actions towards a member of each family are often taken as actions against the family as a whole, and equally the behaviour of these families has often been interpreted according to the behaviour of only some of their members. In these chapters it is suggested that the larger families such as the Tusculans and Octavians in fact fell into smaller groupings; the result is that their behaviour and treatment can be seen to have been far from uniform; equally, just because these families fragmented, they represented a far lesser danger to the Reform Papacy than has been suggested.

One cannot properly understand the disputes between individual churches, the nobility, and the Papacy, often a three-cornered process, without appreciating the extremely diverse grounds on which these disputes took place. Accordingly each of these chapters looks at the land-holding of each family, as well as its membership. On this basis it can be seen that the popes were far from consistent in supporting churches in their attempts to recover usurpations, and equally that the evidence of usurpation presented by churches was not
always satisfactory. It may well have been the necessity to win the imperial good will which obliged Benedict VIII and Nicholas II to support the imperial abbey of Farfa's claims against the holders of castles near the monastery, and these claims were not always well founded. The processes which took place do not in fact represent a deliberate papal attempt to break the respective families, and some popes, notably Gregory VII, were as ready to support the local nobles against the monastery as others had been to do the reverse. Much of the evidence which has been adduced in support of the view that the reform popes deliberately set out to break the power of the older landed families in fact rests upon evidence which is either suspect or does not in fact bear upon the families in question. Against this must be set the wealth of evidence which suggests an altogether more complaisant relationship, in which the nobles seldom directly opposed the popes, and in which their support or quiescence was rewarded with office, land, and money, and sometimes by a recognition of their usurpations through their conversion into leasehold property at nominal rents.

The fragmentation of the larger and more powerful families left a vacuum in the city which made room for the rise of newer families which were able to assume an importance out of all proportion to their landed wealth. The Pierleone and Frangipane are both examples of such families, and it can be seen in chapters five and six, which are devoted to them, that their behaviour followed differing patterns. The Pierleone were consistent supporters of the reformers, though perhaps less important than has sometimes been thought. In this support, they were assisted by a comparatively invulnerable position, and were rewarded by office and lands on leasehold. The Frangipane were less consistent, probably because they held lands
from an earlier date and were therefore obliged to divide their allegiance during the Wibertine schism in order to safeguard their possessions. Their rewards were comparatively meagre, perhaps because the popes had little to give once the Pierleone were rewarded. In the mid-twelfth century the Frangipane secured extensive parts of the Tuscan lands, but earlier popes were unable to resort to this expedient precisely because the history of their relations with the Tusculans suggests that they were reluctant to alienate them through the purchases and confiscations which only later occurred. It is probably this inability to reward the Frangipane which accounts for their unrest under Gelasius II.

Chapter seven is an examination of the chief figures in the opposition to the reformers in the third quarter of the eleventh century — Count Gerard of Galeria and Cencius de Praefecto with his descendants, the Tebaldi. Gerard was a son of Margrave Rainer of Tuscany, and it is likely that his opposition can be explained in terms of the losses that he and his family suffered at the hands of the House of Canossa which had succeeded to the Margraviate and which established a practical dominance over the Papacy during the minority of Henry IV. Cencius de Praefecto may have been a relation, and it is suggested that his opposition to Alexander II and to Gregory VII was over the possession of lands which had been formerly held by Count Gerard. Eventually Paschal II settled a dispute between Cencius’s grandsons and the monastery of St. Paul’s concerning lands in the same area by assuring them the leasehold on favourable terms. The opposition which Gerard and Cencius offered was exceptional, and this is probably because it was directed essentially against the House of Canossa in a conflict over which the popes themselves had little control.
These central chapters suggest that the relations between popes and nobles were normally pacific, though also unstable, that there was no large scale attempt by the Papacy to recover Church property or establish its own dominance, and that recovery was often by gentle means, assured by the granting of leasehold, compensation, and office, though a few instances of confiscation can be discerned. These took place as a consequence of revolt rather than its prelude. Broadly the popes did not go out of their way to provoke the landed nobility; the very fragmentation of the older families gave them enough elbow-room in Rome and most of the opposition that they encountered should be seen as the defence of specific rights rather than as an attempt to maintain the domination over the Papacy which had passed in 1046.

The two final chapters re-examine more familiar territory in the light of these discoveries. In chapter eight the relations between the popes and the Normans of Southern Italy are examined. It is quite frequently suggested that the main object of the alliance between popes and Normans was the control of Rome; here it is suggested that the Treaty of Melfi can be understood largely in terms of the desire of the reformers to establish papal control over the Southern Italian Church. Relations between the popes and Normans were often strained, sometimes beyond breaking point, and the main benefit of the alliance to the Papacy was the financial support and the asylum which it gave, as well as the fact that it was withheld from their opponents. The military advantages of the alliance, only sporadically secured, were primarily directed against imperial forces from outside Rome, and were not an ingredient in the papal control of Rome. Some popes, particularly Urban II, were anxious that they should not be employed there, and there can be little doubt that their
intrusion into Rome would have damaged perhaps irretrievably the somewhat intricate nexus of interests on which good papal relations with the nobility depended.

The final chapter is concerned with the papal administration during the period. These are the years in which the papal administration was extended over the Western Church at large, and the developments which this entailed are sometimes thought to have withdrawn it, perhaps consciously, from local influences. So far as the workings of that administration in Rome are concerned, this is unlikely to be true. Local men were still appointed to the Cardinalate, and the high proportion of foreign cardinals are unlikely to have been particularly influential in local affairs precisely because they did not know the local situation and were often absent on legation. During this period an increasing proportion of each church's business was conducted by subordinate officials rather than the cardinals themselves.

In the Chancery the evolution of a new script does not, as once thought, indicate the exclusion of Roman scribes who continued to be employed. In the Chamber, the moneys which the Papacy was able to raise outside Rome were locally significant in that they could be put to political use, as wages and bribes, and freed the popes from the obligation to press too hard on their local sources of revenue; thus Deudsedit's Canon Collection is little concerned with the local rights of the Papacy. This helps to account for the conciliatory behaviour of the popes towards the local nobility, and equally for the comparative lack of opposition which they encountered.

The thesis concludes with a sketch of the practice of justice in Rome during these years. Local men played a major part in the administration of justice, though within a highly flexible system
which enabled cases to be delegated at the choice of the pope. Sometimes political motives can be discerned behind such delegation, as when Pierleone was made one of the judges between the Octavians, favourable to Paschal II, and the monastery of Farfa which was not. High legal costs are likely to have inhibited churches from making vigorous reclamation, especially since the outcome was often tempered either by compensation or by a favourable lease. There was thus no major onslaught either on the lands or on the role of the Roman nobility, who remained locally prominent within the Church and often influential. It is this which accounts for the comparative tranquillity of Rome despite the turmoil of foreign invasion and of the Investiture Controversy, for ultimately there was a nexus of common interests between the local nobility and the Church which the reform popes were careful not to destroy.
PAPAL POLICY IN ROME, 1012-1124

by

DAVID WHITTON

A thesis submitted for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Oxford

Wolfson College
Michaelmas Term, 1979.


PREFACE

My first encounter with the Roman history of this period was as an undergraduate, reading the Special Subject on Gregory VII and Henry IV. Wanting to understand something of the circumstances behind the celebrated kidnap of the pope, and then of the striking loyalty in Rome which enabled him to hold out for so long against the royal army, I turned first to Gregorovius's classic history of medieval Rome. I was struck by the power and coherence of his narrative, but left wondering; I could not understand how the Reformers could have survived in Rome at all if the opposition to them were so deeply entrenched and implacable, the behaviour of the popes themselves so provocative in its attack upon their opponents' position.

This thesis has grown out of a long preoccupation with that problem. A study of the Reform Popes demanded a knowledge of the situation ante, and the inception of the Tusculan control of the Papacy seemed to make a sensible starting point, especially as the family remained politically significant long after its loss of the office. A concluding point was more difficult; no sooner was some measure of tranquillity obtained after the Investiture Conflict than a fresh schism of equivalent significance was launched. Eventually I settled upon the death of Calixtus II, but I have drawn upon evidence from the succeeding years and the terminal date is not rigid.

Any historian has the choice of presenting his material either in a broadly chronological framework or according to some other conceit. Both methods have their drawbacks, both, perhaps, a tendency to point a conclusion more firmly in one or other direction.
The chronological method gives more play to the ephemeral, the analytic more to the stable. Since I wanted to investigate what was clearly an account, in the end, of success, I chose the latter method, setting out the elements of that success. Consequently the work consists first of an examination of papal elections to see how far the papacy really was under local domination, and how far it escaped from local factors; then a series of studies of the relations between the papacy and most of the more important families; then a study of the extent to which the papacy relied on help from outside Rome, from the Normans, as a means of controlling the city; and finally a study of the papal administration during the period. This scheme has entailed losses; for reasons explained during the introductory chapter on the source material, it is not possible to reconstruct the interests and behaviour of all the really significant Roman families. I am especially conscious that there is no account of the Corsi, who played a major role during the twelfth century and probably before. Then, because I was attempting to examine what seemed a long term problem, I have not examined the role played by Godfrey of Lorraine between 1058 and 1062; there can be no doubt that it proved decisive to the Reformers at that stage, but because direct military aid from the dukes of Tuscany was practically restricted to these years I have not attempted to introduce it into the picture.

The finished study bears a close relationship to the problem which first involved me in the subject. It is a study of the politics of Rome during these years, not one of the Reform movement in Rome, nor one of the Papal States, nor one of the city of Rome itself.
At this point it is customary to thank supervisors, and exculpate them from what follows. I cannot adequately thank Karl Leyser for the immense pains which he has taken in helping me to write this work, or for the shrewd, kindly, informed criticism which he has been able to offer; this would indeed be a better work had I been able to follow all of it. I am also most grateful to Peter Partner for the loan of rare books, and to the British School at Rome and Wolfson College, Oxford, for supporting me during its writing, as Rome Scholar and as a Junior Research Fellow. I owe debts to more librarians and archivists than can be mentioned, and would like to record particular gratitude to the courteous, efficient, staff of the Vatican Archives and Library.
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- Palestrina
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- Velletri
- Veroli
- Ninfa
- Porto
- Ostia
- Albano
- Ariccia
- Tiber
- Roma
- Terracina
- Gaeta

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Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken.


Regesta Chartarum Italiæ.


RerumItalicarum Scriptores


CHAPTER 1

SOURCES AND PROBLEMS

Some time after 1121, an unknown annalist, probably Roman, wrote an account of the negotiations between Pope Paschal II and King Henry V of Germany and of the violence that disrupted them. He based his account largely on the Registers of the pope, now lost, and doubtless also on his own experience as an eye-witness. With this grounding, he wrote that the negotiations had been intended to end the discord which had existed between popes and emperors since the time of Gregory VII 'de investiture'. His account provides a salutary corrective to alternative views which emphasise the range and enormity of the issues which lay between the contesting parties. Whatever had been the case in the years during which the struggle unforgottably began, by the time of Paschal II the issue had narrowed to the investiture of the higher clergy by kings - an interpretation supported by the settlement which he reached with King Henry I of England as well as by the area, if not the terms, within which he sought a settlement with the German ruler in 1112.

Turn backwards to the accounts of the controversy between Gregory VII and Henry IV of Germany and we are in a different world. A work like Bonizo of Sutri's Liber ad Amicum expresses an altogether greater strength of feeling about the conflict, and shows that it extended over an altogether wider field than the question of

investitures, which he barely mentions\textsuperscript{1}. Thus he is insistent that
the patriciate, held by Henry IV and his father, gave no right to
nominate the pope. Opposition to the pope was portrayed in moral
terms as the natural rejection by the worthy of the followers of
Christ, and that rejection was itself identified with the attempt
by Henry IV and his adherents, as well as by the Roman nobles who
had opposed Gregory VII and his predecessors, as an attempt to
oppress the Church and put it under their own power. Vested
interests gave them supporters - the victims of the newly enforced
legislation against clerical marriage and their relations. All
combined in a struggle which threatened the very survival of the
Church\textsuperscript{2}.

There are obvious differences between this style of writing
and that of the later account of events in 1111. Bonizo's writing
magnifies and coalesces issues so that opposition to the pope, from
whatever source, might be portrayed as part of a grand scheme; by
contrast the later author is interested in the events he describes
in terms of a single issue - that of investiture itself. The
earlier author recounted and perhaps invented narratives which
linked Gregory's opponents, the later one had simply to reproduce
the documents to show how dramatically the emperor had broken his
pledges, and thereby, perhaps, to excuse the pope for yielding
temporarily to force majeure.

The differences in style reflect a very real change in climate
during the years which lay between their writing. Bonizo wrote at

\textsuperscript{1} ed. E. Dummler, M.G.H. \emph{Lib. de lite}, i, 568-620.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., especially at pp. 572, 587, 595, 603.
the blackest moment of the Investiture Contest; Gregory VII had
died in exile, a successor had yet to be elected, and the
imperialist pope, Wibert of Ravenna, appeared to be assured in his
control of Rome. By contrast Henry V, though bringing an army to
Rome to enforce his own coronation and to reach a settlement with
the pope, made no consistent or particularly dangerous attempt to
deny the legitimacy of Paschal II or to supplant him. The
comparative moderation into which the struggle between Papacy and
Empire developed, and the limitation of that struggle to much
narrower issues than before, provides the key to understanding the
variable lights which our narrative sources cast upon Roman affairs.

The prevalent impression to be gained from almost all of the
contemporary accounts of events in Rome is one of turbulence. We
most readily learn of the dramatic events, such as the kidnap of
Gregory VII and Gelasius II, the successive schisms during the
middle years of the eleventh century, the siege of Rome, the forced
settlement with Henry V, and the bitter dispute concerning the
nomination of a prefect in 1116. For all the prevalence of the
impression, it is obviously worth asking whether or not that
impression is one based on what was exceptional in Rome, not what
was constant there. Indeed, when we consider the nature of the
literary evidence it becomes reasonably clear that the
preoccupations of the respective authors effectually shaped the
information which they recorded into what is likely to be a very
incomplete account.

Much of our information comes from chroniclers writing far
distant from Rome and sometimes well after the events which they
record. As the Papacy gradually extended its influence over the
Western Church, most notably after the accession of Leo IX, it
was natural for French chroniclers to join the German ones, already interested through successive German interventions in Italy, in recording what they could of the more obvious landmarks of papal history. Yet if there were a ready interest in such matters, the means of feeding it remained limited. The chroniclers themselves were seldom the witnesses of the events which they described, while their informants may often have been men who, only fleetingly in Rome, did not really understand or witness all that they recounted. A test case for the type and degree of distortion which might result is readily provided by the accounts of the disturbances of 1044-6 which led to the intervention of Henry III and the displacement of Gregory VI in favour of a German bishop¹. The account of Raoul Glaber, riddled with internal contradictions, is only one of the many non-Roman sources which present the affair in a wholly confused, misleading, way². Even a source such as the annals of Niederaltaich, not written particularly long after the event, implies that at least two popes were still contesting the papacy in 1046³. Forty years later, authors nearer to Rome were also writing as if this had been the case. Thus abbot Desiderius of Montecassino, who is unlikely to have been a witness of the struggle, wrote in his Dialogues that the church appeared to have three popes, and his view was taken over by the chronicler Leo of Ostia⁴. If this account of


² Poole, Art. cit., 211-3.

³ M.G.H. Script., xx, 303.

⁴ Desiderius, M.G.H. Script., xxx, Pt. 2, 1141-2; Chron. Cas., M.G.H. Script., vii, 682-3.
affairs suited both Henry III in justifying the firm control which he established over the Papacy, and the reformers by supplying examples at the very centre of the Church of some of the abuses against which they were struggling, it nonetheless stood in sharp contrast to the actual course of those events so far as they may be known from a contemporary account, which was probably written locally, preserved in a collection of Roman annals. Here the popes were successive rather than simultaneous, and although the manner in which Gregory acquired the papacy per cartulam could itself be taken as a justification of the German intervention there was no reference to any continuing disorder as a further, and perhaps more imperative justification for the intervention.

There are further clear instances of historians outside Rome writing on the basis of defective information. Thus the annals of Pegau, though dating from at least 70 years after the siege of Rome, seem to rest upon an earlier life of Wiprecht of Gurktsch when they state that Gregory VII was rescued by his avunculus, Pierleone. Wiprecht was present at the siege, but the account on which the annalist drew must either itself have been defective, or garbled by the annalist himself. Other evidence makes it unlikely that Pierleone was active as early as 1084, and impossible that he was Gregory's avunculus. Further the annals are, at this point, in obvious error when they claim that Henry IV received the imperial crown from Gregory VII rather than from his own nominee.

2. M.G.H. Script., xvi, 238.
3. This will be discussed in chapter 5 below.
Wibert of Ravenna.  

Interest outside Rome in events there was largely determined by authors' ties, or by those of their superiors, with the Papacy. Thus it is striking that the Chronicle of Montecassino is far more informative on Roman affairs during the years of abbot Desiderius's involvement in them, both as cardinal and pope, than for any other period. There are complex problems of date and authorship here, most of which concern the extent of Peter the Deacon's authorship and alteration of earlier drafts of the chronicle. The sections of the work which are generally agreed to have been written or interpolated by him perhaps point the moral most clearly. Apart from deleting unfavourable references to his own alleged family, the Tusculans, and inserting a number of more favourable references to them, there is very little that bears on papal history either in the interpolations themselves or in what must, as a minimum, be defined as his own contribution to the work. Earlier compilers of the chronicle, Leo of Ostia and the monk Guido, show an altogether greater interest in Roman affairs. They do so, however, in a way which clearly reflects the activities of the source of their

1. M.O.H. Script., xvi, 239.
2. Weawait Hartmut Hoffmann's new edition of the chronicle; for his view that Peter the Deacon's contribution to the earlier drafts was limited, see Das Chronik Vulturnense und die Chronik von Montecassino, Deutsches Archiv., xxii, (1966), particularly at 194-5; for a much more exuberant view of Peter see H-W. Kiebitz, Petrus Diaconus und die Montecassinenser Klosterchronik des Leo von Ostia, Arch. für Urkundenforsch., xiv, (1936), 414-53.
3. For his alterations and interpolations, see below, chapter 3, pp. 77-8.
information, abbot Desiderius himself. Thus, as we have already noted, Leo's account of the events of 1044-6 closely follows that given by Desiderius in his Dialogues, and although there is no extant writing to prove it, his detailed and reliable accounts of the elections of Stephen IX and Nicholas II may well also have come from him. Guido's contribution to the Chronicle is, like Leo's, most full and satisfactory when he is treating of events which directly concerned Montecassino. His account of the succession of Desiderius to the Papacy has been questioned as a partisan attempt to vindicate a process which was in fact bitterly contested\(^1\); whatever the value of the work on the central issue of Desiderius's nomination by Gregory VII, there is no need to doubt the wealth of incidental material concerning the election meetings and subsequent fighting in Rome.

For the intervening period, as also before and after the periods we have mentioned, the chronicle is altogether less helpful on Roman affairs. The election of two abbots to the Papacy, and the activity of one of them in the service of the Papacy, gave a spur to the historical account which seems to have been lacking in the course of less glamorous contacts, such as that of John of Gaeta as chancellor of the Roman church and the service of Montecassino monks from the Roman dependency of S. Maria in Pallara. For some periods the silence is illuminating; thus the pontificate of Gregory VII, with whom Desiderius was intermittently on poor terms, is treated very sketchily\(^2\).

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1. As by A. Fliche, Réforme Grégonienne, iii, (Louvain, 1937), 198f.

The value of chronicles outside Rome for Roman affairs can thus be limited, we have seen, by their inclusion of poor or misleading information, and also by the fact that their authors might take greater or lesser interest in Rome according to their own ties or those of their subjects with the Papacy. It is not difficult to see that they may often suffer from further limitations as well. During much of the second half of the eleventh century, the Papacy was the object of schism. The dramatic extension of papal authority in the West, the extreme nature of its claims under Gregory VII, and the violent struggle with Henry IV which led to the longest of the schisms, all combined to make events in Rome important, above all in their bearing on papal elections, and hence on the legitimacy of the contesting popes. It was simpler to resist the papal claims not, as some polemic did, by asserting that they were invalid but rather by denying the legitimacy of those who promulgated them. Nor need elections be the only field of investigation. Wido of Ferrara praised Gregory's vigorous actions within the patrimony, but did so, probably, simply to depict him, the more easily, as a violent man leading the church into new and dubious paths. To the limitations which ignorance and the interests of the author might impose upon our accounts from outside Rome, we therefore have to add those introduced in the deliberate fabrication of polemic.

Most of the polemicians of the Investiture Controversy give us some information on Rome, though in many cases they must have done so without knowledge, simply following earlier writers; it was simpler to deny the significance of an inconvenient assertion, than

1. *Lib. de lice* i, 534, 554-5.
to deny the assertion itself. Only a few of the polemics in fact give us particularly detailed accounts of events in Rome; but the significance and influence of those accounts has been major¹.

On the imperial side we have the Liber ad Heinricum compiled by Benzo of Alba². The most valuable parts of the work, for our purposes, are those concerned with the Cadalan schism. Benzo claimed to have campaigned in Rome for Cadalus, and his account offers much information on the course of the street-fighting and the names of the Cadalan supporters. We should remember, however, that we possess the work only in a recension dating from the later and still more serious schism³. When Benzo writes to recall his services to his sovereign, he is also anxious to draw attention to parallels with the schism in which he wrote. Thus Alexander's election is placed after that of Cadalus, and the Roman elements in his support minimised; as the alleged choice of the Normans, there was an obvious parallel with Victor III, and perhaps ostensibly with Urban II as well. There was a further parallel, in the role of Godfrey of Lorraine against Benedict X and Cadalus and that of Matilda of Tuscany against Wibert of Ravenna — a point emphasised by the author's slip when he says that Cadalus's path to Rome was blocked by Godfrey and Matilda, rather than Godfrey and Beatrice⁴.

Then, too, it is clear that although Benzo's account is directly about the legitimacy of Alexander II, it is indirectly about the

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¹ I.S. Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest, (Manchester/New York, 1978) gives a good account of the sphere of the polemic.


³ On which see H. Lehmgzubner, Benzo von Alba, (Berlin, 1887), especially at 12-24, 99-108.

⁴ Benzo, op. cit., p. 612.
legitimacy of his successor and main supporter, whose papacy was declared invalid on the grounds that he had secured his election by bribery, after poisoning his predecessor. With such flimsy, unsupported, grounds for the rejection, it is hardly surprising that Bonzo's damnation is largely on the grounds of precedent and association, and this in turn makes his account of those precedents questionable.

The writings of cardinal Beno and his associates raise similar questions. Here again, the main thrust of the work is to damn Hildebrand through his violence — so that we learn of his torture and execution of Romans without trial — and his association with evil doers, who include a poisoner and a Jew, recently converted but still a usurer. Beno and his colleagues had a more cogent argument against Hildebrand — that he had not taken the advice and subscriptions of the cardinals necessary to validate his acts, but the argument was not the mainstay of their position; that was provided by sheer vituperation.

Beno's counterpart on the side of the reformers was the polemicist Bonizo of Sutri, perhaps the most influential of all of these authors upon later historians. In his Liber ad amicum, Bonizo, as we have already remarked, sought to explain the appalling failure of the reformers. Wibert seemed to be in firm possession.

1. Ibid., 672-3.
3. Ibid., 372.
4. Ibid., 379.
5. Ibid., 370, 418.
of Rome, all the more so since Gregory VII had died in exile and a successor had yet to be elected. Bonizo claimed to see a pattern in these setbacks, portraying them as part of a resolute and consistent exercise of evil, divinely directed towards the eventual purification of the Church\(^1\). There was a secondary motive as well, less explicit. The more severe the opposition, the more consistent its attacks, the less scrupulous its methods, and the more unified its character, so equally was the failure the less surprising, the attempt to resist more praiseworthy. In short there was an obvious temptation to exaggerate.

Bonizo spent his earlier years in northern Italy, and is not known to have become bishop of Sutri before 1078\(^2\). It is therefore unlikely that he was a witness of the events which he describes in the Liber ad amicum, almost exclusively prior to that date, though he may have spoken with men who were. In the circumstances the detail of his account is suspicious, particularly since there are a number of demonstrable errors, some doubtless due to his intention of portraying the opposition to the reformers as a unified, consistent, force. Thus there is nothing to support his assertion that the Tusculans controlled the Papacy by means of the patriciate, an assertion doubtless made principally to associate Henry IV, who had based his intervention on that office, with a less creditable, if mythical, past\(^3\). Equally, the account of Gregory VII's resignation, in conflict with other sources, was doubtless intended

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1. Thus Lib. ad Amicu, Lib. de lite i, at 571-2.
3. For Gregory of Tusculum as patricius, Lib. ad Amicum, Lib. de lite, i, 584.
to emphasise that in this instance at least there was no intention of condemning him without trial. Both the death of Boniface of Tuscany and the appointment of Hildebrand to the position of archdeacon are misdated, and the statement that Benedict X was deposed and degraded soon after Nicholas II's entry into Rome is clearly false. Even for events at the beginning of Gregory VII's pontificate, the account includes demonstrable errors, thus there is little likelihood that Bishop Hermann of Bamberg came to Rome for his pallium; letters in Gregory's Register make clear that he was summoned to answer a charge of simony, but failed to come.

If Bonizo's account is clearly misinformed or misleading on certain points, there must be some doubt of its value in the many instances where he provides the only account. His account has often been taken over by later historians, as it was already in the twelfth century by Paul of Bernried, the biographer of Gregory VII; yet when we consider the motives which led him to write, the circumstances in which he did so, and his manifest unfamiliarity with at least some of his subject material, there seem strong grounds to reject his highly coloured narrative of violence.

For all their faults of perspective and information, works written outside Rome, and particularly the polemical works, with their prevailing interest in turmoil and tumult, have provided the

basis for much of what has been written on the Roman history of the period. They have done so, chiefly, because the local sources from which they might have been corrected, are themselves defective, both in their interest in and coverage of events, and, for reasons of their own, in emphasising what was unstable in Rome to a much greater degree than the more solid network of interests which underlay the violence.

From Rome itself, we have a disconnected series of annals, certainly of varying provenance, and a number of papal biographies. The annals comprise separate accounts of events from 1044 to 1061, as well as accounts of the negotiations between Paschal II and Henry V in 1111 and the violence which ensued, the prefecture disturbances of 1116, the antipopes who were raised against Paschal, and more briefly of his two successors¹. The inclusion of these annals in a manuscript which also includes documents forged or adapted by the Wibertines has led some historians to believe that the annals themselves are to be discounted as propaganda, at least so far as the earlier set is concerned; in fact a study of the manuscript itself fails to confirm this belief, since the relevant sections of the annals do not seem to have been intended to form part of the manuscript². The annals themselves are likely to come from different sources, and are of variable quality. The earliest, that concerning the disturbances of 1044-6 and the intervention of Henry III, and then a much briefer account of subsequent popes up to 1058, is likely either to be or to draw on a contemporary

account; the detail is considerable, the tone unassertive. It includes a reference to Hadrian I's alleged donation of the right of appointing popes, taken by some scholars to be a reference to Leo VIII's Privilegium minus, a Wibertine forgery, which happens to be included in the same codex as the annals. This does not necessarily impugn the value of the source; the reference could be an interpolation at the time of copying, or, alternately, there may have been a legend that Hadrian had granted the privilege before the document itself, attributed to another pope, was actually fabricated. The former explanation is the more likely, and would also account for what is probably another interpolation at the close of the passage – the assertion that one Braczutus, (damned as a poisoner and associate of Hildebrand at the synod of Brixen), poisoned Stephen IX\(^1\).

The succeeding section of the annals, taking us to the death of Nicholas II, is also likely to be based on a contemporary account, given its fullness of detail and the concordance of that detail with what else is known. There are slips, however. Hildebrand was not archdeacon on the death of Stephen IX, and the election of Nicholas II followed that of Benedict X rather than preceding it. Further Alberic of Tusculum had long been dead, and it was his son, Gregory II, who according to Leo of Ostia played a leading role in the elevation of Benedict. The nature of these slips, its demonstrable accuracy in other respects, and above all the text's hostility to Hildebrand whom it portrays as breaking the securities given to the antipope, suggest that we are dealing with a later

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compilation.

The next section of the annals, dealing with the Cadalan schism, was copied into the codex only after 1122. The account itself must have been written after 1072, since it refers to the death of Cadalus. Here we find only one slip, minor and easily explicable; Alexander II is described as archbishop of Milan, rather than as bishop of Lucca. Since he was of Milanese origin, it is easy to explain the confusion, possibly caused by the necessity of the copyist to write into a restricted space in the codex.

The subsequent parts of the annals are more straightforward. The account of Paschal II's negotiations with Henry V and his kidnap was by an eye-witness, who drew heavily upon the pope's Register to demonstrate the emperor's perfidy. The account of the disturbances in 1116 concords well with other accounts from the pope's biographer and from Falco of Benevento, and the account of the successive antipopes elected against Paschal II rings equally true. The same may be said of the concluding account, which is mostly concerned with the election of Gregory VIII against Gelasius II, and his fall under Calixtus II, though the account is far briefer and less valuable than the others.

With this conspectus of the range and variety of the annals, it is worth giving some thought to the motives which brought them together. That the compilation itself was made for propaganda may be excluded, though some of the pieces which comprise the annals, most notably that concerning the election of Nicholas II, may either have been composed or retouched as polemic against Hildebrand. Such retouchings may limit the value of the texts in unsuspected ways, as for example in the account of the distribution
of cash by Hildebrand to win over Rome from Benedict X\(^1\). The money was said to have come from Leo de Benedicto Christiano, blackened by Bono as a recent convert—an assertion which carried hints of simony in the use of his money on behalf of the reformers. Other sections of the annals cannot be suspected of such partiality, and there is little reason to doubt the detailed if fragmentary narrative that they give. As to the compilation of the accounts, and their prevailing interest in schisms, there is a possible explanation in the time that the compilation itself was made, after the Concordat of Worms. Almost all the pieces concentrate on periods of schism; the only exceptions are the pieces concerning the negotiations in 1111 and 1116. For all the hints of hostility to the reformers at certain points, there is no clear indication that the pieces were intended to provide material against the legitimacy of their elections. Thus Nicholas II and Gregory VII, in a brief reference, are both referred to as popes even in the most suspect of the accounts, that dealing with the election of Nicholas II\(^2\). In the later pieces, there is no suggestion that Mauritius Burdinus and the antipopes under Paschal II were anything but illegitimate.

Given the time of the compilation, a parallel comes to mind. After the capture of Mauritius Burdinus, Calixtus II restored the chapel of St Nicholas in the Lateran palace. The restoration included a series of pictures which depicted the defeat of a series of antipopes from the time of Cadalus of Parma\(^3\). Conceivably, what we have in the Roman annals is a literary parallel, a collection

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2. Ibid., 336 refers to Gregory as pope.
of texts chosen mainly because they dealt with antipopes, which thus recorded the dangers through which the Church had passed, but which were not selected on the basis of demonstrating any theory of elections or legitimacy, nor even on that of any special partiality towards the reformers, because the conflict which had given rise to them was over.

If it is the choice of subject matter which gives the annals their particular flavour of faction and violence, the same impression may, for different reasons, be over-predominant in some of the papal lives which have survived. Those for the earlier part of our period are poor, consisting either of bare statements of the length of a pontificate or brief accounts so full of inaccuracies that they must come from a considerably later pen.

Thus the life of Leo IX claims that the pope led the Normans and French against the people of Apulia, and thus restored it to the papal dominion, a statement which is false in every respect\(^1\). The statements that Stephen IX was the first pope to declare the emperor Henry a heretic on the grounds of investitures\(^2\), and that the election of Nicholas II followed the deposition of Benedict \(^3\) are equally false, while the reference to Henry IV as emperor in the life of Alexander II shows that it, like that of Stephen IX, must have been written after his coronation in 1084\(^4\). The life of Gregory VII is drawn mainly from documents in the pope's Register; its main addition, valuable for our purposes, is an account of the

\(^1\) Lib. Pont. ii, 275.
\(^2\) Ibid., 278.
\(^3\) Ibid., 279.
\(^4\) Ibid., 281.
fall of Rome, written after the death of Henry IV in 1106 since it states that he left the city in 1084 and never returned. The life of Urban II is likewise compiled from papal documents, though it does not quote them so extensively; its attribution of a council held under Paschal II in 1105 to Urban shows that it too is probably a later work. In addition to these biographies there are further lives of Leo and a life of Gregory VII, but the latter work, by Paul of Bernried dates from some fifty years after Gregory's death, and is based largely on Bonizo of Sutri's Liber ad amicum.

For all that they occasionally contain valuable information, none of these earlier biographies is particularly valuable for the local history of the Papacy. From the accession of Paschal II we are more fortunate in the papal biographers. First, somewhat on its own, stands the life of Paschal II, thought to have been the work of Pandulf, but in fact most probably the work of another author. The text is detailed, and its author claims himself to have been involved in some of the events which he describes, notably the dispute concerning the prefecture in 1116. A reference to Johannes maledictus probably means that the life dates from after the condemnation of that man at the council of Rheims in 1119, but the text is unlikely to be much later than that. Roger of Sicily

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1. Ibid., 290.
2. Ibid., 294.
5. Ibid., 145.
6. Ibid., 148.
is described, correctly, as count and the text shows a pronounced hostility to both Wibert of Ravenna - a 'damned heresiarch' - and Henry V - an 'exterminator' and 'enemy of the Church'¹ - which suggests that the settlement at Worms still lay in the future.

Pandulf's lives of Gelasius II, Calixtus II, and Honorius II, on the other hand, were written at a greater remove from the events which they describe. Pandulf was one of the Anacletan cardinals, and there are clear signs that he wrote each of these lives after the outbreak of the schism in 1130. Thus in the life of Gelasius II, he speaks of Pierleone as dead, which puts the work after 1124, and in the life of Calixtus II describes Roger of Sicily as nunc autem Italiae rex². Each of the lives emphasises the perfidy of the Frangipane, who played a major part in the election of Innocent II. Thus their repeated attacks on Gelasius II form a major part of the account, and provide the occasion for a striking diatribe against them³; the life of Calixtus II states that the pope destroyed some of their fortifications for the sake of peace⁴; and members of the family were ascribed a leading role in the election of Honorius II, illegally, by force⁵. Equivalently, there is comparatively little emphasis on those alternative disturbers of the peace - Henry V and the Wibertines. Wibert was described as litteratus et nobilis, for all that he did the Church

¹. Ibid., 135, 140.
². Ibid., 193.
³. Ibid., 168.
⁴. Ibid., 194-5.
⁵. Ibid., 204-5.
harm\textsuperscript{1}, while Henry is described as \textit{dictus imperator}\textsuperscript{2}.

A number of slips in the text support the impression that we are dealing with a comparatively late work, albeit one which, as the work of an eye-witness, is full of detailed information. Thus Pandulf must be in error when he states that Gelasius II was educated at Montecassino under abbot Oderius\textsuperscript{3}. Equally the detailed list he preserved of the clergy present at Gelasius's election has proved to be partially false\textsuperscript{4}; possibly Pandulf sought to write as detailed an account as he could of that election so that he could contrast the legitimate (if disrupted) procedure which he here described with that subsequently followed after the death of Calixtus II.

So far, then, as the papal biographies are concerned, our best sources are ones written with a predisposition to emphasise the more violent aspects of politics in Rome - by Pandulf because he wished to place the blame for the later schism directly on the Frangipane, and by the author of the life of Paschal II because he was writing before the resolution of the conflict with the Empire and the capture of Mauritius Burdinus. If Rome were as unstable as these and the other sources which we have been discussing appear to suggest, it is hard to account for the comparatively long periods of tranquillity or to see how there could have been any consistent papal control of Rome at all, let alone the vigorous recuperation

1. \textit{Ibid.}, 162.
2. \textit{Ibid.}, 171.
of Church property ascribed to the Reform Papacy.  

Our narrative sources generally present the Roman nobility and its opposition to the popes either as part of a general movement against the church, or, when the field of conflict between the pope and the emperor had narrowed and the conflict moderated, in terms of factional rivalries. If the pictures seem to be successive, that can be explained as much in terms of the interests of our authors as in terms of any real change in the local situation. A further characteristic of our authors may be noted. Neither interpretation demanded much understanding of the motives behind the nobles' actions, nor indeed any very precise understanding of who they were. Some of the accounts name individuals, not always correctly; others are perfectly content to generalise, as does Bonizo when he states that the Normans destroyed the 'captains' domination of the city during their intervention against Benedict X. Generalisation of this kind raises many questions, not least that of the structure of the noble families; when our sources speak of a family acting together, it does not necessarily mean that we are dealing with a unified homogeneous group of people, bound together by common possession of the same territories and offices, and acting together to maintain them. The kinship group can be found among the Roman nobility, but we should not assume it to be prevalent or overestimate the strength of the bonds it provided.

It happens that there is a wealth of material which enables us, selectively, to investigate the structure and interests of many


2. *Lib. ad Amicum, Lib. de lite*, i, 593.
of the leading Roman families. That material consists of the many surviving leases and donations made to and by individual churches in and around Rome, and in a number of local chronicles which are chiefly concerned with the landed possessions of those churches.

Richest of these archives is the abbey of Farfa, one of whose monks, Gregory of Catino, enregistered the abbey's documents, and wrote a chronicle to explain their origin. Gregory wrote the chronicle towards the end of our period, and relied principally on the legal submissions of earlier abbots to provide his narrative for the earlier part of our period. The natural partiality of a monk towards the claims of his house was thus re-inforced by the material he was using, and at some points, we shall see, presents a distinctly misleading view of events. His concern was with Farfa, not Rome, and he tells us little of direct relevance to Roman politics; on the other hand the chronicle, and still more the registers which he compiled, make it possible to reconstruct the interests and behaviour of the Crescentians in a way which is possible for few of the other families.

We also possess a register of documents compiled at another of the major landholding abbeys, Subiaco. Unfortunately the register hardly extends past the middle years of the eleventh century, and very few of the unregistered documents for the succeeding years have survived. To some extent we are able to fill out the picture from a lively account of the abbacy of abbot John,

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incorporated into the monastery's chronicle. Unlike Gregory of
Catino's chronicle, the work does not incorporate documents, nor
show much knowledge of them. Here too the interest is almost
exclusively in the history of the monastery itself and of its
possessions, and here too we must admit the possibility of special
pleading. Leo IX had a number of Subiaco documents burnt, and
although only documents made at the expense of the monastery were
among the casualties, there remains the possibility that the
monastery acted, and thus wrote its history, in terms of claims
that were in fact dubious.

Besides the archives of these two great monasteries, we possess
the archives of a number of foundations outside Rome — notably of
churches at Veroli and Velletri and those of a small number of the
Roman churches, which demonstrate extensive possessions in the
countryside. The fragmentary nature of this material can pose
problems, as do subsequent forgeries and interpolations; an
interpolated bull of Gregory VII for the monastery of S. Paolo fuori
le Mura is a particularly treacherous historical source, but the
dilapidated character of the monastery's archives makes it especially
hard to reconstruct its true holdings. Then, too, we have to
remember that we possess only a proportion of the actual

(Bologna, 1927).

2. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

3. S. Mottironi, Le Carte di S. Erasmo di Veroli, (Rome, 1956);
M.H. Laurent, Supplement au chartrier de S. Erasmo a Veroli,
Bull. Ist. Stor. Ital. lxxvii, 1960, 181-9; C. Scacca-Scarfoni,
Le carte dell'archivio capitolare della cattedrale di Veroli,
(Rome, 1960); E. Stevenson, Documenti dell'archivio della
cattedrale di Velletri, Arch. Soc. Rom. xii (1889), 63-113.
documentation; many families and their possessions are simply untraceable, most probably because their connections were with churches whose archives have now been lost. These families include the Corsi, whose members played a leading role against Paschal II, were prominent in the prefecture dispute, but are then found among the adherents of Gelasius II\(^1\). The archives enable us to fill out the picture given by the chronicles, and sometimes to challenge it, they enable us to ask questions not posed by the chroniclers themselves; but they do not allow us to reconstruct the whole picture.

How far does the picture that we can extract from them affect the history of the popes themselves? The papal archive itself is among the most slender for this period. Only one of the papal registers survives, that of Gregory VII\(^2\), and the number of direct papal leases and enfeoffments which survive, either in the original or in the collections made from the late eleventh century by Deusdedit, Benedict, Albinus and Cenzius is remarkably small\(^3\). It is probably the case that it was never very much larger, though we shall see that the papal archives were already in disarray by the time of Deusdedit himself. The tenth century had witnessed the loss of much of the direct patrimony, taken by nobles, then often granted to individual churches and monasteries, then leased out, frequently

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2. It is frequently disputed that Reg. Vat. 2 is in fact Gregory's Register; Hoffmann, Zum Register und zu den Briefen Papst Gregors VII, Deutsches Archiv, xxxii, (1976), 86-130, buttresses the view that it is.

on terms which suggest that the donation was intended mainly to
assure possession. Further, there had been at the same time, a
widespread and far-reaching re-organisation of the pattern of
settlement in the area around Rome which broke up the territories
of the old patrimony into smaller settlements, often newly created.
Given these developments, it is likely that most of the property of
the Roman Church had become instead that of individual, mostly
Roman, churches though there were also large allodial territories
such as, most likely, Tusculum itself. Very few of our documents
concern or mention land of the Church itself.

Throughout our period the wealth of certain individuals and
families can be seen, if only partially, in the surviving charters
of individual churches; we can see them here taking a lease on
favourable terms, there suffering dispossessio, sometimes on
rigged evidence. What we do not see in this evidence, and may be
unwise in assuming, is any very continual intervention in this
process by the popes themselves. The popes might intervene as
judges, either directly or through intermediaries, and sometimes
we can discern policy either in their judgements or in their choice
of judges; sometimes, too, it is possible to see an indirect pressure
on a church in its transactions, not always perceptible in the
transactions themselves. Sometimes privileges, by which
proprietorship could be confirmed and sometimes bequested, could
have a political significance — as is often claimed for Gregory VII's

1. On which see P. Partner, Notes on the lands of the Roman Church
in the early Middle Ages, Papers of the British School at Rome,
xxxiv (1966), 66-73; and J.M. Phillips, A study of monastic
patronage in Rome from the fifth through the eleventh centuries,
2. Toubert, Structures, 1, 303-68.
null in favour of S. Paulo. Yet much must have gone on without the knowledge of the popes; the sheer number of the surviving transactions, let alone those that must have actually been concluded, and the frequent absence of the pope from Rome, would seem to ensure that. Insofar as individual transactions can be taken to tell us anything specifically about papal policy towards their parties and subjects, they do so by the fact that they were seldom challenged by the papacy itself.

In this setting we find a picture substantially different from that to which the narrative sources have accustomed us. We find that the most important of the older families were not implacable enemies of a reform Papacy determined to recover its freedom from them, rather that these families comprised individuals holding their land separately whose behaviour was seldom concerted and whose alignments were far from permanent. We can trace this picture only for some of the noble families due to the exigencies of the evidence, but the pattern suggested by what can be reconstructed is unlikely to be exceptional. There is a corollary; for much of the period, we are probably justified in speaking of papal policy as something negative, as, at most, an expression of complaisance; and that too, perhaps is more characteristic of their policy than the suggestion of the accounts, whether contemporary or modern that they followed a more dynamic policy. Therein lies the story of their ultimate success.
CHAPTER 2

THE POPES AND THEIR MAKING

At no time were the relations between the Papacy and the Roman nobility thrown into a higher relief than in the conduct of papal elections. In part this relief is artificial; it was chiefly at such times that the behaviour of the Roman nobles was of any interest to those outside Rome. The development of papal authority and influence brought with it a more widespread interest in the popes themselves and hence in their elections; this interest naturally intensified when the rupture between Gregory VII and Henry IV became open and a struggle developed for the possession of the Papacy itself. At the close of the tenth century, bishop Arnulf of Orleans refused submission to the Papacy on the grounds that the popes were unworthy, and about the same time it was stated that the pope could only be approached after bribing the lay ruler of Rome 1. That the manner of creation could invalidate the claims of office was a viewpoint put forward by the Papacy itself, particularly after the mid-eleventh century. But those who judge others must expect themselves to be judged by the same standards. Papal elections thus constituted a natural area of examination for those who opposed the popes, and this made the popes themselves more sensitive to the mode of their creation. In times of conflict papal elections could become an obvious target of polemic, and for the popes an equally obvious point to be defended. Given this interest, the

1. Arnulf's speech, Acta Concilii Remensis, bribery, Acta Concilii Caesarienses, both in M.G.H. Script., iii, 671f, 691.
more general accounts of neither side are particularly trustworthy.

The motives for local interest in papal elections do not unduly
strain the imagination. The grandest prize available to the Roman
nobility through intervention in papal elections was naturally the
succession of a family member or dependant as pope. Reforming
principles did not necessarily impose any constraint upon this aim;
family interests were as much involved in the disputed elections of
Honourius II and of Anacletus II as they had been a century earlier
in the Tuscanian control of the Papacy. The Papacy offered a position
from which rival families could be broken, territorial gains made,
and civic office secured. For these reasons it was, even if only
intermittently, a more than attractive noble ambition.

It was nevertheless an ambition that came but rarely into the
picture. Between the fall of Benedict IX in 1046 and the accession
of Anacletus II in 1130, the only popes of Roman origin were
Benedict X, deposed after a short pontificate, and Gregory VI and
Gregory VII who may have had ties with the lesser nobility, and
certainly enjoyed good relations with the Pierleone; there is little
evidence that these relations were particularly decisive in their
creations. Apart from these popes and the shadowy antipopes whom
the margrave Werner of Spoleto opposed to Paschal II, there are
none of Roman origin, though long membership of the Curia would
have enabled several of the others to establish Roman connections.

This apparent quiescence of noble interest after the fall of
the Tusculans is best explained by the comparative equilibrium
between the families. None was sufficiently powerful in Rome to
override rivalries, while a coalition in the Tuscanian favour must
have been difficult to form so long as the figurehead of that
faction remained, as it had to during his lifetime, the deposed
Benedict IX, formerly rejected by a powerful group of Romans.

If these factors put the Papacy out of play as an object of noble ambition, other factors might still give considerable reason for intervention. Those families, very few in number, which suffered definite losses at the hands of the popes or of their patrons had a strong and reasonable motive to intervene. Thus it was probably the southern expansion of the duke of Tuscany's power, greatly eroding the influence and lands of count Gerard of Galeria, which caused the latter's role in the schisms of 1058 and 1061. Similar motives were to resurge when the Frangipane intervened in the election of Gelasius II and then supported Mauricius of Braga, even though he was singularly devoid of Roman connections, and they may equally explain the support which the Corsi gave the antipope Maginulf¹.

Given this defensive interest in papal elections, noble intervention was seldom a factor to be discounted out of hand. Rivalries could be difficult to balance and interventions prompted by small as well as by great losses. A direct appeasement of an individual's grievances could do as much to foster discord as otherwise, and it must always have been difficult to determine how serious they really were. Thus, when it was decided to elect a successor to Paschal II under the shadow of the Frangipane fortresses on the Palatine, little trouble can have been expected from them; there is every indication that their irruption came as a complete surprise². Chance, miscalculation, ignorance, could shatter any attempted balance of interests and make the Papacy vulnerable even to those who did not seek it for themselves or

their dependants. Sporadic as the interventions of the nobles were, the situation can seldom have appeared to rule them altogether out of court. Threats can be effective whether they are implemented or not, and that of a lay coup was a sufficiently potent one to be considered an almost automatic factor in the papal regulations and attitudes concerning their own elections.

Previous legislation on papal elections was sparse and sometimes contradictory. A decree that was to be of particular significance in the late eleventh century, since both Deusdedit and Anselm of Luna included it in their canon collections, was that of Stephen III which declared that the elect should be a cardinal priest or deacon of the Roman Church¹. This stipulation was barely observed during our period, even by the reformers. The Tuscan popes were all laymen on election, while thereafter the succession fell to a line of German, Burgundian, and North Italian bishops. Exceptions to this rule were Benedict X as cardinal bishop of Velletri, Gregory VII as archdeacon of the Roman Church, Victor III as cardinal priest of S. Cecilia, Urban II as cardinal bishop of Ostia, Paschal II as cardinal priest of S. Clemente, and Gelasius II as papal chancellor and cardinal deacon of S. Maria in Cosmedin. Yet if this suggests an unbroken, deliberate, line of Roman clergy from Gregory VII to Gelasius II, that picture needs amendment. Hugh of Lyons was considered as a possible successor to Gregory VII, and may have been named as such by the dying pope. Gregory's actual successor, Victor III, owed his succession more to his abbacy of Montecassino than his position as a cardinal, and when objection was raised, initially, to the election of Odo of Ostia, it was as probably

¹. Printed in the M.G.H. Concilia, ii, (Hannover, 1906), 85-6.
because of his absence as in any deference to Stephen's canon. Further at the end of our period, there does not seem to have been any objection to the succession of Guy of Vienne as Calixtus II, despite the fact that he enjoyed no curial position. It was thus more probably the comparative isolation of the reform movement after the death of Gregory VII, rather than any respect for the decree of Stephen III, which resulted in the succession of curial popes. Except that lay Tusculans gave way to imperial bishops, then to curial figures, the pattern governing the choice of the elect was vague. There does not seem to have been any consistent rule of elegibility or non elegibility for the Papacy. Foreigners and Romans, bishops and Roman clergy, were all elected.

If the election could fall upon clerics of all descriptions, the mode by which it did so was almost equally without strict regulation. Work on medieval elections has justly emphasised their comparative informality. Different forms of assent at different times in the election, tacit as well as express, took the place of a clearly defined procedure in which any priority of electing rights was ordained. In Rome this vagueness was particularly marked. As bishop of Rome the formula governing the election of the pope was, as in other sees, election by clergy and people. But at the same time the pope was head of the Western Church, which gave a broad

1. The objection is mentioned in the account of Petrus Diaconus, Chron. Cas., M.G.H. Scriptores, vii, 749. A. Becker, Papst Urban II, Teil 1, (Stuttgart, 1964), 89, curiously accepts the view that the objection was because Odo was already a bishop, even though he has established that Odo was probably not present.

2. This has been very strongly emphasised in the work of P. Schmid, Der Begriff der kanonische Wahl in den Anfängen des Investiturstreits, (Stuttgart, 1926), which gives particular attention to papal elections.
practical, and perhaps ideological, interest in their election. Outside interests were frequently reflected in the papal succession and were often solicited to effect it.

Of these, the most consistently significant was the German court. The Ottonian nominations to the Papacy were a living memory at the time of the Tusculan coup in 1012, even though there had been no recourse to Germany for approval, let alone nomination, since the death of Silvester II in 1003. A disputed election served to re-introduce the German influence, if only fortuitously in that the expelled candidate appealed to Henry II. Benedict VIII was soon able to establish good relations with the German king, though the reasons for this are difficult to evaluate; he had little to offer Henry that could not also have been preferred by his rival. Relations between the German crown and the Tusculans remained good until the crisis of 1046. Complaisant allies of the Salians in Italy, the Tusculans had little to fear from them in Rome1. Yet even so there is no evidence of any German implication in their elections; once established the dynasty had little need of their fiat, even though there was nothing to be lost by seeking it.

A new era dawned with the intervention of Henry III in 1046. Motives of piety should not be too lightly excluded from the reasons for the king's actions, even though strong practical motives are likely to have prompted his intervention2. For what distinguished

1. On the relations between the Tusculans and the German monarchs, K.-J. Herrmann, Das Tusulanerpatrimonium, (Stuttgart, 1973), pp. 25-46, is useful even if the popes are presented as a little less passive than they were.

this intervention from that of Henry II was the consistency of control which was established. Until the death of the emperor ten years later, the imperial assent was a decisive feature of the papal succession, barely less significant at the time than it was to become for subsequent polemicists in the Investiture Controversy. It was not an uncontested control. On the deaths of both Clement II and Damasus II, the Tusculans renewed their efforts to reinstate Benedict IX, gaining the support of Boniface of Canossa on the second occasion. But these efforts were almost foredoomed to failure. Even if the revolt of 1044–6 had been against Benedict himself rather than the Tuscan primacy he stood for, there must have remained a strong opposition group. A figure so decisively rejected did not make a good figurehead for the opposition, and perhaps prevented the formation of any really effective coalition.

Restricted as the opposition may have been, it nonetheless makes it likely that the German control over the Papacy enjoyed support at Rome. Otherwise that control would hardly have survived. With this in mind it is worth looking more closely at the form of that control. An obvious problem, however, presents itself. Later in the century the breach between Gregory VII and Henry IV resulted in the attempted deposition of the pope and the formulation of the appropriate historical justifications for the claims by which this was done. This conflict was not even a shadow on the horizon during the lifetime of Henry III, and we must beware of anachronism from accepting too readily the interpretations which were subsequently put upon this control.

One issue of primary importance is that of the authority by which the German control was exercised. That it was by virtue of the Empire must be excluded. Henry was not yet emperor on the
election of Clement II, while we shall see his son attempting to
secure a similar influence, or at least having it claimed for him,
from the time of his minority, long before his imperial coronation.
More significant is the office of patricius, granted to Henry III
by the Romans in 1046. According to the Annales Romani, the
patriciate gave Henry III the right of appointing popes; but as
we have already noted, this part of the text may be a later
interpolation. Although our knowledge of the rights of the
position comes only from later polemic, particularly that of
Benso of Alba, determined to provide a basis for Henry IV's
nominations of Cadalus, then of Wibert, we are fortunate in that
some of this polemic is from the point of view of the reformers,
notably the Disciplina Synodalis of Peter Damian. This work,
written during the Cadalan schism as an attempt to secure the
German court's recognition of Alexander II, has pitfalls of its
own. Not the least of these is the fact that it should not
necessarily be considered as presenting Damian's own views on all
the issues it covers. Lack of tact could alienate the reader with
disastrous political consequences for Alexander. When Damian
discusses the patriciate, what matters is the value put upon it,
which Damian's 'defender' of the Roman Church has to spend much
space evading. By these terms Henry IV enjoyed the right 'in
electione semper ordinandi pontificis principatum', a right

2. Benso of Alba, Liber ad Heinricum, M.G.H. Scriptores xi,
particularly p. 670. See also E. Fischer, Der Patriziat
Heinrichs III und IV, (Berlin, 1908).
3. Damian, Disciplina Synodalis, in M.G.H. Libelli de lite, i,
Hannover 1891, 76-94. Discussed by O. Capitani, Problematique
della Disciplina Synodalis, Studi Gregoriani, x, (Rome,
granted to Henry III and his successors, and already confirmed to Henry IV by Nicholas II\(^1\). Nicholas's confirmation of rights to the king is readily documented by a clause in the election decree of 1059, which reserves due honor et reverentia . . . sicut iam sibi concessimus et successorum illius, qui ab hac apostolica sede personaliter hoc ius impetraverint\(^2\). It is, however, difficult firmly to relate this right to the patriciate itself, particularly as while the decree speaks of Henry as king and future emperor, it nowhere accords him the patricial title. The grounds of the German right were hardly defined as they were shortly to be, and it is likely that it was the Cadaian schism itself which brought about the reliance on the rights of the patriciate.

The chief factor in this change was probably the Roman mission of 1061 to the German court. It sought the nomination of an alternative pope to Alexander II and its practical chances of finding success must surely have been enhanced by the breach which had occurred between Nicholas II and the court. The mission conveyed the insignia of the patriciatus, with which the young king was invested, and it was at this point that the connection between the office of patricius and the right of intervention, perhaps of control, in papal elections became explicit. The insignia were on this occasion accompanied by a concrete request,

1. Ibid., p. 80.
2. M.G.H. Const. et Acta, i, no. 382, clause 6, p. 540. W. Stürmer, Salvo debito honore; der Königsparagraph im PWD von 1059, Zeitschr. der Savigny-Stiftung, Kan. Abt. 11, (1968), 1-56, has attempted to relate this clause to the inheritance of the empire rather than the honor et reverentia; for which he has been justly criticised by H. Grundmann, Ein neue Interpretation des Papstwahldekrets von 1059, Deutsches Archiv, xxv, (1969), 234-6.
which may distinguish the occasion from the concessions made by
Nicholas, and it was natural that the directness of this association
should colour the thinking of the king, his polemists, and,
perforce, those who wished to excuse their non-observance of the
king's rights without causing further offence by denying the basis
on which they rested.

Special pleading may underlie the linking of the patriciate
and the German court, giving the monarchs specific rights of
intervention in papal elections. This is most probably the case
with Benzo of Alba, desperately searching for arguments in favour
of a direct royal nomination, and thus deposition, over the Papacy,
and unable to resort to the imperial authority as a justification
since his master did not then possess it. The mirror image is to
be found in the work of that most fanatical of the Gregorians,
Bonizo of Sutri, for whom the patriciate simply represented an
illicit claim, the popes whom it appointed thus being invasores\(^1\).
Damian's version has already been considered; the special
circumstances of its composition deprive it of any very great
significance in this context.

The patriciate cannot, then, be said without hesitation to
have been the consistent basis of German intervention in papal
elections. Despite the political use which was made of the
insignia in 1061, the office does not generally seem to have been
a cornerstone of the royal influence. Broadly speaking the
universal position of the Papacy appeared to justify the inter-
vention of the German court\(^2\), but the grounds on which its

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interventions actually took place had little consistent formal
definition. It was the Cadalan schism itself which was probably
responsible for the significance which was attached to the office,
rather than the other way round.

That this was so is almost certainly to be attributed to the
attitude of the Papacy itself, and to what was evidently a
substantial degree of support in Rome itself. As we have already
noted, the Tuscan opposition was in all probability weakened by
its use of Benedict IX as a figurehead until his death in 1055.
This gave an impetus which welcomed imperial control of elections
not only to Henry's nominees, the imperial bishops, but also to
those sections of the nobility and populace which opposed any
Tuscan renewal. Polemics had a natural interest in stressing
the enthusiasm of the Romans for this outside influence, but it
is nonetheless illuminating to note how consistently the role of
the Romans themselves in these nominations is brought to the fore.

There is no reason to doubt that Clement II was essentially
Henry's nominee, yet a number of the accounts make clear that some
form of election took place. Until the death of Henry III each
vacancy saw the departure of a Roman delegation to request the
nomination of a new pope, which was generally done in a diet of
German nobles and bishops. The part played in these deliberations
by the Romans themselves is open to conjecture. Subsequently the
reformers were liable to take a poor view of these popes. Bonizo
regarded them as invasores, while even the more moderate

1. Hermann of Reichenau, M.G.H. Scriptores v, 126; tam Romanorum
quam aliorum assensu. Also Ann. Corbeienses, M.G.H. Scriptores,
iii, 6, ad ann. 1046; et unanimi cleri ac populi electione in
locum eius substitutus est Suidgerius.
Leo of Ostia wrote of the nomination of Clement II as *necesseria potius quam canonica*. This attitude presented problems with the greatest of these imperially nominated popes, Leo IX, whose contribution to the reform movement was so striking that the reformers could have had little incentive to pass him off as simply another *invasor*. For this reason much stress was laid on his election at Rome; one of the earliest lives emphasises that he had only been prepared to accept the nomination on this condition. The veracity of this story is difficult to assess. Comparatively recent work has shown this life to come, most probably, from the pen of Humbert of Silva Candida, whose own views gave him a natural interest in emphasising this incident, perhaps falsely. Yet if the circumstances of Leo's election are not to be accepted unquestioningly in this version, it is none the less likely that the Roman delegations had some degree of influence in the choice of popes. Benzo's account of the delegation of 1061 makes it clear that Henry IV was invited to choose a pope with the members of the embassy, not simply to nominate one. The strength of any influence the embassies had should not however be over-emphasised. However true it may have been in 1046 that there was

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1. Leo, *Chron. Cas.*, 682.


no Roman suitable for the Papacy\(^1\), this was hardly the case on the
death of Leo IX. Henry III's final designation still followed
previous form in nominating a German bishop without previous title
in the Roman Church. Further it is possible that the emperor also
took steps to assure his nomination rights by securing an oath from
leading figures of the Church not to seek the Papacy either for
themselves or for others without prior imperial consent\(^2\). In these
circumstances the Roman role in the imperial nominations can hardly
have been of decisive significance.

If this Roman role were slight in the actual nominations
themselves, it must have been much greater in allowing them to take
place at all. It needs to be stressed that the opposition to the
imperially nominated popes seems to have been very feeble. At each
vacancy a delegation was duly sent, a fresh pope received. The
threat of a second imperial expedition may have acted as a deterrent
to opposition, but the contrast with the earlier Roman opposition
to the nominees of the Ottonians is striking.

Two factors weakened the imperial control over the Papacy,
making that control less attractive to clerics and Romans alike.
The chief of these was unquestionably the death of Henry III and

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1. As later suggested by Desiderius, Dial., M.C.H. Script. xxx
Pt 2, 1143; quia in Romana ecclesia non erat tunc tales
reperta persona etc. Leo, Chron. Cos., 686, uses much the
same words, perhaps heard from Desiderius himself, but
apropos the nomination of Victor II, by which time they were
hardly appropriate.

2. These oaths have most recently been discussed by T. Schmidt,
Zu Hildesbranda Eid vor Kaiser Heinrich III, Arch. Hist. Pont.,
xi (1973), 374-86; later events and the natural interest of
polemists give an air of unreliability to the story which
Schmidt does not completely dispel, but that the charge was
made at Worms, in the presence of several of those who could
have discredited it, suggests that there is something in the
story.
the long minority which followed. The loss of a figure highly respected in reforming circles, the weakening of the Empire in the minority, the strengthening of the Italian power of the house of Lorraine, all necessarily made the imperial nomination less attractive as well as less effective. But in Rome itself, it is likely that a still more important factor was the death of Benedict IX, which removed a bar to coalition among the nobles. Pressure from the house of Lorraine was a potent enough threat to consolidate, and perhaps motivate, a renewed Roman interest in the creation of its own popes.

The resultant modification of the German role in elections was neither sudden nor sharp, but even so it was significant. Stephen IX was elected rege ignorantiae, in considerable haste. It was only subsequently that the German court was apprised of his election and recognition secured\(^1\). The direct control established by Henry III was thus relinquished, even though the local threat to the reformers made the popes probably more dependent on the German court than they had been while it was at the height of its power, controlling their nominations. Stephen IX's stipulation that no further election take place until the return of Hildebrand from the imperial court probably tells us more about the importance he attached to good relations between curia and court than that of Hildebrand at this stage. But the growing local threat made it difficult to respect the German interest, even though it also made German support more necessary. The result was an effectual reduction of the German role in elections to that of a post factum

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\(^1\) For which see H.-G. Krause, Das Papstwahldekret und seine Rolle im Investiturstreit, Studi Gregoriani, vii, (Rome, 1960), at pp. 59-62.
consent. The continuing desire for German support is reflected in the speedy securing of German recognition on behalf of Nicholas II and the association of the king's Italian chancellor, Wibert, in the subsequent deposition of Benedict X and promulgation of the election decree at the Easter Synod of 1059\(^1\). The decree itself illustrates that royal consent was to remain a factor in the papal succession\(^2\). Yet at the same time there was an effectual diminution of the royal rights, above all in that the time of the royal intervention was not defined. When a forged version of the decree was subsequently prepared the omission was made good by explicitly associating the king with the cardinals in the preliminary tractatio\(^3\); this alteration suggests strongly that however real the authority attributed to the king in the original version, there was nonetheless need for a much more precise definition of it. Yet the point should not be overstressed, for the decree was subsequently to become a major bulwark of the royal case against Gregory VII, Henry's proponents claiming that by the terms of the decree, Gregory's failure to secure the royal consent to his election necessarily invalidated his papacy. It seems reasonably well established that these views were expressed with a knowledge of the decree itself, and not simply based on hearsay\(^4\). Even so, however necessary the royal consent was made to the validity of papal elections, the

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2. Krause, *op. cit.*, 85-116, convincingly puts a strong interpretation on words seen by others as deliberately vague.


4. Space can be saved by referring to the excellent summary of the polemic on this point in Krause, *op. cit.*, 158-233.
position of the German court was still weakened. The time of its intervention and nature of its approval were undefined, the place of election fixed at Rome, except in emergency, and the cardinals in particular given a considerably more explicit role in the election procedure than formerly. This was a far cry from the nomination system of Henry III.

If the German role in papal elections was diminished after the death of Henry III, it could be none the less welcome, both to the reformers and their opponents. In 1058 it had been the reformers who sought German support, but on Nicholas II's death the roles were reversed, and the royal intervention once again took the form of nomination. As we have already seen, the reformers were anxious not to offend the king further by denying the validity of his intervention; the grounds on which they sought to excuse themselves for not having sought the royal intervention were essentially unconvincing. Yet although the monarchy exercised the old practice of nomination both in 1061 and in 1080, it seems clear that it was prepared to accept as its due the retrospective consent that was accorded to it by Nicholas's decree. The form of the royal intervention had altered, even though the tradition of that intervention was sufficiently well established to make the German court a centre of appeal in disputed elections and for malcontents.

This image naturally persisted, indeed intensified, after the opening of the breach between Gregory VII and Henry IV. Henry's nomination of Wibert of Ravenna as pope appeared to be reverting to the old tradition; the only Roman present was the dissident cardinal Hugh Candidus. Practical politics obliged the king to be

more circumspect, however. Thus the king's letters to the Romans make no reference to the antipope, and the question of Gregory's deposition is left open. The bold claims of the imperial polemicists could no longer be related to the practical situation, partly because there was no longer any marked appeal from Rome itself for intervention, but also because Henry himself seemed to lose interest in the papal contest once Wibert was enthroned, the imperial crown bestowed, and Gregory exiled, soon to die. Thereafter the emperor seems to have done little to help his antipope, and there is little evidence that he or his son were responsible for the election of the antipopes who appeared early in the reign of Paschal II. Perhaps the most striking feature of the events in Rome in 1111, when Henry V crudely attempted to force a settlement to the investiture dispute, is that despite the impasse which was soon reached, the emperor made no attempt to secure the election of another pope, let alone nominate one himself. The election of Mauritius Burdinus as Gregory VIII enjoyed the imperial blessing, but little subsequent support, and it is likely that the real instigators of this election were the Frangipane.

Broadly speaking, the effective intervention of the German monarchy in papal elections took place more as a matter of convenience that as the consequence of any consistent claims of office. To be effective, it needed support in Rome itself. Germany was too distant, its opportunity of exerting military pressure too


2. On which see C. Erdmann, Mauritius Burdinus, Quellen, xix (1927), 205-61, particularly pp. 229-30, 241, 248.
sporadic, for its influence to be maintained by force alone. To survive, the German influence needed the support of the Roman Church itself, temporarily lost in 1061 by the breach with Nicholas II, and more permanently in 1075. As we have seen, this support was forthcoming during the reign of Henry III, though declining during the minority despite the fact that the relations between the reformers and their lay and clerical opponents in Rome were then at their most critical. Despite the element of constraint involved, the Roman acceptance of the imperial nominations implied a certain willingness, most readily explained by a reluctance to accept the alternative, a Tuscan revival.

The links with the Ottonian tradition, the broad attributes of the Empire, and the narrower ones of the patriciate, gave a certain aura to the German intervention in papal elections, a position of responsibility, endowed with its own rights and not restricted to acting only where its aid was solicited. Yet in practice that position was maintained at Rome for the local convenience of its church and nobility. Similar motives can be seen behind the involvement of other lay powers in papal elections. After the death of Henry III, the Papacy had to seek a protector nearer Rome. Such a protector was to hand in the form of Duke Godfrey of Lorraine; although there is no trace of the ducal influence behind the election, it is almost certain that the succession of his brother Stephen IX represented in some degree a bid for his support. In the disputed election in 1058, it was a former chaplain of Godfrey's, now bishop of Florence, who was chosen as Nicholas II. The new pope gained Rome with Tuscan help, and it was only a revolt in Ancona that prevented the duke from completing the defeat of Benedict X's adherents. Although he seems to have played little
part in the election of Alexander II, the duke was instrumental in establishing a truce during the Cadalan schism. The support which his daughter, Matilda, brought to the reform movement is too well known to require comment\(^1\). But in this context it is well worth noting the extent to which she was involved in the election of Gregory VII's successors. As we shall see, it was the Norman rulers of southern Italy, above all Jordan of Capua, who were responsible for the election of Victor III. Matilda seems to have played a comparatively small part in the protracted series of councils by which Desiderius had the Papacy thrust upon him; given this it is all the more striking that it was to the countess that Hugh of Lyons addressed his letter of complaint\(^2\). The election of Urban II was attended by her legates\(^3\), but neither the Montecassino chronicle nor the other accounts of Odo's election lay much stress upon their activities there or gives them a particularly significant part in the proceedings. Valuable as Matilda's assistance might have been in Rome, as when her forces enabled Desiderius to enter the city briefly for his coronation, she does not seem to have had much influence on the conduct of papal elections.

It was otherwise with the Normans, equivocal as their relations with the Papacy were. The oaths taken by their leaders at Melfi in return for the recognition of their conquests stressed the obligation to support the choice of the meliores cardinales and

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layman in the event of a disputed election. But generally the relations between Papacy and Normans were poor, and the practical weight put on their alliance should not be overestimated. It was an alliance that was more valuable in being withheld from the pope’s enemies than for its more positive assets, and even in the earliest days of their recognition, it is likely to have been less valuable to the Papacy than has sometimes been estimated. Norman troops may have played an initial part in the succession of Alexander II, but their support was temporary and several years later the pope enlisted the aid of Godfrey of Lorraine against them. There can be no suggestion that Alexander was in any sense a Norman pope. Only one papal election in our period was decisively influenced by the Normans, that of Victor III through the pressure of Jordan of Capua and Raimulf of Alife.

What distinguished the interventions of the Tuscan and Norman rulers in papal elections from those of the German monarchy was not the essentially pragmatic basis on which they rested and were solicited, but rather that they were temporary, unbuttressed by theories of office and duties, and not themselves a part of the election procedure. There was no question of nomination, still less that of invalidity if their approval was not secured. Their primary importance is that they were sought against the Roman opposition, their constitutional significance small.

While considering the nature of the German influence in papal


2. As shown by A. Fliche, Réforme Grégorienne, iii, (Louvain, 1937), 196-201.
elections, it is impossible to avoid some consideration of the election decree of pope Nicholas II. The decree was significant in that it established a system of election in Rome which could operate almost autonomously of German control, even though it made provision for the royal consent. Before considering this election structure and the significance which it actually had in the conduct of papal elections, it is important to stress one aspect of the decree. This is the emergency clause, by which elections could be held outside Rome if need arose. Save for that of Clement II, all of Henry III's nominations had taken place in Germany. Nicholas, with obvious relevance to his own election at Siena, ordained that the election could take place outside Rome if the city were disturbed by faction, and made the election still more independent of the city by allowing the full use of papal authority before the enthronization. Whereas a disputed election had formerly been settled, more often than not, by the seizure of Rome itself, the Papacy now declared itself theoretically independent of the city.

During the Investiture Controversy, it was the reformers who made greater use of this provision than their opponents. Practical necessity, dictated by their unpopularity in Rome after the sack of 1084, is part of the story. Thus Victor III's election eventually occurred at Capua, though there had been an earlier election meeting in Rome, while Urban II was elected at Terracina, and Calixtus II at Cluny. Yet an ideological difference of sorts can also be detected. The reformers were readier than most of their opponents to give the cardinalate a position and authority of its own. Peter Damian and

Humbert emphasised the role of cardinals in the government of the Church, giving them a significance which greatly transcended their Roman title churches and suburban sees\(^1\). This was a natural corollary of the calibre of the men appointed to the cardinalate from the time of Leo IX, and it was to colour the thinking of the reformers. The strong emphasis placed on the cardinalate, and particularly on the cardinal bishops, provided a justification for their enhanced significance in elections. Thus Damian regarded the cardinals and pope as the Church itself, the cardinal bishops as its eyes\(^2\). With this presumption, it was not difficult to take the matter a step further and regard the consent of the cardinals as the vital step in papal elections, the one which had real constitutive importance, and this thinking made it easier to disassociate the election from Rome itself.

Their imperialist opponents did not enjoy this intellectual buttress. Of the Wibertines or imperial polemists, only Beno attributes much value to the role of the cardinals in elections, emphasising that the imperial nominations of Clement II, Damasus II, and Leo IX were all made with the consilium cardinalium\(^3\). But of the other propagandists, only those who made the succession to the Papacy directly dependent on the imperial nomination could distance

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2. Migne, Pat. Lat. 145, col. 540-2 where the cardinals are seen as the senate of the universal church; Pat. Lat. 144, Ep. II/1, col. 256 where the cardinal bishops are seen as the eyes of the church.

it from the city as readily as could the reformers. Thus neither Gualtarius nor Wibert appear to have assumed the papal authority after their nominations, while the royal negotiations with the Romans in 1082-3 made no mention of the king's pope-designate, implying that Wibert would be dropped if the political situation warranted such a step. It was not practical for either side to make itself consistently autonomous of Rome. The more the election was distanced from the city, the greater might be the difficulty of establishing control there. But of the two sides, it was the reformers who were more prepared to take this step.

Before considering the role of the Roman elements, lay and clerical, in papal elections, there remains one further external element to be considered. The election of the pope as that of the head of the Western Church had a significance which transcended Rome and gave the higher clergy a natural interest in papal elections. It was thus natural that they should on occasion be implicated in elections, particularly at moments of schism when rival parties were obliged to bid for support where they could find it. The theory behind this was grounded as early as the mid-eleventh century when the author of the 'De ordinando pontifex' used it in complaint against Henry III's behaviour at Sutri. But the theory could also imply agreement with the emperor, being to some extent a legacy from the time of imperial nominations, which were generally made in a diet of German bishops and nobles. The notion was reflected in Henry IV's use of the German bishops to issue sentence upon Gregory VII at Worms. Similarly it was an assembly of bishops which was responsible for the second deposition

1. Lib. de lite i, 11.
of Gregory at the synod of Brixen, the only representative of the Roman Church present being the dissident Hugh Candidus. The reformers, however, showed themselves no less willing to admit this non-Roman element into their elections. Victor III's denunciation of his rival at the synod of Benevento is often taken as establishing that he saw himself as elected according to the provisions of the election decree of Nicholas II\(^1\). But although the pope's denunciation of Wibert's papacy refers back to the decree, the rehearsal of his own claims does not. The pope stated himself elected \textit{unanimi concordia episcorum et cardinalium et comprovincialium episcoporum et cleri su populi Romani}. If the \textit{comprovinciales} are the cardinal bishops, it is clear that the other bishops referred to must have been non-Roman.

If this is the only instance in which a reform pope attributed his election to non-Roman bishops, among other factors, it is still worth noting their attendance at other elections. Thus it is notable that the southern Italian bishops and abbots were summoned to the election of Urban II at Terracina\(^2\). Whatever their role in the actual deliberations of the election, their summoning reflects an understandable bid for support and recognition made all the more necessary by the fact that the election was not held at Rome, currently under the fairly firm control of the Wibertines.

If foreign lay and clerical forces could play a leading part in the election of the pope, and if the election itself were not necessarily tied to Rome, the importance of the clergy and laity

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Chron. Cap.} 760.
\end{enumerate}
of the city could nevertheless be significant. It was only during
the eleventh century that the constitution of the Roman church
became clear, and even during this period questions of expediency
could blur that picture, both in the intervention of the external
factors which we have been considering and in the somewhat flexible
character of the Roman interest in the election of the city's
bishop. Naturally our sources are most interested in the
exceptional, in the elections which were disputed, or which took
their character from the workings of particular factions and
elements. This makes norms difficult to determine. But in fact
the flexibility was such that we may be mistaken to seek a
consistent norm at all.

Let us begin by considering the role of the cardinal bishops.
The procedures by which the Tuscan popes attained the Papacy are
unrecorded, but the privileges they issued to their suburban bishops
show that a ceremonial influence, at the least, was associated with
them in the consecration and enthronization of the popes. The right
of the cardinal bishops to take part in papal enthronizations dated
back to the fourth century, at least in the case of Ostia\(^1\), and
although we have no explicit record of their exercising this
privilege in the early eleventh century, the bull issued by
Benedict IX to bishop Peter of Silva Candida makes particular
reference to his rights in enthroning the pope. In this it stands
apart from the privilege of his predecessor, John XIX, of which it
is in other respects largely a copy\(^2\). The period of imperial

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nominations which followed the fall of the Tusculans left little room for the cardinal bishops' privileges to be other than formal, but the calibre of the men appointed during this period, particularly under Leo IX and Victor II, was high and force of character as much as the legality of their rights, previously much overshadowed, played a decisive part in the schism of 1058. Peter Damian, as cardinal bishop of Ostia, refused to crown Benedict X, who was thus obliged to make shift with the services of the archpriest of that see. With the exception of the antipope himself, and the bishop of Palestrina, the cardinal bishops were unanimous in their support of Nicholas II, and this was reflected in the decree the pope subsequently issued regulating papal elections, with its strong emphasis on the tractatio of the cardinal bishops.

Much has been written on the extent of this right, on the manner in which it was exercised, and above all on the extent to which it proceeded and perhaps dictated the assent of the other groups involved in the election. The text of the decree is certainly open to diverse interpretation; thus it is disputed if the tractatio of the decree represented the election itself, and if so, how far its deliberations might override those of the other groups mentioned in the decree. Space forbids the attention which these issues demand. For the moment we cannot do better than note the subsequently expressed interpretation of those who framed the decree, taken from another text of the same year, the Synodica generalis: "electio Romani pontificis in potestate cardinalium"

2. Krause, *Papstwahldekret*, is by far the best starting point for an examination of these issues.
Further it is worth noting that the Wibertine redaction of the decree included the cardinals in the tractatio, which suggests that this process was not merely one of defining the particular arrangements for the election.

The correspondence between the decree and the circumstances of Nicholas's own election have repeatedly and justly been emphasised. The decree represented a tour de force effected by the cardinal bishops against the remainder of the Roman clergy, effective largely because of the sheer calibre of these men, and to some degree buttressed by the ancient rights of the cardinal bishops in papal inthronizations. But the retrospective element in the decree should not blind us to the fact that it was also prescriptive. It was introduced as such, and described as such in the subsequent texts and polemics to which we have already referred. We have already dwelt on the extent to which it represented a genuine, if respectful, diminution of the royal rights. Here is the other side of the coin; the position of the cardinal bishops was vastly enhanced.

Evaluations of the survival of the decree in practice are as diverse as they are of the nature of the decree itself, not surprisingly since the detailed interpretation of the decree can lead to results so various as to accommodate almost all forms of election. Most significant, perhaps, is the fact that it was barely used as a touchstone of papal elections until after the first deposition of Gregory, when the decree naturally acquired


a polemical importance. Thus when Damian wrote his *Disceptatio synodalís* he did not attempt to justify Alexander II's election by the terms of the decree, even though he did so in terms broadly concordant with it. We have already mentioned Victor III's sentence upon Clement III at the synod of Benevento; here, although the terms by which the imperial pope was denounced were almost exactly in line with the decree, those by which Desiderius justified his own election were not. Bonizo of Sutri and Deusdedit both showed reluctance to believe that Nicholas had really issued the decree, and although their reluctance was based on their opponents' assertion that it had rendered the royal consent a decisive part of the election, their readiness to take this step shows how small a mark the decree had left upon the reformers.

If the decree was thus neglected in reforming circles, what practical influence did it have upon the role of the cardinal bishops in the elections themselves? Neither Alexander II's nor Gregory VII's elections show any sign of an independent role played by the cardinal bishops, while the accounts of the elections of Paschal II and Gelasius II are likewise silent about any *tractatio*. According to the account of the Montecassino chronicle, the cardinal priests as well as the cardinal bishops declared their readiness to

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3. This is so even in the official protocol of Gregory's election, *Reg. i*, I/1*,* pp. 1-2.
5. *Ibid.*, 165-7; but Pandulf's account is questionable.
elect Desiderius at the first meeting in Rome\textsuperscript{1}, and of the elections within our period, it is only at that of Urban II that there is evidence for the cardinal bishops pronouncing their own choice separately from that of the rest of the electors\textsuperscript{2}. In the other camp, there is no evidence that the imperialists, for all their lip service to the decree in the matter of the imperial rights, paid it much attention in the actual procedure of their elections. The most radical aspect of the decree was thus allowed to fall into disuse well within the lifetime of those who drafted it.

If the suburban bishops represented the driving force behind the election of Nicholas II, and were in their own right the leading figures in the reform group, they also represented a distinct minority among the Roman clergy. From considering their significance in papal elections, it is natural to turn to that of their less eminent colleagues. Here we enter territory that is by its nature more obscure. Once again the story starts in 1059; the elections of the Tusculans are too obscure, those of their successors too obviously determined at the imperial court, for the role of the priests and lower clergy to be easily determined. The presence of only four subscriptions by cardinal priests to Nicholas's decree is most likely to be a consequence of the abridgement of the subscription list\textsuperscript{3}. The official account of Gregory VII's election throws light upon the intervention of the lower clergy, however.

\textsuperscript{1} Chron. Cas., 752.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 761.
\textsuperscript{3} The list survives only in the redactions of the Wibertine version of the decree, but probably comes from a lost copy of the original. It comprises 79 subscriptions, whereas other sources claim that 113 or 125 bishops were present.
It is striking that clergy of far lower rank than priests and deacons were present, and although the document that we have is essentially a formal record of the election as an acclamation, the mention is significant; certainly there is little trace of any *ordo electionis*. Being held outside Rome, the elections of Victor III and Urban II seem to have been more sparsely attended by these lower clergy, many of whom had gone over to Clement III in 1084\(^1\). But the accounts of the elections of Paschal II and Gelasius II both emphasise the presence of the lower clergy and in no way distinguish their role from that of the cardinal bishops\(^2\). If it had been the intention of Nicholas II to restrict local pressures upon the electors by giving primacy in the election to the cardinal bishops, his intentions were hardly followed. Specific lay influences through the lower clergy are difficult to identify at this period, but the situation was certainly open to them.

The role of the Roman laity and nobility remains to be considered. Here the picture is still more confused by polemic on the one hand and the practice of what was illicit on the other. Words do not always match actions. The coups by which the Tusculans seized power and later sought to regain it must receive the least attention, even though they deserve more. Except that it was allegedly by the influence of his father that Benedict IX became pope\(^3\), we are all too ill-informed about the nature of their successions and the extent to which there was any consistent lay element in the process of their succession. Later, their use of force in the election and

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enthronement of Benedict X is well enough known, but it is not clear how far they took part in the election process itself, nor what form that process took.

Most illuminating, from these earlier years of our period, is probably the fact that the delegation sent to Basle in 1061 comprised both lay and clerical representatives – Gerard of Galeria on behalf of the nobility, the abbot of S. Gregorio on that of the clergy.

Latter at the election of Urban II, the Cardinal Bishop Peter of Albano and the City Prefect Benedict presented their credentials at the opening of the assembly as representatives of the Roman clergy and laity. This is likely to denote a lay privilege more substantial than that of simply attending and giving a tacit or formal assent to the choice of others. Pandulf's accounts of the elections of Gelasius II and Honorius II cast some light here, though it is a light filtered through the events of a later schism. His account of Gelasius's election makes no distinction between the different stages or election nor between the lay and clerical status of those attending. By contrast, he regarded the election of Honorius II as invalid because the choice of the laymen proceeded and compelled that of the clergy.

Although the election of the pope could be distanced from Rome by the choice of foreigners, by being held outside the city, by the German nomination, or the influence of other powers in Italy, lay and clerical, there was always the problem that its result should be acceptable to the Roman nobility, at least to the extent that

2. Chron. Cas., 760.
active opposition should not be aroused on too grand a scale. After the sack of 1084 the Reform Popes were able to spend little time in the city, but Urban II's insistence that he did not wish to secure it by Norman force is an indication of the importance he attached to not further alienating his episcopal city, even though he was for most of his pontificate debarred from residing or officiating there. If the wishes of Rome could be overruled, it was nonetheless politic to avoid doing so. A reflection of this somewhat obvious fact may be found in an incident which occurred during the first election of Victor III. Declining to accept the Papacy, Desiderius recommended Odo of Ostia; it is striking that beforehand he took counsel from the consul Cencius Frangipane.

The role of the Roman nobility in the elections themselves is difficult to determine. The formula of election by clergy and people can obscure too much to be of any other than a formal significance. A few instances of something more than that can nonetheless be discerned. Alexander II's election was, if Leo of Ostia's account is to be accepted, by the Roman clergy and nobles. Later the account of Gelasius II's election is of interest in its reference to the presence of the senate and consuls - words which clearly denote the upper strata of the nobility - in this case with a clear role in the election as they were, together with the cardinals and other clergy present, ut iuxta seita canonum de electione tractarent. On his death his successor, Calixtus II,

1. P. Kehr, Due documenti, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxiii (1900), 277-8.
3. Ibid., 711.
was elected at Cluny and seems to have assumed his responsibilities without waiting for ratification from Rome. It is however worth noting that he nevertheless sought that ratification, and did so from Pierleone, the prefect, and the consuls, as well as from the cardinals, clergy, and populace. On Calixtus's death, Pierleone and Leo Frangipane, as leading citizens, perhaps also as major rivals, were both associated with the cardinals in the decision that no steps should be taken for three days in the course of the next election and according to Pandulf, it was their influence which proved decisive.

Such evidence of noble involvement in papal elections is not to be taken lightly. If the form which it took was inconsistent and shadowy, the intervention was nonetheless genuine. A congratulation addressed to Gregory VII on his election serves to underline the point. The tumult which preceded the formal election was emphasised by Gregory himself in his accounts of the succession, which is clear enough proof that it did not embarrass him. The congratulations of Walo of Metz went further; the tumult itself, indicative of unanimity in Rome, represented the working of the Holy Spirit.

This attitude is a far cry from careful definition of procedures and constitutional regulation of elections. It helps explain the sheer flexibility of the procedures we have been considering, the readiness of response to the political situation in the choice of election procedure, and perhaps still more the

1. Ibid., 192.
2. Ibid., 203.
3. As in Reg. i, I/1, pp. 3-4.
almost arbitrary acceptance or rejection of results less by any consistent criterion of the procedures employed in an election as by their results. A striking corollary of this attitude, in times of difficulty, was the reference to perhaps the most arbitrary, and certainly the least readily ascertainable, of all influences, that of the dead pope himself.

As we have seen, the reformers did not hesitate to distance the election from Rome, and if necessary from Roman electors. Without the support of previous custom which their opponents enjoyed in their reference to the royal nomination, and without any very clear canonical support for their actions, further buttressing was opportune. Hence it is natural that the reformers made reference to the papal designation of their successors chiefly at a time when the reformers were in a considerable state of disorganisation and demoralisation following the death of Gregory VII. An earlier instance of designation has, it is true, been posited—that of Nicholas II by the dying Stephen IX, so likewise in a disputed election. However this is an instance which cannot be documented, and Nicholas's supporters do not seem to have used the designation, if it took place, as an argument against their opponents. The later occurrences, on the other hand, are well enough documented, even if our account, the chronicle of Montecassino, is clearly partisan in its attempt to justify the election of a former abbot of the monastery. Desiderius was tainted


by his negotiations with Henry IV at Albano in 1082, necessary as these were for the safety of his house after Jordan of Capua had defected from the papal camp. The account of Gregory's deathbed designation of his abbot, among others, as a possible successor, is striking in the force it gives the designation - iuberet is the term used. But whatever the terms of Gregory's designation, whoever received it, and whatever the force with which that designation was uttered, it is essential to note that the designation was not a constitutive act, and was not portrayed as such. It was an injunction to elect, never a substitute.

The dictates of necessity often override those of principle. In this respect the flexibility of the popes' own elections represents a marked contrast to the standards which they sometimes demanded of others. The place and manner of election was inconsistent, the electors variable. A tumult denounced when it brought a Benedict X to power could be acclaimed when a Gregory VII was the beneficiary. Yet although this flexibility of practice gave the greatest latitude to elections, freeing them from any necessary dependence upon the city, and although external lay and clerical elements could always be used to ensure that independence, political necessities could also tie the church to the nobility. Thus the noble influence was particularly marked in the years following Gregory's death. If the decree of Nicholas II represented a manifesto giving the curia independence from the Roman nobles, it was a manifesto which gathered dust on the shelf. For practical reasons, even during the period of imperial nominations, there was a Roman interest in the elections, indispensable to reformers and

imperialists alike. To this interest, as it may be seen in the
relations between the Papacy and most of the leading families, we
now turn.
CHAPTER 3

THE TUSCULANS AND THE COLONNA

In considering the relations between the popes and the individual Roman families, we step at once into a terra incognita, sketchily charted and full of pitfalls for the unwary. Family trees and titles to possession need to be established, and despite the mass of charter evidence which has survived, it is unlikely that they can ever fully be known. Land ownership was in a state of such continual flux that many lordships become virtually unidentifiable and old-established claims appear in much the same light as encroachments. Continuity of possession is thus a treacherous guide to family structure and inheritance, and with both the lordships and their families blurred by uncertainty and unavoidable ignorance, the assessment of what was at stake has necessarily to be all too often a matter of surmise. Yet what can be offered is not negligible, and sometimes it does at least throw light, and occasionally some darkness too, on the familiar picture.

Before going further it is best to sketch that picture; it will at least provide us with a few landmarks during the journey. The starting point is naturally enough the Tusculan Papacy itself. Here we see the family at the height of its power, controlling the destiny of its rivals, balancing the opposing factions against each other, and enjoying a supremacy that was seriously challenged only in 1044. Internal faction followed by imperial intervention broke

1. K.-J. Hermann, Das Tusculanerpatentum, (Stuttgart, 1973), provides a convenient general account of the Tusculan Papacy. Their relations with the Crescentians will be considered in the next chapter.
that power for ever¹. There are grounds for regarding Gregory VII as essentially a Tusculan pope, even if he were not of the family. He was a godfather of Benedict IX² and in 1043 acted as co-executor with Gregory II of Tusculum for bishop Peter of Silva Candida³. But when Henry III established a whole succession of German popes, a state of mutual hostility developed between the ousted family and the interlopers. With a renewed occupation of the Papacy as the goal, the family made consistent and repeated attempts to block the Germans from Rome and re-install their own candidate, at first, and no doubt providentially for the Reformers, since the choice must have limited the Roman support available to the Tusculans, in the person of the discredited Benedict IX. The schisms of 1058 and 1062 represent the turning point. Crushed or intimidated by the Papacy’s use of its Norman allies, the family was then the victim of a slow and deliberate erosion of power, master-minded by the Reform Popes. Two detailed pieces of work support this hypothesis. One is that of Digard, which suggests that Gregory VII and his successors split the family by recognising the claims of its cadet Colonna branch⁴. The other, though taken over by many subsequent historians, is that of G. Falco, who suggested that the same popes won over the towns of the Campagna and Marritima by freeing them from Tusculan control,

¹ The best account of the events of 1044-6 is still that of G.B. Borino, Gregorio VI, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxix (1916), 141-252, 295-410.
² Lib. Pont., ii, 270, 331.
³ A. Monaci, Regesto dell’abbazia di Sant’Alessio all’Aventino, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxvii (1904), no. 6, pp. 374-6.
and thus also weakened the family\(^1\). If there were no continual struggle between the old papal family and the Reform Papacy, there was nonetheless a fairly consistent opposition of interests, implacably smouldering under the surface and bursting into flame whenever suitable draughts blew upon the Roman scene.

An immediate objection to this picture presents itself. Paschal II was accused of having secured the papacy by bribing Gregory III of Tusculum, his son Ptolemy (wrongly called Thodolo) and Peter Colonna\(^2\). In 1108 he made Ptolemy co-governor of the Campagna\(^3\), and in the 1116 disturbances over the Prefecture, he sought to gain Ptolemy's support\(^4\). Both of these latter moves backfired, but they could hardly have been made at all if the picture had been as we have painted it.

In part the discrepancy arises from a certain confusion as to who the Tusculans really were. Particularly on account of this, though also for other reasons, it is valuable to try and unravel the question and find out just who the Tusculans were, what lands they held, and how and when the various members of the family inherited them. The state of our source material makes this a complex and laborious task, and the resultant exposition is necessarily rather long. There is at least consolation in that the conclusions, when reached, are comparatively straightforward.

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The Tusculans and the Colonna

A broken line indicates putative descent; the placement of siblings is arbitrary.

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Theophylact m. Marozia II  
vestararius

Gregory I m. Maria  
+ 1013

Benedict VIII  
(Theophylact)  
+ 1024

John XIX  
(Romanus)  
+ 1032

Alberic III

Marozia III

Peter, Bishop of Silva Candida

Gregory II  
+ 1060

Benedict IX  
(Theophylact)  
+ 1055

Octavian

Peter

Theodora

m. Pandulf

of Salerno

John b. and + 1030

Gregory III  
+ 1104

Peter  
+ 1130

Peter

Gregory

Oddo

Ptolemy I  
+ 1129

m. Prefect

Egidius

Gregory

Peter Colonna

Ptolemy II  
+ 1153

m. 1. Berta

2. d. of Leo Pierleone

Prefect

Peter the Deacon

Oddo Carsidonio

m. niece

of Honorius II

Jonatha

Rainer
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In common with the two chief branches of the Crescentian family, the Tusculans descended from the house of Theophylact\(^1\). One consequence of this common descent has been a readiness to speak of their distant kinsmen, even by the early twelfth century, as Tusculans\(^2\). These links were distant even at the beginning of our story. Gregory I stood in the relationship of second cousin to the Stephanians, and his ties with the Octavians were more distant still. The seizure of the Papacy in 1012 was accomplished in direct rivalry against the Stephanians, and practically the first of Benedict VIII's acts was the launching of a campaign against their strongholds, from which they were for some time expelled. Octavian support was meanwhile enrolled in the Sabina and in Rome itself\(^3\). Already the different branches of the house of Theophylact represented different blocks, generally in a state of rivalry with each other. Unless any closer connection than that of their common descent can be

1. The best demonstration of the link is still that by R.L. Poole, Benedict IX and Gregory VI, *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, viii (1917), 199-235 at pp. 229-35. His supposition that *Theodora* should be read as *Theodora* is stronger than he supposed. \(U\) and \(A\) are easily confused in Roman curial and the slip was a natural one when the document was copied into the minuscule of the Subiaco Register.


3. These events will be dealt with in the next chapter.
demonstrated, it hardly makes sense to speak of the Crescentian families as Tusculans. That title is better reserved to Gregory I and his descendants.

By this definition the family goes back to the late tenth century. A Gregorius consul et dux of a Subiaco document of 961 is often taken as the first reference to our Gregory. Another document of 966 mentions a Gregorius consul et dux filius Georgii, who is clearly not our subject, whom we know to have been the son of Theophylact; this latter Gregory could easily be the same man as appears in the earlier document. Accordingly, the first clear references do not come until 980, though Gregory must have been born early enough to have had a son of sufficient age to hold imperial office in 999. Poole's demonstration that Gregory's mother was Marczia II is convincing. Gregory's wife was Maria, of unknown descent, the mother of three sons, Alberic III, Theophylact and Romamus. Gregory and Alberic both obtained office under Otto III, and Gregory acted as an emissary between Silvester II and Otto. In the subsequent revolt Gregory was on the side of the insurgents, though hardly as dominant in the rebellion as is

1. Reg. Sublac., no. 139, pp. 190-1. Poole accepts this as a reference to Gregory I.

2. Reg. Sublac., no. 118, pp. 166-7. Poole's examination of the Tusculan ancestry makes clear that Gregory was the son of the vestararius Theophylact.


4. Alberic III was magister imperialis palatii in 999, Reg. Farf., iii, no. 437, pp. 149-51.


sometimes claimed. The control of Rome passed to the Crescentians, who retained their dominance until the Tuscanal coup of 1012.

Gregory I and his wife were both dead by 1013. Meanwhile his sons had assumed control of Rome through the seizure of the Papacy, soon to receive imperial recognition. Neither Benedict nor John left sons, and the line continued through Alberic III. He had four sons and two daughters, one of whom, Theodora, married Pandulf of Salerno. Of the sons, one, Theophylact, is best known as Benedict IX; his brothers, Gregory II, Peter and Octavian retained lay status. Alberic was certainly dead by 1045 and may have been dead by 1043 when his son, Gregory II, is found as co-executor for Bishop Peter of Silva Candida. It is obviously tempting to relate

1. Reg. Parf., iv, no. 639, pp. 37-8; a grant by Benedict VIII for the souls of his parents.

2. Borino, Gregorio VI, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxix (1916), at pp. 233-8, convincingly suggests that Bishop Peter of Silva Candida was a nephew of Benedict VIII by one of his sisters. The identification is not demonstrable, but, if true, might account for the extensive privileges which John XIX and Benedict IX granted this see.

3. G.T. Atenolfi, La regione della Velia e gli epigoni della Dinastia Langobarda Salernitana, Archivi, Ser. II, xxviii (1961), at p. 15, n. 37, convincingly argues on chronological grounds that she was a daughter of Alberic III rather than of Gregory I.

4. The four brothers are named together as sons of Alberic in a dorsal note recording a donation to the Trasteverine monastery of SS. Cosma e Damiano in 1055; P. Fedele, Carte del monastero dei SS. Cosma e Damiano in Mica Aurea, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxi (1899), no. xxxiii, p. 54 n. 1.


the Tusulan fall from dominance to his death, but Gregory II must have been middle-aged by 1044 for a son, who died in infancy, had been born as long before as 1030. An inopportune succession of youths can hardly account for the Tusulans' loss of the Papacy.

Gregory II was certainly dead by 1064 and probably by 1060. Of his brothers, Peter and Octavian survived him, and he left at least two sons, Gregory and Peter. Gregory III seems to have succeeded to the title, and lived until 1104. Of Gregory II's brothers, Octavian left no recorded descent; Peter had two sons, Gregory and Otto. Gregory III's issue included two sons, Ptolemy I and the vagrant Egidius, father of Peter the Deacon. Ptolemy I lived until about 1129 before being succeeded by his son, Ptolemy II.

So much for the main line of the family. Its subsidiary branches raise greater problems. First, not so much for its

1. V. Forcella, Iscrizioni delle Chiese e d'altro edificii di Roma dal secolo XI fino ai giorni nostri, xii, (Rome, 1878), p. 10, no. 3.
3. Hoffmann, Art. cit. 26 shows that he was dead by September 1104. A Veroli document of May, 1104, shows that he was still alive then; M.H. Laurent, Supplément au chartrier de S. Erasmo à Veroli., Bull. Ist. Stor. Ital., lxxxii (1960), 184-7.
5. E. Caspar, Petrus Diaconus und die Monte Cassineser Falschungen, (Berlin, 1909), pp. 22-3, doubted that Peter was genuinely of the Tusulan family. Hoffmann, Art. cit., p. 60f. shows that there was some substance to Peter's claim, though it is certainly the case that Egidius is not a proven member of the house.
importance as because the problem bears upon another, it is best to consider the Tuscan relatives who were the key figures in the 1116 dispute over the Prefecture. In that year the Prefect Peter died and Paschal II vainly opposed the succession of his son, also called Peter, in favour of a Pierleone candidate. The young man is called a nephew of Ptolemy I and on these grounds has been described as Tuscan, which would make him a grandson of Gregory III. This identification raises problems, not least of which is that of why Paschal should then have tried, unsuccessfully, to bribe Ptolemy by the grant of Ariccia, in return for support against his nephew’s faction. Ptolemy had already shown his unreliability in 1108 so could hardly be treated as a trusted supporter of the pope irrespective of faction. Generally patrilinear ties were stronger among the Roman nobility than matrilinear ones. It thus seems a little far-fetched that the pope should have sought his support against the son of his own brother. It becomes slightly less so if we consider the possibility that the young prefect was the son of Ptolemy’s sister, for there is evidence that the young man’s patrilinear family was in fact that of the Corsi. Pandulf describes two members of the Corsi family as brothers of the younger Peter and on this basis Paschal’s attempt to bribe Ptolemy in 1116 becomes


2. Thus Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, (London, 1972), pp. 152–3; but he describes both the elder and the younger Peter as a nephew of Ptolemy.


somewhat more credible.  

The second, and greater, problem concerns the relationship 
between the Colonna and the Tusculans. The first mention of the 
Colonna comes when Peter Colonna was alleged to have been bribed by 
Paschal II in order to secure his election. One suggestion has 
been that Peter was himself the prefect who died in 1116, and that 
he was thus the brother of Ptolemy I. A letter of Calixtus II 
effectively gives the lie to this suggestion, since it shows that 
Peter Colonna was still alive on his entry to Rome; it also 
demonstrates that he was a different person from the younger 
Prefect Peter, who is mentioned separately in the document.

Pandulf's life of Honorius II makes plain that Peter Colonna was 
still alive under that pope, negotiating a marriage with the pope's 
niece for his son Oddo, and regaining control of Palestrina. If 
all these references to Peter Colonna are to the same person, it 
is clear that he can neither have been the elder prefect, who died 
in 1116, nor his son.

If this particular identification fails, have we any warrant 
for believing the Colonna to be a branch of the Tusculans? Petrini,

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1. An identification first made by P.F. Palumbo, Lo Scisma del 
MCXXX, (Rome, 1942), p. 112, n. 3. Questioned by Hoffmann, 
Art. cit., p. 25, n. 9, on the grounds that the phrase taken 
to describe two members of the Corsi family as brothers of 
the prefect may in fact be in apposition.


3. A possibility considered and rejected by Hoffmann, Art. cit., 
24. Partner, Lands of St. Peter, 142, sees Peter as a brother 
of Ptolemy I, but does not identify him with the prefect.

no. 176, pp. 261-2.

Coppi, Bossi, and most other historians after them have answered in the affirmative; they have, however, been recently questioned by Professor Hoffmann, reviving a previous but unnoticed argument to that effect. Hoffmann emphasises the instability of the Tuscan possessions, and suggests that Peter's own drive, reflected in his ruthless treatment of insurgents at Palestrina under Honorius II is itself adequate to explain his rise. Certainly it is difficult to accept a link as straightforward as that suggested by Coppi, who thought Peter Colonna to have been Gregory II's son, Peter. In fact Gregory had two sons called Peter; one was of age in 1077 when he made a donation to Montecassino. A man of this age is unlikely to have been very active under Honorius II. The other son of this name was dead by 1059, but may well have died some time before since his name was given to a brother who was of age by 1077. The case against the other Tuscan known as Peter is still stronger; he was a brother of Gregory II and last appears in 1064. Yet if these links may be rejected, it is far from clear that we must altogether rule out the relationship between the two families.


5. Gatula, Hist. Case., i, 236.

6. S. Borgia, De Cruce Velliterna, (Rome, 1780), Appendix, no. 4, pp. 286-8. Under Roman law the age of majority was 25; there are examples of men becoming majors at this age, but we cannot tell if the law was applied rigidly.

7. Ibid., 235-6.
The most striking evidence that there was in fact a link is a contract of 1151 by which Eugenius III bought property rights from Oddo Colonna, including half of the city of Tusculum. The possession of Monte Fortino, also included in the deal, was the basis of a near-war between Oddo and Ptolemy II and the deal initiated a long and complex series of negotiations by which the Papacy and Frangipane gained a substantial control of Tuscan rights before the destruction of the lordship, and later of the city itself. At first sight, then, it would seem that the deal merely supports Hoffmann's argument by showing the Colonna to be in clear opposition to the Tuscan Ptolemy II. Let us look a little more closely at the document. It shows that Oddo held Monte Fortino by virtue of an exchange which had taken place between his father and Ptolemy I; this puts the exchange before 1129, thus well before the outbreak of hostilities and the break up of the lordship. Oddo's Tuscan rights, on the other hand, were simply described as ex successione parentum meorum. In itself, of course, this says no more than that he had inherited them from his father, Peter Colonna, and leaves open the manner in which Peter had obtained them. Yet the document mentions an exchange quite explicitly so far as Monte Fortino was concerned, and it seems surprising that one should not be mentioned if Tusculum too had changed hands in this manner. It is thus possible that Peter had in fact inherited his rights there.

Further evidence that the families were linked comes in the form of a document in the Anagni archive, summarised by Stevenson in his

inventory of the archive. This document records the sale in 1064 of property in Colonna itself by Peter, son of Alberic III. His association with the place is also reflected in a grant he made to Montecassino, in which one of the witnesses is an Amatus, iudex de Castello della Colonia. Now it is worth noting that all of Peter Colonna's political actions were, before 1116, on the same side as those of the Tusculans. In 1099 he was allegedly bribed, along with Gregory III. In 1108 he joined in Ptolemy's revolt. It is only from the 1116 disturbances that they are found on different sides. If he had usurped Colonna from the Tusculans these alliances would not have been very likely. But he is known to have had possession of Colonna during the same years, and this makes it likely that some form of Tuscanan consent had been forthcoming. Given their former rights there, the most probable form of Peter's acquisition would seem to be lineal succession.

This is not a succession which can be documented. But it can at least be shown to be plausible. Peter de Alberico, brother of Gregory II, is known to have had two sons, Gregory and Oddo, both mentioned in a document of 1065, and then of age. Peter Colonna, on the other hand, is first found in 1099, though he must have been

old enough to have had a son of marriageable age by 1124-30\(^1\). By age he might quite plausibly have been a grandson of Peter de Alberico, and thus a second cousin of Ptolemy I. When we recall that Peter de Alberico and his sons are known only through two documents, it is hardly surprising that the link, if there was one, has gone unrecorded. When Peter Colonna came into prominence, his links with the Tusculans would already have been sufficiently distant to arouse little interest, particularly when he began to play an independent hand politically. If the link cannot be established with certainty, it is nonetheless too likely to be dismissed with easy scepticism.

II

So much, then, for the family itself. Let us now turn to the discussion of its possessions. It is vital to make allowance for the comparative instability of ownership and the frequency with which rights were transferred. Without taking these into account, one can present too marmoreal a portrait of the family's interests and lands, as well as confusing them with those of different houses. There is a real danger that we subsume occasional forays, basically predatory in nature, into continual lordship; the danger is the greater when our evidence comes from so wide a chronological net. Stoob, in his study of the Colonna castles\(^2\) makes precisely this mistake. He assumes that the Tusculans held a lordship at Serrano-Pontiano, but the document which he cites is a renunciation of property to Farfa of 1015 which makes clear that it had not long

been confiscated from the Stephanians. His assertion that Castello della Mola had been Tuscan rests on a document of 1229 which shows that the Colonna were then attempting to gain lordship there, but provides no basis or precedent for their claim. It is thus useless as evidence for the earlier period.

At the same time we are faced with a real problem of evidence. The clearest evidence for Tuscan land possession comes from grants, and the majority of those surviving were made to Montecassino. Here they survive only through the Register of Peter the Deacon, perhaps a nephew of Ptolemy I. From Peter's re-working of Leo's chronicle it is clear that substantial alterations were almost invariably made when the Tusculans were mentioned, both by removing Leo's less favourable aspersions on them, and by introducing fresh material. Thus Leo's account of Benedict IX's pontificate was toned down considerably. Similarly he added the information that two silver reliquaries, mentioned by Leo among the treasures of the monastery, had been granted by Benedict VIII de arcivo Lateranensis palatii.

It is also possible to see Peter greatly exaggerating the significance of his uncle's power. According to him, Gregory III and Ptolemy granted Montecassino an exemption of toll on the monastery's ships, which implies a considerable naval power.

Gregory I had held office with naval connections under Otto III.

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1. Chron. Cas., 682. Peter's alterations are in the textual notes.
2. Ibid., 720.
3. Ibid., 745.
but a document from Gaeta gives us a more realistic perspective on
the family's activities in this sphere at the turn of the eleventh
century. In this document, dating from 1105, Ptolemy came to terms
with a number of Gaetan merchants with whom he had quarrelled,
apparently with violence, after a dispute between Gregory III and
the merchants over the common possession of a ship. This is hardly
the action of a naval potentate.

Leo's list of Montecassino possessions acquired by Desiderius
before the consecration of the new basilica in 1071 was also
amended by Peter and substantial additions were made. It follows
that the documents preserved in the Register are hardly the most
reliable of evidence, particularly since the few papal confirmations
of the period which survive independently do not include all of the
named lands and churches. Leo's mention of a number of the churches
is proof enough that the donations took place, but their content is
all too likely to have been the subject of interpolation and
exaggeration by Peter.

If the kernel of our evidence is thus suspect, we are more
fortunate in the survival of many other of their donations, some
to Roman churches and others to the monastery of Grottaferrata,
which had been founded under the patronage of Gregory I. Yet even
here there are problems. From 1056 the family no longer features
as a donor to Roman churches, and ceases to figure in their
necrologies. Law-suits give us an occasional glimpse, but one that

1. Codex diplomaticus Cajetanus, ii, (Montecassino, 1887; repr.


3. Hoffmann, Petrus Diaconus, Deutsches Archiv, xxvii (1971),
11-16, lists and discusses the discrepancies.
is necessarily incomplete. As for Grottaferratta, the monastery gradually fell away from the family and was taken under firmer papal control. The process by which this occurred will be examined later; here it is sufficient to note that the corollary is a drying up of this source, so far as the family is concerned, after the mid-eleventh century.

The core of the family's lands was naturally enough around Tusculum itself. But in the earlier years of the eleventh century, they also held lands to the north of Rome and in the Sabina. In part this was doubtless a legacy from Alberic II whose donations reflect a control of church land all around Rome. Thus a document of Gregory I's shows that he held land at Scurano in 986. A document of 1079 from the same archive shows that this land was in different hands by then, but it had clearly remained in control of the family at least until 1030. An inscription found at the church of S. Christina nearby, adjacent to the old castle of Vaccaroccia, records the death of Gregory II's short-lived son, John, who was born and died in 1030. An inscription of this kind would hardly have been placed in a church where the presence of the family was

1. Partner, Notes on the lands of the Roman Church in the early Middle Ages, Papers of the British School at Rome, xxxiv, (1968), 68-78, illustrates the extent of this control and convincingly suggests that it derived from the spoliation of the old papal domus cultae. A good example of the wide ranging extent of Alberic's control and of his donations is a grant he made in 945 to S. Gregorio, including lands at Massano, Porto, and Albano; G.B. Mitrarelli, Annales Camaldulenses, (Venice, 1755-73), i, Appendix, no. 16, pp. 59-45.


3. Ibid., no. 19, pp. 41-4.

4. V. Forcella, Iscrizioni, xii, p. 10, no. 3.
insignificant. Possessions at Piano are demonstrated by a grant which Benedict VIII made to Farfa in 1013, including land there held by two former famuli\(^1\). Other grants of land in the region are, however, less conclusive since they were of land confiscated from the Stephanians and were only briefly of Tuscan possession\(^2\). When we take these cases into account it is clear that although the Tusculans did enjoy possessions north of Rome, and gained a few very temporary windfalls at the expense of the Stephanians, they did not use their control of the Papacy, as Stoob suggests, to secure fresh possessions\(^3\). Their power rested on a balancing and conciliation of rival families and churches, and even had they wished, it is unlikely that they could successfully have pursued so crude a policy of self-aggrandisement. That they did not do so is an important factor in the decline of the family after the Papacy had been lost.

In Rome itself, the chief Tuscan property has long been recognised to have been in the area of the Via Lata. Under Benedict VIII, Alberic III held a plea in his house, next to the church of the Apostles\(^4\). But they also seem to have owned a palace

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2. Thus Reg. Farf., iii, no. 502, pp. 210-2 of 1015, a renunciation to Farfa by Romanus on the orders of Benedict VIII of land formerly held by the Stephanian sons of count Benedict. Reg. Farf., iv, no. 636, pp. 33-4 is a grant by Benedict VIII of land at Formello; Reg. Farf., iv, no. 659, pp. 58-9, shows that in 1012 it had been held by Rogata di Crescenzio, wife of Octavian, who had granted it to Farfa for the soul of the Patricius John.
in Trastevere near the church of S.S. Rufina and Secunda\(^1\), a
dependant of S. Maria in Trastevere. This might explain the choice
of an entrance to the city through Trastevere in 1045 when
Benedict IX's adherents sought to re-instate the expelled pope
against the Crescentian Silvester III\(^2\). But in Rome too, it is
difficult to trace their possessions after the mid-eleventh century,
especially as the flow of Tuscan donations to Roman churches and
monasteries ceases; this may mean that the family was no longer
resident in Rome. The rebellion of 1108, in which Ptolemy I and
Peter Colonna were leading figures, was largely quelled by the
destruction and ransom of the insurgents' town houses, but the
revolt was so widespread that we cannot be certain that their own
houses, if they had any, were among them\(^3\). Even if the family
retained property in Rome, their influence had rested too much on
the control of the Papacy itself, through which court cases were
delegated to other members of the family, for it to endure after
the Papacy had been lost\(^4\).

On their home ground, the wealth and standing of the Tuscanals
is reasonably well attested, particularly during the years when they
were in possession of the Papacy. It is not known how they came

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   versions of these bulls are poor, but the reading here is in
   the oldest copy, \textit{MS. Arch. Vat.}; \textit{Reg. Vat.} 18., fol. 242\(V^{2}\),
   249\(V^{2}\).


3. \textit{Lib. Pont. Derbua.}, p. 140, a proposit buildings held by
   Stephen Alberti.

4. Alberic III and Gregory III both held pleas at Rome; Alberic,
   \textit{Reg. Farf.}, iv, no. 637, pp. 54-5. Gregory, A. Monaci,
   S. Alessio, \textit{Arch. Soc. Rom.}, xxvii (1904), no. 2, pp. 365-8,
   concerning land formerly leased to his kinsman, Bishop Peter
   of Silva Candida.
into possession of the territory; the most plausible explanation is
that it represented an appanage granted to Gregory I's mother by
Alberic II. Their wealth is reasonably well illustrated by the
foundation of Grottaferratta under Gregory I, and its subsequent
e
endowment\(^1\). Gregory's son Alberic III also built a church, at
Castro S. Paolo, which he granted to Grottaferratta in 1037\(^2\). The
donations made to Montecassino between 1064 and 1077 are also
impressive, even if we must make allowance for the exaggerations
and interpolations of Peter the Deacon\(^3\). Yet even at the height
of their power the Tusculans were far from being the sole masters
of the Alban hills. Some of the evidence for this, and its
implications, is best examined later. Here it is sufficient to
note that the Tusculan popes themselves entrusted the rulership
of the region to a count Amatus, who does not seem to have been
connected with the family\(^4\).

The churches and lands granted to Grottaferratta and
Montecassino were all in the general region of Tusculum itself,
including Monte Forzio and Monte Fortino, with lands on the other
side of the pass around the Castello Colonna. They also held lands
near Velletri, as shown in documents of 1045 and of 1059\(^5\). Documents

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1. As, for example, in the grant made in 1037 by Benedict IX of
lands near Albano, Ottenthal, Documenti per la storia
ecclesiastica e civile di Roma, Studi e documenti per Storia
e Diritto, vii (1886), no. 1, pp. 103-4.

2. In MS., Arch. Vat., Fondo Basiliana, vol. 1, the Bullarium of
P. Menetti, fol. 20².


4. W. Koelmel, Rom und der Kirchenstaat, Abhandlungen zur
mittleren und neueren Geschichte, lxxviii, (Berlin, 1935),
p. 62.

5. Stevenson, Velletri, Arch. Soc. Rom., xii (1889), nos. 6 and
7, pp. 87-90.
of 1104 and 1105 show that Gregory III and his heirs held land near Veroli\(^1\). But as we shall see, it was one thing to possess land, and another to enjoy a firmly consolidated lordship. If we exaggerate the position of the family, we are all too likely to reach false conclusions about its fall.

If one accepts that the Tusculans and Colonna were related, there was one major addition to their landed wealth during the period, the city of Palestrina. Peter Colonna is first found in control of the city about 1106, when he imprisoned there the papal legate and comes Campaniae Berard\(^2\). Earlier he had held Colonna and Zagarolo, reputedly lost after the rash seizure of Cave\(^3\). His claims to Palestrina are unlikely to have been founded on usurpation alone. So spectacular an acquisition would surely have been mentioned in the accounts of the 1105 and 1108 revolts. More conclusive still, Honorius II was prepared to recognise his claims and assist his recovery of the city against the insurgent citizens\(^4\).

The manner in which Peter obtained possession of the city is certainly open to conjecture. The city had been granted in 970 to the senatrix Stephania II and her immediate descendants\(^5\). Her grandson, John, son of count Benedict, was in control of the city at the time of the Tusculan coup in 1012, and despite promising to

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yield the city, seems to have retained control\(^1\). John represented
the third generation, the normal term of such a lease, but the city
seems to have remained within the control of his descendants. His
daughter-in-law, Emilia, can be found there as habatrix in 1053,
after the death of her husband, Donadeus\(^2\). Subsequently the legend
developed that this lady, Emilia, married a Stephen Colonna in
1137, and that the Colonnas' ownership of Palestrina stemmed from
this marriage\(^3\). Bossi, in the article cited, pointed out the
numerous flaws which mar this account, most notably that there was
no known Stephen Colonna at this time, that Emilia can hardly have
been alive, let alone marriageable, in 1137, and that the Colonna
had in any case enjoyed the possession of Palestrina for at least
twenty years. It is thus difficult to see why Hoffmann, less
prepared than Bossi to see a germ of truth in the legend, should
raise these objections against him\(^4\). On the other hand Bossi's
suggestion that Emilia became the second wife of Gregory II is not
very likely\(^5\). Gregory II must have been of age by 1030, when his
son John was born, and was probably somewhat older; a marriage
after 1053 is thus unlikely, at least so far as producing issue is
concerned. On the other hand, one of his nephews might conceivably have

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2. Reg. Sublac., no. 41, pp. 81-2, domna Iamilia nobilissima
comitissa que olim domnas Donadeus coniugem fuit habatrix
in Palestrina. Another Subiaco document, Reg. Sublac.,
no. 36, p. 75, makes clear that Donadeus was a son of
count John.
3. The sources for this legend are critically discussed by
G. Bossi, I Crescenzi di Sabina, Arch. Soc. Rom., xli (1918),
154-7.
made the marriage. The link between Peter de Alberico and Peter Colonna has already been suggested, and the problem of Peter Colonna's possession of Palestrina could be solved quite simply if he were the issue of a marriage either between Emilia and one of Peter de Alberico's sons, or between Emilia's son, John, and one of Peter's daughters; - the latter solution is the more likely if the marriage were to bear fruit, though no daughter of Peter is known. On this basis, Palestrina would have come to Peter Colonna by the normal course of inheritance.

III

Having dealt with the members of the family and with their landed possessions, we are at last able to devote ourselves to their relations with the Papacy. In tracing their land-holding, we have already seen that there was a certain decline in their standing, particularly after the loss of the Papacy itself. Thus their lands at Scurano had changed hands by 1079 and their influence in Rome itself declined after the mid-eleventh century. The slow process by which the house was extinguished and its lordship dispersed is well enough known. What we must ask is how far the process had begun by 1124, and how far the Papacy was responsible for it.

The obvious point at which to begin is the Tuscanian fall from power in 1046 and the subsequent attempts by the family to regain control of the Papacy. An imperial diploma dated at Colonna on the 1st of January, 1047, may possibly be evidence that a punitive expedition against the family took place, but there are no other
traces of any campaign. On the deaths of Clement II and Damasus II, Benedict made attempts to recover the Papacy, on the second occasion with the alliance of Boniface of Tuscany. A biography of Leo IX is probably reliable when it speaks of the Tuscan resistance to Leo, since it names Benedict's brothers correctly; according to this source Leo launched a punitive expedition against them and ravaged their vines and crops. The same source makes clear that their opposition was still marked in 1054; Leo prayed for them on his deathbed. This hostility cannot have been enduring, however.

Benedict IX was dead by January 1056, which deprived his family of a figurehead, and even before then he and his brothers had recognised Victor II by dating a donation with his name. Benedict himself probably ended his days as a monk at Grottaferrata.

If the fires of resistance were banked, they nonetheless remained alight. Stephen IX's attempt to regulate the election of his successor is evidence that trouble was expected, and certainly

4. Ibid., 292.
5. G. Ferri, Le carte del Arch. Liberiano, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxvii (1904), no. 9, pp. 190-1, a donation on behalf of Benedict's soul by his brothers. The previous September Benedict had been associated with them in a grant to the monastery of SS. Cosma e Damiano, P. Fedele, Carte del monastero dei SS. Cosma e Damiano in Mica Aurea, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxii (1859), no. xxxii, p. 54 n. 1.
7. As in the stipulation that the election be deferred until the return of Hildebrand from Germany.
Benedict X's election followed so rapidly after the arrival of the news of Stephen's death from Florence that it must have been prepared\(^1\). Leo is clear that Gregory II was behind this\(^2\), which is confirmed by the *Annales Romani*, despite a slip by which Gregory is named as Alberic\(^3\). With the precedent of the former Tusculan attempts to recover the Papacy, it is natural that some attempt should have been made to suggest that Benedict X was himself of the family\(^4\). This is a difficult link to establish. Benedict's name was John Mincius; he was a Roman, and son of a Guido\(^5\). Except for Gregory II's son, John, who died in infancy, neither of the antipope's names are found among the Tusculans, and there is no record of descent. A family of similar name can be found in the Via Lata region of the city in the late tenth century, and it too, like Gregory I, had landed interests in the Sabina. Possibly, then, there was some tie of neighbourhood; nothing more concrete is discernible\(^6\). Borgia and Galletti thought Guido to be a son of Alberic III, which is possible but not demonstrable. John became

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1. Stephen died in Florence on March 29th, while Benedict was enthroned in Rome on April 5th. The journey is likely to have taken at least three days if the general pattern established by F. Ludwig, *Untersuchungen über die Reise-und Marschgeschichte im XII und XIII Jahrhunderten*, (Berlin Diss., 1897), is correct.


6. *Reg. Farf.*, iv, no. 608, pp. 6-8, of 1012 - a donation to Farfa by the executors of *Iohannes qui vocatur Miccinus*. 
cardinal-bishop of Velletri in 1057 or 1058, and was presumably at least 30 by then. His birth must therefore have taken place by about 1027 at the latest. Among Alberic III’s grandsons, the first known Tuscan was born in 1030 – from the eldest of Alberic’s grandsons, though he may not have been the first-born.

There is no need to suggest that Gregory supported him because he was a relation. As cardinal-bishop of Velletri, John would have had opportunity, for all the brevity of his tenure, to contact his backers and establish good relations with them. Given the recent state of hostility between Leo IX and the family, it is unlikely that any close kinsman or dependant should have been appointed to the see. Peter Damian regarded him as the unwilling puppet of his supporters, and although he had an obvious polemical interest in saying this, Benedict’s subsequent career seems to bear him out. Unlike his less fortunate successors as antipopes he was allowed to lead a private life after his fall.

The Tuscan role in the schism is itself worth attention. Our principal source for the failure of the coup and suppression of Benedict’s adherents is the work of Bonizo, though the Annals Romani are also valuable. Bonizo wrote at a time when the affairs of the Reform Papacy were at their darkest; Rome had become untenable, support elsewhere depended heavily on Jordan of Capua, and a successor to Gregory VII had still to be elected. One effect of this situation was that Bonizo sought to explain the failure of the Reformers, as it must then have seemed, in terms of the noble

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opposition to it. Another was that he quite naturally wanted to emphasise the fate of the ungodly, to the extent that almost alone of the Gregorians he welcomed Guiscard's sack of Rome. Historically this helps to explain a contradiction in our source material. The account of Bonizo, long accepted by historians, has been that it was the support of the Normans which broke the power of Benedict X's supporters and destroyed their power. The Annales Romani make clear that the Norman expedition took place after the Easter synod of 1059. But a Velletri charter of that year shows that Gregory II had already come to terms by April 15th, a bare eleven days after Easter. The document is dated by Nicholas II, and it is not difficult to construe the donation it contains, together with the conventional plea for the soul of the donor and his son Peter as some kind of peace-offering. If we accept the implication of this document we must conclude that it was the threat of a Norman expedition rather than the expedition itself which forced his submission.

The Tusculan role in the Cadalan schism was certainly less significant than in that of 1058. One explanation may well be the death of Gregory II in 1060. Benzo relates that the Cadalan force moved to Albano and was met by a 'young nephew' of Alberic, which raises doubt as to his reliability on the point; Alberic is not known to have had any nephews, and if he had, they would hardly

1. *Lib. ad amicum, Lib. de lite*, i, 593. According to Bonizo, both Tusculum and Palestrina were attacked.


have been young in 1062. Godfrey of Lorraine's adjudication between the rival popes took place at Tusculum, according to Benzo, and if this is accepted, it follows that the family's role in the schism was hardly one of whole-hearted support.

We have already mentioned a number of grants made by the Tusculans to Montecassino, most of which date from 1064-8. It is obviously tempting to follow Hirsch and Hoffmann in interpreting these donations as forced, dictated by the winning side in the schism as the price of the settlement. The chief problem with this view is the time at which the grants were made. Between 1065 and 1066, especially, the relations between Alexander II and Richard of Capua were strained to breaking point and beyond. Richard threatened an invasion of the Campagna, while the pope supported rebels against his rule, notably William of Montreuil, and invoked the forces of Godfrey of Lorraine. These were hardly propitious circumstances for the exaction of a hard settlement from the Tusculans. Yet clearly the grants need some explanation, since the family had not formerly been among the benefactors of Montecassino. One possibility is that it was seeking to change the direction of its influence, following the loss of its position in Rome. According to the biography by Bernried, Hildebrand visited a sick colleague at Tusculum during the reign of Alexander II, and this certainly implies a more cordial state of relations.

1. Benzo, M.G.H. Script., xi, 616. This could be Gregory III if nepos is taken as meaning grandson.
2. Ibid., 617.
The subsequent role of the family is shadowy. The family is generally thought to have taken the Wibertine side and one historian has gone so far as to suggest that they received Tivoli, Palestrina, Segni and Anagni in return for their support\(^1\). Henry IV seems to have camped briefly at Albano in 1082, though the evidence for this is unsatisfactory - an interpolated diploma and a narrative which is quite probably fictitious\(^2\). Yet there are one or two features about this period which must lead us to doubt their importance to the Wibertine cause. Chief among these is cardinal Bene's polemic against Hildebrand, which strenuously attempts to discredit him through his association with Benedict IX, here presented in the darkest colours\(^3\). If there were so little desire to respect the family pride of the Tusculans among the Wibertines in the mid 1080's, it is surely valid to reflect that they cannot have been very important to their cause. On the other hand, they must certainly have been sympathetic in 1098 when Wibert's first refuge on fleeing Rome was Albano\(^4\).

Wibert's stay there was short. If the allegations of the

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1. A. Lanciotti, *I falsari celebri*, (Città di Castello, 1914), p. 49. I have been able to find no basis for his statement; but it is worth noting that the book is tendentious and unconvincing, above all for its attempt to claim that all Subiaco documents prior to 1053 are forgeries, the monastery being founded only in that year.


margrave Werner are to be believed, Paschal II soon secured
Gregory III's support by bribery and the antipope was forced further
north to Sutri, held by his nephew and too far distant from Rome to
constitute any real threat. Subsequently Ptolemy was charged with
the government of the Campagna during Paschal's absence in France;
this step misfired badly when Ptolemy, Peter Colonna, and
abbot Berard of Farfa initiated a widespread revolt, though it
should be noted that Paschal was welcomed at Albano on his return. Despite this setback Paschal again sought Ptolemy's aid in the 1116
prefecture disturbances, first taking refuge at Albano and offering
him Ariccia. Once again the attempt proved abortive and Ptolemy
a treacherous ally. His opposition was cemented by the arrival of
Henry V in Rome and a marriage between his son, Ptolemy II, and
Berta, illegitimate daughter of the emperor. For once Ptolemy's
opposition to Paschal and his successors seems to have been
enduring. He was among those excommunicated at the synod of
Rheims and is likely to have come to terms only on the arrival of
Calixtus II and defeat of Burdinus. Incidentally it is worth noting
that the antipope took his refuge in Sutri rather than in Albano.

As for Peter Colonna, he too was alleged to have been tribed

3. Ibid., 147.
4. Chron. Cas., 791. Ptolemy II later married a daughter of
Leo Pierleone, as a document of 1140 shows, A. Monaci,
5. W. Holtzmann, Eine Bannsentenz des Konzils von Reims 1119,
in Neues Archiv, 1 (1933), 301-9; and also in Beiträge zur
Reichs- und Panstgeschichte des hohen Mittelalters, (Bonn,
by Paschal II. His seizure of Cave led to the sequestration of some of his lands, and in 1108 he supported Ptolemy's revolt. Thereafter he must have come to some settlement with the pope, since in 1116 he fought on Paschal's behalf. In the same year Cono of Palestrina dedicated the cathedral altar there, and the ceremony was repeated by Paschal II the next year. This certainly implies friendly relations. Later he was one of the Roman nobles who greeted Calixtus II on his arrival in Rome.

This evidence, taken in sum, does not suggest that the Tusculans were consistent opponents of the Reform Popes. After the failure of their coup in 1059, their opposition seems to have been insubstantial and fleeting; and from 1099 it was twice thought amenable to bribery. If there were any attempt to destroy their power, it would fall more convincingly between 1046 and 1059 than at any other time. And even then there are grounds for doubt, particularly when we recall that the submission of Gregory II took place before the arrival of Norman aid. The series of Tuscan donations made between 1064 and 1077 to Montecassino suggest that their rights were unimpaired on their home ground, while the suggestion that the donations were forced has little to commend it.

With this in mind, the argument that the Papacy had already set itself to destroy their power deserves closer examination. As we have already mentioned, there are two detailed pieces of work

3. Petrini, Mem. Prenestine, pp. 401-2, nos. 9, 10.
on which this suggestion rests. But before we turn to examine these arguments it is worth noting that Tusculum itself appears in the papal confirmations of Subiaco lands included in the famous register. This is simply likely to be an interpolation during the enregistration of the documents, which do not survive in the original. But even if this were not the case, the inclusion of Tusculum among the monastery's lands can have been little more than a somewhat impractical insult. There was no mention of the monastery's claims during the transactions which took place over Tusculum during the twelfth century.

Perhaps the most convincing argument that the Papacy sought to limit the power of the family is that which Falco constructed on the basis of a series of immunity privileges which certain popes granted to towns under Tuscan control. First in importance among these is the series of privileges granted to Velletri, by Gregory VII, Urban II and Paschal on the one side and by Wibert on the other. There is, however, a clear objection to the conclusion that these privileges were aimed against the Tusculans. For it is


2. Reg. Sublac., no. 10, p. 20 (John XVIII); no. 15, pp. 42-3 (Benedict VIII); no. 21, p. 60 (Leo IX). For the whole question of Subiaco's claim to Tusculum see P. Egidi, L'abbazia Sublacense e la signorie di Tuscolo, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxv (1902), 470-7.

3. According to the editors of the Reg. Sublac., the relevant passage in Benedict's bull is an addition in a later hand; he is certainly unlikely to have included the city among the monastery's possessions.


far from clear that the town had ever been fully within their sphere of influence. In 1032 the town seems to have been under the rule of a count John, who cannot be documented as Tuscanian. Another Velletrici document, dated 1045, defines a place outside Velletri at Selci as marking the border of Gregory II's dominium. It is striking that Paschal II's privilege to the city, which defines the boundaries of its lands, refers to the same place. In short it looks as if the Tuscanian rule extended as far as the boundaries of Velletri, but not into the city itself, nor into its adjoining lands. That both sides should have sought to win its support is instructive, but their bulls cannot in themselves be construed as anti-Tuscanian.

Another alleged instance of this policy fails for the same reason. Terracina had never come within the Tuscanian sphere of influence, though in the tenth century it had come under Crescentian domination. More important still, the privilege Gregory VII granted to it has proved to be a forgery. According to Pandulf the city was offered as a bribe to the Pierleoni in 1124, in return for their support of Lambert of Ostia's election to the Papacy; there is no evidence that the promise was honoured. These examples hardly suggest that the Papacy was consistently supporting towns against

2. Ibid., no. 6, pp. 87-9.
3. Kehr, It. Pont., ii, p. 105 no. 3. Not all of the editions he lists are complete, but that of Ughelli, Italia Sacra, 2nd. ed. (Venice, 1717), i, 46, includes the boundary definitions.
the nobility.

One further example from the Alban hills confirms this impression. The Liber Censum preserves an important document, taken from the Register of Albinus, which records the terms which Paschal II imposed on the city of Ninfa, on the southern fringe of the area under Tuscan influence. The document is undated, but evidently represents a punishment after some revolt, perhaps that of 1108. All twelve of the city's mills were confiscated, its walls were to be destroyed and only rebuilt with the permission of the Curia, and heavier military and food taxes were imposed. This is gentle wooing indeed.

In one sphere only is it possible to see a centre of Tuscan influence demonstrably falling from the control of the family into that of the Papacy. That sphere is the monastery of Grottaferratta, very much a family concern at first. Here we may note that abbot Nicholas was a close friend of Urban II, on whose behalf he was sent on legation to Constantinople. Eventually the monastery was to become sufficiently alienated from its founding family to appeal against Ptolemy II's usurpation of its property. Yet although Paschal II himself granted a confirmation privilege to the monastery in 1115, it cannot be said that he had consistently worked towards its subjection to the Papacy. Only a few years earlier he had given judgement in favour of the Roman church of

4. Ibid., no. 2, pp. 105-8.
s. Giovanni alla Porta Latina against the monastery.¹

There remains one other source which might support the argument that the Papacy sought to weaken the Tusculans. This is a bull issued by Gregory VII to the abbey of which he had formerly been vcononus, S. Paulo². This is a problematic document since it has almost certainly been interpolated. The confirmation privilege later issued by Anacletus II is considerably less full, while the other documents in the monastery's admittedly scanty archive make no mention of many of the properties included in Gregory's bull³.

For our purposes, the bull is striking in including half the castle of Colonna, Monte Porzio, and the church of S. Maria known as Domine quo vadis which is recorded expressly as in the possession of Gregory III of Tusculum⁴. All of these possessions were or had been Tusulan, and there was an even clearer link in the inclusion of two churches near Vaccareccia, where the family had held its more permanent northern possessions, and where Gregory II's infant son had been buried. It is obviously tempting to regard the inclusion of these properties as a deliberate step against the Tusculans and the


2. L. Santifaller, Quellen und Forschungen zur Kanzleiweisen Papst Gregors VII, i, Studi e Testi, cxc (Vatican, 1957), no. 36, pp. 20-8.


4. Santifaller, Op. cit., at pp. 24 and 26. The name of the church almost certainly proves that it was on the Via Appia, near Rome; it thus stands outside the topographical order adopted in the bull.
Colonna. Just possibly we are dealing with an impractical insult of the kind that the confirmation of Tusculum to Subiaco would represent, were that genuine. And it is just conceivable that the later marriage between Ptolemy II and the daughter of Leo Pierleone would explain the dropping of his possessions from the later confirmation. Since these are far from being the only omissions in the later bull, the most likely probability is that Gregory's document is too much interpolated to be of value. Two of the relevant possessions, only, are likely to have been in the original bull. One is the church of S. Maria, explicitly referred to as held by Gregorius de Tusculana – without that reference its inclusion would be as suspect as that of their other lands. The other is the castle of Vaccarreccia, the possession of which is confirmed by other S. Paolo documents. In themselves these are hardly sufficient to support the thesis that Gregory VII deliberately sought to undermine the family by upholding the claims of his former church against it. Without this premise, it becomes impossible to accept Digard's suggestion that it was the waiving of these claims, apropos the Colonna, which split the family and marked the beginning of its decline.

If it were not the Papacy that was responsible for the decline of the family during our period, there was nonetheless a decline, albeit a limited one. As we have already noted, the family lost

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1. As does Digard, *Fin de la seigneurie de Tusculum*, *Mélanges Paul Fabre*, p. 296.

2. Trifone, S. Paolo, *Arch. Soc. Rom.*, xxxi (1908), nos. 2-5, pp. 285-7. The first two of these documents, however, make clear that the castle itself had not been Tusculan despite their possession of lands nearby.

its lands north of Rome, and after the mid-eleventh century lost much of its influence in the city itself. There must have been many factors behind this change of affairs. Chiefly, no doubt, it occurred because the Tusculan power in Rome had rested on the Papacy itself, though lay members of the family had been associated in papal government. There had been no attempt to enrich the family or improve its landed position, despite the temptation which the expropriation of the Stephanians must have offered. The loss of the Papacy thus relegated the family to a comparatively uninfluential position, geographically too distant from Rome to serve as a basis for power over the city, from which they were only sporadically involved in Roman politics. The reaction which had occurred in 1044 against Benedict IX is likely to have worked against their resumption of control so long as Benedict was their candidate, though the support they were able to enlist for Benedict X in 1058 spread across most of the Roman nobility and transcended old rivalries. Thereafter the family remained on the fringes of Roman politics. Its help might be sought in moments of crisis, as it was by Paschal II, but the days of its independent and spontaneous action were over despite its marriage ties with the new urban families. This contrasts sharply with the behaviour of Peter Colonna, who after 1116 seems to have been firmly on the papal side, and who, as we have already noted, was among the nobles who greeted Calixtus II in 1120.

If the nature of the Tusculan prominence before their fall gives

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1. The Annales Romani, Lib. Pont., ii, 334, name Benedict's adherents. The presence of the Stephanians is striking given the earlier hostility between them and the Tusculans.
as part of the answer about their decline, the example of the Colonna shows that it was hardly inevitable. Curiously it may be the very rise of the Colonna branch of the family which completes the explanation. We have already mentioned the donations made by the family to Montecassino, and the caution with which they need to be treated. The particular details of these donations have been scrutinised closely by Professor Hoffmann¹. But there are other features about these grants which seem more important still, and which have gone unnoticed. For they seem to indicate a division of property within the family. First let us note that Octavian, one of the surviving sons of Alberic III, referred in a grant of 1064 to the city of Tusculum as civitas mea². The same words recur in a grant made in the same year by his nephew, Gregory III³. Both of these grants refer to the church of S. Agatha, clearly a joint possession, so there is the possibility that the duplication of formula might simply be carelessness; on the other hand, we cannot in this case be dealing with interpolation since Leo mentioned the establishment in his chronicle⁴. When we examine the two documents, carelessness is not a very plausible explanation for the duplication since the wording and order of the two grants is substantially different. The number of documents involved implies that some kind of rift had taken place. In 1055 the four sons of Alberic III had made a joint donation, and the three survivors made another together

3. Ibid., 232-3.
the following year. The Montecassino donations, on the other hand, are made individually - by Gregory III, by his brother Peter, and by two of his uncles, Octavian and Peter, each in separate documents, and the latter with his two sons, Oddo and Octavian. According to Peter the Deacon, Gregory III and Ptolemy I were also involved in the donation of the church of S. Antonio at Monte Porzio which had also been the gift of one of the brothers, Peter. The extent to which these donations overlap is puzzling. Rights over whole properties and churches were involved, rather than merely of respective portions; this would seem to rule out any clear division of property among the members of the family. That there was some kind of rift within the family, possibly a property dispute, seems all the more likely when we recall that Gregory III must have been very young on his accession in 1060 for he lived until 1104. There was no established rule in favour of primogeniture among the Roman families, and even had there been, the situation of the family after its failure in the 1058 schism clearly favoured dissolution and disintegration. Nicholas II had, momentarily, brought into play overwhelming forces from outside the Roman district, in the form of Duke Godfrey of Lorraine and Richard of Capua; if this seemed, in 1060, to rule the recapture of the Papacy out of court, there can have been little common goal to hold the family together.

As we have already suggested, the house of Colonna descended from Gregory III's uncle, Peter. Further, we have seen that


Oddo Colonna's claims to part of Tusculum derived from inheritance rather than exchange, as had been the case with his rights over Monte Fortino. Taken together, these points strengthen our suggestion that the Montecassino donations of the 1060s already mark a split between the different branches of the family which was to become fully marked in 1116 when Peter Colonna and Ptolemy I fought on different sides. Yet we have also seen that there is very little to tie the Papacy to this development. The inopportune succession of a young man and the natural disintegration of an extended family would seem to be the chief culprits in the decline of the house's stature.

In conclusion, two points need emphasis. The first of these is that after 1059 the Tusculans were far from being implacable opponents of the Reform Papacy. The second, in obvious correlation with this, is that their decline is not to be explained through papal manipulation and hostility but rather by the extent to which their position had depended on their own control of the Papacy, and by the natural fragmentation of the family into different branches.
CHAPTER 4

THE STEPHANIANS AND THE OCTAVIANS

With the two chief branches of the Crescentian family - the Stephanians and Octavians - we enter upon a field still more difficult and still more confused than that of the Tusculans. The reasons for this are simply given; certain names, in particular those of John and Crescentius - are so common both within these families and outside them that it is often impossible and almost always difficult to know to just whom our far from insubstantial source material is referring at any point. This difficulty is compounded by the instability of their possessions. As we shall see the Stephanians lost most of their Sabine possessions under Benedict VIII and it is far from clear that they ever recovered them; continuity of possession in an area which was disturbed by the rivalry of the two branches of the Crescentians, by the diverse territorial policies of the abbey of Farfa, and by direct papal action, is thus practically useless as a basis for the identification of persons. Instead we find ourselves in a field of bewildering complexity in which interpretation can only rest upon a nightmare whirl of various identifications, often conflicting and impossible to resolve, which profoundly affect the conclusions that may be drawn. Anyone attempting to draw out what our sources allow rather than to impose a preconceived pattern soon finds that he is obliged to allow for alternative and wholly divergent interpretations.

This is a difficulty which cannot be by-passed. As we shall see, the Crescentians were simply too important in the history of Rome and the Papacy for their history to be written only in outline, its
more significant aspects and problems tacitly suppressed because of the difficulty of reaching clear conclusions that are also certain ones. Consequently alternative conclusions can often be reached, neither more demonstrable than the other, and each with their respective significance for the history of papal policy towards the respective branches of the family. There is, nonetheless, a negative value in the study. We are able to exclude many of the more misleading accounts of that history, and show the relations between these nobles and the Papacy as altogether more flexible than has been thought.

I

The names Crescentian, Stephanian, and Octavian do not occur very frequently in our source material; although they may occasionally be found as a description of a stirps, they are essentially modern terms. As such they are extremely convenient; the same personal names recur so frequently within these families that it is practically impossible to write about them without, for example, distinguishing between the Stephanian and the Octavian Crescentius. The convenience can nevertheless be misleading; contemporaries knew these men, for the most part, as fathers, sons, husbands, brothers - not as members of a larger social group. As we shall see, we are talking about individuals with largely disjunct interests rather than a kinship grouping. Accordingly, let us start by finding out who these people were.

The persons who interest us in the eleventh century are the descendants of Count Benedict of the Sabina and of Octavian. Both families can be traced back to the tenth century to a family known
as the Crescentians, and both are sometimes known under this name. It is tempting to leave the question there, and move directly on to look at Benedict, Constantine, and their descendants. Unfortunately we cannot do so; to understand their relations with each other and with the Papacy, we have to know something of their common origin.

That origin is something of a minefield of divergent interpretation among historians. There are so many variant suggestions that there is little point in detailing them all at every point. The more important of them must, however, be considered.

The Stephanians are so called because they are thought to have descended from the senatrix Stephania. Who was this lady? The title senatrix is recorded only among the females of the house of Theophylact, which dominated Rome during the first half of the tenth century. In 945 we encounter a senatrix Stephania as one of the donors to the Roman monastery of S. Gregorio; she was a sister


of Marozia II, and thus the child of Theophylact’s daughter, Theodora II. Since she appears in the donation in her own right, it must be assumed that she was of age in 945.

The link between this lady, a cousin of Alberic II, and the Stephanians is a difficult one to establish. The Stephanians were, we shall see, the descendants of a Count Benedict; in 987 we find a Count Benedict and a senatrix Stephania as husband and wife in a S. Alessio document. Two questions at once pose themselves. Is this Stephania the same woman as we find in the earlier document? Then, is this Count Benedict the father of the Stephanians or another man?

Abbot Hugh of Farfa tells us in his Exceptio relationum that Benedict, count of the Sabina, was a nephew of a Pope John qui appellatus est major from whom he received the countship of the Sabina and, as wife, Theodoranda, the daughter of Crescentius qui vocatur a Caballo Marmoreo. This would seem to rule both Stephanias, those of 945 and 987, out of the reckoning, as well as the Count Benedict whom we find, married to a Stephania, in 987. In fact it does not; people can marry several times, and their second marriages may be more significant than their first.

Benedict, it is clear, advanced largely through the patronage of his papal uncles. If we can identify this uncle, we are some way towards determining whether or not the Benedict who married Theodoranda and the one who married Stephania are in fact the same person. According to Hugh, his sons, John and Crescentius, began

their deprivations of Farfa property during the patriciate of John Crescentius, who loved them as if they were his own relations.\(^1\)

One of them, Crescentius, was active if not of age still earlier, in 998\(^2\). John Crescentius is found as patricius between 1006 and his death in 1012\(^3\); accordingly Benedict's sons are unlikely to have been born much after 990, and had probably been born some time before. Who, then, was the pope who had advanced their father? Was he a Pope John at all? Under Benedict VII, we find a neptus of the pope, a count Benedict, among the judges in a S. Ciriaco case\(^4\). It is not clear if this alters the picture. Hugh of Farfa wrote his Exceptio relationum after 1022, and could easily have erred on the name of Benedict's patron. Alternately, Hugh's statement that it was a Pope John who advanced Benedict can be accepted and the neptus of Benedict VII either be identified as another Benedict or as being, at the same time, a nephew of a Pope John as well, perhaps on respective sides of his family. If Benedict did enjoy advancement from a Pope John, which pope is this likely to be? Obviously not John XVII or John XVIII who reigned between 1003 and 1009; nor, probably, John XIV whose short pontificate, between 983 and 984 hardly qualified him for the appellation maior. There are only two real alternatives - John XIII (965-72) and John XV (985-96). Of these men, the former is the more likely to be the pope referred to by Hugh. John XV was driven from

\(^1\) Ibid., i, 65.

\(^2\) Ibid., i, 64.

\(^3\) Reg. Farf., iii, no. 471, pp. 180-1, is the first reference to John as patricius.

\(^4\) Ecclesiae S. Mariae in Via Lata Tabularium, ed. L.M. Hartmann, i, (Vienna, 1895), no. x\(^2\), p. 14.
Rome by Crescentius, father of the later Patricius John, and left little mark on local politics; a rapprochement between the patricius and the sons of this pope's client, to the extent that he loved them uti dilectos consanguineos would be surprising, though not impossible.

John XIII followed an active local policy. He leased Palestrina to the senatrix Stephania in 970\(^1\), and was assisted back to power in Rome after a coup through the graces of a John, son of Crescentius, who was probably the uncle of the later patricius\(^2\). An alignment of this kind might account for the later friendship between the patricius and Count Benedict's sons. Further, in favour of the earlier pope as Benedict's uncle, we may note that his father-in-law, Crescentius de Caballo Marmoreo, can be found only in 963, at the synod which deposed John XII\(^3\); he may, under a different name, have survived until 984, but his presence and position at the synod suggests a certain seniority and maturity. It is therefore a reasonable inference that his daughter, Theodoranda, would have been marriageable and able to bear children to Benedict under John XIII, but not under John XV.

What we know of these popes' families does not greatly help. John XV was the son of a priest called Leo, whose family is unknown\(^4\). John XIII was the son of a John de Episcopo\(^5\). Bossi

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2. Bossi, Crescenzi, p. 65.
5. Ibid., ii, 252.
believed that he had solved the problem of the relationship between Benedict and John XIII by demonstrating two points. The first was that John XIII was a brother of the senatrix Stephania; the second was that we are in fact dealing with two Benedicts, the first the husband of Stephania, the second their son and husband of Theodora, as well as a count of the Sabina. On this basis, the Stephanians were closely linked to the house of Theophylact; cousins of Alberic II were respectively the ancestress and patron of the house.

There are difficulties with this view. Bossi could find nothing more substantial on which to claim that John XIII and Stephania were brother and sister than the fact that he had held some land adjacent to that of one of her sisters, Marozia II. He was not a partner to the grant which Marozia and Stephania made in 945, and his lease of Palestrina to Stephania mentions no blood-tie. The positive evidence for the link is thus weak. There are chronological difficulties with this view as well. The evidence that Stephania married a Count Benedict is the document of 987; in the lease of 970, no husband is mentioned. Now the sons of the Benedict who became count of the Sabina must, we have seen, have been born before about 990; further, that Benedict, we are told, was

2. *Reg. Sublac.*, no. 124, pp. 173–4, in which John’s lands adjoined those of the senatrix Marozia, who was the sister of Stephania and mother of Gregory I of Tusculum.
raised to the countship by his uncle, i.e. John XIII who died in 972. Given that the lease of Palestrina mentions no husband, we must assume either that the Stephania of the 967 document is a different person from that of the lease, as from the donation of 945, or that the marriage between her and Benedict took place after 970. If we adopt the former view, there is, obviously, no evidence for the marriage; if we adopt the latter, we cannot then say that the marriage produced a son whose career was advanced by a pope who died in 972.

The most likely solution to the problem is one along the lines already suggested by Bernard Hamilton; unfortunately his work, being unpublished, has not gained the attention it deserves. Hamilton's suggestion is that we are dealing with one Benedict and two Stephanias; the Benedict was raised to the countship of the Sabina by John XIII, and married Theodoranda from whom his children were the John and Crescentius who figure so prominently in the Farfa chronicle during the first two decades of the eleventh century. On her death he married Stephania's daughter, who bore the same name. Hamilton's argument is that Benedict's sons were already of age in 989, and that the marriage to Theodoranda must therefore have occurred under John XIII.

There are difficulties with this theory as it stands. The brothers John and Crescentius whom we find in documents of 987 and 989 are almost certainly not the sons of Benedict. In the earlier document these men bore the titles of consules et duces, which Benedict's sons are never known to have used. In the later one,

the text itself makes it quite clear that they were sons of
Crescentius and Theodora, not of Benedict and Theodoranda. Yet
even if Benedict's sons were not born as early as Hamilton suggests,
they are likely to have been born from a marriage contracted under
the earlier pontificate, that of John XIII, rather than that of
John XV; there is thus ample time for Benedict to have contracted
two marriages, one to Theodoranda under John XIII, another to
Stephania which is recorded in the document of 987. There seems
little reason to assume that there must have been two Stephanias,
one the lessee of Palestrina, the other the second wife of Benedict.
The marriage is not known to have borne any fruit, and if Stephanie
were somewhat aged at the time of the marriage, as she certainly
would have been if she is the same lady as in the 945 document,
still there would have been strong political motives for the match.

Given this, the links between Benedict's sons and the house of
Theophylact were somewhat slight. Benedict's uncle, John XIII, was
probably not connected with that family, while Stephanie, who
probably was, stood only in the position of step-mother to them.
When Benedict VIII launched an attack upon Palestrina near the
beginning of his pontificate, he may have done so less as pope as
because he felt the claims of his family, the descendants of
Stephania's sister, Marozia II, were stronger than those of
Stephania's stepsons.

1. Hamilton gives no evidence for this assertion but is likely to
be relying upon two donations dating from the 980s. The 987
S. Alessio document referred to above bears the subscriptions
of a John and a Crescentius, both consules et duces. An
unpublished Lateran document of 989, preserved in a
transcription by Galletti, MS. Bibl. Vat., Vat. Lat. 8043
Pt. 1, fol. 36-9, is evidently by the sons of Crescentius de
Theodora.
Before leaving the subject of the Stephanians' ancestry, we should examine their connections on their mother's side, the family of Theodoranda. Their ancestry through their father's marriage to Stephania has obvious implications for their later relations with the Tusculans; their ancestry through their mother is no less significant for their later relations with the Octavians.

Theodoranda was, we will remember from Hugh of Farfa's statement, a daughter of Crescentius de Caballo Marmoreo. There is only one other clear reference to this man, for he appears among the Roman nobility in Luitprand's list of those present at the synod which deposed Pope John XII in 963. As has long been recognised, his name implies that he lived on the Quirinal\(^1\). Hamilton has ingeniously suggested that he can be identified with a much better known figure, Crescentius de Theodora, who was prominent in the turbulent Roman politics of the later tenth century and was the father of the still better known Crescentius who dominated Rome during the minority of Otto III\(^2\). His grandson, the Patricius John, dominated Rome for at least six years before his death in 1012. If this identification is valid, there would indeed have been reason for the patricius to love Theodoranda's sons uti dilectos consanguineos.

Hamilton notes that de Caballo Marmoreo is a place name, whereas de Theodora records his maternal descent; Crescentius de Theodora's obituary inscription confirms the latter point while the first is beyond dispute\(^3\). Since the names are of different types, it is

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The probable relationship between the Crescentians, Stephanians and Octavians.

A broken line indicates a putative relationship.
obviously possible that they may have been born by the same man. Further, they appear in different contexts. Crescentius de Caballo Marmoreo appears in the accounts of Hugh of Farfa and of Luitprand, though the latter was doubtless following an official document. Crescentius de Theodora, on the other hand, appears only once under that name, in a literary source, as the murderer of Benedict VI\(^1\), otherwise only in documents and his own inscription\(^2\). Hugh himself, who wrote after 1022, may well have been unaware of the identity, while in 963 his possible ties with the disgraced house of Theophylact may well have led him to use a place name rather than a parental one at the synod\(^3\). In short, the identification seems reasonable, though it cannot be demonstrated conclusively.

If Theodoranda’s father and Crescentius de Theodora are in fact the same man the Stephanians and the Octavians were fairly close relations. Octavian, we shall see, was the brother-in-law of the Patricius John, who was himself the grandson of Crescentius de Theodora. His wife, Rogata, was thus the niece of Theodoranda, and he himself was a cousin by marriage of her sons. No quarrel or rivalry is more bitter and enduring than one between relatives, particularly when property rights are at stake, and this relationship, though only hypothetical, would explain many features

\[\text{1. Lib. Pont., ii, 251.}\]

\[\text{2. Besides the Lateran document mentioned above, a donation made by his widow and sons, he features in a lease dating from 978, Statuti della Provincia Romana, ed. V. Federici, Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, lxix, (Rome, 1930), pp. 3-9.}\]

\[\text{3. A number of scholars have suggested that he was the son of one of the Theodoras who can be found among the members of the house of Theophylact, e.g. Bossi, Crescenzi, pp. 65-9; like so much, the link is likely but not demonstrable.}\]
of the relations between Octavians and Stephanians. That contemporaries did not record the relationship should not surprise us. The link was by marriage on each side and both Octavian and Benedict were sufficiently important in their own right, the latter through advancement by his papal uncle, for it to seem comparatively insignificant until several generations later.

Count Benedict’s descendants can be traced a little more easily than his antecedents, though here too there are problems of identity. Benedict himself was dead by 1010\(^1\). His sons, John I and Crescentius, were among the first victims of Pope Benedict VIII after the Tuscanian coup in 1012, with the result that it is not easy to identify them in documents after 1014. John I married an Hitta matrice\(^2\), and it is probably he who was the Count John whose son, Donadeus, features in a donation to Subiaco in 1036\(^3\). Donadeus’s widow, Emilia, appears in a donation made to Subiaco in 1053 which refers both to a son, John, and to the souls of Donadeus and John de Benedicto\(^4\). This makes it virtually certain that Donadeus’s father was John I. The fate of Emilia’s son, John II, is unknown; as we have seen in the last chapter, Emilia or her son may well have married into the Tuscanian family, and this was probably the origin of the house of Colonna.

The descent of John I’s brother, Crescentius, is a little more problematic. The co-donors with Donadeus in the donation to Subiaco of 1036 which we have already mentioned were Regetellu and

4. Ibid., no. 41, pp. 81-2.
The Stephanians

Benedict m. l. Theodoranda  2. Stephania II

John I m. Itta

Crescentius praefectus

Donadeus m. Emilia

Regem  Rainaldus

+ by 1053

John II
Rinaldus, sons of the Prefect Crescentius. Regetellus is probably the same person as the Regem who in 1059 sheltered the fleeing Benedict X at Passarano. A note in the Subiaco Register referring to a document which was not in fact entered makes clear that John's brother, Crescentius, was prefect at some time, but we shall see that other men of the same name are also likely to have held the office under the Tusculan popes. The note is undated and makes no reference to Crescentius's sons, so we cannot out of hand assume that Regetellus and Rinaldus are to be counted among the Stephanians even though their co-donorship with Donadesus makes that likely. Neither of them is known to have married or produced any children, so that the Stephanian line, if Stephanians they were, effectually disappears after Regem's last appearance in 1059.

The Octavians were influential for a much longer period and are much better documented. Whereas the Stephanians seem to have died out with Regetellus, Rinaldus and Emilia about the middle of the eleventh century, descendants of Octavian were active and important throughout our period and are likely to have produced the Antipope Victor IV in 1159. The family takes its name from Octavian, son of a Joseph Bona. This Joseph is often seen as Duke of Spoleto and Rector of the Sabina for a period in the tenth

3. On which see the opposing articles of P. Kehr, Zur Geschichte Victor IVs, Neues Archiv, xlvi (1925-6), 53-85; and more convincingly H. Schwarzmaier, Zur Familie Vikto IVs, Quellen, xlviii (1968), 64-79.
4. Octavian's father is normally called Joseph in the documents; only Reg. Parf., iii, no. 577, pp. 283-4, of 1024, which presumably relates to the same Octavian, calls him Joseph Bona.
The Ottaviani

Joseph

Atto Gottifredus Rainerius Octavian I m. Rogata John
patricius + 1012

Marozia m. Gregory, son of count Amatus of the Campagna + by 1056

Oddo I + by 1048 m. Doda

John I

Creacentius I + by m. Theodora

John + by 1058 m. Davinia

Creacentius Atto John Cencius Guido Rusticus m. Gemma

Maria Oddo II Octavian II m. 1. Juliana 2. Maria John III abbot of Subiana c. 1066-1121 Rainerius Beraldus Oddo Rogata Oddo Berardus m. Romanus de Iohanne Maria

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It is impossible to place correctly a Gregory, son of Count Oddo.
He could have been either a son of Oddo I or of Oddo II, as here.
century. Some of Duke Joseph's sons are known to us; their names are Atto, Gottifredus and Rainerius. Octavian does not appear with them, and Joseph is not known to have used the sobriquet Bona as Octavian's father did. Some of Octavian's grandchildren and great grandchildren bore the names Atto and Rainerius, and one of his more distant descendants bore the name Gottifredus, but none of these names are rare and the link may be fortuitous. They might nonetheless express a genuine link with the sons of Duke Joseph, and thus confirm that Octavian did indeed come from the Spoletan nobility.

Octavian's wife, Rogata, was the sister of the Patricius John who died in 1012. The patricius was the son of the Crescentius who ruled Rome during the minority of Otto III and was executed at his order in 998. It is known that Crescentius had a brother called John, and a document of 989 makes clear that Crescentius de Theodora and his wife Theodora had two sons called John and

1. e.g. by Toubert, Structures, ii, p. 993 n. 4 with tree on p. 994.
3. If the Octavian whose father was Joseph Bona is in fact a different person, the evidence that he was Duke Joseph's son is still weak since only this document shows Octavian holding and bestowing land in Spoletto.
5. Hugh of Farfa, Chron. Farf., i, 65, makes clear that the patricius was the son of Crescentius.
6. Bossi, Crescenzi, p. 96, claims that Crescentius's brother, John, survived unmolested after the fall of his brother in 998, but I cannot find any later reference to him.
Crescentius\(^1\). There thus seems no difficulty in assuming along with most other scholars that these two men are the father and uncle of the patricius and of Rogata.

Octavian and Rogata are known to have had at least four children, a daughter, Marozia, who married Gregory, son of Count Amatus of the Campagna\(^2\) and three sons, Oddo I, John I, and Crescentius I\(^3\). Only Oddo and Crescentius are known to have married and produced children. Oddo married Doda, a daughter of a Count Bainer, probably of Marsi\(^4\), from whom he is known to have had

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1. e.g. from the Lateran document already mentioned, MS. Bibl. Vat., Vat. Lat. 8043 Pt. 1, fol. 36-9. Reg. Sublac., no. 144, p. 195, a grant by the brothers John and Crescentius for the souls of Crescentius and Sergia, was almost certainly made by the sons of Crescentius de Theodora in 984. The edition bears the date 896, but the grant is for the construction of a church whose foundation is recorded in another Subiaco document, a grant by Pope Boniface VII of 984, Reg. Sublac., no. 202, pp. 244-5. This document is dated by the xiiith indication, that of the brothers by the xvth, which falls after the end of Boniface VII's pontificate; but the Subiaco Register is itself a copy, and xiii is an easy misreading of xv, as is vi for vii in the regnal number of the pope; the surviving originals of such documents are themselves often unreliable in details such as regnal numbers and indications.

2. Reg. Farf., iv, no. 891, p. 286 provides evidence of the marriage. By 1056, the date of the document, Marozia had been widowed and was granting part of her inheritance from her late husband to Farfa. It was placed in comitatu Campaniae, which confirms that Gregory's father, Amatus, was indeed the count of the Campagna known from other sources.

3. Oddo and Crescentius are named as Octavian's sons by Hugh, Chron. Farf., i, 70. Crescentius was dead by 1061 as Reg. Farf., iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300 shows. His brother Oddo was dead still earlier, by 1048 — Reg. Farf., iv, no. 816, p. 219. Marozia mentions her brother John in her donation of 1056, cited above; it is the only reference to him.

two sons, John II and Crescentius II¹. Bossi has claimed that he
had a further son, Peter², but his evidence is a charter which makes
clear that this Peter’s father, Oddo, also married to a Doda, was
the son of a Peter Franconis rather than of Octavian I³. John II
and Crescentius II both had children. Crescentius II is known to
have had a son, Beraldus, who married one Domnica⁴. Meanwhile his
brother John II had married a Davinia, and had at least five
children⁵. These comprised four sons, Oddo II, Octavian II,
John III – later to become prominent as Abbot of Subiaco – and
Rainerius as well as a daughter, Maria, who is known to us through
the Subiaco chronicle, which records that her brother allowed her
to be buried in his monastery⁶. John, who was a Farfa monk, is
likely to have been the eldest of the children since he became
Abbot of Subiaco under Alexander II⁷. His brother Oddo cannot have

   John was dead by 1058, Reg. Farf., iv, no. 874, pp. 269-70.
2. Bossi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 133.
5. Davinia, Otto, John, and Rainerius made a donation of land to
   Farfa for John’s soul in 1058, Reg. Farf., iv, no. 874,
   pp. 269-70. Octavian did not take part in the donation,
   perhaps because he was under age; several documents record
   his ancestry, e.g. Reg. Farf., v, no. 1274, p. 249 of 1093.
6. Chron. Sublac., p. 18. Maria features in the monastery’s
   necrology, Der Liber Vitae von Subiaco, ed. H. Schwarzmaier,
   Quellen, xlviii (1968), 80-147 at p. 139.
7. Chron. Sublac., pp. 10-12. The controversy surrounding the
   precise date of the election need not concern us here. For
   a summary of John’s career as abbot and cardinal, see most
   recently R. Hüls, Kardinale, Klerus und Kirchen Rom, 1049-
been very much younger since he had sons who were of age at the
beginning of the twelfth century — Octavian III, Crescentius III,
and John IV, of whom the last named may well be the John maledictus
who fathered the Cardinal Octavian, later antipope as Victor IV\(^1\).
Octavian II is known to have married twice, to a Juliana and to a
Maria, but no issue can be identified\(^2\). John IV's sons — besides
the antipope — included Otto, Gottifredus and Salimamus;
Gottifredus's name recalls that of one of Duke Joseph's sons, and
may indicate a connection, either real or imagined\(^3\). His son,
John de Monte Albano, lived in the final years of the twelfth
century; it is nevertheless worth noting his identity since his
activities occasioned a lawsuit which casts light upon the earlier
activities of the family.

So much for the descendants of Oddo I. We should now turn to
consider the Octavians who were descended from Octavian I's other
son, Crescentius I. Crescentius married a Theodora, and was dead
by 1061\(^4\). Five of his sons are recorded — Atto, John, Crescentius,

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1. John is mentioned in the Farfa chronicle about 1103, Chron.
Farf., ii, p. 231. Octavian III was alive in 1139 when the
Abbot of S. Paulo accused him of holding Momentana infaste,
S. Paulo, ed. B. Trifone, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxi (1908), no. 7,
pp. 288-9. Crescentius III is known only from the Chron.
Sublac., p. 14; this reference seems to be to events under
Gregory VII, so may in fact be to Crescentius II.

2. His donation of 1093, Reg. Farf., v, no. 1274, p. 249, mentions
his deceased wife Juliana, her sons, though not by name, and
his current wife Maria.

3. Otto, Gottifredus and Solimano are mentioned in two documents
of 1134, Tabularium, ed. Hartmann, iii, (Vienna, 1913),
nos. clvii and clviii, pp. 8-9. Documents of c.1186-90 from
the same archive feature John de Monte Albano, who was already
then dead; ibid., no. cclxxx and cclxxx, pp. 116-9.

Guido, and Rusticus\(^1\), the last named being particularly active during the last years of Gregory VII's pontificate. Of these five sons, only two are known to have had children. Cencius fathered two children, Oddo and Rogata. Rogata married Romanus de Iohanne Maria and bore a daughter, Theodora\(^2\). Rusticus, Cencius's brother, married one Gemma and had at least two children — Beraldus, who married an Agnes, and Oddo\(^3\).

So much for the more definite members of the family. There is no evidence to support the view of Bossi that Rusticus had sons called Senebaldus and Ugolinus\(^4\), nor his assertion that Berardus, son of Rusticus, had a son by the name of Gerard\(^5\). He also claimed that Rusticus had a further son, Oddo, who married an Onoreelda and fathered a Stephen; the evidence which he cites shows that Onoreelda was in fact Stephen's wife, and dates from 1081. At this time the Oddo in question, even if he were the son of the Octavian Rusticus, could hardly himself have fathered a son, for Rusticus himself came

1. John, Cencius and Guido are mentioned in *Reg. Farf.*, iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300. Rusticus, who may have been absent from this document on grounds of age, appears from 1062, *Reg. Farf.*, iv, no. 932, pp. 326-7. *Atto filius Crescentii comitis* appears only as a subscriber to a document of 1024, *Reg. Farf.*, iv, no. 715, pp. 115-6. His absence from the document of 1061 may imply that he was dead.


4. Bossi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 140, based on *Chron. Farf.*, ii, 212. They were sons of a Rusticus, but there is nothing to suggest that this is the same Rusticus as concerns us.

of age only during the 1060s\(^1\).

From this sketch of the respective descendants of Count Benedict and of Octavian, it is obvious that there is immense possibility of confusion. So many people bore the same names that it is sometimes impossible and often difficult to identify an individual among the various alternatives. The respective tables of descent should therefore be kept firmly in mind when we move on to examine the property rights and offices held by members of the two families. It is also vital to remember the likely bond of relationship between the two families. Much of the Stephanians' property is subsequently found under Octavian control; a transfer of right, and the rivalry which preceded it, is reflected in the history of their possessions.

II

Both families held almost all of their property in the lands to the north and to the east of Rome - thus in the Sabina, and around Tivoli and Palestrina. Crescentius de Theodora, probably an ancestor of both families, had held land near Velletri on lease from the monastery of S. Andrea in Silice, but the lands were returned to the monastery by his widow and sons after his death, despite the fact that the lease had two more lives to run\(^2\). It is probably his son, Crescentius, who is found in control of Terracina, allegedly per preceptum pontificalis atque imperatorum in 989, but here too there was no enduring possession. Under Silvester II a Daiferius

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is found in control there\textsuperscript{1}. These are the only two examples which have survived to illustrate Crescentian rule and landholding outside the areas which were later to fall to the Stephanians and Octavians.

As to the property rights of count Benedict, it is impossible to determine what came to him by right. The grant of land in Astura to S. Alessio in 987 was made jointly by him and his wife Stephanie, so that the land could originally have belonged to either of them\textsuperscript{2}. Octavian I is found in 1024 granting Farfa some goods in the duchy of Spoleto and near Nocerino, which he had inherited from his parents, but this is the only example of a grant made by him outside the Sabina and Tiburtina\textsuperscript{3}. Just as the Tusculans held almost all their property to the south of Rome, so the Stephanians and Octavians held almost all of theirs to the north and east.

The lands of both families fall into two main groups. Predominantly they owned and held land and castles in the vicinity of Farfa, and around Tivoli and Palestrina. Since most of our evidence comes from the cartularies of Subiaco and Farfa, it is not difficult to see that this preponderance may be one of the source material itself, and not of the reality we are attempting to uncover.

\begin{enumerate}
\item For Crescentius and Daiferius at Terracina, see MS. Bibl. Vat., Vat. Lat. 12632, an important volume of transcriptions, including much material now lost, from the Terracina archives, at fol. 158r-9v and 164r-5v; and also Documenti Terracinesi, ed. I. Giorgi, Bull. Ist. Stor. Ital., xvi (1895), no. 1, pp. 63-6.
\item Reg. Farf., iii, no. 577, pp. 283-4. The subsequent document, no. 578, pp. 284-5, is a record of an exchange of lands near Rieti and on the Sangro following a war with Count Berard of Marsi; it is impossible to determine whether the lands mentioned were held by right only of conquest.
\end{enumerate}
What is striking, and ultimately illuminating, is that lands held by the Stephanians are later found in the possession of the Octavians. A transfer of wealth took place which was directly related to papal policy.

At the beginning of the pontificate of Benedict VIII, we find John, son of count Benedict, in control of Palestrina, defending it vigorously against attack\(^1\). The city is likely to have come to him by descent from his stepmother, Stephanie, who had received it on a lease for three lives in 970. It is not clear that the city was ever lost during the period of open war between Benedict VIII and the sons of Count Benedict. Hugh of Farfa speaks as if the Stephanians had been exiled following Benedict's success, with the help of Henry II, in 1014\(^2\), but Hugh's declared interest when he was writing was in the goods of Farfa. Expulsion from the Sabina, or in more limited terms still, from the castles which surrounded and threatened to dominate his abbey, were the factors which concerned him. Thus the exile may have been from the Sabina only, not from Palestrina. In her Subiaco donation of 1051, Emilia, widow of John's son Donadeus, described herself as habitatrix in Palestrina which indicates residence if not possession\(^3\). It is not clear if the Stephanian possession of Palestrina was broken by their conflict with the Tusculans, or if they remained in uninterrupted possession, but there is no evidence that the city, very sparsely documented for this period, came under any other domination. By the terms of the

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1. Thus John's joint renunciation of his rights at Tribuco to Farfa was acted at Palestrina, Reg. Farf., iv, no. 628, pp. 24-6. Hugh gives a full account of the struggle in his Exception relationum, Chron. Farf., i, 61-70.

2. Chron. Farf., i, 76.

lease of 970, the Stephanians would, if descendants by marriage were admissible, have had rights to it until the death of Donadeus; if descendants by marriage were not admissible, the Tusculans may have felt themselves the better entitled to the city by virtue of their descent from Stephania's sister, Marozia II. In 1051 a Count John received a lease from S. Gregorio for two castles; neither of them can be precisely located, but one of them was in territorio Penestrino. It would be rash to assert that this John is Benedict's son, particularly when one considers that he is known to have been active from the time of John's patriciate; by 1051 he would have been very old indeed. The identification is nevertheless possible; Donadeus did not say that his father was dead in the donation which he made in 1036. The lease made to John may then be taken as possible evidence for a continued interest by the Stephanians into the 1050s of the lands around Palestrina. Regem, who was probably John's nephew, is found in control of the castle at Passerano as late as 1059 when he sheltered Benedict X, following the antipope's expulsion from Rome. This itself confirms that he was the nephew of John, for a donation to Subiaco made in 1010 shows that the brothers John and Crescentius had territorial rights at Gallicano, situated between Passerano and Palestrina. We do not know if John and Crescentius had inherited Palestrina jointly, but the later documents imply at least a partial division of property within the individual members of the family. Thus Donadeus appears in the donation made by

Crescentius and his sons, whereas John does not\(^1\), while Emilia's donation of 1053, which largely confirms that of 1036 though with additions, was made by her alone; the sons of Crescentius do not feature in the document\(^2\). It therefore seems that the lands had been divided between the different members of the family.

Much of the same conclusion can be reached on the basis of the same evidence in its bearing on the Stephanian lands in the diocese of Tivoli. Some of their land here is likely to have been inherited from the Crescentians. An undated note in the Subiaco Register records a donation made by Count Benedict's sons for a church near Tivoli though inside the boundaries of the Roman diocese; the church and some of the endowment is clearly the same as one which had earlier been enriched by the sons of Crescentius de Theodora\(^3\). Obviously the land could have been acquired in other ways, but if the Crescentian John and Crescentius were indeed the uncles of the Stephanian ones, its acquisition by inheritance is far from unlikely. The joint donation which Count Benedict's sons made to Subiaco in 1010 included a church, its location unknown, in the area of Tivoli\(^4\). Thereafter the donations made by Crescentius's sons and by Donadeus in 1036, and by Emilia in 1053, as well as the lease made to John in 1051, suggest a division of property. The donation of 1036 included considerable property near Tivoli, the castrum Ampolloni and the Castel novo S. Angelo, both formidable centres of power; as we have seen, John does not feature in the

1. Ibid., no. 36, p. 75.
2. Ibid., no. 41, pp. 81–2, largely a confirmation of no. 36.
3. Ibid., note after no. 202, p. 245, and no. 144, p. 195, which in fact dates from 984.
4. Ibid., no. 199, pp. 239–41.
donation. The lease of 1051 to John included a castle in the Tivoli area; here there is no mention of any other member of the family.

Emilia's donation of 1053 is still more suggestive. It mentions Castel S. Angelo but not Ampolloni, and includes properties not found in the donation of 1036. The additions may have been properties held in her own right, but her confirmation of properties donated in 1036 indicated that she had inherited at least some rights from her husband; if the castle at Ampolloni were not mentioned, it is fair to conclude that she had inherited nothing there.

Another possession in the diocese of Tivoli is particularly important for the history of the family. The Annales Romani tell us that the sons of Crescentius de Monticelli were among the supporters of Benedict X; a little later they tell us that the antipope took shelter at Passarano with Regem, son of the Prefect Crescentius. It is not clear if the different descriptions conceal two Crescentii, though that is obviously possible. What makes the matter important is that we know Monticelli, a powerful castle about 5 km. from Tivoli, to have been held by one of the Octavians, Oddo II, in 1062. If Crescentius de Monticelli was not the same man as the Prefect Crescentius, the castle may always have been held by the Octavians; if he was, it is likely to have been lost to the Octavians between 1058 and 1062. The riddle is not

1. Ibid., no. 36, p. 75.
5. Ibid., ii, 335.
insoluble, but it is better for us to postpone it until later, and consider it within the context of papal policy towards the respective families.

That the Stephanians did in fact lose their rights at Monticelli to the Octavians is suggested by a parallel development which took place in the region of Farfa. Both families held extensive lands and castles in the region of the abbey itself, and the vicissitudes of these possessions need some explanation if the four-cornered struggle between the two families, the abbey, and the Papacy, is to be understood properly.

The most familiar possessions of the sons of Count Benedict are the castles of Tribucco and Bocchignano, both situated about a kilometre to the west of Farfa and thereby dominating the abbey. Bocchignano had been granted to Farfa in 939 by an Ingeboldus and his wife Theodoranda. According to Abbot Hugh, it was seized by the sons of Count Benedict after the death of their father. With the accession of Benedict VIII and the arrival of Henry II in Rome for coronation, the abbey attempted to recover it. Interestingly, John claimed that it did not concern him, which implies that the castle was held by Crescentius alone, and not jointly by the brothers. The castle fell late in the summer of 1014, after it had been confirmed to the monastery by emperor and pope. Therefore no member of either the Stephanian or Octavian families is


2. Hugh, Querimonium, Chron. Farf., i, 75.


4. Reg. Farf., iii, no. 492, pp. 199-202, for the confirmation; for its fall, Chron. Farf., i, 76.
found there, with the possible exception of a Lothar, son of Atto, conceivably the grandson of Duke Joseph of Spoleto. His tenure was short, for he renounced his share of the castle to Farfa in 1018. Hugh regarded Bocchignano as the more important of the two castles to recover. Partly this may have been because the recovery of Tribuco was, as we shall see, altogether more dubious legally. Hugh says that Bocchignano had been seized by John and Crescentius, and there is certainly no documentary evidence that they had any title to it. If it were not recovered, there was a real danger of permanent alienation. This is reflected in the fact that at one point, Hugh was ready to buy back Bocchignano both with cash and the recognition of their rights over Tribuco. No member of either family is subsequently found there, but the Abbots of Farfa remained apprehensive about the castle. In 1104 the Octavian Berard, son of Rusticus, was obliged to promise that it would remain in the dominium of the monastery, and it was among the properties which Abbot Guido was in 1119 obliged to swear not to alienate in order to secure his own election. By now the Stephanians appear to have been extinct; rather the descendants of Octavian were now the threat.

The case of Tribuco is altogether more complex. The castle is first mentioned in a Farfa lease of 982. Benedict acquired it under Abbot John (966-97) on a three-life lease which remained unconfirmed.

2. Chron. Farf., i, 76.
Since his tenure was thus illicit, it is striking that when the monks appealed to Otto III and Gregory V to restore the adjacent manor of S. Getulio, which Benedict had also seized, they did not take the opportunity to recover the castle, which the count was allowed to keep¹. The inference is that a settlement had been reached and Hugh tells us that he himself drew up a lease for Benedict which remained unconfirmed because Benedict hoped to hold the property in his own right as an alod². Whatever settlement had been reached, it was soon overtaken by events since on Count Benedict's death his sons again seized S. Getulio³. When Pope Benedict VIII came to power, they were initially obliged to restore only the manor and not the castle; it is an interesting feature of their renunciation that it was made jointly by the brothers and by John's wife, which implies common possession⁴. The renunciation was followed by a further lease, to which Hugh did not consent, by which Abbot Guido confirmed the castle and half the manor to them⁵. Hugh's account makes clear that what was really at stake was not the possession of the castle, nor possibly of the manor either, but rather the terms on which it was held. Benedict and his sons had claimed it as their own, and John had given half of the castle to his wife as a wedding present⁶. It was only when Henry II came to Rome for coronation that their tenure of the castle

3. Ibid., i, 65.
6. Ibid., i, 77.
itself came into question, largely at the instigation of Hugh, now again abbot. The castle was recovered by a papal and imperial army in the summer of 1014, and granted to the monastery by the pope at the emperor's request. In 1019 the emperor confirmed the abbey's rights there by including the castle in the confirmation privilege which he gave the monastery in that year. By then the situation had changed. The sons of Benedict had been allowed to return from exile and sought to recover their old castles. Faced by this danger, and no longer able to rely upon papal support, Hugh, on the advice of Archbishop Pilgrim of Cologne, granted part of Tribuco to Oddo and Crescentius, the sons of Octavian. There is no evidence among the numerous Farfa documents that the Stephanians ever recovered their position at Tribuco, though this is naturally explicable by the fact that Abbot Hugh would not have wished to legitimise it through any kind of document.

Protectors are always liable to become oppressors, so it is no surprise that the difficulties which had arisen between the Stephanians and Farfa over Tribuco were soon to be revived when the Octavians were in control there. Hugh's Guerimonium to Conrad II on the occasion of his coronation shows that the Stephanians had not given up their claim to Tribuco, and although Conrad confirmed it to

3. Hugh's account, Chron. Farf., i, 76-7, makes clear that the return of the Stephanians is to be dated before 1022, when he informed Henry II at Troia that he had installed the Octavians in the castle.
4. Ibid., i, 76.
5. Ibid., i, 73-7, and Reg. Farf., v, no. 1279, pp. 252-4.
the monastery, the confirmation only gave it the property rights; the question of the leasehold does not seem to have been settled\(^1\). This is important because there is a contradiction in our sources as to the title by which the sons of Octavian held Tribuco. Hugh had given Oddo and Crescentius half of the castle, subject only to the obligation to defend it and the abbey against the Stephanians\(^2\). Subsequently, in 1026, Octavian's son Crescentius I leased a quarter of the castle and of the manor of S. Getulio for a cash payment in a document which is highly revealing\(^3\). He referred to a three-life lease made to the sons of Count Benedict by abbot Guido, and this reference seems to confirm that what Hugh did, after the expulsion of the Stephanians, was to transfer the lease, which he had formerly claimed to be invalid, to Oddo and Crescentius - perhaps simply because they were powerful in the Sabina, but perhaps also because of the tie of relationship between the two families. Confirmation of their control may be seen in the renunciation of the castle made in the same year by a number of individuals on their orders\(^4\).

So affairs stood until the accession of Abbot Berard I in 1047, following which the Octavians suffered a no less violent onslaught on their position than had the Stephanians before them. In 1048 Oddo's sons, John II and Crescentius II, renounced the castle of Tribuco to the abbey; perhaps the death of their father had concluded the lease on which they held it\(^5\). Hugh's grant had also

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been to Oddo's brother, Crescentius I, and here we encounter a surprise. According to Gregory of Catino, Crescentius seized the castle about 1049 and expelled a monk whom he found there. He held it until his death, for though we learn that Leo IX had attempted to do justice in the case, the castle was not formally restored to the monastery until 1060 when Nicholas II confirmed it to Abbot Berard. After Crescentius I's death, by 1061, his widow Theodora and sons John, Cencius, and Guido restored their part of the castle to Farfa and the restoration was confirmed a year later by another of his sons, Rusticus, who may have been too young to take part in the earlier deed.

The difficulty, of course, is that if Hugh had granted Tribuco to Crescentius I, then the count cannot have seized it unless he had subsequently lost his title there. Yet if he had done so, it is surprising that none of the documents, particularly not Nicholas II's confirmation, make any reference to this loss, whatever form it had taken, nor indeed to any previous tenure there by the count. The lease which Hugh had made to Octavian's sons does not survive; possibly the arrangement was purely verbal, and it may be that its terms, in particular the non-payment of rent, worried Berard as weakening the monastery's own title to the land. Perhaps too, if it were a transfer of the previous lease by Abbot Guido to the Stephanians, it was simply regarded as invalid, even though Hugh had now given his authority to the deed. Benedict and his sons had

3. Ibid., iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300.
4. Ibid., iv, no. 931, pp. 325-6.
attempted to claim Tribuco as their own property, and it may be that the sons of Octavian were similarly tempted. Two undated documents in the Farfa Register throw a little light on the problem. In one Crescentius I confirmed half of the castle to Abbot Berard, in the other the same abbot leased half the castle to Crescentius's sons. The restoration by Crescentius I's wife and children shows that he was dead by 1061; the first of these documents must therefore have been issued between Berard's accession in 1047 and the conflict between abbot and count which was only to be resolved in 1050-1 with Nicholas II's confirmation of the castle to the monastery and the restoration by Theodora and her sons. It may be that the other document falls within the same period, no doubt after the death of Crescentius I himself, but whatever its date the first alone is sufficient to cast doubt on Gregory of Catino's account, written 70 years later, that Crescentius and his sons had seized and held the castle by force. It was on this understanding that Nicholas II restored the castle to the monastery, so Gregory's version of the affair is likely to be that given by Berard himself. It does not look as if the abbot behaved very honestly.

Subsequently Berard leased part of the manor of S. Getulio to a John, possibly the son of Crescentius I, who had himself in 1061 renounced his share of Tribuco to the monastery. Crescentius I's grandson Oddo, and his wife Rogata took a lease on a mill at Tribuco

1. Ibid., v, nos. 1258-1259, pp. 237-8.
2. Ibid., iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300.
for a few years at the beginning of the twelfth century. The
castle itself, however, seems to have been lost to the family for
good. It was not one of the castles from which Berard had to seek
Henry IV's help in expelling Rusticus, Crescentius I's difficult
son, though there are a few signs that the monastery was sensitive
to its rights there. Thus in 1104 Berard, Rusticus's son, had to
swear to respect the monastery's dominium over Tribuco when taking
a lease of land elsewhere. Later still Abbot Guido was obliged to
swear that Tribuco, like Bocchignano, would not be alienated. That
the main difficulties between Farfa and the Octavians were wholly
with the descendants of Crescentius I after the restoration in 1048
by the sons of Oddo I suggests a major division of interest within
the family. The Octavians whom we find in the region around Tivoli
were all descendants of Oddo I; only the descendants of Crescentius I
are found for long in the region of Farfa.

Besides Tribuco, the Octavians held three other castles very
close to Farfa - Corese, Arci, and Farfa, all to the south of the
monastery. Of these castles the first had evidently belonged to
Octavian and his wife, who granted the castellum there to Farfa in
1006. Clearly the family kept some lands and rights there, but no
leasing back is recorded; in 1011 Octavian's son, Oddo I, with his
father's consent, granted a mill there to the church of S. Martino,

1. Ibid., ii, nos. 1444, 1445, p. 202, of 1102 and 1111.
2. Reg. Farf., v, note after no. 1098, p. 94.
3. Ibid., v, no. 1313, p. 299.
adjacent to Farfa. A grant of land there to Farfa in 1058 by John II's widow, Davinia, and her sons shows that the polarisation of the two main branches of the Octavians was not yet complete, but it is also the last evidence that Oddo I's descendants had any rights there. Subsequently the castle seems to have fallen to Crescentius I's son, Rusticus. In 1062 he sold lands there, including the castellum, without reference to any relative and later in 1084 he accepted land there in exchange for the castle of Fara. Four years later he was accused before a Wibertine court of holding the castle of Corese unjustly. He is last found there in 1100, when he and his son Oddo consented to exchange it for another castle, more distant from Farfa. Even this was not the end of the Octavian presence, as leaseholders, on land which their ancestors had donated to Farfa, for in 1104 Rusticus's other son, Berard, took a lease of land by the castle on the Corese.

If the possession of the castle at Corese after its donation to Farfa in 1006 looks like an usurpation of Farfa property, that impression is clearer still in the cases of Arci and Fara. Here, too, however, there are problems. The Farfa chronicle claims that Arci was acquired by Abbot Berard I (1047-89) to build a castle, and

1. Ibid., iv, no. 619, pp. 16-7.
2. Ibid., iv, no. 874, pp. 269-70.
3. Ibid., iv, no. 932, pp. 326-7.
4. Ibid., v, no. 1085, pp. 80-1.
5. Ibid., v, no. 1115, p. 116.
6. Ibid., v, no. 1177, pp. 177-8.
7. Ibid., v, no. 1313, p. 299.
had been seized by Crescentius and his sons. It was on this understanding that Leo IX attempted to bring them to justice and Nicholas II restored the castle to Farfa. However the renunciation which Theodora and her sons made of it to Farfa in 1061, though not that of a year later by her son Rusticus, states that it had been held jointly by Crescentius and his brother Oddo. This must have been before 1048, since Oddo was dead in that year. Now there is just time between Berard's accession and the restoration of Tribuco by Oddo's sons, for a castle to have been built at Arci, and seized by the two counts; but then why should the restoration by Oddo's sons not mention Arci? If we remember the manner in which Berard misrepresented the rights of the Octavians at Tribuco when presenting his case to Nicholas II, and the falsehoods in Gregory of Catino's account of Crescentius's seizure of this castle, it seems likely that at Arci too, Berard was deliberately misleading the pope and his judges over the situation. No Octavian is found at Arci following the renunciations of 1061 and 1062, and in 1084 Henry IV confirmed it to the monastery.

If the Octavians did in fact have rights at both Tribuco and Arci which were concealed when Abbot Berard came to seek judgement against them, they seem to have had no such rights at Farfa.

1. Chron. Farf., ii, 143. I can find nothing to suggest that it had been the seat of Count Benedict, as claimed by O. Vehse, Die päpstliche Herrschaft in der Sabina, Quellen, xxi (1929-30), 120-75 at p. 138.
3. Ibid., iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300 and no. 931, pp. 325-6.
4. Ibid., iv, no. 816, p. 219.
5. Ibid., v, no. 1099, pp. 95-6.
Understandably embittered, perhaps, by the abbey's policy, Rusticus seems to have seized the castle before 1082, in which year he was expelled from it by Henry IV\(^1\). Two years later the king confirmed the castle to Farfa\(^2\) and Rusticus renounced his rights there\(^3\). He seems to have kept some lands there for in 1100, together with his son Oddo, he exchanged part of it together with other goods for a more distant castle\(^4\). Farfa was among the castles over which his other son, Berard, promised to respect the dominium of the monastery in 1104\(^5\), and like Arci, Tribuco, and Bocchignano, was among those which Abbot Guido was obliged to promise not to alienate in 1119\(^6\).

The remaining Octavian possessions in the Sabina were not in the region of Farfa, but rather on the southern border of the diocese, adjoining their possessions in the diocese of Tivoli. Thus Octavian II seems to have been lord of Palombara, where in 1111 he restored goods to the nearby church of S. Giovanni Baptista\(^7\). His brother, Oddo II, had been lord of nearby Monticelli since 1062, and it may be that Octavian's rule at Palombara dates from the same period. The Subiaco chronicle mentions an Oddo of Palombara, as adversary of Abbot John\(^8\). His identity is doubtful; Schwarzmaier

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1. Ibid., v, after no. 1098, p. 94.
2. Ibid., v, no. 1099, pp. 95–6.
3. Ibid., v, no. 1085, pp. 80–1.
4. Ibid., v, no. 1177, pp. 177–8.
5. Ibid., v, no. 1313, p. 299.
sees him as identical with Oddo of Monticelli, and thus brother of
the abbot, but the chronicle is not explicit on this point though
the identity is certainly possible¹. A Subiaco manuscript, now at
Perugia, refers to Abbot John as the son of Oddo de Palombara; the
chronicle, however, calls him the son of John Oddonis, which casts
some doubt on the Perugian manuscript. If it is mistaken about the
name of John's father, the place reference may also be doubtful.
The source is not contemporary and should not be given too much
weight².

As is now clear, the territorial interests of the various
branches of the Crescentians diversified during the course of the
eleventh century. Whereas at the beginning of our period, both
Stephanians and Octavians appear to have been based, licitly or not,
on the lands around Farfa, by about 1060 if not before, both
families had become chiefly interested in the area around Tivoli.
This is easily explained in the case of the Stephanians by their
expulsion under Benedict VIII, after which their shadowy existence
in Palestrina and the diocese of Tivoli cannot be documented after
the middle years of the eleventh century. The beneficiaries of
their expulsion, the sons of Octavian, themselves diverged in their
landed interests. Whereas the sons of Crescentius I fought a bitter
rearguard action against Farfa, the descendants of Oddo I are found
further south and east from the middle years of the eleventh century.
If the sons of Crescentius de Monticelli are the last of the
Stephanians, then it may be that the Octavians succeeded the

¹ H. Schwarzmaier, Zur Familie Viktor IVs in der Sabina, Quellen,
xlviii (1968), 64-79 at p. 65.

² See additional note at the end of this chapter.
Stephanians in Monticelli just as they had earlier done in the castles adjacent to Farfa. If we are correct in seeing the two families as respective branches of the family of Crescentius de Theodora, this succession may have been eased by family rights following the apparent extinction of the Stephanians.

One great lacuna is surely striking. Despite the fact that Crescentius de Theodora and his sons had been the leading figures in Roman politics for most of the period from 970–1012, none of the Stephanians or Octavians can be identified as holding land in Rome, nor in making donations to any Roman church, save for the money that they must have been given to have themselves recorded in the necrology of S. Ciriaco so that the office might be said for their souls.

Whereas the Tusculans had a Roman palace until the middle years of the century, and kept in touch with several of the Roman churches by their donations until the same period, the land owning of both the Stephanians and the Octavians gives a predominantly rural impression. The documentary evidence implies that it was the Sabina, Tivoli, and Palestrina which really interested them, not Rome itself.

1. S. Ciriaco necrology, Necrologi e libri affini della provincia Romana, ed. P. Egidi, i, Fonti per la storia d'Italia, xlv, (Rome, 1906). The entries which concern us are; Gregorius filius comitis Octonis at p. 20; domino Crescentio et Berta filia Crescentius, and Crescentius consul Romanorum at p. 28; Ovicio Octaviani at p. 29; Iohannes patricius at p. 32; Aldruda comitissa uxor Gotifredi de Monticello at p. 35; Otto comes at p. 52; Crescentius frater de Iohannes prefectus at p. 66; Crescentius de Monumento at p. 82. Of these, the patricius John was of course the brother of Rogata. Gottifredus de Monticello was a grandson of abbot John of Subiaco's brother, Oddo. Otto comes must be the son of Octavian; his later namesakes in the family were still alive in the twelfth century, while according to the editor, this entry is in an eleventh century hand. Gregorius filius comitis Octonis may have been son either of this Oddo, or of John of Subiaco's brother, Oddo; he is not definitely known from any other source. The connection with S. Ciriaco should not be over-emphasised; many members of the family do not appear in the necrology.
Despite that, there are reasons for supposing that certain members of both families held the office of City Prefect, though the difficulty of names strikes home here with a vengeance so that it is often impossible to reach a firm identification. The prefect before Benedict VIII came to power, under the Patricius John, was one Crescentius\(^1\). In 1014 the prefect was again a Crescentius, evidently the same man as before since both documents mention a Marinus as brother of the prefect\(^2\). For the same reason, it is the same man that we find active in a law suit of 1017 between Farfa and S. Eustachio\(^3\). In a document of July, 1019, Marinus subscribed to a donation as *germanus Crescentii olim urbis Rome praefecti*\(^4\).

The use of the term *olim* rather than *quondam* has led to some difficulty; according to Bossi, *olim* simply means former, so that the word refers to the office, rather than the person, and does not mean that this Crescentius was dead\(^5\). Koelmel, however, takes it that the term necessarily implies death; and consequently that this Crescentius cannot be anyone of that name who is subsequently found living\(^6\). There are examples of this latter usage in Roman documents.

Thus a S. Cosimato document of the same period refers to the *heredes holim* Leone arcario, which has to mean that Leo was dead\(^7\). It is

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impossible for this Crescentius, prefect from c.1012 to 1017, to be
the son of Octavian, who was active in the Sabina much later and who
is not recorded as dead until 1061. Further the prefect's brother
Marinus is not known as a descendant of Octavian. Marinus later
made a donation to Farfa of land at Ponticelli, to the south east of
Farfa, which was adjacent to that of his brother Crescentius, olim
praefectus. The proximity of the place to the castles owned or
held by both Stephanians and Octavians certainly suggests a
connection. But with the Stephanian Crescentius just as with the
Octavian one, there is the problem that the olim would have to be
taken as meaning former, and not as a synonym of quondam. Hugh's
Querimonium of 1026-7 speaks as if both John and Crescentius were
still alive, indeed the very purpose of his complaint was to secure
an imperial adjudication of their rights over Tribuco and
Bocchignano. Further it will be recalled that in a donation to
Subiaco of 1036, we find a Crescentius praefectus, together with
his sons Regestellus and Rainaldus and Count John's son, Donadeus.
The co-donorship with Donadeus, and the inclusion of many of the
territories mentioned in the donation in the later one by Donadeus's
widow, Emilia, makes it likely that this Crescentius is the son of
Count Benedict. Unless the olim praefectus of Marinus's donation
and subscriptions simply means former, we must clearly rule out the
possibility that he was the prefect from 1012 to 1019 - a surprising
possibility in any case since it was during this period that
Benedict VIII launched his onslaught against the Stephanians. In

1. In Reg. Farf., iv, no. 905, pp. 299-300. As we shall see, he
was definitely alive until 1046 as rector of the Sabina.
2. Ibid., iii, no. 587, pp. 292-3.
short the prefect of these years, brother of Marinus, is unlikely to have belonged to either family.

If the Prefect Crescentius of 1036 is indeed the son of Benedict, as seems likely, it is possible that he can be identified with the Prefect Crescentius who is found in a document of November 1019, thus just a few months after Marinus first referred to his brother as *cilim praefectus*. A S. Cosimato document of 1041 refers to land near Silva Candida as held by the heirs of a Crescentius *cilim praefectus* whom Toubert has taken to be the prefect of 1036. The position of these lands does not allow us to identify the man. He could be either the prefect of 1012-19 or that whom we first find at the end of 1019, probably the son of Benedict. It provides no basis for assuming the Stephanian Crescentius to have died by 1041. Between 1036 and 1059 there are no references to any active prefects, though heirs and descendants sometimes appear in the documentation — without, however, providing sufficient evidence for any further conclusions.

Under the Tusculans the Prefecture does not seem to have been an office of any great importance. Both Alberic III and Gregory II

1. Mittarelli, *Annales Camaldulenses*, i, (Venice, 1755), Appendix, no. 104, pp. 231-5. Koelmel, *Rom und der Kirchenstaat*, 159, believes it unlikely that the prefect found in this document is the son of Benedict since he believes the return of the Stephanians from exile did not occur so early. All we know is that it occurred before 1022 and I see nothing to rule out a restoration to favour by 1019. Further, it is not clear whether their exile was from Rome and its environs or merely from the castles near Farfa, which was the chief concern of our main source, Abbot Hugh of Farfa. In the latter case, there is no difficulty in identifying the prefect of the S. Gregorio document with the son of Benedict.


of Tusculum held pleas in Rome in their own right, thus by-passing
the office of prefect\(^1\), and such important cases as that concerning
Tribuco and Bocchignano in 1014 seem to have been in the absence of
the prefect, though his brother, Marinus, was present\(^2\). Thus
although it seems that it was the Stephanian Crescentius who was
prefect between 1019 and 1036, that does not imply any great
involvement in Roman affairs. The scarcity of references and the
absence of the prefect at important cases implies that the office
had virtually become honorific during these years.

In the Sabina we find many men, arguably of both families, who
held the Rectorate\(^3\). Antecedents of both families had held the
office. Thus Count Benedict, father of the Stephanian John and
Crescentius, was given the *comitatum Sabinense* by his uncle,
Pope John\(^4\). Previously a Count Joseph can be found as rector of
the Sabina\(^5\), and it is certainly possible, as Toubert has suggested,
that this man was the father of Octavian\(^6\). The terms on which the
Rectorate was held are not known, and it is not clear if the position
was normally hereditary. For this reason we should take care not to
prejudge the question, as does Bossi, by assuming that it was and
that the rectors were thus members of the two branches of the

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3. The Sabine rectors have been listed by Bossi, Crescenzi,
p. 109, n. 2, and Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 131 n. 2; but note
   the corrections to this list and another version by Koelmel,
   *Rom und der Kirchenstaat,* 154-7.
Crescentians. Even when they were at the height of their power, we
find rectors who cannot be linked with the family, and not all
documents in the Sabina are dated by them. Another difficulty is
that the title count does not necessarily imply the countship and
rectorship of the Sabina, though it may well have taken its origins
from that office. Thus whereas the title of prefect was applied
only to men currently holding that office, that of count does not
confirm that they did so at that time. In 1036 the son of the
Stephanian John, Donadeus, was described as son of domno Johanne
inclito comes, though as the count and rector of that name in that
year was rather the son of the Octavian Oddo. Further we find
the comital title applied to some names which were never recorded
on documents as a means of dating them. Thus Oddo and Rogata,
children of Octavian's grandson Cencius, not only took the titles
of comitissa and comes for themselves, but also for their father.
Neither of these two men is ever found as count and rector of the
Sabina, for the Oddo whom we find as count about the same time in a
single Farfa document is, we shall see, second cousin of Cencius's
son; further no Cencius is recorded at all as count of the Sabina in

1. Thus a number of Farfa documents between 1003 and 1005 are
dated by a Count Rainer, references in Bossi, Crescenzi, p. 109
n. 2. It is impossible to identify this man, though he may
have been the son of Duke Joseph, and thus, if this Joseph is
the father of Octavian, Octavian's brother. Bossi's list for
the earlier period is particularly valuable in noting those
documents which were not dated by the rectors as well as those
which were. Thus in 992 and 993, when the father of the later
Patricius John and his sister Rogata was at the height of his
power, there is no reference in the Farfa dating clauses to
the rectors. For these years the episcopal dating is used.


this period. There is a further problem. Our prime source of information is Farfa itself. It is demonstrable that in the quite frequent periods of hostility between the monastery and the various members of both families, the latter would not be and were not mentioned as rectors if they held that office. A period of silence does not necessarily mean that the office had been suspended.

Between 1006 and 1012 the rectors were Crescentius and Oddo. Oddo is thought to be the son of Octavian; he is found calling himself count in 1011. The use of the title count does not necessarily imply that he was in fact count and rector of the Sabina, but the identification is plausible and there is no other prominent individual of the name in the Sabina at this time. The identity of his colleague, Crescentius, is in doubt. Bossi saw him as the brother of Oddo, and thus an Octavian. Koelmel was rather of the view that he was the son of Benedict, and that his disappearance from office after September 1012 was a result of the struggle between Benedict VIII and the Stepbanians. He also referred to a Farfa document of 1011 in which the son of Benedict is referred to as Count Crescentius. This latter argument is hardly decisive since the comital title does not necessarily imply the Rectorship of the Sabina. Koelmel claimed that since Oddo and Crescentius are

1. For references see Bossi, Crescenzi, p. 109 n. 2, Reg. Farf., iv, no. 642, pp. 40-1, shows that the two rectors of that name were still active in September 1012, thus five months after Benedict's coup.


not described as germani, as the sons of Octavian were when they later held the Rectorate jointly, they must come from different families. This is more convincing, and certainly tends to support his view that the Rector Crescentius of 1006-12 is the son of Benedict. If so, it is surprising to see him still in office four months after Benedict’s coup, at a time, as we shall see, when the pope had already launched his onslaught against his brother, John.

Between 1012 and 1022 the rectors were Oddo and Berard. Each of them appears alone during this period, but only on one document each; generally they both appear. Oddo is usually taken to be the rector of 1006-12, and thus the son of Octavian, and although there is nothing to support this identification, there is nothing to detract from it either. Bossi believed Berard to have been a relative of Octavian since he can be seen in possession of some of Octavian’s lands in Risti. The document which Bossi cites shows, however, that Berard had obtained the land by conquest, which not only opposes Bossi’s suggestion that Berard had obtained it as a dowry, but also makes it unlikely that this Berard of this document is the same as that who can be seen at the same time as joint rector with Octavian’s son. For a brief period in 1023 and 1024 the rectors are Oddo and Gregory, then Oddo and Peter. It is reasonable to suppose that the Oddo is the same as before, but the Peter and the

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1. References in Bossi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 131 n. 2.
Gregory give problems. Bossi suggests that both were relatives of the Octavians, Gregory as the son-in-law of Octavian and Peter as Oddo's son. The latter identification rests upon a Farfa document which makes clear that the Oddo in question, Peter's father, is not the son of Octavian, so this identification naturally falls. The identification of Gregory as the *Gregorius filius comitis Octonius* of the S. Ciriaci necrology is not impossible. Equally, however, it is far from unlikely that the Gregory and Peter who briefly appear as rectors at this time were the sons of Alberic III of Tusculum, and thus nephews of Benedict VIII. From 1024 to 1035 the rectors are the brothers Oddo and Crescentius, though occasionally Oddo appears alone. There is no specific proof that these two men are definitely the sons of Octavian, but it is difficult to see who else they might be, particularly since one of them, Oddo, had a son John who is subsequently found sharing the Rectorate with his uncle roughly from 1035 to 1046. Since we know that Oddo I had both a brother Crescentius and a son called John, there can be little doubt that it is the Octavians whom we thus see in the Rectorate during these years. A document of 1053 is dated *temporibus filiorum Ottonis et Crescentii*, as is another of 1057. This is likely to mean that they, or rather some of them, held the Rectorate during these years even

1. Bossi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 133.
4. References in Bossi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 131, n. 2.
if it does not say so, since Oddo's son John was recorded as rector in August 1058. Thereafter we come across two rectors who cannot be linked with the Octavians, a Sinibald who appears from July 1059 to October 1066, and a Stephanus who appears jointly with him in 1059 and 1062. Bossi has attempted to demonstrate that both men were in fact Octavians, Sinibald as the son of Octavian's grandson, Rusticus, Stephen as the grandson of Rusticus by his son Oddo. His evidence clearly refers to other people, and it is impossible that Rusticus, who was active from c.1062-1100, could have had both a son and a grandson capable of comital office in the 1060s. It thus looks very much as if the Octavians lost the Rectorate following the death of John II between August and November 1058. After 1066 there are few references to the rectors. This does not necessarily mean that the office was suspended. If it were held by the descendants of Crescentius I, whom we have seen in active conflict with Farfa over the castles surrounding the monastery, the omission of their names from the dating clauses of Farfa documents would be wholly explicable. Alternately, if it were held by the descendants of Oddo, as it had been during the period when it was demonstrably in Octavian hands, the pre-occupation of that branch of the family with lands in the south east Sabina and Tiburtina might itself explain the omission.

In 1079 and 1080 we briefly find an Oddo and a Gregory as rectors. The former may well be Oddo II, brother of Abbot John of

1. Ibid., iv, no. 876, p. 271; Ibid., iv, no. 874, pp. 269-70 shows that he was dead by November of the same year.
2. References in Bossi, Crescenzì di Sabina, p. 131, n. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 135.
Subiaco, and the latter may be another member of the family, the unidentifiable Gregorius filius comitis Octonias whose death is recorded in the S. Ciriaco necrology. The Rectors Oddo and Octavian whom we find in 1106 are likely to be the brothers of Abbot John, and may well have held office for a considerable period. Documents transcribed from the Archivio Communale in Casperia are dated in 1087 and 1104 by Oddo and Octavian as counts and rectors. They do not appear in any Farfa document during these years, but that was almost certainly due to the hostility between them and the monastery.

During the period we have surveyed, the Rectorate was predominantly held by the descendants of Octavian. Between 1006 and 1058 one of the two rectors seems always to have Octavian, while the rectors of 1079-80 and 1087-1106 also belonged to the family. All of the Octavians concerned were descendants of Oddo I, who himself held the office from 1006 to 1035. The office was not, however, an Octavian preserve. The Rector Crescentius of 1006-12 is likely to have been Stephanian, the Rectors Berard, Gregory, and Peter between 1013 and 1024 are not Octavian, and the Sinebald and Stephen of 1059-66 are also of different descent. Though Oddo and his son John II held the office for a considerable period, and though John II's sons are also likely to have done so subsequently, there are enough rectors not of the family to demonstrate that the Octavians had no monopoly of the office. When we do not find one


3. I have not seen the originals, if they still survive, but cite from copies made in the 19th century, MS. Bibl. Vat., Vat. Lat. 9782, fol. 11 and 16.
of them holding it, we should not automatically assume that the
distribution of the family was being deliberately reduced or threatened,
or that a state of hostility is implied between the family and the
Papacy. One final point before we turn to look directly at papal
policy; the Sabine Rectorate is likely to have become as nominal as
was the City Prefecture during this period. It is comparatively
rare to find the counts presiding over law suits in the Sabina,
though they had deputies who are more frequently found; from 1046
at the latest it is likely that the office declined in importance.1
If Count Oddo was present when Tribuco was restored to Farfa in
1014, and Count Sinebald had summoned the descendants of Crescentius I
to court on behalf of Nicholas II, though his subscription is missing
from the act of restoration which followed, the rector was in
neither case the initiating authority.2 One more reservation may be
made. When we find Oddo I and his descendants holding the Rectorate,
we should not assume that they had become major cogs in the papal
administration. The office simply did not carry that significance.

III

So far we have identified the members of the families, the lands
they held and as far as possible the titles by which they held them,
and the offices which they occupied. This may seem a lengthy
prologue to an examination of papal policy towards them, but failure
to untangle this web of confused identities and titles has badly
flawed previous attempts to deal with the problem. It now remains

1. Thus Toubert, Structures, ii, 1274-1303; though the predominance
   of Farfa evidence may weight the conclusion unduly.
2. Reg. Farf., iii, no. 492, pp. 199-202, and Reg. Farf., iv,
   no. 906, pp. 300-2.
to see what light the understanding we have reached of the families casts upon their relations with the popes.

Our story begins with the almost simultaneous deaths of the Patricius John and Pope Sergius IV which occasioned the Tuscanal coup of 1012. Benedict VIII's election was contested by one Gregory who was soon expelled from Rome and fled to Germany to secure the recognition of Henry II, doubtless the more confident of success in that the Tuscanal brothers were sons of one of the rebels against Otto III. It is not known if the Stephanians supported Gregory; that they did so is quite commonly deduced from the attack which the pope launched in the summer of 1012 against Palestrina, held by John. His brother, Crescentius, obtained the prayers of the monks of Farfa on his behalf, much to Benedict's anger. According to Hugh, the brothers lost all their castles save Bocchignano and Tribuco at this time, but it is clear that John retained Palestrina at least for he is found there two years later, unwilling to restore it as he had promised. Now it is clear that both brothers recognised Benedict at an early date, for their renunciation of some of their Farfa possessions, made on 22 August 1012, is dated by him. They had thus accepted him as pope even before news can have arrived of Gregory's reception in Germany. Further we may recall that one of the Sabine rectors in September 1012

1. The pope died on May 12th, the patricius on May 18th, Herrmann, Tuscanalermepettum, p. 4.
2. For Gregory's reception in Germany, see Herrmann, op. cit., 7.
4. Ibid., i, 68.
was probably the Stephanian Crescentius, and thus brother of the
man whom Hugh states the pope to have been expropriating, as well
as a victim himself. Between the events of the summer of 1012 and
those of 1014 when the arrival of King Henry II brought a new and
formidable element into the situation, there is no record of any
hostilities.

The picture that thus emerges is puzzling. Benedict's quarrel
at this point does not seem to have been with Crescentius at all,
for he was allowed to keep his office. Further the joint renunciation
which the brothers made of some of their usurpations to Farfa does
not mention any papal instigation; rather it was to secure the
intercession of the monks at a difficult moment, and it does not
seem to have been forced. We are thus driven to the conclusion that
at this point Benedict's struggle was with one brother only, John,
and that the scene of the struggle was outside the Sabina, at
Palestrina and perhaps in the Tiburtina as well where the Stephanians
also held property, both before and after this interlude of violence.

Benedict's preoccupation with Palestrina is interesting. It
would seem that John held it as the second of three lives, having
inherited it from his step-mother to whom the lease was made. The
attempt to recover it did not necessarily mean that he did not have
a proper title to it; it may instead reflect concern that he was
attempting to turn it into an allod, as he was the manor of
S. Getulio.1 Benedict may thus have been acting with the intention

1. Apropos S. Getulio he is alleged to have said Quoque pacto
ego teneam terram allicius ecclesie per triginta annos absque
pensione redditione, mea postea erit proprietas., Chron. Farf.,
i, 67. Hugh doubtless reported this to blacken his character,
but the fear of leasehold property becoming alodial was
wholly understandable.
simply of safeguarding the papal rights over one of the major
strongholds in the Patrimony. But it is more likely that his
motives were less altruistic. As we noted in the last chapter,
it is striking that the family did not enrich itself by acquiring
lands through the seizure of the Papacy. There were potent reasons
why it did not and could not do so. This does not mean that the
idea was far from the minds of Benedict and his brothers in those
eyearly days of success in the summer of 1012. Palestrina was
conveniently adjacent to the main centre of Tuscanian lands, and was
an altogether desirable acquisition. Further Benedict and his
brothers, as great-nephews of Stephania, may well have felt their
claims to be stronger than those of her step-son. It later passed
to a branch of the Tusculans, probably by marriage, which demonstrates
a continuing interest, and it would not be surprising if the initial
intention was to take it by force. This would explain the curious
situation in which the Sabine lands of the Stephanians, held for the
most part on a far more dubious basis, were not at first the object
of attack. They were distant from the Tuscanian lands, and thus
less desirable to the new rulers of Rome. Further they could not
be taken and kept without alienating the monks of Farfa, which might
have prejudiced recognition from Henry II. Machtpolitik of the
crudest kind is thus the most probable explanation of the onslaught
in 1012, and above all of its partial nature.

The resumption of hostilities in 1014 also has its puzzling
aspects. This time there was no mention of Palestrina, though we
know that John had failed to restore it as he had promised.¹

¹. Chron. Farf., i, 68.
Instead the pre-occupation was with the Stephanian lands around Farfa, the castles of Tribuco and Bocchignano, whose tangled history we have already examined. It is clear that the impetus behind this development came not from the pope but from Farfa and from the emperor. Henry II had ordered his abbots and bishops to account to him for any alienated or usurped property, and the newly restored Abbot Hugh, who had not subscribed to the settlement between Abbot Guido and the Stephanian brothers, was no doubt anxious to bring his difficult neighbours to justice. The brothers were summoned to justice, declined to come, and consequently lost both their castles near Farfa. Emperor and pope were associated in the restoration to Farfa of the two castles, and their subsequent conquest. Henry's coronation at Rome had been marked by a revolt on behalf of his Italian rival Arduin, in which the Stephanians may have taken part. There is no evidence that they did so, and the confiscation is never portrayed as an act or reprisal for revolt. It may have been a factor in their downfall, though in that case it is surprising that Palestrina, still in John's possession, should not also have come into question. Concern for the rights of one of the greatest of imperial abbeys is quite sufficient to explain the emperor's action.

The motives of pope and abbot are harder to determine. As we have already seen, Hugh's chief concern was with Bocchignano, to which Crescentius had no title; even after the two castles had fallen in 1014, he was ready to recognise the Stephanian rights as tenants over Tribuco provided Bocchignano were assured to the

1. The above is based on *Chron. Farf.*, i, 68-9.
monastery. Thus at this point it was not part of his intention to expel his dangerous neighbours from the lands of his monastery; it was the terms of their tenure, at Tribuco if not at Bocchignano, which were in question. Benedict's involvement is equivocal and difficult to evaluate. Since the chief impetus in the restoration came from the emperor, the pope could hardly have opposed it. Perhaps he deliberately espoused the cause of Farfa as a means of winning imperial recognition and co-operation – for Henry had initially promised to support his rival, Gregory. Possibly, too, the idea of family aggrandisement was at the back of his mind even though the lands at stake were distant from the centre of power of his family. After all the Tuscan family did initially, if very briefly, profit from the expropriation of the Stephanians in the Sabina. Farfa, under Abbot Hugh, was tenacious of its rights, and Benedict's brother, Romanus, was soon forced to renounce to the abbey lands which he had acquired from the Stephanians at Serrano and Pontiano. Acquisitions in the Sabina were of little real value to the family, and were all too likely to alienate Farfa, in whose interests the emperor, on whom Benedict all too clearly depended, was clearly concerned.

These two periods of war, in 1012 and in 1014, are the only clear instances of hostility between the Tuscan popes and the Stephanians. In the first instance the pope seems to have been the aggressor, concerned chiefly with the extension of his family's lands. In the second, the initiative seems to have been taken by the emperor, and although the expulsion of the Stephanians from

their Sabine castles may have benefited the pope indirectly, neither the Roman church nor his own family drew any direct advantage from it. It is far from clear that the expropriation of the Stephanians was as total as it is sometimes claimed to be. Bocchignano and Tribuco were lost, but nothing suggests that Palestrina fell. Ultimately that is not a matter of much significance for we know that Benedict was later obliged to support their claim to recover the two Farfa castles which they had lost. The Stephanians do not seem to have recovered these castles, being forestalled by the installation of their Octavian relatives, but their restoration elsewhere, had they ever been expelled, might well date from this period. As we can recall, they had substantial lands and rights in the southern Sabina, Tiburtina, and at Palestrina itself, all of which can be documented in the years following 1036.

In office holding, too, it is far from clear that the Tusculans set out to break the Stephanians. We have already noted that the Rector Crescentius in September 1012 was probably the son of Benedict, and the joint-rector Berard is not found until August 1013. He thus kept his office during the first of the Tuscan onslaughts on his family's position, which seems to have been confined to Palestrina and directed only against his brother John. His loss of the Rectorate was no doubt associated with the hostility between the new pope and himself, though that hostility only manifested itself, on the initiative of the emperor, with the dispossession from the Farfa castles in 1014. Bocchignano itself was removed from the

1. *Chron. Farf.*, i, 76. Their exile may well have been merely from the castles near Farfa, not from the Roman district generally.

jurisdiction of the rectors, so a change of personnel was not
necessitated by the situation there, though it may well have eased
the process which was to occur¹. Further, as we have already seen,
there are strong grounds for believing that it was the very same
Crescentius who became prefect towards the end of 1019 and who was
still holding the office in 1036². The Stephanian tenure of
Palestrina, together with lands in the Tiburtina and adjacent part
of the Sabina, and Crescentius's tenure of the Prefecture between
1019 and 1036, suggest that the antipathy between the Tusculans and
Stephanians was short-lived and there is no reason to suppose that
more was at issue than the chief concern of our main chronicler,
Hugh of Farfa, whose writings on the subject are directly concerned
with the castles adjacent to his monastery. The very impossibility
for the Tusculans to enrich themselves at the Stephanians' expense,
because so many of their possessions were jealously guarded by Farfa
and thus indirectly by the emperor, is likely to have been responsible
for ending this brief and sordid interlude of territorial politics.

For this reason we should be careful not to assume too readily
that it was the Stephanians who were responsible for the explosion of
violence in 1044 which was to lead to the fall of the Tusculans. The
best account of these events, the Annales Romani, makes no mention of
them, indeed its narrative of the restoration of Benedict IX a short


2. It is not known when he died. The Annales Romani refers to
his sons and does not describe him as quondam, Lib. Pont., ii,
335; but the annales, as a literary source, are not likely
to be as precise as contemporary documents in their use or
omission of the word. We know that Crescentius was active,
if not of age in 998 (Chron. Farf., i, 64) which makes it
unlikely that he lived for very long after his last recorded
appearance in 1036.
period after the installation of Silvester III suggests that it was the landed nobility, the comites, who were Benedict's chief adherents\(^1\). It is not known if the Stephanians were among them, but this seems highly likely, particularly when we remember that Crescentius, son of Benedict, may well have still held the prefecture\(^2\). Silvester III had been the bishop of the Sabina, where he was to retire after his expulsion and was still active until 1062\(^3\), but the chief centre of Stephanian power was no longer the Sabina itself. The Rectorate had been lost in 1012-13, and the castles near Farfa in 1014. Their chief landed interest was now to the south-east, on the southern border of the Sabina, in the Tiburtina, and at Palestrina. None of this can prove that the Stephanians were not among the opponents of Benedict IX; but it does make it unlikely.

The Stephanians are last found in 1058-9. It is not known if they played any part in the sporadic Tuscan revolts against the succession of German popes which followed their fall, though that is quite likely as they had profited from the Tuscan ascendancy, after its initial stages, through tenure of the Prefecture and of their eastern possessions. The only attempt on the Papacy which they are known to have supported during this period is that of Benedict X. The Annales Romani tell us that after his expulsion from Rome, the

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2. Bosi, Crescenzi di Sabina, p. 115; Partner, *Lands of St Peter*, p. 107; Herrmann, *Tuskulanerpapsttum*, p. 153 all see Silvester III as the Stephanian candidate, while the Octavians supported Benedict. Brezzi, *Roma e l'impero medievale*, (Bologna, 1947), p. 206, takes precisely the opposite view, as well he might since there is no evidence to support either view.

antipope first fled to Passarano, seeking shelter with Regem qui erat
filius Crescentii prefeci. This personage is probably Regustellus, son of the Stephanian Benedict. With more obscurity the same source tells us that Benedict's supporters had included the sons of Crescentius de Monticelli. It is not immediately obvious that the two Crescentii mentioned by this source are the same. As we have seen, Monticelli was held by the Octavian Oddo II in 1062; it is not known if he had rights there previously. Two members of the Octavian family could be meant - Crescentius I, whom we know to have died only by 1061, or Crescentius II, Octavian's grandson by Oddo. Both had sons, though in the latter case only one son is recorded in the documentary evidence and then only in a document of 1110, which almost certainly means that he would, even if born, have been too young to have taken any active part in 1058-9.

The identification of this Crescentius de Monticelli whose sons supported Benedict X is by no means an insignificant matter. For these references in the Annales Romani are the very last that we hear of the Stephanians. If the reference is to a Stephanian Crescentius, then the loss of their rights at Monticelli might imply a confiscation or a transfer of rights following the coup and its failure. Now it will be recalled that among the Octavians, it was the descendants of Oddo I whose landed interests shifted to the Tiburtina and southern part of the Sabina from about the middle of the 11th century. The sons of Crescentius I and their descendants

2. Ibid., 334.
3. This son, Beraldus, features in Reg. Parf., v, no. 1205, pp. 197-8.
are, on the other hand, found chiefly in the region of Farfa itself, where a grim repetition of the expulsion of the Stephanians was now taking place at their expense. In consequence it is likely that the Crescentius de Monticelli and the prefectus Crescentius of the Angales are the same person, that his sons were thus in possession of both Monticelli and Passarano at this time, and that they played an active part in the attempted coup of 1058-9. As we have seen, the opposition between the Tusculans and the Stephanians which had broken out in 1012 was brief, and the Stephanians had been compensated for their losses around Farfa by the office of Prefect and perhaps by the lands which they held in the Tiburtina in 1036. Further, it is far from unlikely that Palestrina was acquired by the Tusculans after 1053 by marriage with Domadeus's widow, Emilia, or a descendant of hers. Given this state of relationship between the two families, it is not very surprising that Crescentius's sons were among the adherents of the Tusculan backed Benedict X.

It is impossible to say what happened to these sons. The Subiaco Register includes few documents from the latter part of the 11th century, so that the transfer of their possessions cannot be identified and dated. Their disappearance may be no more than a reflection of the sudden decline in quality and volume of our sources for the area. But the fact that Monticelli was by 1062 in the hands of the Octavian Oddo II, suggests that something more drastic had taken place. In chapter 7 we will see that Gerard of Galeria, another figure in the revolt of 1058-9, suffered at least partial dispossession in its aftermath. The Tusculans themselves do not seem to have suffered equivalently, but this may be only because they saved themselves by an early submission before Nicholas II's Norman allies arrived in the Campagna. By sheltering the expelled antipope,
Crescentius's son Regem had identified himself with the movement after its failure. The consequence for him may have spelt ruin and the transfer of his rights to his distant Octavian relatives.

The descendants of Benedict's other son, John, seem to have taken no part in the coup. This is hardly difficult to explain. In her donation to Subiaco of 1053 Emilia mentions a son, John, who may or may not have been alive at the time the document was drafted - the wording does not make clear which. If he were alive, his failure to confirm the donation, made at least partially on his behalf, implies that he was under age. He is thus unlikely to have been old enough to have taken part in the coup of five years later. If there is substance in the legend that Palestrina passed to the Tusculans, and thus to Peter Colonna, by marriage, it is striking that there is no indication of any papal objection, even though Donadeus and his wife Emilia represented the third and final life of the lease. Had Emilia or her son taken any part in the coup following the death of Stephen IX, it is likely that the story would have been very different.

What we know of the Stephanians suggests that the family suffered at the hands of the Papacy at two points - the campaign of 1012 launched by Benedict VIII against John and the deprivation which seems to have followed the success of Nicholas II. It should be emphasised that this latter loss is very largely conjectural. The first of these onslaughts is likely to have been caused by the desire of the new pope for the territorial aggrandisement of his own family, the second, and more shadowy, by a coup which came perilously close to success and which led the Reformers to take extreme

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measures. In both cases the attack was partial; the first was concentrated upon John at Palestrina, the second upon the sons of Crescentius in the Tiburtina. Between these two onslaughts stands one which was more significant still, that of Henry II in 1014. As we have seen, this was undertaken largely at the imperial initiative, albeit with the support of Hugh of Farfa and, perhaps involuntarily, of Benedict VIII too. It was with the loss of the castles around Farfa that the Stephanians lost what was, Palestrina apart, the centre of their power — and they did so not at the instigation of the pope but at that of the emperor and of the abbot of Farfa. The loss was not simply territorial. Bocchignano seems to have been held only by Crescentius, just as only John seems to have had rights at Palestrina. With the exception of the lands in the joint donation to Subiaco of 1036 by Crescentius and his sons and by Donadeus¹, Tribuco seems to have been the only, and certainly the chief, joint possession of the brothers. When it was lost, there was that much less to give them cohesion. This fragmentation of interests with its consequent diminishing of political influence is one of the most characteristic and significant trends among the landed Roman nobility during the eleventh century.

In many respects it was the same story with the Octavians. Their family was to become larger with more extensive ramifications, and it survived throughout the century, so that their history is more complex, but once again a marked fragmentation is notable. When Benedict VIII came to power, Octavian and his family were quick to grant their recognition. The death of the Patricius so soon after that of Sergius IV is unlikely to have been coincidental. A few

¹. *Ibid.*, no. 36, p. 75.
months later a grant made to Farfa by his sister, Rogata, with the consent of her husband and two of her sons, bears the date of Benedict VIII\(^1\). The Octavians thus lost little time in recognising the likely murderers, and their acquiescence is perhaps the more striking in that their tie with the Patricius had been even closer than that of the Stephanians, even if it were the latter who had been loved uti dilectos consanguineos\(^2\). When we recall the pattern of their lands, the contrast between the apparent amicability of their relations with the Tusculans and the conflict between Benedict VIII and the Stephanians is quite easily explicable. At this stage the Octavian lands seem to have been concentrated wholly in the Sabina and perhaps further north and east; their acquisition would not much have benefited the new ruling house.

As we have seen Oddo I kept the Rectorate which he had held since 1006, whereas Crescentius, son of Benedict, was to lose his joint position some time between September 1012 and August 1013. As we have also seen, Oddo, his brother Crescentius I, and his son John II held the Rectorate uninterruptedly from 1006 to 1058, though they sometimes did so jointly with members of other families. Any antagonism on the part of the Papacy would almost certainly have manifested itself in the loss of office, if only as a first step in an assault on the family's land, perhaps the basis of such an antagonism. Under the Tusculans, there is no evidence that the Octavians were anything but loyal servants of the Papacy, whose policy was anyway distinctly torpid after the excitement and dramatics of the accession to power. It is sometimes claimed that

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Benedict VIII began a policy which we shall see attributed to later popes - the installation of rival figures at key points in order to restrain and limit the power of the landed nobility. The installation of one Stephen at Tivoli in 1015 is thus seen as an attempt to limit and perhaps to control the Octavians. The argument fails because Tivoli simply was not the Hauptsitz of Octavian power at this or any period. The interest of the Octavians in the Tiburtina can be traced only from the middle years of the eleventh century, and there is no evidence that it ever impinged upon the city itself. If the act was against anyone, it was against the Stephanians, who are found earlier in the Tiburtina than the Octavians; but as we have seen, the hostility between the Tusculans and the Stephanians was brief and although the wounds may still have been smarting in 1015 the attempt to limit their power by seizing their major bases of power is not at all typical of the Tuscanian policy towards them. As for the Octavians, the presence of Octavian's sons, Oddo, John and Crescentius, at the restoration of Bocchignano to Farfa in 1014 shows that they knew very well which way the wind was blowing. Crescentius, indeed, had subscribed to the act by which the Stephanians renounced S. Getulio to Farfa two years earlier, which argues a very quick appreciation of the new realities.

Naturally enough, because Silvester III was bishop of the Sabina, his election at the expense of Benedict IX is sometimes seen as the work of the Octavians. A Farfa document from the brief

3. Ibid., iv, no. 628, pp. 24-6.
4. Thus Brezzi, Roma e l'impero medievale, 206.
period of Silvester's papacy is dated by the Octavian rectors, Crescentius and his nephew John and by Benedict IX, but this only reflects the allegiance of Farfa itself, and does not suggest that Benedict and the rectors were on the same side as each other\(^1\). All that can be said, on the basis of the *Annales Romani*, is that we know Benedict to have been supported by the landed nobles and that the Octavians may very well have been among their number\(^2\). Local support for Silvester is perhaps more likely to have come from the Octavians than the Stephanians, for they were more powerful in the Sabina following their acquisition of the Farfa castles which John and Crescentius had lost in 1014. Alternately one might claim that the lure of recovering these castles was the bait which led the Stephanians to support Silvester. But although a polarisation of politics of this kind is very plausible, we have no scrap of evidence for it. The view that the Tusculan popes controlled both the Stephanians and the Octavians against each other can rest on nothing but the Octavian succession to the Stephanian Farfa possessions\(^3\), and this, as we have seen, was the joint work of Hugh of Farfa and Henry II. Both families did well under the Tusculans, the Octavians through their new Farfa possessions and the Sabine Rectorate, the Stephanians through their retention of Palestrina, the exercise of apparently unchallenged rights in the Tiburtina and southern Sabina, and the tenure of the Prefecture by Crescentius. There is no necessity to assume that either family took part in the reaction against the Tusculans.

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3. View expressed, for example, by Partner, *Lands of St Peter*, p. 103.
The biography of Leo IX names Crescentius and John, the sons of Oddo I, as among the pope's enemies at the beginning of his pontificate. The life does not suggest, as it does in the case of the Tusculans, that the pope launched an expedition against them, so the outcome of hostilities is not known. Nor indeed, owing to a hiatus in the manuscript, is whether or not they were included among those for whom Leo prayed at his death, and who were thus still hostile. It is not known whether the opposition to Leo took any form other than that of support for Benedict IX, but it is wholly credible that the Octavians should have welcomed back the papal family under whom they had prospered. The biography, incidentally, is likely to be a reliable source because it names the sons of Oddo and the Tusculans correctly. A shadow was already on the horizon for the Octavian Crescentius and his family in that Leo had summoned them, doubtless at the behest of the recently elected Abbot Berard I of Farfa, to attend court over their castles of Tribuco and Arici. The sons of Oddo, who had died by 1048, do not seem to have been at all involved in this dispute. The threat to the Octavian position near Farfa did not affect them directly, and thus does not explain their opposition to Leo IX. The interests of the lines of Oddo and Crescentius were arguably already divergent, and this was greatly to help the Papacy when it came to grasp the nettle of their Sabine positions. As it was, the situation should not be exaggerated.

Despite the hostility of Leo IX to the sons of Oddo, and on different grounds.

1. A. Poncelet, Vie et miracles du pape S. Léon IX, Analecta Bollandiana, xxv (1906), 258–97 at p. 278.
2. Ibid., p. 292.
to those of Crescentius, a Farfa document of 1053 is dated temporibus
iciorum Ottonis et Crescentii which demonstrates that they had not
yet been supplanted in the Rectorate.

It was with Nicholas II, one of the most radical of the reforming
popes, that the picture altered. The Octavians suffered two distinct
losses. First the Rectorate, recorded as being held by Oddo's son,
John, in August 1053, passed to two men who were almost certainly
not Octavian. At the same time the descendants of Crescentius were
obliged to renounce Tribuco and Arci to Farfa. At first sight this
looks like a sustained attack upon the Octavians, and it is naturally
possible to surmise that they had been among the supporters of
Benedict X. The measures that were taken against them could thus
look like another example of the harsh measures that we shall see
were applied to Gerard of Galeria and which also seem to have been
applied to the Stephanians. Some historians would argue that this is
precisely what took place, and have construed the measures as part of
deliberate attempt by the papacy to bring the Sabina under its own
control. This interpretation has been supported not only by the
double deprivation, of the Rectorate and of the Farfa castles, but
by the claim that Nicholas II was attempting to build up Stützpunkte
for his lordship. At first sight this seems plausible, but let us
examine the evidence a little more closely.

There are but two examples on which the latter claim, - that

2. Ibid., iv, no. 876, p. 271.
3. Notably O. Vehse, Die päpstliche Herrschaft in der Sabina bis
zur Mitte des 12 Jhs., Quellen, xxi (1929-30), 120-75, followed
by Toubert, Structures, ii, 1068-74.
the papacy was building up its own power bases in the Sabina—can be based. Both are privileges of Nicholas II, one to the inhabitants of Montasola and the other to those of Roccaantica. In both cases the pope took the places under the apostolic protection and granted an immunity from other authorities, including the counts. Both places were in the vicinity of Farfa, but to the north whereas the Octavian possessions were to the south and to the west. Vehse and Toubert have claimed that these two privileges are but examples of a general trend, and that many others must have been lost. It is difficult to argue with faith of this sort, since the only basis for assuming that there were more is that the papacy did in fact follow a policy of direct intervention and rule in the Sabina, and this itself can be based only on the documents in question; the argument is thus wholly circular. It tends also to disregard other aspects of the relations between Nicholas II and the Octavians.

Let us take first the case of the Farfa castles. As we have already seen, the case that Abbot Berard presented to the pope was in at least some degree a distortion of the truth. Further his suit was against the sons of the Octavian Crescentius. This concentration on that branch of the Octavians was natural in view of the fact that this branch alone had possessions near Farfa by this stage. It is less significant when one speaks of papal policy towards the Octavians. One must be careful not to speak as if the family were a monolithic

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block so that a hurt to one was a hurt to all; this it patently was not by the mid-eleventh century. When these facts are born in mind, it becomes clear that Nicholas's attack on the Octavians boils down to the recognition of Farfa's rights over Tribuco and Arci on the basis of the claims of Abbot Berard, themselves distinctly dubious in nature. The sons of Crescentius I were the victims of rigged justice, though it cannot be suggested that the pope himself was aware of this. As was the case with the Stephanians, the sons of Crescentius were the victims of Farfa even if the mechanism of their ruin was that of the pope.

The division of the family into separate branches gives us some chance to re-evaluate the loss of the Rectorate after 1058. In that year it had been held by Oddo's son John, and previously by the sons of both Oddo and Crescentius. Now we know that John died by 1058, certainly before November. There would thus have been a change of rector in any case. Looking at the members of the two branches of the family in 1058, it is clear that Nicholas II could have appointed Octavians to the Rectorate only with difficulty. The sons of Crescentius I were the object of strong protestations from Farfa, whose goodwill Nicholas II was anxious to gain perhaps as a means of securing the imperial goodwill. That ruled them out. As for the sons of John II, it is all too likely that they were too young for office in 1058, even if they were of age at that time as the donation by John's widow suggests. Certainly three of the brothers, John III,


2. Note his assurance of Farfa's immunity even from papal intervention in Reg. Farf., v, no. 1307, pp. 294-5.

3. Ibid., iv, no. 874, pp. 269-70.
Oddo II, and Octavian II, were all alive and active during the first decade of the twelfth century; they cannot have been very old in 1058. Consequently we cannot assume that Nicholas II appointed non-Octavians to the Rectorate against that family. It is just as probable that he did so for lack of a suitable Octavian to appoint.

This interpretation is strengthened if we remember that Oddo, one of John's sons, is found in Monticelli in 1062. We have already seen that the Crescentius de Monticelli whose sons had supported Benedict X was a Stephanian, the son of Benedict, and there is no need to repeat the argument here. What matters is that one of his chief possessions, Monticelli, thus passed to an Octavian, and further an Octavian of the branch that was not embroiled with Farfa. The precise time and manner in which this happened is wholly unknown, save that it must be put between 1058/9 and 1062. It is quite likely that we are dealing with a case of deliberate expropriation by the pope, and the fact that the castle passed to Oddo, very possibly by virtue of the by now very distant ties of blood between the Stephanians and Octavians, suggests that the Papacy did not nurse a policy of implacable hostility towards this branch of the family at least.

This interpretation is strengthened by developments under Alexander II and Gregory VII. The descendants of Crescentius I never recovered their rights around Farfa, but they continued to be a thorn in Abbot Berard's flesh and in that of his successors. Rusticus, the most active of Crescentius's sons, seems to have been brought to heel only by the intervention of Henry IV in 1082. The date of Rusticus's

1. Ibid., iv, no. 926, pp. 320-1.
2. Ibid., v, notice after no. 1098, p. 94.
The seizure of Farfa is unknown, but the absence of any appeal to the pope, and, it seems, of any papal injunction against him, may date it after the breach between Gregory VII and the abbot of Farfa. It may thus be that the papacy countenanced Rusticus’s usurpations as a means of subjecting Farfa, which had become the chief stronghold of the empire in the Sabina.

It is the history of the other branch of the Octavians which is the more revealing, however. Under Alexander II, one of Oddo’s grandsons became abbot of Subiaco, following the intervention of Hildebrand. Oddo’s descendants were already established in the Tiburtina, as witness Oddo II’s position at Monticelli by 1062, so the election was in some degree a concession to them, and perhaps a recognition of them. If the Rectorate were to remain in other hands, there was ample compensation. Indeed it is far from clear that the Rectorate did remain in other hands. The last reference to Sinibald is in 1066. By 1080 the Rectorate was again in Octavian hands and the absence of dating by them in Farfa documents during the intervening period does not mean that they had not already recovered the office. Gregory’s favour for the family may be seen in his prevention of Abbot John from recovering a fortification near Anticoli from Oddo’s son, Crescentius III. Abbot John does not seem to have been much influenced by family ties in his abbacy. We know that he expelled his brother Rainer from Cervaria and Maranum, and

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1. Berard was threatened with excommunication by Gregory at the Lent synod of 1078, Reg. ii, V, 14a, p. 371.
5. Ibid., p. 13.
that he engaged in a struggle with Oddo of Palombara, who may be
identifiable with his brother, Oddo of Monticelli. That he was
restrained from taking action against his nephew by the pope is surely
revealing.

A later lawsuit is particularly revealing on the standing of
Abbot John's brothers during the pontificate of Gregory VII. In 1134
the Abbess of S. Ciriaco promised Oddo's grandsons, Otto, Gottifredus,
and Salimannus, that they would receive dues from the Silva Maioris
district which had been granted to their avus Oddo, clearly the brother
of Abbot John, on the order of pope Gregory (VII). Dues of this kind
also seem to have been in question elsewhere in the Sabina. Thus in
a lawsuit of about 1105 in which Oddo II claimed rights over Forano
and Colle de Nera, both to the north of Farfa, as exactor Romane
curtis, the court was told that such dues had never been rendered
except under Gregory VII when they had been procured by threats to
burn the crops. It is not wholly clear from this latter text that
Oddo himself was the exactor at this time, but in view of his standing
under Gregory, and particularly his appearance in the Rectorate from
1080, that certainly seems likely. Since a number of Farfa
possessions were evidently among the targets of such exactions, it is
hardly surprising that so few Farfa documents are dated by his
Rectorate.

1. Chron. Sublac., pp. 18-19. It is not clear why the chronicle
should not have mentioned that Oddo of Palombara was a
relative of the abbot if he was, whereas it did mention that
Rainer, expelled from Subiaco possessions by John, was a
consanguineus, ibid. p. 13. On the alleged relationship between
John and Oddo of Palombara based on a Subiaco psalter now in
Perugia, see the additional note at the end of the chapter.

2. S. Mariae in Vira Lata Tabularium, ed. Hartmann, iii, (Vienna,
1913), no. clviii, p. 9.

With the arrival of Henry IV it would seem that all the Octavians changed their allegiance. Oddo's descendants had done well under the reform popes, but their interests were essentially local and it would have been folly to sacrifice their gains against the kind of force that the emperor could invoke. Rusticus opposed the emperor at Fara, but we may be reasonably sure that he did so to retain a usurpation which would have been lost in any case. As for the other members of the family, they seem without exception to have defected from Gregory. Abbot John of Subiaco, who had become cardinal deacon of S. Maria in Domnica under Gregory VII, defected in 1084 and seems still to have been on the Wibertine side in 1099. His brothers Oddo and Octavian were present at Rieti in 1084 when Henry IV invested Abbot Berard of Farfa with certain goods, and the former is probably the Oddo comes who was present at a Wibertine court in 1088 when Rusticus was charged with unjustly holding Farfa lands at Corese. On occasion Clement III can be found in Tivoli, and his withdrawal there certainly implies that the Octavians of the region were not hostile to him, even if it does not do so conclusively as Tivoli itself never came under their control.

Whatever support the Octavians gave Wibert, it is unlikely to have been held against them after the antipope's death. One of the antipopes who opposed Paschal II had been bishop of the Sabina, but this in itself does not indicate Octavian support though it is

3. Ibid., v, no. 1115, p. 116.
certainly possible that the John Odoine who raised him up and then betrayed him was Abbot John's nephew. It is more significant that Abbot John retained his abbacy and cardinalate under Paschal II, while Oddo and his brother Octavian are known to have been the Sabine rectors in 1106. It was under Paschal, too, that a lawsuit took place which perhaps tells us more about papal policy towards the two brothers than any other document.

The case originated as a quarrel with Farfa over lands and goods near the monastery, and developed into open war. Oddo's son, John IV, played a particularly active part in the attack on Farfa's castles which may explain how the first reference to him subsequently describes him as maledictus. The stance of the Octavians when the case came to Rome is interesting. Previously Oddo had justified his actions on the grounds that he had obtained the Countship of the Sabina from the emperor, and that his consent was thus necessary for the monastery's new acquisitions. In Rome, however, where one of the judges was Pierleone, Oddo and Octavian changed their tack and claimed to be acting in the interests of the pope, whose temporal authority rested on the Donation of Constantine. This claim drew forth one of the great pieces of propaganda of the period.

4. The case is described at length in Chron. Farf., ii, 229-34 and 255-7.
7. Ibid., ii, 231.
demonstrating with a wealth of historical example the imperial rights
in Italy. Two features of the case are particularly interesting.
The first is that one of the judges, Pierleone, was in favour of the
Octavians; this must imply some degree of papal backing for their
behaviour. Second, pointing in the same direction, when the case
was heard again under different judges a conclusion was never
reached, and the matter simply returned to its status quo ante
bellum. Over and above these points, it is notable that the
Octavians were prepared to justify their actions both by imperial and
by papal office. The great issues of the Investiture Contest
obviously did not much affect them. Local opportunism is all too
probably what decided their political stance.

Given this, we cannot assume that they were among those nobles,
prospective among them the Tusculans, who revolted against Paschal II
in 1108. We know that the Sabina was one of the affected areas, but
that could be explained through the opposition of Farfa. It is
certainly true that we no longer find mention of them as rectors, but
their hostility towards Farfa could itself explain that; no Farfa
document between 1101 and 1105, the very years of the lawsuit, refers
to them as counts and rectors, even though the lawsuit itself makes
it clear that comital rights were, at least nominally, just what were
at issue. It cannot thus be assumed, as it is by Bossi, that Paschal II
deprived them of office and took over the direct administration of the

1. On which see K. Heinzelmann, Die Farfenser Streitschriften,
(Strassburg Diss., 1904).
3. Ibid., ii, 256-7.
Sabina. In 1109 Oddo and Octavian were present at a restoration of Subiaco property by the pope which may imply that they had stood by him in the earlier revolt. Farfa is known to have been involved, and the most plausible course that the Octavians might have followed at this point would have been to support the pope, thus securing or maintaining his support in their lengthy duel with the monastery. But in 1084-8 at least, force of circumstances had put them on the same side as Farfa, and the tide of rebellion which swept the Campagna in 1108 may well have had the same effect. Whether they were involved or not, it cannot be shown that they lost in consequence.

For the remainder of our period all that we know of the Octavians is that they usurped some church property which they were obliged to restore. In January 1111 Octavian II is found restoring goods to the church of S. Giovanni Baptistia at Argentella. The date of the restoration may be significant, since it comes very shortly before the arrival of Henry V on his notorious Roman expedition. The expeditions of Henry II in 1014 and of Henry IV in 1084 had resulted in the restoration of church property held by the Stephanians and Octavians. However much the arrival of the king might be feared by Paschal II, who attempted and failed to contract the alliance of the Normans against the event, it must have been eagerly awaited by those churches whose property was held, perhaps with papal connivance, by members of the nobility. By coming to terms a month before the king's

2. Liber Censuum, i, no. xxxi, p. 407.
arrival, Octavian at least assured himself compensation.

A further restoration, in 1124, concerns the likely father of Victor IV, John IV, who together with Gregory of Monte Albano had seized a quantity of S. Ciriaco possessions and was obliged to return them to that monastery. John had played a leading role in the conflict with Farfa between 1101 and 1105, and it is very probably he who was in 1119 excommunicated at the council of Rheims as Johannes maladictus. A late twelfth century document tells us that the lords of Monticelli and Monte Albano lived on their exactions from travellers. It is impossible to say how long this practice had been going on, but it is far from unlikely that it dated from our own period. The record of the Octavians, not to mention their conflicts with the monastery, made it fully understandable that in the abbatial election of 1119, some monks at Farfa were emphatic that they did not want an abbot Octavianisca consanguinate.

The history of the Octavians brings out much that is illuminating in the context of local papal policy, and much that is illuminating simply in terms of family history. The ramifications into which the family developed, each with its distinct territorial interests which were predominantly local, meant that it cannot at any stage have been said to have played a major role in the most dramatic aspect of Roman politics - those coups which are such a distinctive feature of tenth century Roman history, and with which our own period opens. Neither in the initial opposition to the Tusculans, nor in their fall, nor in

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the schisms of the mid-eleventh century, can the house be shown to have played any role, let alone a major one. In the late 1080s and probably later the family recognised Clement III, but in this they were simply moving with the tide and soon switched their allegiance when that tide turned.

It is perhaps this very lack of interest in matters of high politics that best explains the course of papal policy towards the family. The events of Nicholas II's pontificate might look decisive, but they concerned only one branch of the family, and were carried out on the basis of a largely misleading appeal from Farfa. What is more significant is that the other branch of the Octavians was encouraged in the Tiburtina, by the transfer of Monticelli from the Stephanians, the appointment of Abbot John at Subiaco, and for much of the time their control of the Rectorate. Their usurpations were not always condoned, but the general picture suggests that the family was, the watershed of the loss its Farfa possessions apart, left to go its own way even when that way was simply its own aggrandisement at the expense of churches hostile to the popes. The thesis that the reform popes set out to break the Octavians as a basis for supplanting their rule in the Sabina by their own does not bear examination; a policy of laissez-faire seems to have been by far the more general rule.

The total eclipse of the Stephanians and the comparative survival of the Octavians might suggest a contrast between papal policy towards the two families. A close study of their respective histories suggests that there was no such contrast. The Stephanians were victims primarily of Farfa, just as was one branch of the Octavians, and although their total eclipse appears to follow a revolt so closely that it can be explained by a deliberate
dispossession, that revolt and its aftermath is not characteristic of papal relations with either family, or group of families, during this long and complex period. The basic policy of both families was complaisance towards the popes, and for most of the period that complaisance was recognised by tolerance and rewarded by office. A history based on the recorded highlights of the period might and often has reached a different conclusion, but it could do so only by over-riding the evidence of our marvellously detailed sources and ignoring the picture that can be restored from them. Here, in the history of both families, we have evidence that both under the dynastic Tuscan popes and their successors, there was no long term clash of interests between the papal rulers of Rome and the remnants of the family that had dominated the city in the last half of the tenth century. To know that alone is sufficient justification for our study.
ADDITIONAL NOTE TO CHAPTER 4

ABBOT JOHN OF SUBIACO AND ODDO OF PALOMBARA

Professor Morghen has proposed that two of the Octavians were elected almost successively to the abbacy of Subiaco\(^1\). The first was John, son of Octavian's son Oddo, the second John's son of the same name. He bases his opinion upon a 12th century psalter from Subiaco, now in Perugia, which includes a number of obituary and historical notes. One of these reads \textit{p(re)pos(it(us) cessav(it) ab electio(n)e et Joh(anne)is fili(us) Otto(n)is de Palu(m)b(ar)ia fuit elect(us),} and can be seen on the second plate of the article. It is clearly in a later hand than the others, though probably not later than the end of the twelfth century.

Its weight may be doubted. The Subiaco chronicle makes no distinction between two Abbot Johns but simply speaks of a son of John Oddonis\(^2\); equally the Subiaco necrology speaks only of abbot John as the son \textit{comiti Iohannis Ottoni}\(^3\). The first election of either John seems to have taken place in 1065, and we know that the elder of the two Johns, the grandson of Octavian, was dead by 1058. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the account in the psalter is simply false. Possibly \textit{fili(us)} was written by mistake for \textit{fret(ex) or was simply a slip for Ioh(anna)is. Or perhaps the writer in the psalter simply omitted a word, writing \textit{Iohannes filius Oddonis} instead of \textit{Iohannes Iohannis filius Oddonis.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Chron. Sublac., p. 10.
\item Reg. Parf., iv, no. 874, pp. 269-70.
\end{enumerate}
CHAPTER 5

THE PIERLEONE

In the last two chapters, we have seen that both the Tusculans and the various branches of the Crescentians declined greatly in importance after the middle of the eleventh century. Each split into divergent branches, and each showed only a sporadic interest in Roman affairs. In this their members may well have been encouraged by the spectre of the forces which had since 1046 prevented them from seizing the Papacy for themselves; more tangibly, they were given little motive to intervene, and their local interests were left more or less undisturbed even where they rested on usurpations. As allies they could represent a potent threat against hostile churches, as was the case with Farfa and the Octavians during the pontificates of Gregory VII and of Paschal II. This development left a vacuum in Rome itself which gave the popes a free hand to foster the interests of newer urban families and thus ensure a more reliable basis of positive support. The Pierleone supply us with a case book example of this trend; their support for the Reform Popes was continuous and unflinching to a degree which was in fact exceptional, and that support was reflected, perhaps to some degree ensured, by a corresponding flow of benefits to them. The story of this family is much better known than that of any of the others, and fortunately it is also very much less complex; there are no difficult questions of identity here. This state of affairs encourages a brevity out of proportion to the real importance of the family, but that is no fault.

The chief problem in dealing with the Pierleone is quite simply
the admissibility of evidence. Much of our information on them comes from pens which are all too likely to have been jaundiced. Imperial and Wibertine polemicists could emphasise their role as a means of damned the popes with whom they were associated, while the schism of 1130 meant that later writers, among them Pandulf, could praise or damn their activities according to their own loyalties. Accordingly, the picture we find is not quite that which has become orthodox since the publication in 1904 of what is still the basic work on the family, a detailed article by Pietro Fedele. Fedele's work has been followed by many subsequent scholars writing about the family, in particular for his suggestion that both Gregory VI and Gregory VII were related to it. Before going on, let us sketch that picture. For Fedele, the Pierleone was a family of converted Jewish financiers, related to Gregory VI and Gregory VII, who enjoyed an early marriage tie with the Frangipane and consistently used their money in support of the reformers. Why they should have done so was a question which Fedele somewhat neglected to answer; perhaps he thought the tie of relationship to two of the popes to be sufficient explanation.

Taking the elements in this picture by turn, let us first examine the descent of the family. In the late twelfth century, Walter Map was among those who claimed that the conversion of the family took place under Leo IX, from whom they took their name.

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More contemporary writers make much the same suggestion; both Beno and Benzo of Alba described Leo, active in the 1060s, as a recent convert. Despite this consensus, there is further evidence which quite rules out a conversion as late as Leo IX's pontificate. The first known member of the family was one Benedict Christianus, who was later stated by Alfanus II of Salerno to have married a nobilissima femina. Benedict's sobriquet of Christianus suggests, not quite conclusively, that he was a convert, but his conversion is most unlikely to have occurred as late as the reign of Leo IX. As we shall see he was dead by 1051, by which date his son Leo was already of age; he could hardly have married a nobilissima, and therefore Christian, femina, Leo's mother, much later than the mid 1020s, under Benedict VIII or John XIX. Later writers such as Walter Map may well have postdated the conversion from ignorance; the earlier ones like Beno and Benzo almost certainly did so to blacken the family and the popes who associated with them.

Leo's mother cannot be identified; some would suggest that she came from the Frangipane family, and this would certainly have qualified her for the description nobilissima, at least in the perspective from which Alfanus wrote. If there were a link, it is one which cannot be established. An inscription dating from the 17th century states that Pierleone fought the Frangipane even though they were his relations, but this evidence comes too late to carry much weight and it is likely itself to rest upon a confusion.

Pandulf's account of the pontificate of Gelasius II names Pierleone among the pope's rescuers from the Frangipane brothers after his election, and then, in describing a subsequent attack made by them on the pope, recounts an exchange between the Corsi Stephen Normannus and the Frangipane which shows that these two latter families were related. The inscription is all too likely to have confused the events and the participants.

One further tie of relationship should be examined before we go on to identify the Pierleone and consider their role in Roman politics. Fedele believed that both Gregory VI and Gregory VII were related to the family, and has been followed by a number of historians. This statement can, it is thought, turn upon either pope since they were themselves related; Beno states that Hildebrand, whom we know to have accompanied Gregory VI into exile invitus, was the beneficiary of his will. It is not at all clear that this is a conclusive demonstration of their relationship. Beno wanted to damn Gregory VII by association with a figure whose own purchase of the Papacy and deposition made him an evil figure; as if this were not enough, he named the older pope as one of Hildebrand's teachers in magic. No other source suggests that Hildebrand did in fact inherit money from Gregory VI, and even Beno does not suggest upon this basis that they were relations rather than associates.

Dealing first with Gregory VI, it must be said at once that there is little to connect him with the Pierleone. His names, John and Gratian, were born in the twelfth century by sons of Pierleone

2. Lib. de lite, ii, 378.
himself, but both names were so common that they do not in themselves suggest a connection. That he was able to purchase the Papacy from Benedict IX is not itself evidence that the money came from the Pierleone. The wealth of the Pierleone may itself, we shall see, have been the subject of exaggeration and Gregory may have drawn upon the resources of his church, S. Giovanni alla Porta Latina, though the disappearance of the archives of this church makes that suggestion undemonstrable. The inscription which we have already cited states that he was the patruus of Pierleone, but it is too late to represent conclusive evidence.

The suggestion that Gregory VII was related to the family is a little stronger. The annals of Pegau, written in the mid-twelfth century but based on a life of Wiprecht of Groitsch, state that Pierleone was an avunculus of the pope\(^1\). This source should not be given too much weight; its account of the siege of Rome conflicts with almost every other, above all in its suggestion that pope and emperor resolved their conflict amicably. Pierleone features in no other source before 1068, and he was still alive in 1124, so he cannot have been avunculus of the pope. Should the annals simply have reversed the relationship, so that it was the pope who was the uncle of Pierleone, there is a further problem to be faced. In the schism of 1130 Pierleone's son, Anacletus II, was remorselessly blackened through the Jewish origins of his family\(^2\). Gregory VII's opponents themselves distorted those origins as a means of blackening

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the pope with whom they were associated; if he were related to them, it is barely conceivable that an author such as Beno, familiar with Rome, should have failed to seize upon the fact.

Having seen who was not of the family, let us go on to see who was. The earliest known member of the house was Benedict Christianus, husband of a nobilissima femina and father of Leo. A document of 1051 shows that he was dead in that year, and also that Leo himself was of age. Leo himself was dead by 1072, and a lease of that year shows that he left several children as his heirs; since they were unnamed, they were probably still minors. Only one of these children is known by name, Pierleone himself. No source save the annals of Pegau mentions him before 1088, and he was active in 1124 at the election of Honorius II. Of his many sons, none is found before 1107 when one of them, Obicio, features in a lawsuit that suggests he was of age. This would put his birth about the time of Gregory's later years, when his father was himself likely to have been quite young. Another son, Leo, may have been born still earlier, for we know him to have had a daughter who was married to Ptolemy II of Tusculum by 1142. Pierleone was probably dead by 1130; no source mentions him in connection with the election of his son to the Papacy, and Pandulf, writing a little later, called him quondam. A diploma

2. Ibid., no. 73, pp. 401-3.
Family Plan of the Pierleone.
(N.B. that the order of Peter's sons is conjectural).

Benedict m. a noble Roman lady
+ by 1051

Leo de Benedicto Christiano
+ by 1072

Pierleone
+ by 1130
daughter

Obicio

Peter

John

Gratian

Leo

Guido

Berta

Roger

Tropea?

Jordan

Gratian

Obicio

Hugh

Bishop of Piacenza*
in 1155

Peter

Obicio

John
daughter

m. Ptolemy II of Tusculum
by 1140

* Italia Pontificia V p. 452 no. 51

² Anacletus II
issued to the family by King Roger II conveniently lists his many sons; there is no need to repeat the list here, for they do not feature in our period\(^1\).

What was the source of wealth of these people? Only one contemporary, the hostile Cardinal Beno, goes so far as to claim that they practised usury, and since his statement carried an obvious polemical thrust it is worth questioning it\(^2\). Leo himself was described as a negotiator or businessman in 1051 and there is certainly little to suggest that their wealth came from land\(^3\). By 1072 the family owned a water-mill on the Tiber Island, an obvious place for milling, and one of only a few water-mills within the city\(^4\). This suggests that Leo himself was a corn-merchant, and such an occupation would certainly have brought him into contact both with those who sold corn for grinding and those responsible for providing the populace and pilgrims of Rome with bread. It may have provided the basis for a fortune which could have been employed in usury; equally it may have provided a fortune sufficient to make that usury unnecessary.

It is striking that we find the family established on the Tiber Island as early as 1072; it was to become a major centre of their power, and its strategic importance was considerable since the only other bridge across the Tiber within the walls was dominated by the

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2. Lib. de lite, ii, 379.
4. Ibid., no. 73, pp. 401-3.
Castel S. Angelo. The family may always have been based there, for there seems to be no evidence for the quite frequent statement that its origins were Trasteverine. A Leo de Insula is found on the island as early as 1042, and may easily be identified with Pierleone’s father. By the early twelfth century, Pierleone also held a fortress near S. Nicolao in Carceres; it was stoned from the Capitol during the Prefecture riots of 1116, and Pierleone may well have held it as early as 1104 when he was co-judge of a plea held at that church. Unfortunately the archives of S. Nicolao are among those which have not survived; they are likely to have been rich in material bearing on the family, just as those of S. Maria Nova tell us most of what we know about that church’s neighbours, the Frangipane.

There is no shortage of information on the help which the Pierleone gave to the Reform Popes, but some of that information may be suspect. According to Benzo, Leo fought on Alexander’s side in the schism of 1061-2. There is no reason to doubt the fact, but it should be taken within the context of Benzo’s intention, which was to portray Alexander as the choice of a very small clique, and equivalently to emphasise the support of many of the Roman nobles for his rival, Cadalus. Further statements that Pierleone himself gave military support to the reformers are less questionable, though we must remember that Pierleone, not clearly found until 1088, can hardly have been the mainstay of support for Gregory VII as he is often portrayed. The annals of Pegau are too unreliable to be given

1. Ibid., no. 47, pp. 83-4.
full acceptance, when they make Pierleone the chief defender of Gregory VII in Castel S. Angelo; another late account, in the Liber Pontificalis, gives him no place in the defence of Rome, though it does stress the role played by Gregory's nephew, Rusticus. Later Pierleone is likely to have given military help to Victor III and Urban II at their respective enthronements, though the fact is nowhere stated; he certainly gave them the hospitality of his island home, and it was there that Urban II died. Under Paschal II he was made co-governor of Rome in 1108, and may have provided help against the rebels of that time as in 1116 when his house was bombarded for his support of the pope in the Prefecture dispute. He was among the leading nobles who rescued Gelasius II from the Frangipane, after they had disrupted his election, and according to Pandulf was among those whose approval Calixtus II requested in confirmation of his election. This latter statement needs qualification, for it is evident that Calixtus, whoever's confirmation he may have requested, did not in fact await it before assuming office. He was among the chief nobles who welcomed Calixtus II to Rome, and may have led the force which was sent against Mauritius Burdinus in Sutri, though Pandulf states that the

1. M.G.H. Script., xvi, 238.
3. Ibid., ii, 294.
5. Ibid., 169.
6. Ibid., 194.
expedition was led by Cardinal John of Crema.\footnote{Lib. Pont. Dertua., p. 195.}

This evidence suggests a powerful if sporadic military support for the reformers; if Pierleone is not always found fighting for them, he is never found fighting against them, and this makes him almost unique among the nobles we are considering. In other respects the help which he and his father Leo gave to the reformers is less clear cut. Much of it was financial. Money could carry with it the taint of simony, or at the least bribery and corruption, and could thus damn both those who used it and those who profited by its use. Beno, we have already seen, sought to blacken Hildebrand by association with Leo; if Christ had thrown the money lenders out of the Temple, here was an archdeacon who received them with open arms. It follows that much of our information on the financial help which the family gave may be invention, particularly when there is no very strong evidence to support the allegation that its members were bankers.

As we have already seen, there is nothing which connects the family with Gregory VI's purchase of the Papacy. The first clear instance in which Leo is said to have supported the reformers with cash comes in the statement of the \textit{Annales Romani} that he won over the Romans from their allegiance to Benedict X during the 1056/9 schism\footnote{Lib. Pont., ii, 334.}. The section of the \textit{Annales} in which this statement falls is the least satisfactory of its early parts, even though it is likely to have been based on a contemporary account. Gregory II of Tusculum is mis-named as Alberic, and Hildebrand was given the title of archdeacon, which he did not then hold. Further the account is in
clear, perhaps deliberate, error when it states that the election of Nicholas II preceded that of Benedict X. Since the account refers to Gregory as pope, it must have been written some time after the event, and was quite probably tinged by the conflict between pope and emperor which broke out in 1076. Given this, it is not the most reliable of evidence that Leo did in fact bribe the Romans. If the statement were an invention, Leo was admirably qualified for the role ascribed to him; as we have seen he was dead, and therefore mute, by 1072.

John Brachutus, another supporter of Hildebrand named by some of the polemists, also features in this account, as a poisoner, and it is striking that he too was dead when the account was compiled. We are therefore probably justified in discounting the role it ascribes to Leo.

The success of Nicholas II against his rival can easily be explained in terms which do not include Leo's bribery; the army of Duke Godfrey of Lorraine, and then the two Norman expeditions seem quite adequate to account for the defeat of the antipope and his supporters. The financial support provided by Leo's son, Pierleone, is altogether better attested, and was probably considerably more significant since the reformers lacked the powerful auxiliaries which they had earlier enjoyed. In 1098 it was Pierleone who recovered the Castel S. Angelo, dominating St. Peter's, from the Wibertines. For this we have the evidence both of the Chronicon Imperatorum et Pontificum, favourable to Urban II, and the Albinus and Rufinus satire which was not. Subsequently Werner of Ancona wrote to Henry IV

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1. This is shown by a S. Maria in Trastevere document of 1073; MS Rome, Archivio del Vicariato, Fondo di S. Maria in Trastevere, Perg. no. 5; no 7 in my forthcoming edition.

claiming that Paschal II had bribed Ptolemy of Tusculum and Peter Colonna with money supplied by Pierleone\(^1\). The complaint bore an edge, for Werner must have hoped thereby to discredit Paschal II and gain support for his own antipope. Further Paschal II's biographer claims that it was money from Roger I of Sicily which enabled the pope to drive out the Wibertines, but does not mention that of Pierleone\(^2\). Whether or not he supplied the money must remain open to question. There seems no reason, however, to doubt that it was Pierleone who supplied the money by which Mauritius Burdinus was driven from the Leonine city, and St. Peter's recovered\(^3\).

If the military and financial help with Leo and Pierleone gave the reformers remains open to some question, they can nonetheless be seen as important and trusted figures in the papal entourage. Leo was among the many Roman nobles present when Nicholas II restored Arce and Tribuco to Farfa, and his high place among the subscribers suggests considerable importance among them\(^4\). Pierleone himself was particularly prominent under Paschal II and his successors. Thus in 1104 he was co-judge in the major dispute between the Octavian Rectors of the Sabina and the Abbey of Farfa; in contrast to his colleague he favoured the Octavian, and thus the papal, cause against the monastery and may have been selected as judge with precisely this in mind\(^5\). Subsequently he was co-governor of Rome in Paschal's absence\(^6\) and played a major part in the negotiations between Paschal

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and Henry V in 1111; a son and nephew were also involved, as hostages on Paschal’s behalf. Naturally it was with Pierleone that Paschal took refuge upon his release from captivity.

Pierleone’s influence can also be seen less directly applied. In 1108 he was a witness to the papal recovery of Ninfa, which must mean that he had accompanied the papal army which Paschal launched against the centres of rebellion. One of his sons subscribed to the same act, another to a similar one in the next year. The influence was felt in the Church’s affairs well outside the Campagna. He subscribed to a papal judgement concerning the see of Aversa, and he and his sons were among the chief lay recipients of the vast legal sums expended by Genoa to achieve a favourable settlement in its long standing dispute with Pisa over the primacy of Corsica. Roger II’s diploma to the family, issued in 1134, records help given to his father, Roger I, who had died in 1101. The exact service which was given can only be conjectured; it is quite likely that help in securing the Legatine privilege from Urban II was meant.

Within Rome, there are two clear signs which confirm the

4. Ibid., i, no. cxxxi, p. 407.
eminence and position of trust which Pierleone attained. One is that Paschal II hoped to raise one of his sons to the Prefecture though he had to drop the plan when the claims of a member of the Corsi were violently advanced. The other is that according to Pandulf, it was the bribery of Pierleone with Terracina which forced the hand of the cardinals, and obliged them to recognise Honorius II.

Mention of this eminence and trust brings us to the question of Pierleone's motives. His loyalty to the reformers was exceptional; other families, such as the Frangipane, saw no difficulty in keeping a foot in both camps during the Wibertine schism, and most bowed at least briefly to the threat of superior force. There is no other family which is not found at some point in conflict with the Papacy, even if that conflict was exceptional. How then to explain this loyalty? Part of the answer is likely to lie in the advancement of the family itself. The unsuccessful attempt to make one of his sons prefect was paralleled by the rapid rise of another son, Peter Pierleone, first as Cardinal-Deacon of SS. Cosma e Damiano, then as Cardinal-Priest of S. Maria in Trastevere. The dates of both elevations are revealing; the first, by 1112, is likely to reflect Pierleone's help in 1111, the second in 1120 that which had been given to Calixtus II. A further reflection of papal interest and

1. Falco of Benevento in Cronisti e Scrittori sincroni Napoletani, ed. G. Del Re, i, 173, states that Paschal intended to appoint one of Pierleone's sons to the Prefecture and gives a detailed account of the riots. So does the biographer of Paschal II, Lib. Pont. Bertus., pp. 144-8.

2. Lib. Pont. Bertus., pp. 203-6. There is no evidence, however, that he actually took up the rulership of the city.

3. Hüls, Kardinale, Klerus und Kirchen Roma., p. 225 for the dates of Peter's promotions.
patronage was the very full confirmation privilege which Calixtus granted to S. Maria in Trastevere and the privilege of celebrating a new Station there, for the Circumcision. Pandulf himself suggests that Pierleone strove for the rise of his son, and that rise is suggested by the fact that some copies of Godfrey of Vendome's treatise on lay investiture and the ordination of bishops bear dedications to Peter Pierleone while he was still a cardinal-deacon.

The rise of Peter Pierleone is not the only instance in which Pierleone is known to have applied pressure for the benefit of his sons. A lawsuit of 1107 shows that one of them, Obicio, had taken a substantial lease of the monastery of S. Cosimato's property mostly in the Isola Farnese. When the widow Bella died, she left her goods in this area to the monastery, and Obicio at once took them over on the grounds that they fell within the terms of his own lease. Pierleone acted as advocate on his behalf, claiming that the lands in question belonged to the monastery by ancient right and were therefore included in the lease made to his son; the Rector of the monastery, Gensius, successfully opposed the claim by arguing that the lands had lapsed from the monastery's ownership due to non-payment of rent, and were therefore a new acquisition, not included in the lease. If the tone of this case was witty and good-humoured, there was a serious point at stake as is indicated by the fact that the case came to court. The land in question does not seem to have been restored to

4. Lib. de lite, ii, 687-90.
the monastery; a later document in the S. Cosimato archive shows that Obicio kept the land, and another that Abbot John (1121-47) extended his lease to include all the monastery’s property in Albano¹.

Benefits such as this go some way towards accounting for Pierleone's actions. The rise of his sons Peter and Obicio can be documented, and we have seen that another almost secured the Prefecture. Our source material is so fragmentary that its lacunae may well conceal equivalent pressures on behalf of others among his eight sons. What the benefits cannot explain is why Pierleone supported the reformers during the darker days of the schism. Here the position of the family itself gives some explanation. It was not until the beginning of the twelfth century that Pierleone and his sons seem to have taken much interest in acquiring property outside Rome itself. Leo's position seems to have centred upon his holdings on the Tiber Island, with its mill. There was therefore comparatively little to lose in the schism, while the Island itself offered a secure base. If Leo and his son were indeed corn-merchants, their position must have been somewhat double edged. The siege of Rome is known to have made the collection of foodstuffs difficult²; those who could control their distribution, as the Pierleone could through their possession of one of the few mills within the city walls, may have suffered particular unpopularity. Ultimately Pierleone may have taken the side of the reformers because his business left him no alternative, though his support was rapidly rewarded. When we move on to examine the role of another family,

1. MS, Archivio di Stato, Rome; Fondo S. Cosimato, nos. 133 and 176.
2. See, for example, Reg., ed. Caspar, ii, no. IX/35, p. 628.
it may seem that it was in part that very readiness of the Papacy to
reward Pierleone and his sons that caused the rivalries which
erupted in the schism of 1130.
CHAPTER 6

THE FRANGIPANE

As we have seen in the last chapter, the Pierleone provide a classic instance of advancement from comparative obscurity at the beginning of our period to a position of considerable dominance at the end of it. Their rise was greatly assisted by the power vacuum created in Rome by the dissolution of the older families, and it was marked by considerable papal patronage. They were not the only family so to rise; the schism of 1130 reflected a developing rivalry with another rising family, the Frangipane, who like Pierleone had played a decisive role in the election of Honorius II in 1124. The rivalries of the newer families could be no less dangerous to the Papacy than those of the older ones.

There is a parallel between both families in that each rose from obscurity to dominance during our period. It is a parallel which should not be over-emphasized; the families differed, above all in the sources of their wealth, and these differences explain most of the divergencies in their respective political behaviour.

To chart that rise, we need to know who the Frangipane were. The name Frangipane is first found on S. Gregorio and Farfa documents of 1014, which bear the subscriptions of a Leo Frangipane\(^2\). The family in fact goes back rather further; the historian Onuphrius Panvinius ascribed their name to an act of poor relief

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Family tree of the Frangipane.
(N.B. that the order of the various sons is conjectural).

Benedictus

Petrus qui voc.
de Imperiol
Adult, 963-1014

Leo  Bernard  Bona

John de Romanus
Imperato 2
+ by 1066

Cencius I 3
Frangipane
m. sister of
Stephen Normannus

Leo Frangipane
+ by 1148

Cencius II
Frangipane
+ by 1137

Robert Frangipane
Leo, bastard

Oddo  Cencius
Adelascia  Mahabeus
m. Rainer of Cornazzono

Peter

1. Also called Peter de Imperato, Peter qui et Imperiola dictus, Peter Praiapanis de Imperator.

2. Also called John Sardo de Leo de Petrus de Imperato.

3. Also called Cencius filius quondam Iohannis de Imperator.
during a famine, and although there is no supporting evidence for the ascription it is plausible enough. Accordingly members of the family can be found under other names; Pietro Fedele, in his fundamental article on the family, has been able to show that its members carried alternative names – De Imperato, De Imperatore, or De Imperio. A donation made in 1039 gives conclusive evidence of the link. It is a grant made by Leo, Bernard and Bona. The original of the document has been lost, but it survives in a transcription from the original by Galletti, one of the most reliable of transcribers. This transcription includes words omitted by Fedele in his edition of the charter, for it makes clear that the donors were all filii quondam Petri Fraiapanis de Imperator. On this authority, the link between the two names is undeniable.

The document enables us to trace the Frangipane back to the middle of the tenth century. A Peter qui Imperiola dictus was present ex plebe at the trial of John XII in 963. It is probably he who as Peter qui vocatur de Imperio leased lands from Farfa in 959 and 973, and as Pater de Imperato renounced land to Subiaco in 966. It is not

1. In his manuscript history of the family, MS. Bibl. Vat., Barb. Lat., 2481, fol. 57v.
4. MS. Bibl. Vat., Vat. Lat. 11980, fol. 5f.
clear if he was also the father of the donors of 1039. The donation states that their father was dead. If he had died some time before 1039, he is quite likely to be the same Peter as we have seen under a variety of names from 959 to 973; if he did not we must interpose another generation or discount the link altogether. Leo, one of the donors in 1039, is likely to be the same person as the Leo Frangipane whom we find in 1014. Leo himself is last found in 1042, and he had a son, John, who was of age by 1052. John's own son, Cencius I, was active by 1062; it therefore seems very plausible that Leo's father, who was certainly dead by 1034, is in fact the man whom we find during the third quarter of the tenth century.

Two of Leo's sons can be identified. One was Romanus whom we find in documents dating from 1070 and 1075. The other was John Sardo whom we find in 1052. It is probably safe to identify this John with the John de Imperato, dead in 1066, whose son Cencius sold land in Rome in a document of that year. There seems no reason against this Cencius being the same person as the Cencius Frangipane whom we find according to Benzo, among the Alexandrines in 1062, and the conjunction of the names De Imperator and Fraiapanis in the

2. Ibid., no. 15, pp. 211-3.
5. Ibid., no. 15, pp. 211-3.
earlier document of 1039 makes that identification virtually certain.

In establishing Cencius I's progeny, it is easier to work backwards than forwards. Three members of the family were particularly eminent from the second decade of the twelfth century—Cencius, Leo, and Robert. From Pandulf, we know that Cencius and Leo were brothers¹ while Robert features in a document of 1116 as the son of John Frangipane². In 1088 we find a Leo, son of Cencius Frangipane among the subscribers to the judgement of a Wibertine court hearing the plea of Farfa to recover Corese³, and it is likely that it was this Leo who was the brother of the Cencius named by Pandulf. Leo is not known to have been dead before 1148, but he is not found after 1128 and may have died soon afterwards⁴; this may explain why Pandulf's invective against the family was directed chiefly against Cencius, who was still alive when he wrote⁵.

On this basis, it seems that Leo and Cencius were the sons of Cencius I, while their contemporary, Robert, was a son of a John. We find a John Frangipane during the last years of the eleventh century, for the last time in 1101⁶. He is obviously not the father of Cencius I, who had died in 1056, but he is very likely to have been the father of Robert. His own standing in the family cannot be established, but chronologically he may have been a brother of

¹ Lib. Pont. Durtus, p. 175.
Cencius I. This reconstruction of Cencius I's descent differs from that of Onuphrius Panvinius and all subsequent historians who have attempted to outline the course of the family¹. According to these historians, Leo, Cencius and Robert were all brothers, and must therefore be sons of John Frangipane; in fact only Leo and Cencius are known to have been brothers, and only Robert is known to have been a son of John.

Cencius I, the brothers Leo and Cencius II, John, and Robert are the chief actors in our story and it does not seem necessary to go on to outline their progeny in the twelfth century. Only one further observation may be made. We know from Pandulf that Leo was the nephew of Stephen Normanus². His father, Cencius I, must therefore have married Stephen's sister. Her name is sometimes given in modern works as Bona, but is in fact unknown.

Even in enumerating the members of the family, it is clear that the family was somewhat different from that of the Pierleone. It was older established, and features far more frequently in donations and leases of land, both inside and outside Rome. It may well have been this difference of character which accounts for the role which they played politically, very different from that of Pierleone; accordingly let us go on to examine their territorial interests.

As we have already seen, the family was already of some account by 963; otherwise Peter qui et Imperiola dictus would hardly have been named among those present at John XII's trial. The tenth century


documents which probably concern the same Peter show that he leased land in the Sabina from Farfa, while his donation to Subiaco of land outside the Porta Maggiore may well have been a means of assuring a disputed freehold - for he received it back on lease directly. The joint donation by Leo, Bernard and Bona made in 1039 shows their freehold possession of land by the Domus nova in Rome, and another document concerning the same area shows that Leo still held property there in 1042. Of his sons, John Sardo subscribed to a lease which the church of S. Maria Nova made in the same area, while his brother Romanus held a vineyard there, as his sale of some of them in 1070 confirms. In 1075 he subscribed to a document of the same church concerning lands outside the Porta Maggiore where Peter de Imperato had held land, and this may indicate that he also held property there.

The lands of the heirs of Peter de Imperato are mentioned as one of the boundaries in a document of 1034 concerning land outside the Lateran Gate, which obviously indicates property there as well.

Cencius I is known to have held property in the northern part of Rome, since in 1066 he sold land in the IXth region of the city to St. Peter's; he had inherited it from his father, John de Imperato.

5. Ibid., no. xv, pp. 211-3.
6. Ibid., no. xxiii, pp. 224-5.
7. Ibid., no. xxv, pp. 227-8.
If none of these holdings was very great, they nevertheless added up to a considerable aggregate; our knowledge of their property holding is likely to be extremely fragmentary, and much of it only concerns what they gave or leased, not what they kept.

From this it follows that the family was one of some substance even from quite an early date, as is confirmed by the presence of Leo Frangipane at the restoration of Bocchignano to Farfa in 1014. By the end of the eleventh century its power in Rome had developed still further. Cencius II and Leo are found holding towers in Rome by 1118 from which they could disrupt the election of Gelasius II in S. Maria in Pallara and then a service which he celebrated at S. Prassede. From this position they would have been able also to control S. Lucia in Septisolio, where the election of Victor III took place, but at this date Leo at least was on the Wibertine side. It follows that he may not then have held his adjacent tower. The Turris Chartularia, in which at least part of the papal archives were stored during the upheavals at the end of the eleventh century, may then have been in the family's possession, but that cannot be demonstrated. The area which these fortresses could control was considerable, including the Palatine, Aventine, eastern part of the Forum, and the adjacent Via Sacra which thus controlled communication between the Vatican and the Lateran. Strength of this order easily

accounts for the importance of the family, though it is impossible to say how or when they acquired the fortresses, or how many they held simultaneously. On his arrival in Rome, Calixtus II ordered the destruction of the towers of Cencius, doubtless in retribution for his attacks on Celsius II, perhaps also for his less demonstrable support for Burdimus, and at the same time ordered another tower, that of the lady Bona, to be pulled down. Bona could possibly have been the lady, long dead under Calixtus II, whom we find in the joint donation made by Cencius II's ancestors in 1039; if so, the possession of that tower and perhaps of others in the vicinity was of long standing.

It is, perhaps, the very strength of the family, as well as its somewhat scattered character, which explains the behaviour of its members under the reformers. According to Benzo, Cencius I supported Alexander in the Cadalian schism; there is no need to doubt his evidence on this point. He was also among those nobles who witnessed the Mathildine Donation under Gregory VII. It is likely to be he who is the Cencius Romanorum consul in Guido's account of the elections of Victor III and Urban II. He is first found in 1062, whereas his son Cencius II was alive under Anacletus II. If the Cencius of the Montecassino chronicle is either of these persons, he is obviously more likely to be the father than the son. According to this source, Cencius was one of the leading figures among the reformers during the exile from Rome, present at the election


2. Benzo, M.G.H. Script., xi, 614; two years earlier Cencius had subscribed to Nicholas II's restoration of Tribuco to Farfa, Reg. Farf., iv, no. 906, pp. 300-2.

meetings, suggesting that Odof of Ostia be elected, and at the synod of Capua in March, 1087\(^1\). Thereafter we hear no more of him; he may very probably have died at this juncture.

If Cencius I's record is that of a convinced supporter of the reformers, that of his son, Leo, provides a striking contrast. In 1088 he is found subscribing to the judgement of a Wibertine court in Parfa's interests\(^2\), and his allegiance is further illustrated by the dating clauses employed in the churches which came within the area of the fortresses later and perhaps already held by him and his brother. S. Maria Nova dated its documents by Urban II briefly, but then by the Incarnation - a reasonable declaration of neutrality; S. Prassede, on the other hand, seems to have dated its documents by Wibert, as a charter for 1091 indicates\(^3\). This divergence between the allegiance of Leo and of his father is perhaps best explained by the sheer position of the family, wealthy but vulnerable because its possessions were so scattered. Unlike Pierleone the Frangipane had much land to lose and a corresponding difficulty of defending their possessions. A division of loyalties, with one foot in each camp, was the obvious answer.

John Frangipane, probably Leo's uncle, followed Cencius I as a supporter of the reformers. Urban II stayed at his house near S. Maria Nova in 1093 and 1094\(^4\), and we find him with the pope in France. He was at the synod of Tours in 1096\(^5\) and advised the pope

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in a dispute between the sees of Lyons and Sens\(^1\). He is last found in 1101, as one of the signatories to a case concerning the church of Aversa which was held in Rome\(^2\). By about this time, doubtless with the death of Wibert, Leo was back in the reformers' camp. He is not mentioned among the supporters of the Margrave Werner's antipopes, and was almost certainly not among them for in 1108 Paschal made him co-governor of Rome with Pierleone\(^3\). He was among the signatories to a dispute between the churches of Benevento and Troia heard at Ferentino in 1113\(^4\). These signs of favour, and the degree of eminence which he achieved under Paschal, are evidence that his Wibertine past was not held against him. Paschal showed himself willing to receive Wibertine cardinals, and sensible in not depriving them of office; Abbot John of Subiaco is only the best known of the cardinals who gave him their allegiance after Wibert's death\(^5\). He was correspondingly mild with Wibert's lay adherents, as we shall see in the case of the Tebaldi, examined in the next chapter, and as was probably also the case with the Corsi. In these circumstances, the trust which he placed in Leo is not surprising.

Unlike Pierleone and his sons, the Frangipane cannot be seen to have received any particular reward for their service, though we must remember that the acquisition of their towers might date from this period. During the central years of the twelfth century, the family

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was to become one of the chief beneficiaries of papal policy, taking
over many of the possessions of the Tusculans and Colonna. This
process was not set in train until the pontificate of Eugenius III;
as we have seen in Chapter 3, there was no corresponding move
against these families during our period. Under Honorius II,
Cencius II received the Countship of Ceccano\(^1\), and by the middle
years of the century the Papacy had so won over the family with its
large grants of land that Cencius III, a son of Leo, was exiled by
the senators as one of the principal enemies of the commune\(^2\). This
development cannot be read back into the pontificates of Urban II and
Paschal II; there is simply no evidence for it, and what we know of
the relations of these popes with the older families suggests that
they were not inclined to alienate them through dispossessio.

It is this lack of reward which probably explains the next step
in the history of the family. On Paschal II's death, Leo and
Cencius II violently disrupted the election of his successor and
briefly kidnapped him\(^3\). The move evidently came as a surprise, for
otherwise the election would not have been held in so vulnerable a
place. Subsequently they made another attack on the pope, at
S. Prassede\(^4\), and although there is no explicit evidence for the fact
it is very likely that they provided the chief local support for the
antipope Mauritius Burdinus\(^5\). We know nothing of their motives, but

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2. Codice diplomatico del Senato Romano, ed. F. Bartoloni, Ponti
   per la Storia d'Italia, lxxvii, (Rome, 1948), nos. 5 and 6, pp. 3-7.
4. Ibid., pp. 174-5.
5. As suggested by C. Erdmann, Mauritius Burdinus, Quellen, xix
   (1927), at pp. 230-4.
when we recall that these were the years in which we know one of Pierleone's sons to have been proposed for the Prefecture, another to be rising in the Curia, and another to be receiving very favourable leases of church property, it is most likely that it was the lack of corresponding rewards for themselves which provoked the attacks.

Their hostility was short-lived. Among the nobles who welcomed Calixtus II to Rome while Burdinus was still holding St. Peter's were Leo Frangipane tctaque illa gente. Calixtus destroyed the towers of Cencius, but also showed some signs of favour. Cencius II and Leo were among the recipients of the large sums paid by Genoa to assure its primacy over Corsica, and Cencius became leader of the papal body-guard or masnada. His violent attempt to abduct Gelasio II does not seem to have been held against him. On the other hand, although these indications suggest that the brothers were rehabilitated under Calixtus II, there is equally little evidence of any more tangible benefit to them, as there was to be under Honorius II whose election they engineered.

The general course of the family's politics may best be described as opportunist. Its members seem to have divided their allegiance during the Wibertine schism, probably as the most practical way of safeguarding their possessions, and their subsequent service of the Papacy, together with their brief but dramatic opposition, is perhaps best understood in terms of the benefits which they hoped to receive thereby. The popes did not, and arguably could not, find a solution

4. Ibid., pp. 203-6.
to the problem which they posed. Much of their patronage was already
pre-empted by the far more loyal Pierleone and his sons, and there
could be no question of advancing the Frangipane at the expense of
the older families because those families were generally, if weakly,
loyal and their opposition could not be provoked. There was thus no
room in which the Frangipane could expand; herein lay the seeds of
their role in the schism of 1130.
CHAPTER 7

COUNT GERARD OF GALERIA.

CENCIUS DE PRAEFECTO, AND THE TEBALDI

The relations between the Papacy and the noble families at which we have so far looked suggest an essentially amicable picture, even if there were latent rivalries between the noble families which could be disruptive. In particular the older families disintegrated into smaller and less formidable branches which much reduced their significance, and they were not much involved in Roman affairs after about 1060. There are exceptions to every rule, and in Count Gerard of Galeria, Cenicius de Praefecto, and his descendants, the Tebaldi, we encounter the most striking divergence from the norm. Their case is fascinating, not just because it is so exceptional, but because it demonstrates how factors quite distant from Rome and the Papacy could have a dramatic influence on Roman affairs. It is important, too, because it was largely the activities of these men upon which Bonizo of Sutri drew, followed by many later historians, to provide exemplars of the Roman nobility.

Gerard and Cenicius are among the best known among the Roman nobles of the eleventh century. They are familiar chiefly from the work of Bonizo as classic exemplars of the very worst kind of local interest against which the Reform Popes had to contend. Gerard's involvement in three papal schisms and his robbery of an English mission to Rome on the one hand, on the other Cenicius's involvement in the Cadalan schism, his career of exactions, murder and forgery, and finally his sacrilegious kidnap of Pope Gregory VII - these are the elements of the portrait, and they are obviously strong enough to
serve as its primary colours; they were a gift to such writers as Bonizo who had to explain why the reformers had aroused opposition in Rome. The picture they drew was partial; a fuller understanding of both men can be attained if we make some attempt to unravel their interests, and the result is a far less dramatic picture.

Gerard's ancestry has been the subject of some contention, but it is not in fact difficult to establish. In 1048 he judged the rival claims of Farfa and the Trasteverine monastery of SS. Cosma e Damiano concerning the important cell of Minione; the resultant document identifies him as Rainerii filium qui abbas Hugo commissit omnes cellas omnemque terram quas habemus in marchia Toscana. The Farfa Register contains several references to the advocacy of its interests under Abbot Hugh by Rainer, margrave of Tuscany, one of which concerns the same dispute between Farfa and S. Cosimato as Gerard was later to judge. That Gerard should have followed him in the same role, and himself become the monastery's advocate, makes it reasonably clear that he was the son of the Tuscan margrave.

Rainer himself may well have been count of the Sabina between 1003 to 1006, and possibly also the marchio et dux of Spoleto-Camerino to whom several Farfa documents, probably of the year 1012, refer. These documents date from the time of Abbot Guido, and thus

1. For alternative views see Koelmel, Rom und der Kirchenstaat, (Berlin, 1935), 159-60.
4. A Rainer as count and rector of the Sabina, Ibid., iii, nos. 415, 469, pp. 125, 178-9; as marchio, Ibid., iii, nos. 450, pp. 162-3, and iv, nos. 633-5, pp. 31-3, the latter confused in their dating clauses.
precede Henry II's Roman expedition; it was only after that expedition that Rainer is found as margrave of Tuscany, and one of his sons was later active as dux et marchio in Spoleto. If Rainer were no stranger to the area towards Rome, as rector of the Sabina and duke of Spoleto, his own origins were Tuscan, and his family possessions are mostly found in the region of Arezzo.

Rainer is no longer found after 1027, in which year he opposed Conrad II's Italian expedition and briefly held out in Lucca. It is unclear if the loss of his office was the immediate penalty of rebellion, for his successor, Boniface of Canossa, is not found as margrave of Tuscany until 1032. The date of Rainer's death is unknown; the last reference to him is that of Wipo in his account of Conrad's expedition, so the absence of subsequent references to him after 1027 need not mean that the emperor deprived him of Tuscany but simply that death soon intervened. On the other hand, even if Rainer was left in control of Tuscany after his revolt the office itself soon passed from his family, and this despite the fact that at least one of his sons was appropriately of age.

Rainer had three further sons besides Gerard. One of these, Rainer, is found only in a grant made in 1015 to S. Salvatore on Monte Amiata by his father; the terms of the document certainly allow for the possibility that he had already died as an infant,


since his soul was one of those in whose favour the grant was made.
A further son, Saxo, is known as brother of Gerard from the biography
of Leo IX, and is thus also likely to be a son of Rainer1. Finally a
marchio Ugo filius quondam Reginerii marchionis is found at and near
Aresso in 1046 and 10502. He was dead by 1059 and may thus plausibly
be identified with the marchio Hugh who in 1020 leased land to
Camaldoli3. Gerard, as we shall see, if first clearly found only in
1049, though he may have been active as early as c.1020. Saxo is
first found in 1049 and Rainer II is found only in 1015 when he was
probably already dead. Hugh, on the other hand, seems not only to
have been of age by the time of his father's revolt, but also active
as marchio in his own right. Whatever the fate of Rainer I after his
revolt, it would thus seem that at least Hugh, and possibly Gerard
and Saxo as well, was passed over in favour of the house of Canossa.

Of Rainer I's sons, all save Rainer II bore issue. Gerard
married a Theodora whose own ancestry is unclear, and seems to have
had three sons4. One of these, Gencius, is known only from Bonizo's
Liber ad amicum, and such is Bonizo's unreliability that he might
easily represent either a confusion with another of Gerard's sons, or
someone not in fact descended from him, or perhaps simply an

1. Vie et miracles du pape S. Léon IX, ed. A. Poncelet, Analecta
Bollandiana, xxv (1906), at p. 278.
2. Documents in J. Ficker, Forsch. zur Reiche und Rechtsgesch.
Italiens, (Innsbruck, 1868-74), iv, no. 62, pp. 85-7; and in
Le più antiche carte dell'Abbazia di S. Maria Val di Fonte,
no. 7, pp. 14-17.
Ital., xxiv, Rome, 1938), nos. 139 and 140, p. 86 show that he
was dead by 1059. Regesto di Camaldoli, ed. L. Schiaparelli
and F. Baldasseroni, i, (Reg. Cart. Ital. ii, Rome, 1907),
no. 58, p. 26 is the lease of 1020.
invention⁴. Substance is given to Bonizo's account by the appearance of a Cencius domini Giraldi filius, in company with a Romanus Petri de Galera in an unpublished Lateran document of 1073 which concerns lands at Fiano where Gerard himself had owned property². Bonizo's account asserts that Cencius died at some time before 1074, so the identification of the Cencius in the document and that of his account is perfectly plausible. Gerard himself died in 1061 not long after his brother Hugh so the death of his son Cencius by 1074 does not greatly disturb the chronological pattern of descent even if Cencius seems to have died somewhat in advance of his brother's³. Another son, Gerard, is found in a Farfa document of 1066⁴ while the Rainerius Gerardi who is in 1083 and 1084 found renouncing usurped goods from S. Maria in Minione - in which both Rainer I and Gerard had been involved - may be another of his sons⁵, though equally he might have been a son of Gerard II, and thus a grandson of Gerard. None of these men is known to have born heirs.

Gerard's brother, Saxo, may be identified with the count Saxo of Civită Castellana, husband of Stephania, whose joint son Rainer made a grant of a church in Civitavecchia to Farfa in 1066⁶. Rainer's son, Saxo II, appears in two Farfa documents of 1072, after the death of his father, and of 1084 concerning substantial rights in

1. Lib. de lite, i, 604.
5. Ibid., v, no. 1076, pp. 71-2 and no. 1319, p. 308.
6. Ibid., iv, no. 990, p. 370.
The families of Gerard of Galeria and Cencius de Praefecto

Wido

Rainer, Margrave
of Tuscany c. 1012-27

Rainer +1015?

Gerard of Galeria + 1061
m. Theodora

Cencius + by 1074

Rainer + by 1072

Saxo

Hugh, margrave + by 1059

Rainer + by 1078

Rainer

Guido

(Ughuiccio)

Rainer

Stephen, prefect

Cencius + 1077

Stephen + 1077

Tebaldo

Cencius Stephen
Civitavecchia. The third of the brothers, Hugh, had a son Rainer who is found between 1059 and 1078 and may be identified with the dux et marchio accompanying Henry IV at Rome in 1084. All of the documents concerning him are Tuscan, and his title of dux et marchio in 1084 may suggest that Henry IV had restored him to the office held by his namesake and grandfather against the countess Matilda. His own son and grandson, Rainer and Uguccione, are found in a Camaldoli document of 1117, though without title. By this time Spolet was under the administration of Werner of Ancona and it seems unlikely that the family enjoyed their nominal reacquisition of Tuscany for very long.

Before going on to examine the landed interests of Gerardi and his family, it is well to clarify as far as possible the descent of our other chief figure, Cencius de Praefecto. Cencius is first found during the Cadalan schism, and was the son of a Prefect Stephen. The identity of this Stephen remains unclear. No prefect of that name is found after 1002 but there are long periods, notably between 1017 and 1036 when the name of the prefect, if there was one, is

1. Ibid., v, nos. 1096, 1097, 1100, pp. 91-3, 100.
2. Regesto della Chiesa di Pisa, ed. Caturegli, nos. 139, 140, p. 86; Regesto di Camaldoli, i, ed. Schiaparelli and Baldasseroni, i, nos. 342, 344, pp. 138-9; Reg., ed. Caspar, i, Il/47, pp. 186-7, and ii, V/14a, p. 371.
4. Regesto di Camaldoli, ed. Schiaparelli and Baldasseroni, ii, no. 795, p. 76.
unknown. Since Cencius was active until his death in 1077 and makes so late a debut upon the Roman scene, he is hardly likely to be the son of the Prefect Stephen whom we find in 1002, but the periods during which no prefect is known are sufficiently long for his father to have held office. A Prefect Peter is found in 1051, and a man of the same name was replaced by Nicholas II after his expulsion of Benedict X, but there is no means of knowing whether or not he were the same person. If he were not, there was a period between 1051 and 1059 during which Cencius's father may have held office in addition to the long period between 1017 and 1036. Alternately Stephen may himself have become prefect only at the same time as his son's first appearance in our sources, possibly as nominee of Cadalus in the schism, though there is no evidence to support this hypothesis.

According to Bonizo, Cencius was the executor of the will of Count Gerard's son, Cencius². The tie between the two namesakes is difficult to explain, since Cencius de Praefecto is known only from the period at which death removed Gerard of Galeria from the scene; joint support of Cadalus II does not explain the link, particularly since it cannot be shown that Gerard's son, Cencius, took any part in the schism. One possible link may have been the common origin of both families in Arezzo. In 1051 the Roman judge Stephen granted land in Rome to the church of S. Donato, Arezzo³. The grant was for the souls of his parents and brothers, and was witnessed by the Roman

1. See the list of L. Balphén, Études sur l'administration de Rome au moyen-age, (Paris, 1907), pp. 147-56; corrections by Toubert, Structures, ii, 1353.

2. Lib. de lite, i, 604.

Prefect Peter. The choice of beneficiary suggests that Stephen came from Arezzo, while the choice of the Roman prefect as witness and his own position in the Roman judiciary make it far from implausible that he became prefect himself, though as such he is known from no document. Twelve years later we find a Cencius quondam Stefani de Johannes de Atria who subscribed to a sale made to one of the churches associated with S. Peter's, Rome; this may be Cencius de Praefecto himself; a hiatus in the manuscript appears directly after his name and the first two letters before the hiatus – 'ol' – suggest that the missing words may well have been olim praefecti. John de Atria is not known either in Rome or Arezzo, but further work may enable us to identify him and thus solve the problem of Cencius's origins. Until that is done, we can only suggest that the Stephen of the 1051 donation is quite a probable identification of the unknown prefect who was his father, that that Stephen seems to have had origins in Arezzo, and that it might well have been a common origin in that city which led to the association between Gerard's son and the prefect's, though no family tie can be demonstrated.

Cencius's descent is far more easily demonstrable, though I am not aware that it has previously been noticed. He had a brother, Stephen, who was killed after his murder of Gregory VII's prefect, Cencius Iohannis Tiniosi, and who seems to have left no descent. His own son, Tebaldu, is not found until 1089 when he fought on the Wibertine side, and who can be identified from documents concerning

2. Borino, Cencio del Prefetto, Studi Gregoriani, iv, 440.
his sons which date from the pontificate of Paschal II as Tebaldus Cencii de Stephano. Tebaldus himself is last found in about 1104 and is not mentioned in the documents which we have just cited, themselves of uncertain date within Paschal's reign and almost certainly drawn up after Tebaldus's death. His sons, Cencius and Stephen, are first found in these documents; Stephen was dead by 1139 while a document which must be dated shortly before indicates that Cencius was also dead. The references to Cencius de Praefecto's descendants are sparse and occur only after 1089, but this need occasion little surprise since according to Bernried Cencius took his wife and children with him when flying from Rome after his kidnap of Gregory VII.

Thus far we have noted the following points in common between count Gerard and Cencius de Praefecto. One came definitely, and the other probably, from outside the Patrimony and from families based on Arezzo. Both, as we shall see, engaged in a suicidal struggle with the Reform popes, which has led to their personification as the archetypes of the Roman resistance though their origins, and to some extent the aims of their resistance, were probably not Roman. Further, both were linked in that Cencius stood as executor to Gerard's son. An examination of their property interests serves to clarify the link and suggests a motive for their behaviour which helps to explain the particular virulence of their opposition to the

2. Ibid., no. vii, pp. 288-9, which shows that his son already had a guardian.
3. Ibid., no. viii, p. 289.
4. Bernried, 505.
papacy.

As we have already noted, Gerard's family came from Tuscany and most of its lands which can be traced were in the region of Arezzo, though the losses which the archives have suffered and the fact that such lands can chiefly be traced through donations to churches should not lead us to assume that the family was in possession only of those lands. Gerard's father, the Margrave Rainer was active outside Tuscany and had both lands and influence on the northern border of the Patrimony, in particular at Corneto. He guaranteed Farfa's rights over S. Maria in Minione in 1014 and three years later adjudicated the restoration of some of the cell's goods. The site of the latter judgement was Corneto, as was that of an earlier judgement in favour of S. Salvatore sul Monte Amiata. A grant to the same monastery shows that he held property there. However despite these appearances in Roman territory, his interests appear to have been chiefly Tuscan. He is found giving judgement at Volterra, and when he made his stand against Conrad II he did so in Lucca.

The right by which he held these dispersed properties and rights must remain somewhat obscure. His son Hugh and his descendants continue to be found in the region of Arezzo well after the office of marchio had passed to the house of Canossa, so these lands may


reasonably be supposed to have been his family's¹. Elsewhere the
to position is less clear. When Gerard and Saxo made their first
definite appearance on the scene, at the accession of Leo IX, the
papal biographer called them *comites Tusciarum*². Yet unlike Hugh
and his descendants, these two men and their heirs are never found
in Tuscany itself, even though their interests were chiefly to the
north of the patrimony. Some of their lands and interests were in
different hands before they came to hold them, and the manner in
which they appear to have done so throws a fresh light upon Gerard's
behaviour.

Chief of Gerard's possessions was of course the castle of
Gal eria itself. Bonizo at one point speaks as if Gerard were a major
landowner with lands stretching as far as Sutri itself, but this is
not borne out by the documentary evidence, and the surviving charters
from Sutri show no evidence of his activity or possession there³.
Apart from the literary evidence, Gerard is associated with Galeria
by a document of 1058, a grant to Farfa drawn up at Galeria⁴, and by
his defence there of Benedict X after the antipope had been driven
from Rome. Galeria itself had formerly been one of the *domusculcae*
established in the eighth century by Hadrian I⁵. By Gerard's time
it had long since passed out of the papal possession, but other

1. *Regesto di Camaldoli*, ed. Schiaparelli and Baldasseroni, i,
no. 58, p. 26; no. 272, p. 111; no. 342, p. 138; no. 344, p. 139;
Chiesa di Pisa*, ed. Caturegli, nos. 139, 140, p. 86.
3. *Lib. de lite*, i, 593.
churches still had rights there. Benedict IX's bull of confirmation for Silva Candida included a house there\(^1\), and adjacent lands were held in 1004 by S. Stephen's, one of the Vatican churches\(^2\) and in 1053 by S. Saba\(^3\) — whose rights were to be disputed in the twelfth century by S. Maria Nova\(^4\) and later still by a daring forgery which we will consider later. In 1026 Galeria itself was held by a count John Tocco who cannot be related to Gerard and his family in any way\(^5\).

The site itself is a strong one, surrounded by a steep scarp on three sides which is further re-inforced by a stream. Many of the ruins which can still be seen there are of later origin, but the site alone would have given its owner a position of very great strength\(^6\). For this reason, it is not merely the hindsight of Gerard's resistance there which prompts one to ask how he came to hold it. Arguments from silence are always dangerous, but if there is no documentary evidence that he had usurped it, that charge is also absent from the literary sources. His tenure appears to have been allodial for although the lands adjacent to Galeria itself were the property of various Roman churches, the castle itself appears as

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5. Kehr, *It. Pont.*, ii, p. 25, no. 2; the printed versions are inadequate.

6. David Andrews of the Institute of Archaeology, London, kindly identified the different stages of construction for me during a visit to the site in 1974.
such only on evidence which is almost certainly unreliable. Gregory VII's confirmation privilege for the Roman monastery of S. Paulo fuori le mura, of which he had at one time been viconomus, includes the whole of Galeria\(^1\). Unfortunately his bull survives only in a thirteenth century copy which has, without the slightest doubt, been very heavily interpolated. Some check on this can be made with the aid of a subsequent privilege issued to the monastery by Anacletus II which includes a very much smaller number of properties and which does not include Galeria\(^2\). After Anacletus's death the monastery claimed Galeria among other properties, but there is no evidence that the suit was successful\(^3\). Beyond showing that the monastery thought itself to have a claim to the castle as early as the mid-twelfth century, as in the thirteenth century when the copy of Gregory VII's privilege was made, it thus does little to show that the castle had actually been S. Paulo property, particularly during Gerard's own lifetime. Under Calixtus II the counts of Galeria seized the Massa Careia, were obliged to restore it to S. Maria Nova, and again seized it on the pope's death\(^4\). There is no reference in this case to Galeria itself as one of their usurpations, and the use of the title comites implies that their possession was wholly legitimate. As for the Massa Careia it was subsequently held

1. Quellen und Forschungen zum Urkunden und Kanzleiwesen Papst Gregors VII, ed. L. Santifaller, Studi e Testi, cxc (Vatican, 1957) no. 36, pp. 20-8. The bull states that Galeria had been granted to St. Pauls by Pope Paschal I, but there is no other trace of the donation.


on leasehold by the guardian of a subsequent count of Galeria, son of
a Count Benedict of Galeria who can in no way be related with Gerard.\(^1\)
Once again there is no reference to the castle itself in the document,
and this suggests that from these twelfth century examples, the
castle can, S. Paulo’s claims notwithstanding, be described as
allodial.

The importance of this is that Gerard is the only member of his
family to be found in possession of Galeria. Gerard cannot be
related to John Tocco, and none of his sons bore the title comes
Galerie. Of his sons, Cencius is known only from Bonizo’s account,
unless he is the Cencius domini Giraldi filius of the Lateran
document which we have already mentioned. Another son, Gerard,
describes himself as comes but also as ‘habitator in territorio
maritimano’\(^2\). This implies that he was not based on Galeria itself.
Another of Gerard’s descendants, Rainerius Gerardi, either his son or
grandson, is also found only in the Marritima, restoring goods to
S. Maria in Minione, and bore no comital title\(^3\). Galeria thus seems
to have passed out of the family’s possession with the death of
Count Gerard himself.

Apart from Galeria itself, Gerard is found owning property only
at Fiano, where he granted two churches to Farfa\(^4\). Once again there
is no trace that his descendants enjoyed any property there, though
it may be his son Cencius who was one of the subscribers to a

\(^{1}\) Ibid., Arch. Soc. Rom., xxvi (1903), no. clxx, pp. 136-7.
\(^{3}\) Ibid., v, no. 1076, pp. 71-2; no. 1319, p. 308.
\(^{4}\) Ibid., v, no. 1270, p. 246.
donation concerning goods situated there\(^1\). Bonizo tells us that one
of Cencius de Praefecto's crimes was the alteration of this Cencius's
will in his own favour, and the goods concerned may conceivably have
been at Piano since lands there were subsequently, as we shall see, to
be the object of a contest between S. Paulo and Cencius de Praefecto's
own descendants, the sons of Tebaldo.

If the documentary evidence for Gerard's possessions suggests a
far more meagre position than that implied by Bonizo's statement
apropos the campaign of 1059 that all his castles as far as Sutri
were destroyed\(^2\), that evidence is likely to be as exaggerated, though
for different reasons, as Bonizo's. If Gerard was invited to act as
judge for Farfa in the continual suit with S. Cosimato over S. Maria
in Minione, as in fact he was, his local position can hardly have
been as insignificant as the known concentration of his lands implied,
and he was in fact assuming an office which had been performed by his
father as margrave of Tuscany\(^3\). For this reason, the apparent
diversification of territorial interest among his sons, and their
almost total lack of connection with the areas in which Gerard himself
is found, cannot be without significance.

Gerard's position as judge and guarantor of Farfa's interests so
far as S. Maria in Minione was concerned were soon subject to
erosion, at the hands of the house of Canossa. His own judgement in
Farfa's favour dates from 1048. Within three years the dispute was
re-judged, without alteration of sentence, by a missus of Boniface

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2. *Lib. de lite*, i, 593.
of Canossa\(^1\), while subsequently the case was heard by Hildebrand\(^2\) and by the Countess Matilda\(^3\). If the two later judgements occurred well after Gerard's death, the earlier one was well within his lifetime and could illustrate a development which explains his subsequent and turbulent intervention into papal politics.

The landed interests of Gerard's brother, Saxo, and his descendants are less revealing, since apart from a reference in the life of Leo IX, there is no evidence that Saxo played much part in contemporary politics. Saxo himself was described after his death as count of Civitavecchia\(^4\) but his son and grandsons are found in Civitavecchia\(^5\). All bore the title of *comes*, and although it may be that like their cousins, they had been forced to operate in a different area from their father, the documentary evidence for Civitavecchia is in truth so fragmentary as not to justify the assertion.

The landed interests of our other chief protagonist, Cencius de Praefecto, are altogether more shadowy still. If his father was indeed the Roman judge Stephen of the 1051 donation to S. Donato, Arezzo, then the family had possessed lands near S. Maria Maggiore in Rome\(^6\). If Cencius himself inherited these, his choice of the Midnight Mass at that church for his kidnap of Gregory VII might be

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readily explained – though for most narrators of the event, the date
was fixed by collusion with Henry IV rather than the convenience of
place. Cencius himself had a tower in Parrione which he still held
in 1075, for it was there that the kidnapped pope was held captive.
Under Cadalus II he seems to have held the Castel S. Angelo, but
there is no evidence that he did so by hereditary right rather than
by the temporary appointment of the antipope. Bernried claims that
he exacted tolls from pilgrims on the Ponte S. Angelo, the chief
thoroughfare to the Leonine city and St. Peter's, and that subsequent
reprisals against him included the destruction of his tower. The
Castel S. Angelo itself would have been wholly adequate to that
purpose, but that structure was patently not destroyed; we must
therefore presume that Bernried is speaking of some other structure,
probably at the other end of the bridge and thus not far from the
attested tower in Parrione. The story thus indicates that at this
time, either under Alexander II or in the early years of Gregory VII,
Castel S. Angelo itself was no longer under Cencius's control.
If Cencius had property dealings with any church, the record of
them has not survived. It is hard to believe that his wealth was
wholly urban, even if that wealth were indeed supplemented by illicit
tolls as Bonizo claims. Bonizo tells us that he falsified the will
of Count Gerard's son Cencius to acquire lands left to the Roman
church, and whatever the truth of the details of this account, it is
certainly true that conflict was to develop between Cencius de

1. Thus Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 605-6; and Bernried, 500-1.
3. Ann. Rom., in Lib. Pont., ii, 336; Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i,
   595.
4. Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 603-5; Bernried, 499.
Praefecto's son and grandsons and the monastery of S. Paulo over
lands in areas where Count Gerard had also held property. If Bonizo
invented the forgery itself, it is still far from unlikely that the
breach between the prefect's son and Gregory VII did in fact occur
over the Galeria inheritance.

Cencius's son Tebaldo makes few appearances in the documents
of the period, but this is not wholly surprising since Bernried tells
us that the wife and children of Cencius de Praefecto accompanied
him into exile after the failure of the coup in 1075. Tebaldo
himself is first found only in 1089 and although the date of his
action is not known it was he who was responsible for the seizure of
lands in the district to the north of Rome and in particular at
Fiano where we have seen that Gerard himself was a sufficient
proprietor to grant two churches to Farfa. The evidence for this
seizure is the first of two documents drawn up under Paschal II but
not otherwise dated, the first a renunciation of the lands in question
to the monastery, and the second a lease made in the interests of
those who had restored them, who are none other than Stephen and
Cencius Tebaldi. The first of these documents states that the
seizure had been by Tebaldo himself, who may or may not have been
alive at the time of the transaction since his name is not qualified
by such a term as quondam but who was most likely dead since it is
otherwise difficult to see why he too should not have been involved
in the affair. Tebaldo himself had been active under Paschal as a
papal judge and this, together with the subsequent concession of the

1. Bernried, 505.
2. S. Paulo, ed. Trifone, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxi (1908), nos. iv
and v, pp. 286-7.
lease to his sons which was made on the order of Paschal II, implies that
the seizure was not wholly without papal approval — and thus
presumably that he did in fact have some right to it. All of the
lands involved were to the north of Rome, and it is not clear that
all had been Count Gerard’s. They nonetheless serve to give some
substance to the possibility that Tebaldo’s rights, presumably
inherited from his father, Cencius de Praefecto, eventually derived
at least in part from Count Gerard of Galeria, and that this
inheritance was itself seen as legitimate by Paschal II.

The political relations between Gerard and Cencius on the one
hand and the popes on the other, for all that they are presented
by Bonizo and his modern followers as typical of those between the
Reform Papacy and the Roman nobility, in fact impress by their very
strangeness. Whereas the basic tone of relations between the Papacy
and the Tusculans and Crescentians was essentially one of
acquiescence and non-aggression, especially after the fragmentation
of interest which occurred in both families, that between the Papacy,
Gerard and Cencius is highlighted by violent opposition, armed
struggle, siege warfare, spoliation of pilgrims, and sacriligious
kidnap. Insofar as this is a true picture of relations between them,
it seems that the interests of family and land which we have already
outlined give the key to the difference.

It is difficult to determine when Gerard made his first
intervention in Roman politics. The return of the Stephanians to
their possessions near Farfa was effected with the help of the ‘sons
of Rainer’ but it is not clear if the Rainer were Gerard’s father,
nor that Gerard was among those sons if that were indeed the case.

Furthermore, it is far from clear that the expulsion of the Stephanians from their Farfa possessions in fact demonstrates the rivalry between them and the Tusculans that it is frequently stated to do; it was far more likely to represent a concession to Farfa made in order to secure the support of the emperor Henry II, and hostilities were not protracted; after the Stephanian return, one of them became Prefect. For this reason it is not terribly important to identify the sons of Rainer; the rivalry in which they took part was not durable, and whatever they then did is therefore unimportant.

This is important because it was under the Tusculans that Gerard became count of Galeria. As we have already seen, the count there in 1026 was a John Tocco, so far as is known unrelated to Gerard. Now as we have seen Galeria itself is likely to have been allodial, and some of Gerard's possessions were certainly freehold for he would not otherwise have been able to grant the two churches at Pianò to Farfa. Given this there seems one clear and plausible explanation for his acquisition of Galeria itself - that he received it from either John XIX or Benedict IX. If he did so, the grant may or may not have been made on the basis that Galeria was specifically Petrine property. It is unlikely that the record of Hadrian I's domuscula was remembered at this period, but equally a grant may have been made in terms of the general papal overlordship of the Patrimony. If John Tocco had no heirs the papal intervention, though highly unusual, would not have been exceptional, for previously John XIII had leased Palestrina to Stephania in a similar way. As so often when we attempt to unravel the most vital strands in this history, this can remain no more than a suggestion, but if valid it would help to explain the appearance in the Patrimony of a man whose family was chiefly Tuscan and of which one branch continued
to subsist in Tuscany even after Margrave Rainer had died and the office of margrave had passed to the house of Canossa. This process itself may be vital to our understanding of Gerard's actions, for of Rainer's sons Hugh is found as marchio as early as 1020 well before the loss of the margraviate. It is only Hugh's sons who are found on the family lands near Arezzo, and this raises the possibility that a distribution of lands had already occurred during Rainer's lifetime, with the family lands being designated to Hugh and his descendants and the remaining lands, perhaps, being designated to the remaining brothers. If this were so both Gerard and Saxo would have been the direct sufferers when the office of margrave passed to Boniface of Canossa; they would have lost both the hope of office and perhaps also their property. Thus deprived it would have been wholly natural for them to look elsewhere for land and since Galeria itself came into Gerard's possession only after 1026 one might suggest that its acquisition was itself a consequence of dispossessing in Tuscany.

If Galeria were acquired from either of the last two Tusculan popes, the grant was certainly rewarded by a reasonably consistent loyalty to them. Gerard's behaviour in the great crisis which befell the Tusculans is the subject of directly contradictory testimony, but in fact his behaviour at this time is not difficult to determine. Bonizo tells us that one Gerard de Saxo first proposed that Benedict IX marry his daughter and then used the proposed marriage as a lever to arouse the popular hostility against him in favour of Silvester III. It is difficult to see why Bonizo might invent this story, since he consistently describes Gerard as one of the enemies of the reformers.

2. Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 584.
along with the Tusculans and the Crescentians. So far as these latter families are concerned, his account is in fact a travesty, but with Gerard himself there is a further problem for it actually went against Bonizo's account of him to portray him as acting against the Tusculans while his, possibly mock, horror at Benedict's intention of retaining the papacy after his marriage hardly rings true in one who is portrayed as an enemy of reform. Further we may note that although Bonizo is obviously referring to Gerard of Galeria, he commits the solecism of calling him Gerard de Saxo, when his father was in fact Rainer; writing forty years after the event the slip was minor, but it suggests that the account as a whole is the product more of a lively imagination than of good information.

The *Annales Romani* tell us a very different story. Here Gerard, son of Rainer is among the nobles who came in from the Campagna after the expulsion of Benedict IX and in league with the Trasteverines effected his restoration. The annals have more in their favour than getting Gerard's name right, and although the account survives in a somewhat heterogeneous collection of narratives and documents, of which some of the latter are unquestionably of polemical intention, it is itself likely to come from an earlier account. The detail of the narrative at this point, as also its accuracy on all the points at which it can be checked, suggest that we have here an account contemporary with the events which it describes, and one of very high order.

Gerard's behaviour during the earlier years of the Reform Papacy remains impossible to determine. Leo IX's biographer described him and his brother Saxo as among the enemies of that pope at the opening

of his reign\(^1\), but the grounds of their hostility are not stated and a hiatus in the manuscript leaves the reader uncertain if they were among those for whom the pope prayed on his deathbed, and who were thus still hostile\(^2\). It was during these years that Gerard's rights and position began to suffer erosion at the hands of the house of Canossa. In 1051 the habitual dispute between Farfa and S. Cosimato over S. Maria in Minione was adjudicated by a missus of Boniface of Canossa\(^3\). Gerard may not have been persona grata, but Boniface too can hardly have been the most reliable of allies to the reformers, even if his power made his alliance worth gaining, for in 1048 he had blocked the passage to Rome to Poppo of Brixen during one of Benedict IX's brief resumptions of his papacy\(^4\). The adjudication of the dispute may reflect an attempt by S. Cosimato to reverse the previous decision; but equally it must reflect a changed balance of power in the district, and perhaps even a re-allocation of Gerard's standing and perhaps of part of his lands to the man who had assumed the office once held by his father. The process by which this erosion occurred is unclear; it may reflect deliberate papal policy, such as an attempt to win over Boniface by making concessions at Gerard's expense, but equally it may reflect only the southern extension of Boniface's power autonomously of the Papacy. Whatever the truth in this instance, the reformers were soon to demonstrate a close alliance with the house of Tuscany, with the elevation of

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2. Ibid., 292.
Duke Godfrey's brother to the Curia, to the Abbacy of Montecassino, and then to the Papacy itself. If Gerard did suffer territorially during these years, the alliance made a reversal of that loss practically unthinkable, and perhaps amplified it.

It may be this process which explains Gerard's conduct during the schism of 1058. His involvement in Benedict X's accession is again the subject of conflicting testimony. Bonizo regarded Benedict as essentially the nominee of Gregory II of Tusculum but both Leo of Ostia and the Roman Annalist gave Gerard a position of equal importance in the coup. For once Bonizo is likely to be right. Stephen IX died in Florence on March 29, 1058, and Benedict's enthronement followed on April 5. Given the time that the news of Stephen's demise must have taken to come through from Florence to Rome, this was quick work indeed, and suggests prior arrangement. If this was the case, Gerard himself is unlikely to have been party to it for on 1 April he was himself at Galeria. However if Gerard's role in the inception of the schism was smaller than some of the sources suggest, his part in its final stages was certainly significant. After Benedict X had been driven from Rome by the forces of Godfrey of Lorraine he fled first to Passarano, probably then held by the descendants of the Stephanians, but then to Gerard at Galeria who resisted sieges by the Normans before resigning the antipope into their hands. It is the choice of Gerard as harbourer at this late stage, and the subsequent desperation of his resistance, which is significant. For as we have


seen, Gregory of Tusculum had himself already recognised Nicholas by the time of these events, while Benedict's flight from Passarano to Galeria implies that shelter was also likely to be withdrawn there as well. Given this state of affairs, which in part pre-dated the arrival of the Normans, it must have been clear that Benedict's cause was lost, and that nothing was to be gained by further resistance. As we have already seen, the Tusculans do not seem to have lost greatly by the failure of their coup, even though Gregory II was the leading figure in it. Why then should Gerard have provided refuge for the expelled antipope and only withdraw that refuge during a second siege of his castle?

One possibility is that the erosion of his influence and perhaps of his property which had already occurred seemed set to continue under the new pope, Nicholas II, who had been a chaplain to Godfrey of Lorraine before becoming bishop of Florence. Gerard had left Tuscany after his family had lost the margraviate, and now his position in the Roman duchy was under attack from the same family that had succeeded to his father's office. Further, as we have seen, the precise terms on which he held Galeria remain undeterminable; if he held it, as seems likely, as the result of a grant by one of the Tuscan popes, the terms of his tenure and perhaps the grant itself was liable to come into question. These considerations may have determined him to support the Tuscan candidate, and they may have seemed particularly potent after the election of Nicholas II when the ties of the new pope were known. Documents from the area of Spoleto were already being dated by Godfrey, even though this was no part of his dominion, and a further extension of his power and influence must
have seemed all too likely.\(^1\)

It is not known if Gerard suffered any penalty as a consequence of his opposition to Nicholas. Whereas the Tusculans seem to have escaped scot-free, the Stephanian Crescentians appear to have suffered dispossession in favour of their Octavian relatives. Gerard’s long resistance at Galeria may have disposed the Papacy to dispossession, to which his very tenure of his goods may have rendered him vulnerable; but it cannot be demonstrated that this occurred at this point.

Gerard’s behaviour under Nicholas II was hardly conciliatory to the pope. At the Easter synod of 1061 he was excommunicated for a striking act of brigandage at the expense of a party of English bishops and the earl Tostig\(^2\). That his loot comprised a thousand pounds of Pavian money as claimed by Damian strains credulity, but even if it were not so vast the chance of acquiring it may well have outweighed other considerations particularly if Gerard were already meditating his next move in papal politics. For it was in the same year that he took a leading part in the Roman delegation to Henry IV seeking a nomination to the Papacy against Alexander II\(^3\).

Peter Damian attempted to put the whole blame of the schism on Gerard, and although his motives in doing so were in part polemical since the blame could thus be put on a dead man and Henry IV’s rights left unchallenged, it is clear that there was some measure of

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truth in his account. Gerard's motives can be no more certainly clarified and defined than in the previous schism, but it is not unlikely that they were the same, and they may have been intensified by punishment after the failure of the earlier coup. Whatever the punishment of Gerard himself, it is clear that his sons suffered. Gerard himself died shortly after the inception of the Cadalan schism, and as we have already noted, his sons cannot be documented at Galeria itself but chiefly in the Marritima. It thus seems virtually certain that a dispossession did in fact take place; but far less certain whether that dispossession preceded or followed the Cadalan schism. Whatever the truth of the matter, it seems that Gerard's behaviour can be explained in terms that only indirectly implicated the Papacy. The advance of the house of Canossa at his expense was a longstanding development going back to events in Tuscany under Conrad II, and the continuation of that advance into the Patrimony, assisted by its domination of the Papacy itself, was a development which very plausibly accounts for his opposition and for its particularly extreme character. The terms of that explanation do not really have much to do with the Reform movement.

The careers of Gerard and Cencius de Praefecto do not overlap, though the explanation of their behaviour may be common to both men. According to Benzo the principes Galeriani fought on the Cadalan side, and these may have been Gerard's sons. However Benzo's account of Roman events at this juncture is far from reliable, and several of the Roman nobles whom he names are either misnamed or, possibly,

2. Ibid., 91.
inventions. It is striking that he does not mention Cencius de Praefecto, who played a leading role on the Cadalan side. Some historians have chosen to identify the Cencius de Praefecto of Nicholas II's Farfa privilege with our subject\(^1\); but by 1060 when the document was issued, Nicholas II had already installed John Tiniosus as prefect and we know that he had a son, Cencius, who was to succeed to the Prefecture under Alexander II. Far from showing that the Prefect Stephen's son was among the major Roman nobles who witnessed Nicholas's act, the document thus seems to suggest either that he was not counted among them, or that he was already recalcitrant. Benzo's failure to mention him supports the former explanation. Yet Cencius can hardly have been of such obscurity when his role in the schism was to be so substantial, and when he was to be entrusted with the Castel S. Angelo on Cadalus's behalf, even if relations were subsequently to deteriorate. We have seen that there is likely to be some substance in Bonizo's story that Cencius stood as executor to one of Gerard's sons, and he too came of Arezine origins; this suggests that he may be one of the unnamed Galerians to whom Benzo refers.

For Bonizo and Bernried no colours were too black to depict Cencius. He was, after all, the kidnapper of Gregory VII, and had he not handled the matter ineptly the Reform for which Bonizo saw Gregory as standing, so imperilled at the time of his writing, might have come to an abrupt conclusion there and then. For this reason their accounts of his behaviour need to be treated with particular caution. It is, for example, chronologically impossible that Cencius fell into trouble for murder under Alexander II and therefore

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took part in the elevation of Cadalus of Parma at Basle as Bernried
tells us\(^1\), and a more temperate source addressed to some of those
who were present as Basle gives that role to Gerard of Galeria\(^2\). It
must also be a matter for doubt that Cencius held Cadalus himself to
ransom for his expenses incurred during the pitched battles in Rome\(^3\);
for it is all too obvious that the point of this story is to
represent him as a man who was no less untrustworthy to his friends
as to his enemies, and the ransom of Cadalus must have seemed almost
like a foretaste of the more dramatic kidnap of Gregory VII. Behind
these stories there is however an unwitting element of truth; as was
the case with Gerard, Cencius's involvement in papal politics seems
to have been accidental, concerned very directly with his own
position.

This is notable in the accounts which they gave of the events
which led to the breach between Cencius and Gregory. Cencius is
said to have levied illicit tolls on the Ponte S. Angelo, the chief
route between the city itself and St. Peter's\(^4\). Balked in this, he
eventually forged the will of Count Gerard's son, Cencius, and was
reprieved only at the behest of the Countess Matilda\(^5\). Only after
failure in these enterprises did Cencius become part of a widespread
conspiracy against the pope, comprising Henry IV, Wibert of Ravenna,
and Hugh Candidus, of which the kidnap in 1075 was the natural

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2. Damian, *Disc. Syn.*; *Lib. de lите*, i, 90-2, supported for
   Gerard's role by Benzo, *M.G.H. Script.*, xi, 616.
outcome. Whatever the truth of the conspiracy theory, it is notable that Cencius is portrayed as becoming party to it only after the failure of his attempts to improve his position by the exercise of toll-rights and the acquisition of land. For Bonizo these attempts were automatically illicit and their punishment justified. This may remain open to doubt, particularly in the light of the kidnap attempt itself.

That the kidnap was part of a grand conspiracy against the pope by Henry IV and his allies cannot be disproved but may easily be doubted. The thunderclouds were already in the air at Christmas 1075, but the first shaft of lightning was Gregory's letter to Henry of December 8. Henry may well have expected difficulties after his appointments at Milan, Fermo and Spoleto, but one may wonder whether either he in making those appointments or Gregory in reproving him for them quite appreciated the inflammability of their actions. Given that communication between Rome and Germany might normally take between three and four weeks in midwinter, Henry cannot have communicated with Cencius after the receipt of Gregory's letter. His response was to summon the German bishops and the resultant synod against Gregory was held on 26 January. If Henry had been relying on Cencius's coup to remove his difficulties, he cannot have known its outcome at the time of summoning his bishops, though he might have done by the time of the synod itself. These considerations make it unlikely that the kidnap of 24 December was launched as part of a premeditated conspiracy against Gregory; conversely it is more likely that it has to be explained in Roman terms directly related to

1. Thus Bonizo, ibid., 605-6; Bernried, pp. 500-1.
Cencius himself.

The course of the kidnap itself supports this hypothesis, since Cencius's aims, had they simply been revenge, as Beno appears to suggest\(^1\), could far more easily have been satisfied by murder. All the accounts of the kidnap agree that Cencius had Gregory wholly within his power, both at S. Maria Maggiore itself, and subsequently at his tower in Parrione\(^2\). For Cencius to expect any satisfactory result from his wild action, as surely he must, one must suppose that he expected his requests to be granted, and this in turn tends to favour the suggestion that those requests were not wholly illicit. What those requests were cannot be known. Those who recount in detail, even if only imaginative detail, the actual kidnap and the scene in Cencius's tower seem curiously indifferent to the aims that lay behind it. But although the suggestion can only be tentative, we may once more take note of Bonizo's story that Cencius had unsuccessfully forged the will of Count Gerard's son, and, recalling the common factors which we have already noted between the two houses, suggest that it was the Galeria inheritance, from which we know Gerard's sons to have been at least partially dispossessed, which lay at the root of the matter.

Cencius himself does not much concern us after this event. He was expelled from Rome, accompanied by his wife and children, and died at Pavia after capturing Bishop Rainer of Como, one of Gregory's chief supporters in northern Italy\(^3\). It is clear that all of his

\begin{enumerate}
\item Beno, \textit{Lib. de lite}, ii, 372-3.
\item Bernried, 501-2 and Bonizo, \textit{Lib. de lite}, i, 605, are the fullest accounts; Borino, Cencio del Prefetto, \textit{Studi Gregoriani}, iv (1952), at pp. 431-3 summarises all the contemporary accounts.
\item \textit{Lib. de lite}, i, 610.
\end{enumerate}
family was not expelled, for a brother, Stephen, murdered Gregory’s prefect, Cencius, and lost his own life as a result. Cencius and his family may have suffered some kind of dispossession, but the only evidence which suggests that they did is that concerning the lands which may well have been in dispute before the kidnap.

His son, Tebaldo, is first found only in 1089 when a letter of Urban II shows that he was one of the leading figures fighting on the Wibertine side. He was still on the Wibertine side in 1093, but was among those persons, both lay and clerical, who were able to transfer their allegiance to Paschal II at or perhaps before the death of Wibert without harm to themselves. Leo Frangipane provides a similar example of Paschal’s prudent clemency. Under Paschal, Tebaldo was Pierleone’s co-judge in the lawsuit between Farfa and the Octavian rectors of the Sabina. It may reflect his old Wibertine sympathies that he opposed his colleague’s intention to decide in the Octavians’ favour for the monastery had been a far more consistent supporter of the antipope than of the reformers.

The dispute between the Octavians and Farfa illustrated well a principle that the Tebaldi were soon to turn to their own use - that on occasion the Papacy was prepared to overlook the usurpation of church land to gain the support of nobles. Gregory VII himself acted in this manner towards the Octavians, and Paschal clearly did so towards the Tebaldi; he may have won over the Corsi in this manner too, but unfortunately none of the surviving evidence illuminates

1. Ibid., 611.
the activities of that family. Tebaldo himself was said in a later
document to have seized land from St. Paul; after his death, though
still during Paschal's pontificate, his sons were brought to court
to defend their right to it. On the order of Paschal II, they were
obliged to restore the contested lands to S. Paulo, but received them
back as leasehold on favourable terms. So far as can be ascertained,
this secured their loyalty, for Stephen de Tebaldo was one of
Gelasius II's rescuers when the newly elected pope was seized by
Cencius Frangipane.

To understand the significance of Paschal's concession, we need
to look once more at the enigma of the S. Paulo claims to Galeria.
The basis of this enigma is the source material itself; the S. Paulo
archive has been decimated by fire, and the use of what remains is
made the more difficult by a particularly inadequate edition. It
will be recalled that Gregory VII's bull is heavily interpolated,
and does not necessarily vindicate the S. Paulo claim to the lands in
question. Yet Anacletus's subsequent privilege does include Fiano,
where Gerard had owned two churches, as well as other lands which
were the subject of dispute between the Tebaldi and the monastery.
Further we will recall that Gerard's son Cencius, whose will was
forged by Tebaldo's father, Cencius de Praefecto, appears to feature
in a document concerning goods at Fiano, and may thus well have been
resident there; the lands in question when the will was altered

1. S. Paulo, ed. Trifone, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxi (1908), nos. iv
   and v, pp. 286-7.
3. That of Trifone, cited above.
could well have been the same as those subsequently at issue, along
with others, between the Tebaldi and S. Paulo.

Although Gregory's bull does not provide evidence that Galeria
itself had become the property of the monastery, its confirmation of
some of the other lands connected with Count Gerard and with the
Tebaldi has some support from the other documents of the monastery.
Anacletus's bull is only one of these; there is also an order by
Lothar III that Fiano be returned to the monastery\(^1\), a plea of
abbot Azzo in 1139\(^2\), another plea of the prior dating from about the
same period\(^3\), and a privilege of Henry VI which confirms an earlier
one by Barbarossa\(^4\). Of the lands in question, only those at Fiano
were situated where Count Gerard is known to have held land, but it
is possible that he had also held the lands at Vaccarrecchia,
Leprignano and Strictiliano which also feature in most of these
documents. These lands were disputed between the Tebaldi and the
monastery as early as the reign of Paschal II. We have seen that
some degree of dispossession seems to have been inflicted on Gerard's
sons, and if Galeria itself does not seem to have been granted to
St. Paul's, closely bound to the Papacy by Hildebrand's rectorship
there under Alexander II, the other lands which were later in question
may well have been. If this were so it is striking that the
beneficiary was not the Roman church itself, on the basis of the
former domuscultus which it had held in the region. However a

\(^1\) M.G.H. Dipl., Lothar III, ed. Ottenthal and Hirsch, (Berlin,

\(^2\) S. Paulo, ed. Trifone, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxxi (1908), no. vii,
pp. 298-9.

\(^3\) Ibid., no. viii, p. 289.

\(^4\) Ibid., no. xi, p. 291.
domusculta was not necessarily a large estate, and in the final chapter we shall see that the Roman Church, as opposed to the many churches and monasteries of Rome, had very few territories of its own during our period; it also did little to enlarge them. There are many 'ifs' in the argument; some may be settled by further research, others will probably remain insoluble. Accept the 'ifs' and it would seem that the lands disputed between the Tebaldi and St. Pauls may well have been taken from Gerard's descendants and granted to the monastery; through their descent from Cencius de Praefecto who may himself have inherited rights from Count Gerard, the Tebaldi may thus have had rights to the land against the monastery which antedated the dispossession. These rights would themselves explain the dramatic actions of Tebaldo's father, Cencius de Praefecto, and it was their partial recognition and restoration by Paschal II which poured balm on wounds inflicted two generations previously.

Returning to the questions which we raised at the outset, we should again put on Bonizo's spectacles and ask what it was about Gerard and Cencius that made him portray them as archetypal of the Roman nobles. As we have seen in the earlier chapters, the reformers followed a policy of laissez-faire towards both Tusculans and Octavians and thereby secured their intermittent assistance, or at least their neutrality, fostered by office and a tacit recognition of their acquisitions even when they were illicit. This was hardly suitable material for Bonizo, for it was the formula for success rather than the grandiose failure which he was obliged to explain and excuse. With Gerard and Cencius there was better material to hand - a long record of support for successive antipopes, a wrangle over property, and above all the sacrilege of Christmas 1075. The
chance was too good to miss: With enemies like these, how could Gregory have succeeded?

In this instance we have the advantage over Bonizo not so much of knowing more than he could have done as simply enjoying hind-sight. We know that the Reform Popes were eventually successful in Rome, and we know that that success was achieved by patience and tolerance. Consequently we do not write as he did under the shadow of exile, with Rome partially devastated and seemingly untenable. Instead we can, perhaps, ask whether the whole saga of relations between the reformers and our two chief protagonists is in fact exceptional. For such it appears. The chief threat to Count Gerard's position seems to have been the extension southwards of the power of the house of Canossa; it was a development which may well have borne bitter memories given their replacement of his own family in the margraviate of Tuscany. Because the house of Canossa extended its influence through the Papacy, with the advancement first of Frederick of Lorraine and then of Gerard of Florence, the struggle when it came took the form of one over the Papacy; the arena should not be confused with the objective.

The sequel bears out this analysis. Cencius de Praefecto and his descendants were linked in some way no longer definable with the house of Galeria. Bonizo himself seems to have lighted on the truth when he portrayed Cencius's behaviour as rooted over the property of Gerard's son, even if he then had to obscure that truth by invoking a conspiracy theory to explain the kidnap. Paschal II displayed a more realistic grasp of the situation when he won over the Tebaldi by employment as a papal judge and by partial recognition of the disputed property. In so doing he put his finger unerringly on the root problem and possibly at the same time illustrated just why this
solution of the problem had earlier been impossible. So far as he was concerned, the contest of property had been between S. Paulo and the Tebaldi; no other power had been involved. Earlier this had not been the case, for the origins of Count Gerard's behaviour which lay behind the subsequent grievances assuaged by Paschal II, lay not in the Patrimony but in Tuscany, and the extension of that conflict into the Roman area through the extension of Tuscan influence in fact pre-dated the years when the house of Canossa dominated the Papacy itself. For these reasons we are now able to see, as Bonizo could not, that these most dramatic hostilities between reformers and Roman nobles far from being archetypal were in fact wholly exceptional; the policy followed towards the Tusculans, the Octavians, and eventually towards the Tebaldi was far more characteristic of how the Reform popes handled the older Roman aristocracy, and ultimately explains their final success.
CHAPTER 8

THE POPES AND THE RULERS OF SOUTHERN ITALY

Count Gerard of Galeria's career is a striking demonstration of the fact that intervention from outside Rome was not always beneficial to the Papacy even when it was made on behalf of the popes themselves. Intervention could create its own problems, and was almost bound to do so when it was made at the expense of vested interests. The popes did not as a rule challenge the proprietary rights of the Roman nobility; their allies could be less circumspect. Intervention could thus provoke the very forces against which it was invoked, and there was always a danger that the intervening power itself might become over-dominant. Then, too, support could seldom be secured for nothing, and the price which had to be paid was not always acceptable to the popes.

Duke Godfrey of Lorraine's intervention into Roman politics during the late 1050s and early 1060s illustrates the first of these points clearly enough, and possibly the second as well; but if we want to see the continual working of these principles in the intervention of non-Roman powers, we would do better to look at the states of Southern Italy rather than at the House of Tuscany. Duke Godfrey's interventions may well have been decisive in that they took place before the fragmentation of the Tusculan family and thus at a time of maximum danger to the reformers. On the other hand, the most desperate resistance which the reformers seem to have met may well have been primarily an expression of grievance and resistance to the house of Tuscany rather than to the popes themselves. We should remember too that Tuscan military aid in Rome was limited to the expulsion of Benedict X, and less certainly to the provision of an
escort which enabled Victor III to be crowned in Rome. Matilda's celebrated assistance to the reformers in northern Italy, and her famous gift of treasure to Gregory VII, should not obscure the fact that her aid was seldom of direct military significance in Rome itself. 1

Most historians would claim that it was otherwise with the Norman rulers of Southern Italy. For Déer, echoing many earlier scholars, the alliance between the Reform Popes and the Norman rulers was a fundamental necessity for the application of their policies. 2 At the same time historians are now less willing to read the conflict between Empire and Papacy back into the pontificate of Nicholas II. Accordingly both the Election Decree of Nicholas II and his alliance with the Normans at Melfi are more often seen in Roman terms; both were directed against the Roman nobility, not against the Empire. 3 This is a verdict which must, it is clear, be reconsidered; the relations between popes and nobles could be marked by hostilities and revolt, but they were not characterised by any deep-seated or consistent opposition. The popes themselves were generally careful not to provoke their opposition, and to conciliate them where necessary. Where, then, does the Norman alliance fit into this picture?

1. For Matilda's aid, see L. Simeoni, Il Contributo della Contessa Matilde al Papato nella Lotta per le Investiture, Studi Gregoriani, i, (Rome, 1947), 355-72.


There was no precedent for the use of southern forces in Rome before 1059. The Tuscan popes had strong marriage ties with the rulers of Salerno through the marriage of one of Prince Waimar's sons to a cousin of Benedict IX\(^1\). The marriage is likely to have taken place about 1037, and was thus comparatively recent when the Tusculans met their great challenge during 1044-6. All the interested parties were still alive, but there is no indication that the Tusculans either sought or received Salernitan help. When Henry III entered Italy to settle the affairs of the troubled Papacy, and began to appoint a series of German bishops as popes, he took the precaution of reversing his predecessor's policy and reinstated an independent Capuan Principate, formerly under Salernitan control. He also took the step of recognising the first of the recently established Norman dominions\(^2\). These were actions which could well be construed as a recognition of the danger inherent in the ties between the Tusculans and the ruling dynasty of Salerno, for foreseeing danger and as far as possible forestalling it\(^3\). Whatever the danger, it does not seem to have materialised.

With the arrival of the Normans in southern Italy, a new factor entered into Italian politics. There is no evidence that Benedict VIII


sought to use them in Rome, as he might have done, had he wished, against the Stephanians who were by 1022 at the latest seeking to recover the castles which they had lost near Farfa. Instead the Normans made their debut in the south, as mercenaries of Salerno; the claim that Benedict VIII was himself responsible for this deployment of their power rests on highly unsatisfactory evidence\(^1\). Further south, the Normans were initially welcomed at Montecassino, but in 1045 were expelled from the lands of the monastery, their conduct having become insupportable\(^2\). Increasingly the Normans were becoming a menace to the political stability of the south and the Church's control of its lands and revenue.

It was only in 1059 that the picture altered. Clement II and his successors seem to have seen the Normans as a dangerous group of plunderers and marauders, all the more difficult to control in that they were under no firm ruler who might control their excesses. When Benevento became part of the Patrimony, the situation was brought to a head. Leo's requests to Count Drogo proved ineffective, for the count was unable to control his anarchic subjects\(^3\). With Drogo's assassination in 1052, the situation worsened and Leo made no further attempt to negotiate. The Normans were to be subdued by force. In this he was acting against his more obvious Roman interests. As an outsider in the Roman scene, backed only by the forces of the distant

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1. E. Joransen, *The Inception of the Career of the Normans in Italy*, Speculum, xxiii (1948), 353-96, gave a very considerable role to Benedict VIII; see the sceptical treatment by H. Hoffmann, *Die Anfänge der Normannen in Süditalien*, Quellen, xlix (1969), 95-144.


Empire and endangered by the threat of a Tusculan revival, the moral
was still clear. The Normans, as cuckoos in the south Italian nest,
were unthinkable as allies. Even after his defeat at Civitate, Leo's
hostility remained unaltered. No settlement of any significance was
concluded with the victors, and the pope began negotiations with the
Eastern Emperor Constantine Monomachos for a fresh campaign against
them.¹

This hostility continued under the next two popes. Although
Gebhard of Eichstätt had been opposed to Leo's plan², as pope he
too began to seek help for a renewed campaign against the Normans
who had begun to besiege Benevento.³ At Montecassino there was
strong pressure to ensure the anti-Norman Frederick of Lorraine as
abbot, a move perhaps also intended to ensure the support of his
brother, Duke Godfrey of Lorraine, during the minority of Henry III;
Leo of Ostia later described the pressures which were exerted in
striking terms.⁴ It is already possible, too, to see the Papacy
supporting the lords of the Abruzzi and the lands to the south by
overlooking their misdemeanors or imposing only token punishments on
them. When Frederick of Lorraine, returning from a mission to
Constantinople in 1054, was robbed of the treasure he had brought
back with him, his despoiler, Count Transmund of Chieti, was

¹ Letter in Acta et scripta quae de controversia Ecclesiae
   Graecae et Latinæ saeculo undecimo composita extant, ed.
² Chron. Cas., 684-5.
³ Victor's campaign, Ann. Rom., Lib. Pont., ii, 334; the siege
   of Benevento, Chalandon, Domination Normande, i, 143.
⁴ Chron. Cas., 688-92; at p. 691 he remarks that Ita ad
   subiugandam sibi violenter abbatiam animum papa intenderat.
comparatively lightly punished. Three years were allowed to elapse after the event before he was excommunicated, and he was soon absolved following a donation, probably in the nature of an obligatory penance, to Montecassino. This contrasts strongly with the almost immediate excommunication passed on Gerard of Galeria by Nicholas II after an equivalent theft of treasure. When he became pope as Stephen IX, Frederick's hostility to the Normans was unabated. His attempt to finance a campaign by pledging the treasure of Montecassino failed, and his early death, like that of Victor II, prevented his expedition from taking place. This projected campaign, we should remember was carried out in the face of at least some hostility in Rome as Stephen's attempt to regulate the election of his successor suggests. Despite this, he did not yield to the temptation to use the Normans against his Roman opponents - and this probably tells us much about what he himself thought of that opposition.

It was only in 1059 that the picture altered. After the election of Nicholas II, Hildebrand enlisted the aid of Richard of Aversa by legitimising his rule over Capua. The forces thus raised were used against Gerard of Galeria, and possibly against other supporters of Benedict X. There can be no doubt that the effect of their intervention has been exaggerated. When Bonizo of Sutri claimed that the Normans had destroyed the 'Captains' domination of Rome,

2. Chron. Cas., 694.
4. Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 593.
he was himself overstating the case, for the Cadalan schism showed that the nobility was far from destroyed. Further, the first Norman expedition is likely to have taken place only after the Easter synod of 1059, by which time the Tusculans had already submitted.1 Subsequently with the help of the new abbot of Montecassino, Desiderius, who was already on excellent terms with the Norman leaders, Nicholas took the decisive step of recognising the rule of Richard and of Robert Guiscard and thus laid the foundations for a firm alliance between Papacy and Normans. It is from this point that the Normans are thought to have become important in the history of the relations between the popes and the Roman nobles.

What did the pope gain by the treaty concluded with Robert Guiscard and Richard of Capua?2 First the treaty established the temporal claims of the Papacy over southern Italy. Both German and Eastern Emperors laid claim to the area, and the claims of both could be disputed on the grounds of the forged Donation of Constantine.3 It is striking that later German writers regard the papal investiture of the Norman rulers as illicit, the lands wrongly conceded and wrongly held.4 Here, then, was an opportunity for the

1. For the date of the Normans' intervention, see Borino, L'Arcidiaconato di Ildebrando, Studi Gregoriani, iii, (Rome, 1948), at p. 509 n. 136.


pope to re-assert an important claim and to place itself behind a power which bid fair to expel both Byzantine, and still more important, Saracen, power from the southern part of the peninsula.

Second the alliance with the Norman rulers gave the Papacy the opportunity to re-assert its control over the southern Italian Church. It is noteworthy that even some of the Norman accounts of the synod of Melfi, especially that by William of Apulia, lay most stress on the ecclesiastical part of the proceedings, on the deposition of unworthy bishops and the beginnings of a reorganisation of the southern hierarchy. The oaths sworn by the Norman rulers laid stress on the control of the churches within their dominions, which were to be under Roman control. At Montecassino the advocacy of the Lombard Count Atumulf of Aquino was soon replaced by that of Richard of Capua, and the monastery was subsequently to use the support of Guiscard’s nephew, Count Robert of Loritello, to re-enforce and reform the dependent monastery of S. Maria in Tremiti. The state of the southern Italian church was particularly deplorable to the influential figures in the curia in 1059 and recognition of Norman rule made possible a positive reforming programme in the area. It is of the greatest significance that even before the treaty, Abbot Desiderius of Montecassino had been admitted to the Curia and charged with the control of all the southern Italian monasteries.


2. F. Hirsch, Desiderius von Montecassino als Papst Victor III, Forsch. zur deutsehen Gesch., vii (1867), 27-8, following Leo and Amatus.

3. Ibid., 57-8.

The synod of Melfi was not merely a political matter, then. Nor can it be described as particularly Rome-orientated, even though the Norman leaders swore to support the choice of the meliores cardinales in papal elections. This was a clear reference to the possibility of schism and dissension in Rome. The Reform Papacy was thereby seeking to assure itself support in the event of future difficulties in Rome. Yet such support could have been as easily secured from Duke Godfrey of Lorraine, who had been instrumental in the capture of Rome from Benedict X and his adherents and who had been unable to settle the matter only because called away by a revolt in Ancona. Had the relations with the German court been strained it might still be possible to hold that the alliance was directed against German tutelage; yet Nicholas II had secured the support of the German court and although relations deteriorated by 1061, it is more likely that that deterioration was the result of the alliance rather than the other way about. How, then, should we regard the political aspect of the treaty of Melfi? Relations with the German court were good in 1059, and so long as this continued there was no danger of losing Godfrey's support through any clash between the court and the house of Tuscany. This is important not simply in its bearing on the relations between Papacy and Empire, but also on those between the popes and the Roman nobility. If there were no obstacle to hinder further support from Godfrey, there was less need for Norman help in Rome.

In fact there was such an obstacle, for as we have seen in the

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1. On German recognition of Nicholas II, and on the later breach between the pope and the court, see H.G. Krause, das Papstwahldekret und seine Rolle im Investiturstreit, (Studi Gregoriani, vii, Rome, 1960), pp. 64-9 and 126-41.
last chapter, it may well have been the intervention of Godfrey into the Patrimony which provoked much of the resistance to the reformers. The Normans had proved temporarily effective in the campaign against Benedict X, and there was possibly the danger that they might ally with the Roman opponents of the popes. The Papacy held a trump card against those opponents, for it could legitimise the Norman conquests. There was a problem, nevertheless, for the Papacy had only one trump card to play, and was obliged to use it in the first trick. Once Norman rule over its conquered and un conquered domains was recognised, the popes had little they could offer the Norman rulers in return for their support. They could intervene in questions of succession, and could bargain with the rulers by obstructing their control of the southern church, but the actual legitimisation of the conquest was a single, unrepeatable, act even though it was a procedure which was often enough confirmed. Politically the treaty of Melfi put the Papacy on the horns of a dilemma; if Norman force was used in Rome, the local political structure would be disturbed, the nobility weakened to the advantage of an even more turbulent Norman nobility, the papal control over the Patrimony threatened. It was the old problem; effective help from outside could be as constricting as the forces it was meant to subdue.

Given these points, the political significance of the treaty to the Reform Popes in Rome should not be over-emphasised. Ecclesiastically the treaty was still more significant, the real gain to the Papacy not in the Campagna but in Samnium, Apulia, and Calabria. This is a judgement which is born out by the subsequent

1. Itlament, p. 13, nos. 19-21; p. 17 no. 41; p. 18, nos. 47-9; p. 23, no. 72; p. 26, no. 84; p. 29, no. 99; p. 51, nos. 107, 111-2; p. 205, no. 23; p. 206, nos. 24, 28; p. 208, no. 31.
course of events.

By and large the Norman rulers kept the political obligation to the papacy which they had contracted at Melfi. In particular it is noteworthy that whatever practical aid they gave to the Papacy, however great or little that was, they gave still less to its opponents. In 1075-6 Henry IV attempted to win the excommunicate Guiscard to his side, but the attempt was fruitless. In 1082 Jordan of Capua defected to Henry IV, but the defection seems to have been undertaken chiefly to forestall an insurrection against him. Rivalry between Capua and Apulia may also have played a part in the defection, and it was temporary. With the departure of the imperial party from Rome, Jordan rapidly established himself as one of the leading figures in the election of a new pope to oppose the imperialist Wibert of Ravenna. Subsequently Wibert sought to secure the defection of Duke Roger of Apulia, and it was possibly these negotiations which encouraged Roger to disrupt the election of Victor III by releasing the captive imperial prefect. Yet once Roger's domination of Alfanus II as archbishop of Salerno had been accepted there was no further hope for Wibert in that direction.

One of his surviving letters shows that he despaired of support from

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1. Thus Amatus, Storia de'Normanni, ed. cit., 320-1, and Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 604. Bonizo's account of the transaction between emperor and duke is likely to be particularly worthless, for it was an important element in the conspiracy theory by which he explained the kidnap of Gregory VII by Cencius de Praefecto.

2. Chron. Cas., 739.


the Normans, his continual enemies in Italy\textsuperscript{1}.

There was thus a negative benefit to the Reform Papacy in the obligations incurred by the Norman rulers through their investiture. Their support for the Papacy's enemies had been forestalled. Yet in terms of positive support the picture was less rosy. The forces supplied by Richard of Capua had played a major part in the subjection of Benedict X and his supporters, yet in the next schism, which began only two years later, Norman support was already becoming less significant. Benzo claimed that it was Richard of Capua who provided much of the force which ensured the election and coronation of Alexander II\textsuperscript{2}, but subsequently Richard understandably found himself preoccupied with the consolidation of his rule over Capua, which was only completely taken in 1062. The real test of Alexander's pontificate was yet to come, with the imperial nomination of Cadalus of Parma and the two years of street fighting in Rome which followed. What part did the Normans play in this struggle? Of the contemporary accounts only one author gives the Normans much part in the schism, Benzo of Alba\textsuperscript{3}. Benzo's work is the sheerest polemic, designed above all to justify the claims of Cadalus as the choice of the Romans themselves. Like Cadalus himself at the council of Mantua this meant minimising the role of the Romans in the election of Alexander and

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emphasising that of the Normans – a good debating point as they could still be portrayed as turbulent and disreputable robbers who held their lands unjustly since they had not received imperial recognition. This meant that he had strong motives to misrepresent the opposition to Cadalus; too much reliance should therefore not be placed on his work. No other source gives the Normans much significance in any part of the schism other than its inception. Indeed when we come to consider the diplomatic relations between the pope and the prince we shall see that there are still stronger grounds for minimising the Norman role even as early as two years after the treaty of Melfi.

Apart from this early fruit of the alliance, which seems rapidly to have withered, the Normans were used by the popes against their Roman enemies only at times when the threat to themselves was itself non-Roman. It was only in 1084 that Norman forces were again summoned to Rome itself, and this time the threat took the form of an entire imperial army. Guiscard's relief of Rome was followed by an expedition against Tivoli whence Wibert had retired, so even this move could be construed as anti-imperial rather than anti-Roman. What complicated the matter was the sack of Rome which had accompanied the liberation of the besieged pope. The sack of the most prosperous part of the city was an event which could not be undone, and its immediate effect was to make Rome untenable for the pope. Among

1. Dated 1082 by Lupus, M.G.H. Script., v, 61, followed by Heinemann, Gesch. der Normannen, i, 398 n. 46; but the local Chron. Pont. et Imp. Tiburtina, M.G.H. Script., xxxi Pt. 1, 259, is surely to be preferred when it dates the expedition 1084.

contemporary writers only the most extreme of the Gregorians did not attempt to gloss over the sack; of the extreme Gregorians, only Bonizo, with his superb disregard of political expediency, maintained that in the sack the Romans had received their just deserts. Gregory had left his successors a bitter legacy.

Popes could not be enthroned elsewhere than at Rome. But since the days of Leo IX, the Papacy had established itself as sufficiently peripatetic to make absence from Rome a comparatively minor handicap in every respect but one - the collection of revenues - and even this was offset by the flow of new revenues secured by the granting of papal protection to churches and monasteries. It was fortunate for the Reform Papacy that this was the case. Even the need to be enthroned in Rome at first forced on Gregory's successor a strong reliance on the Norman alliance, indeed there is every indication that the choice of Desiderius to succeed Gregory was primarily a tour de force for Jordan of Capua. Urban II was likewise obliged to use Norman aid in his enthronement. Yet both popes carefully avoided anything approaching a systematic assault on the city. There was no attempt to conquer Rome, only a series of almost unconnected forays into the city. The sack had made it likely that further use of the Normans in the city would only make matters worse, alienate what sources of support remained. For this there

1. *Lib. de lite*, i, 615.

can be no evidence more conclusive than the words of Urban II himself. He was proud to have regained Rome sine uno Normannorum. Even in the Campagna there does not seem to have been any attempt to employ the Normans against the dissident nobility. Almost all the deeds drawn up at Veroli between 1085 and 1099 were dated by the imperial year and sometimes also by that of the antipope, Clement III. A bull of Urban II dating from 1097 shows that the Reform popes were not without influence in the area, but the prevalence of the alternative dating is good evidence that there was no attempt to coerce the district.

Under Paschal II the situation only slightly altered. The threat from the antipope and his supporters was mostly negligible after the death of Wibert in 1100 but the threat from the empire, particularly during the Roman expeditions of 1111 and 1117, was still considerable. Here was an external threat of the greatest magnitude, and it is not surprising that on both occasions Paschal turned to the Normans for help. This time the problem was not that of restricting Norman influence in the city but that the discord following the death of Roger Borsa of Apulia and the minority of the Sicilian ruler limited the availability of support to Robert.

1. Due documenti, ed. Kehr, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxiii (1900), at 277-8, confirmed by Bernold, M.G.H. Script., v, at pp. 451 and 457; Urban had no desire Romanos cives armata manu inquietare.


of Capua, whose help, if it forthcame, was insignificant against so powerful a threat, and was soon annulled by a pact between prince and emperor. A slight change in papal policy is discernible in the brief use of Capuan forces against Ptolemy of Tusculum, but the campaign does not seem to have had any lasting results; even if it restricted the count's power, it did not prevent him from concluding a marriage alliance with the emperor during the expedition of 1117. Earlier in his pontificate Paschal had used Norman help to re-subdue Benevento to the papacy. Yet with these exceptions, papal recourse to Norman help under Paschal II tended to be rather against the external than the internal threats to papal control of Rome as it had been also under his predecessors.

So it was also under Paschal's successors. When Gelasius II was expelled from Rome by the Frangipane and the fresh arrival of Henry V, a brief attempt to regain control of the city through Capuan support was half-hearted and unsuccessful. There is no indication that the campaign against Mauricius Burdinus under Calixtus II made the slightest use of Norman help.

These, then, were the positive military benefits to the popes of the Norman alliance. Only exceptionally was the alliance used against the Roman nobles themselves, even though the first fruit of the alliance in 1059 had been strictly local in character. The


forces of Cadalus, Henry IV, and Henry V, were all essentially non-Roman in character, whatever support they derived from Roman sources; almost without exception the Norman forces were invoked by the Papacy as an emergency response to external pressure. This had not always been the case. At the beginning of his pontificate Gregory VII was careful to stipulate that Richard of Capua should be prepared to swear fidelity to the emperor if so required by the pope. But in practice, and especially after the disastrous sack of Rome, the Normans were never a particularly important factor in specifically Roman politics. The alliance might have been militarily important in preventing further defection among the Romans, but its practical use was against Germans and Lombards, not Romans.

Financially the papal ties with the Normans were more consistent and probably more beneficial, particularly when the loss of Rome forced a peripatetic existence upon Gregory VII's successors. One of the most important provisions of the treaty of Melfi was the payment of a large annual pension from the lands under Norman domination. There is no evidence that so large a pension was ever paid, but Deusdedit took pains to include the oaths by which the money was promised in his canon collection and the relevant texts were subsequently copied into the tax books of Albinus, then of

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2. In 1082 Gregory wrote that he feared the effect of Guiscard's rumoured defection on the Romans, Ibid., ii, IX/11, pp. 588-9.

3. The pension was of twelve Pavian pence for every yoke of oxen. For the wealth of Southern Italy under the Normans, see V. von Falkenhausen, Aspetti storico-economici dell'eta di Roberto il Guiscardo, Relazioni e comunicazione nelle Prime Giornate Normanno-Sveve, Bari, 1973, (Rome, 1975), pp. 115-34.
Cencius\textsuperscript{1}. Further the obligation was repeated when Gregory VII and Guiscard came to terms at Ceprano in June 1060\textsuperscript{2}. This suggests that the claim was no empty one, and that some financial return was forthcoming, particularly important to the popes if they were to keep their hold over Rome through bribery rather than by force. During the siege of Rome, a very large cash sum was sent by Guiscard, and if we may believe the unreliable source which gives us this information, this money proved decisive in temporarily stiffening the will of the Romans to resist\textsuperscript{3}. Certainly there is no lack of other evidence for the military importance of money to the popes. Paschal II was also the beneficiary of a substantial cash sum, this time from Roger of Sicily in 1099, and used it to expel Wibert\textsuperscript{4}.

Yet it is likely that the real financial benefit to the papacy lay not in the money forwarded by the rulers, substantial as this may have been. These sums seem, like the military help of the Norman rulers, to have been exceptional, designed to meet exceptional needs, and mentioned in the sources chiefly for that reason. More important was probably the revenue from the churches in the lands under their rule. The confused ecclesiastical situation in the south, with its conflicting claims of primacy and jurisdiction, furthered the papal cause, as did the proximity of the area and the consequent ease with which the regions might be, and were, visited when the popes were not in Rome. The number of synods held in the south far exceeds that of those held elsewhere, and this gave

\begin{enumerate}
\item Texts cited above, p. 261, n. 2.
\item \textit{Reg.}, ed. Caspar, \textit{ii}, \textit{VIII}/\textit{1\textsuperscript{c}}, pp. 516-7.
\item Lupus, \textit{M.G.H. Script.}, v, 61.
\item \textit{Lib. Pont. Dertius.}, p. 135.
\end{enumerate}
constant opportunity for the ventilation of rival claims and the issue
and confirmation of the protection of St. Peter. Such protection was
not granted free, and the income from justice and from the rents must
have been considerable. If the Latinisation of the southern church
was less complete than has often been thought\(^1\), it was under Rome's
auspices, and not Constantinople's, that the control of the southern
church and the enjoyment of its revenues was devolving.

So much for the practical benefits which accrued to the papacy
after the treaty of Melfi. Revenue and hospitality were assured
which were probably of immense historical significance. Without
them it is doubtful if the Reform Papacy would have survived the
long exile from Rome. Militarily, however, the fruits of the
alliance were sporadic and unreliable even where they were effective.
The sack of 1064 raised as many problems as it solved, while on
later occasions the disruption of the Norman dominions made their
help ineffective even when forthcoming. Even as an emergency response
to emergency situations, the Papacy can have had little cause to
over-estimate the value of the alliance to the Papacy. In its
practical benefits, the alliance could hardly be described as one of
the fundamental factors behind the policy of the reform popes.

The diplomatic relations between popes and Normans provide
further grounds on which this view should be questioned. It has
already been suggested that the Papacy laboured under the handicap
that once Norman dominion over most of southern Italy had been
recognised, it had little to offer the Norman rulers. Any conquests
the Normans now made would either confirm their almost total

\(^1\) Thus W. Holtzmann, Sui rapporti fra i Normanni e Papato,
-domination of the south, if made at the expense of the remaining Lombard principalities, or extend into the Patrimony itself. Whichever happened, and both did, the spectre of a Norman domination over Rome could be perceived looming in the background. Any further concessions the papacy made to the Normans could only hasten this undesirable state of affairs. Too much had been given too soon at Melfi, and almost immediately the Papacy had to pay the price for this tactical mistake. As the Norman power developed it became incumbent upon the Papacy, to support the threatened rulers against the Normans and to exploit any dissensions which might arise between the Norman rulers. Gradually the papal policy veered round in another volte face and so far from using the Normans against the threatened local nobility, the Papacy began once more to follow the reverse course.

This was a development which took place remarkably soon after the inception of the alliance. Alexander II sheltered the rebel William of Montreuil and gave him important military responsibilities in the Campagna. At the synod of Mantua in 1064 he hinted strongly at an alliance with Henry IV against the Normans which suggests that his relations with Richard of Capua were already strained even though he had confirmed Richard's rule over Capua only the previous year, after his final subjection of the city. It took a full scale expedition by Godfrey of Lorraine, on behalf of pope and emperor, to contain Richard's threat to the Campagna itself in 1066-7. Although


Richard was initially on good terms with Gregory VII, relations soon broke down after his alliance with Guiscard against Salerno and Naples, and their joint siege of Benevento. A reconciliation was established with his son, Jordan, who probably did penance primarily with the notion of thus assuring his succession, but relations were soon strained again when Jordan executed a notable theft of treasure from Montecassino. Jordan was threatened with excommunication for his deed; in 1079 Gregory again showed himself as little prepared to overlook the theft of ecclesiastical goods than he had been previously; there is little trace of any regard for political expediency. Subsequently under Urban II, it is striking that the pope did practically nothing to help the prince against his insurgent subjects.

Relations with Robert Guiscard were even more difficult, perhaps because it was his nephew, Robert of Loritello, who was the chief figure in the Norman penetration into the Abruzzi. Gregory’s pontificate began badly when the pope accepted a rumour that the duke was dead and tactlessly wrote to his widow. An early meeting at Benevento failed to take place, each party fearing the treachery of the other, and from 1074-80 the duke was continually

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1. Good account by Heinemann, Gesch. der Normannen, i, 278-87.


4. For their penetration into the Abruzzi, the most comprehensive work is still C. Rivera, La Conquiste dei primi Normanni in Teate, Penne, Abruzzo, e Valva, Bull. Dep. Abruzzese, Ser. 3, xvi (1925), 7-94.

5. See Heinemann, Gesch. der Normannen, i, 262-3.
excommunicate. Gregory's opposition did not stop there. The first year of his pontificate was marked by the formation of a formidable alliance against Guiscard, and one of Gregory's own letters makes plain that the Crusade he projected to relieve the pressure on Byzantium was intended first to help him settle the danger from Guiscard. Unabashed by this, the duke was able to detach Richard of Capua from the alliance and by 1077 had established his rule over Salerno; only revolts in Apulia prevented Benevento from meeting a like fate, since at that time Gregory had no forces which he could oppose to him.

Given this almost continual hostility, it is worthwhile to give a few moments attention to the settlement at Ceprano and its aftermath. In the treaty Gregory was careful not to cede Robert's rights to his new conquests. Further the alliance was followed almost directly not by the expedition into northern Italy, for which the pope had hoped, but by an expedition to Greece designed to restore to the Greek throne a monk posing as the deposed Michael VII. This expedition had full papal support and it is likely that the pseudo-

1. Guiscard was excommunicated at the Lenten synod of 1074, Reg., ed. Caspar, i, I/85, p. 123; the sentence was repeated though without mentioning him explicitly only three months before the meeting at Ceprano, Ibid., ii, VII/14, p. 481.


3. Reg., ed. Caspar, i, I/46, pp. 69-71; the Crusade was to cross to Constantinople pacatis Normannis.

4. Ibid., ii, VIII/1, p. 516.

5. Ibid., ii, VIII/7, pp. 524-5.


Michael arrived in Italy, and thus probably mooted the project, even before the reconciliation at Ceprano had taken place. From Gregory's point of view, the expedition was disastrous. Jordan of Capua's desertion might not have occurred had Guiscard been in Italy to help counter the imperial threat and Gregory's letters to the duke show an increasingly strong request for help in Rome, where it was sorely needed. How much of this had been foreseen at Ceprano?

Generally it is assumed that the rapprochement with Guiscard only took place because Gregory feared counter-measures following his second excommunication of Henry IV. But Gregory's own letters show that he himself later thought matters to be going much better for him in Germany than they really were, and when the treaty was made at Ceprano, the situation was better in that Rudolf of Rheinfelden was still undefeated. Guiscard himself, according to some sources, claimed that he would not have undertaken the Greek expedition had he realised how matters would develop in Italy. In sum, and particularly if the project was already mooted before the reconciliation, it would seem that the German threat must be minimised as a factor behind it. It is more plausible that Gregory hoped thereby to divert a particularly dangerous neighbour.

2. In particular Reg., ii, IX/17, pp. 597-8.
3. Thus, for example, Fliche, Réforme Gregorienne, ii, 387.
4. E.g. Reg., ii, IX/4, pp. 578-9, clearly written well after the settlement at Ceprano, and particularly optimistic in its concluding sentences about events in Germany.
Under Victor III and his successors the Papacy showed itself more pliably inclined towards the dukes of Apulia. After Roger had disrupted Victor's election by releasing the captive imperialist prefect, the pope felt obliged to ratify the duke's choice of the new archbishop of Salerno. Under Calixtus II relations were sufficiently good for Duke William to entrust his duchy to the pope during his absence in Byzantium, a particularly onerous task since Roger II of Sicily was already attempting to establish his claims to the mainland. Yet even so it is notable that from the beginning of the twelfth century the Papacy took oaths of allegiance not merely from the Norman overlords but also from their vassals. The period of hostility might be over, but the ties by which the Papacy might protect itself if the threat revived were not neglected.

It is in the Abruzzi that the papal volte-face can most clearly be seen. Under Gregory VII and his successors, there was a marked trend towards appointing the members of the threatened Lombard counts to high ecclesiastical office. At Montecassino, Desiderius's successor, Oderisi I, and two subsequent abbots, Bruno of Segni and Oderisi II, all came from such families. This represented a marked change from the time when Norman advocacy of the monastery had been enthusiastically accepted. Such patronage extended to bishoprics and to places in the Curia. Gregory VII appointed a member of the Counts


of Marsi to the see of Valva, and although he subsequently suspended him, it was for leaving his see in face of the Norman avalanche, not as a political concession to the Normans. A letter of complaint addressed to Gregory VII by Bishop John of Penne is particularly interesting. The bishop was complaining at the exactions imposed upon his church as a result of the capture of Count Transmund of Chieti and his ransom by Robert of Loritello. So far as is known, his plaint met with no favourable response, though Urban and Paschal both allowed a relaxation by confirming the benefactions made by the conquering Normans in the newly conquered lands; this tacitly accepted the legality of their possession. The policy of appointing men from the old Lombard families to high ecclesiastical preferment continued, however, again most notably at Montecassino and in the Curia. Here too we have an indication that the Norman alliance was less important to the Papacy than has been thought.

The Legatine Privilege granted by Urban II to Roger I of Sicily stands against this trend. Possibly it can be taken as the reward for the money which the count sent him, or perhaps as a reflection of the ties which already existed between the comital house of Sicily and the Pierleons, the most constant of the Reform Papacy's

1. Amatus, Storia de'Normanni, ed. cit., pp. 267, n. 1, 324, n. 3.
2. It. Pont., iv, p. 54, nos. 5 and 6.
5. Bishop Berard of Marsi, Abbots Oderisius I, Bruno of Segni, and Oderisius II of Montecassino, and perhaps the chronicler Leo Marsicanus, all came from the noble families of the region, and all held office in the Curia.
supporters. Yet even here there was a reversal of policy. As we have seen Calixtus II did all he could to prevent the extension of the Sicilian power on the mainland, and earlier Paschal II had written a sharply expressed letter in which the terms of the Legatine Privilege were more closely and circumspectly defined. Under Roger II there was a marked tendency to favour Genovese trade at the expense of Pisan, yet despite the fact that the issue was decided partly by the Roman nobility, including the Pierleoni, the final solution given to the long dispute between Pisa and Genoa over the primacy of Corsica was decided in favour of the former. Even here, where support was positive and the danger to Rome negligible, the Papacy did not go out of its way to favour Norman interests.

To conclude, the Norman alliance was not a necessary expedient of the Reform Papacy. In times of extreme danger it was an essential; had it been more carefully nurtured the disaster of 1111 might have been averted. Yet Norman help was not a component factor in the political system which the popes nurtured in Rome; from what we know of relations between the popes and the leading noble families, we may wonder if it ever needed to be. The relationship was always difficult, because of the threat to the Patrimony, always unstable because the Papacy had little it was prepared to give the Norman rulers after it had legitimised their rule. Whatever had been intended at the beginning, papal rule in Rome did not become dependent upon Norman swords. The ties between the two were not so much a positive

alliance, nor even a condition of mutual dependency, as the temporary and short-lived accord of two conflicting egoisms.
CHAPTER 9

THE POPES AS PRINCES

The latter part of the eleventh and the early part of the twelfth centuries witnessed considerable development within the papal administrative machine. These years saw an enhancement of the position of the cardinals, the evolution of the chancery, the introduction, at least by name, of the chamber, and the codification of both the general and the specific rights of the Papacy. Each of these developments reflected the enhanced standing of the Papacy in Europe; thus the definition of the rights of the cardinals was connected primarily with the election of popes, and naturally moved into the limelight when the validity of Gregory VII’s election was questioned. Equally, the developments in the chancery and chamber reflected the greatly increased burden of work which these offices had to bear, as well as the increasing tendency of the Papacy to conduct its business outside Rome. The issues raised by the Investiture Controversy themselves touched freshly on so many points of papal prerogative that it is not surprising to find these too becoming a matter of investigation and codification during our period. If the growth of

1. Each of the developments has been very thoroughly explored by historians. The classics remain: on the cardinals S. Kuttner, Cardinalis; the History of a canonical concept., Traditio, iii (1945), 129-214; on the chancery, P.F. Kehr, Scrinium und Palatium., Mitt. Inst. Ost. Geschichtsforschung, Supplementary Volume, vi (1901) 70-112; on the chamber, K. Jordan, Zur papstliche Finanzgeschichte im 11 Jahrhundert., Quellen, xxv (1933-4) 115-64; but the only real attempt to estimate the effect of these developments on the position of the Papacy in Rome remains D.B. Zema, Economic re-organisation of the Roman See during the Gregorian Reform, Studi Gregoriani, i (1947), 137-68.
the Papacy's standing and influence in Europe is not itself our theme, these developments obviously need to be put into their Roman context; did they affect the local administration of the popes, as well as the more general control of the Church? If so, can they be seen as prompted by local factors? In short, does the Papacy's development of the machinery of its government reflect a conscious emancipation from local influences?

The cardinals make an obvious starting point; they show at the outset how dramatic changes in some respects may have an altogether less certain effect in others. Our period sees distinct and significant changes, but it is not clear that their significance much affected Rome itself. First, there was a substantial change in the personnel of the cardinalate. We do not know much about the men who were cardinals under the Tusculans, but there is nothing to suggest that they were not mainly Roman. From the time of Leo IX foreigners formed a group of men who were always predominant among the cardinals in influence if not in number. Then, too, there was the greatly increased role the cardinals took in the government of the Church at large – individually as legates, collectively in papal elections and councils so that by the end of the eleventh century cardinal Beno sought to invalidate the actions of Gregory VII – and no doubt also to disassociate himself from them – by claiming that they had been made without the consent of the cardinals. These developments have enjoyed considerable attention and their significance

1. R. Hüls, Kardinale, Klerus und Kirchen Röses, 1049-1130, (Tübingen, 1977), gives an exhaustive list of cardinals together with what may be known of their origins.

2. Beno, M.G.H. Lib. de lite, ii, 370.
for the general history of the Papacy can hardly be denied. That they were very significant locally is an altogether different matter.

Let us take first the matter of personnel. Non-Romans such as Humbert, Peter Damian, Odoo II of Ostia, and Haimeritc are all extremely well known and were demonstrably influential within the Curia. Yet their very significance within the Church at large and their long periods of absence on legation must have restricted their influence on strictly Roman affairs. A strongly Roman element remained in the Curia at all times; it's members do not much catch the limelight, but they may well have been more significant in the government of Rome. The reason for this is that the acta by which Rome was controlled were individual deeds—leases, renunciations, lawsuits and so on, rather than conciliar decrees in which the cardinals and others deliberated as a formal body.

The Roman Church wore more than one face. On the one hand it was a directing body in Christendom which claimed for itself a unique and decisive authority. It did not wear this face in Rome itself; rather it was a heterogeneous body of individual churches, each with its own rights and interests. In the case of the titular churches, the priests were almost automatically cardinals; but in the


2. For Roman cardinals, see Huls, Kardinale, Klerus und Kirchen Rome; John IV of Tusculum, p. 141; John II of Velletri, p. 144; Hugh of SS. Apostoli, p. 151; Crescentius of SS. Marcellino e Pietro, p. 183; Conrad of S. Pudenziana (later bishop of the Sabina), p. 201; Saxo of S. Stefano in Monte Celio, p. 206; Gregory of S. Angelo, p. 223; Peter Pierleone, p. 225; John of S. Maria in Domma (abbot of Subiaco), p. 233; Theobald of S. Maria Nuova, p. 235; Aldo of SS. Sergio e Basso, p. 241. By far the majority of the cardinals during this period are of uncertain origin, and many of these may also have been Roman.
case of the bishoprics and the diaconates membership was still an evolving and fluctuating right.\footnote{1}

There was an equivalent ambiguity concerning the city of Rome and the district around it. In a general way it presented to the outside world the face of a papal patrimony and general statements concerning its recovery, definition, and enlargement were the province of the pope himself. Locally it had another face, dominated by a closely enmeshed network of interests - both secular and of the individual churches - in which it is hard to determine much involvement and direction by the popes themselves. It is clear that such involvement could in fact be exercised without leaving direct traces. Innocent II obliged the monastery of S. Ciriaco to lease land to his nephews and annul a previous lease to another party. It was only subsequently that his intervention became known, as did the fact that the monastery feared the loss of its land through non-compliance.\footnote{2}

From this example it is clear that the normal form of local transaction, involving only the cardinal of a church or a subordinate priest, may in fact conceal a considerable degree of papal intervention. Yet it would be unwise to assume that such intervention was a consistent and dominant feature in the administration of each church. The surviving donations and leases made to and by each church run into thousands for our period, and due allowance must be made for the majority of transactions which have not survived. Sheer bulk of business, the frequent absence of the popes, disruption caused by

\footnote{1}{Bishoprics, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 3-5; diaconates, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 38-44.}
\footnote{2}{\textit{Tabularium}, ed. Hartmann, iii, no. clxxii, pp. 20-1.}
schism, and claims of immunity such as those upheld by the abbey of Farfa, combined to limit direct papal control over each church and its property though lawsuits might redress the balance.

This is the context in which the appointment of cardinals should be seen, a context in which the local church and the local scribe is altogether more significant than the great offices and functions of the Roman Church as a whole. Yet those offices and functions themselves inhibited the control which the cardinals themselves might exercise over their own churches, for precisely the same reasons that inhibited a papal control over the same area—absence on legation, exclusion in the schism, and a natural pre-occupation with the grand issues of the government of the church at large. It is thus not surprising that subordinate officials came to transact much of the business concerning church property, and that many of the surviving documents bear the names and subscriptions of the archpriests and stewards (vconomoi) rather than of the titular priests and deacons. This was a developing trend during our period, but was present right from the beginning.

These are factors which make it hard to estimate the effect of the change of personnel among the cardinals upon the Romans themselves. Bonizo of Sutri claimed that many of Gregory VII's opponents in Rome were men who posed as cardinals in order to appropriate the offerings of pilgrims. Whatever the value of his testimony, it is evident that he did not regard exclusion from the cardinalate itself as one of the Roman grievances, while the enforcement of the general decrees on clerical celibacy from the time of Benedict VIII may well have reduced the attractions of a clerical life. Romans continued to

1. Bonizo, Lib. de lite, i, 603.
become cardinals during the period of the Reform. Abbot John of Subiaco from the Octavians and Cardinal Peter of S. Maria of Trastevere from the Pierleone enjoyed careers which indicated that the scions of the local nobility might still aspire to the heights, and they are only the best known of the local men. The majority of cardinals during our period are of unknown provenance, the majority of their names allowing for a Roman origin. Our known Romans are few in number, but their significance often considerable. Hugh of SS. Apostoli as rector of Benevento, is only the most considerable of a whole series of men from Rome and its environs whom Paschal II raised to the cardinalate from his writing office.

That Romans continued to attain eminence in the Curia, and that there is no record of any grievance through their exclusion, is perhaps the best evidence that the transformation of the status and personnel of the cardinals was not of great local significance. It was a development of great importance for the Church at large through the infusion of talent and European contacts which was achieved, but there is no evidence that the development had an equivalent local impact.

In general the title churches of the cardinals were not among the most important land-holders in the Roman area. None attracted donations on the scale of those enjoyed by the monasteries, no doubt because a small community of priests obviously required a less generous endowment than a larger community of monks. Our evidence is slanted because most of our surviving charter evidence comes from monasteries, but what it suggests is that the really significant

land-holders in Rome and its environs were the monasteries of St. Peter's, the Lateran, S. Gregorio, St. Paul's, S. Cosimato and the two great monasteries of Farfa and Subiaco. The abbots of these monasteries were not normally cardinals, and it is far from clear that they were normally appointed by the pope. Here it is possible to trace a development which must have been locally significant, for at different times during the period each of the monasteries came under the authority of a man directly appointed by the Papacy.

If we exclude the Vatican and Lateran monasteries from our discussion for want of evidence, we may still note that these, with their direct connection with the Papacy through service in the main papal basilicas, are likely to have been under papal control. Elsewhere we may see a process which was mirrored elsewhere in Italy, and which is probably best known through its incidence at Montecassino - direct papal intervention in the election of the abbot\(^1\). Thus at Subiaco Abbots Humbert and John were installed by the popes\(^2\), while the monastery of Farfa, for all its vaunted status as an imperial monastery, immune from the authority of the pope, fell subject to a papal nominee after a disputed election and a long period of disruption following the death of Berard III in 1119\(^3\). In Rome itself most of the monasteries were for a period under the control of cardinals who were not always the abbots of the respective houses. Thus Cardinal Stephen of S. Grisogono was abbot of S. Gregorio between 1063 and 1069, an appointment possibly made due

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1. For papal intervention in the election of Frederick of Lorraine, see Chron. Cas., 688-92.


to his predecessor's support for Cadalus in the Roman embassy which requested a papal nomination from Henry IV at Basle⁴. Under Paschal II the same abbacy was held by Cardinal Gregory of S. Eustachio⁵. The important Trastevere monastery of S. Cosimato was under the abbacy of Cardinal-Bishop Rainer of Palestrina between 1041 and 1060, and under Gregory VII was submitted to the rectorship of Cardinal Falco of S. Maria in Trastevere⁶. Subsequently S. Lorenzo fuori le mura was under the abbacy of Cardinal Rainer of S. Clemente, later to become Pope Paschal II⁷. The most famous example of this practice is of course the appointment of Hildebrand as vocatus and rector of St. Paul's when its abbot, Airard, became bishop of Nantes. It is not always clear that the pope nominated an outsider to temporary or permanent rule of the monastery in each of the cases; sometimes the reverse may have happened, with the abbot being given a titular church and thus brought into the Curia, as happened to Desiderius of Montecassino. But whatever the mechanics of the action it is surely significant that each of the really important monasteries, with the exception only of S. Ciriaco, was brought at some time under the control of a cardinal. Only at Farfa where the immunity of the monastery, its close ties with the German monarchy, and perhaps the vastness of its territorial possessions, are distinguishing features does the process seem to have excited any opposition.

One reason for this lack of opposition is that generally the

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4. Ibid., p. 160.
Pope seem to have been particularly solicitous for the well-being of monasteries. We find Leo IX, Alexander II, Gregory VII, and Paschal II all supporting the claims of Subiaco both against laymen and against the jurisdiction of the bishop of Tivoli, and this is only the most striking and dramatic example. Conflicts between monasteries or between monasteries and other churches raised different problems, however. Thus one reason why S. Cosimato supported Wibert during the schism may well have been that earlier papal rulings were in favour of Farfa during the protracted dispute over S. Maria in Minione. Farfa itself is very much the exception to this rule. As we saw when looking at the role of the Octavians under Paschal II, the Papacy seems to have licensed considerable hostility against the monastery and a formidable threat to its possessions. The outcome was to be the subjection of the monastery to the Papacy, but the method was hardly scrupulous.

The period was marked by the considerable extension and development of the machinery of papal administration. Let us take first the case of the chancery, which need not long detain us since it has been the subject of an admirable study. Here we may note that when the popes had letters written outside Rome, they generally employed non-Roman scribes and that these scribes were sometimes brought to Rome as permanent members of the chancery staff. This development is well-known, and need concern us only in one of the


2. Kehr, Scrinium und Palatium; his study has however been supplemented and in some respects challenged by P. Rabikauskas, Die römische Kuriale in der päpstliche Kanzlei, (Rome, 1958).
inferences which is drawn from it - that Roman scribes were thereby excluded from the chancery, and the writing-office thus freed from local pressures. This inference has at first much to commend it, and perhaps above all the fact that the writing of papal documents itself altered about the end of the eleventh century and soon became substantially different from that previously employed. We should beware here of drawing too easy a conclusion. The curial script long used in papal documents was not the only script known to Roman scribes. The Roman book hand of the period is a minuscule not markedly different from that employed elsewhere, and there are known examples of scribes who could write both in curial and minuscule. What probably settled the fate of the older hand was that it was difficult to read for non-Romans. So when the Papacy assumed a European importance, it was natural that its style of script should alter. It would be unwise to deduce from this that the chancery was itself re-staffed with non-Romans.

Support for an alternative view may be found in a list of cardinals promoted from the chancery by Paschal II, preserved for us by his biographer. Three of these men came from Pisa, but others came from near Rome - Alatri, Anagni and Ferentino respectively. These men, we may believe, represent only a proportion of the local

1. Rabikauskas, Op. cit., pp. 124-5, for a scribe from Lucca who wrote in minuscule, then in curial; Ibid., pp. 128-9, for one who wrote in curial, then minuscule; Ibid., pp. 105-8, for Roman scribes able to write in minuscule; Ibid., pp. 68 n. 12, 98 n. 34, 128-9, for the activity of city notaries in the writing of papal documents.

2. Ibid., pp. 2-3. A document of Gregory V was found illegible in Marmoutiers in 1075 quia Romana littera scriptum.


element in the chancery; and it is only by chance that we know their origins and the fact that the route to their cardinalates was through the writing office and papal chapel. If the sample is fair, it indicates that local men occupied a considerable place in the chancery, and that local interests were not excluded.

It is reasonably clear that the chief impetus behind the development of the chancery was the sheer pressure of business which accompanied the enhancement of papal influence in Europe, coupled with voluntary and forced periods of absence from Rome. The Reform Papacy never seems to have been more endangered in Rome than in the middle years of the eleventh century and in the closing years of the same century. During these periods Nicholas II, Alexander II, and Urban II continued to employ the Roman scriniarii when they were resident in the city. Even when a distinct group of papal scriptores may be seen emerging, one may suspect that they are sometimes the same men who wrote private documents as scriniarii sancte Romane ecclesie - and in a few cases we know this to have been the case.

The development of the office of chancellor itself pre-dated the period of reform, and may be seen as a purely administrative measure which did not carry any political overtones; the officials of the Lateran palace who in the ninth and tenth centuries had been so formidable a group in local coups had long been excluded from direction of the chancery; we shall see that they in fact continued to play a role in papal government in other respects which was sufficiently important to rebut any suspicion that the Reformers

2. Ibid., pp. 68, 98, 128-9.
wished to exclude them from their administration. When we find the office of chancellor developing in the course of the eleventh century, we need not read much local significance into the development.\(^1\)

In the case of the chancery, a major cause of innovation was the frequent absence of the popes from Rome. The same factor was decisive in the development of the Papacy's financial apparatus which also occurred during our period. The major developments occurred during the long period of exile suffered by Urban II and not before, and we shall see that here there was indeed a local significance to the trend — cash represented the surest way of recovering the city, and meanwhile the Curia needed finance when it was cut off from the local sources of revenue. A few historians see an early stage in the development of the chamber in the appointment of Hildebrand as oeconomus of the Roman Church\(^2\). In this they follow contemporaries; the synod of Brixen clearly saw the office as separate from the rectorship of St. Paul's since it refers to the offices separately\(^3\), while Bonizo of Sutri explicitly states that Hildebrand received the office of oeconomus of the Roman Church\(^4\). Both authorities had a reason for this ascription; the opponents of Gregory VII found it convenient to portray him as an essentially secular man, leading the Church into new and highly dubious paths, a man whose very virtues could be counted against him\(^5\).

\(^1\) For the office of chancellor under the Tusculans, see Kehr, Scrinium und Palatium, pp. 72-8.

\(^2\) E.g. Zema, Economic Re-organisation, at p. 141.

\(^3\) M.G.H. Const. et Acta, i, no. 70, p. 118f.

\(^4\) Lib. de lite, i, 588.

\(^5\) As particularly by Wido of Ferrara, Lib. de lite, i, 534, 554-5.
Bonizo, on the other hand, found the key to Gregory's failure in the opposition which he had aroused; since that opposition was largely based on the threat to its own material prerogatives, it followed that Gregory himself had to be portrayed as largely concerned with them. Aside from this testimony, there is little to suggest that such an office existed; it is recorded in no document and it pre-dated the popes' own attempts to find out just what their material rights were. Given this we are probably justified in regarding the title as a mis-ascription, doubtless due to confusion with the rectorship and stewardship of St. Paul's which Hildebrand indeed held. The true development of a papal financial office came later, under the pontificate of Urban II, when a system modelled on that of Cluny and initially directed by a Cluniac monk came to be adopted\(^1\). The implications of this development were considerable; as we shall see, they reflected a trend which also took place at Cluny in looking to more distant sources of revenue to the detriment of local ones, and this trend itself alleviated such divergence of interest between popes and Romans as might otherwise have occurred.

Our knowledge of the papal revenues is far from complete. In this it resembles that of the popes themselves. There does not seem to have been any record of the dues payable to the Papacy before the compilation made by Cardinal Deusdedit after the death of Gregory VII\(^2\). Deusdedit's work draws heavily upon the surviving papal registers, and it is clear that he had before him volumes which have since been

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lost\(^1\). Even when he wrote, the papal archives had been dispersed and some volumes were to be found in the turris chartularia\(^2\), others in S. Maria in Monastero\(^3\). The location of these volumes, close to an area dominated by the Frangipane, reflected the political disturbances of the schism, yet the dispersal and the fragmentary state of knowledge implied in his source material is hardly likely to give too unflattering a picture of his source material. He may well have worked from a preliminary collection compiled under Gregory VII\(^4\), but the compilation is still rudimentary — and in that it consists primarily of a cartulary as the basis for financial claims, many far from any reality, rather than a geographical survey such as was to be compiled a century later, it does not indicate any very developed attempt to codify and tap the ancient sources of revenue, though it was certainly a first step in that direction.

This impression may be supported from what we know of the popes' own attempts to extend their income. The period is notable for the considerable extension of papal protection over a very large number of monasteries in return for an annual census. These are mostly known to us through later compilations — the Liber Census and the earlier collection by Albinus — and even these are far from

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1. Deusdedit refers at various points to the registers of Gregory III, Stephen VI and Nicholas I as well as to those of Gregory the Great and Gregory VII.

2. Deusdedit, ed. cit., nos. cxxi, p. 353; cxxii, p. 357, for example, were drawn from volumes kept iuxta Palladium.

3. He did not include the lease of Palestrina to the senatrix Stephania in his collection, so the document was probably already in S. Maria in Monastero where Albinus found it, Lib. Census, i, no. cxxx, pp. 406-7.

complete. The sums involved were individually trivial; few monasteries owed more than twelve pence a year and some of the dues were in kind. Papal protection was doubtless of major significance in the extension of papal influence, and the dues themselves carried an almost legal significance in defining the protected houses as under the guardianship of St. Peter. But the small sums involved and the difficulty of regular consignment deprive these dues of much financial significance.

The Reform Popes seem to have given much more of their attention towards annual payments from states which themselves in various ways enjoyed particular ties with Rome. The English historian is familiar enough with Peter's Pence, which was a recurring theme in correspondence between Rome and England following the Norman Conquest. Alexander II, Gregory VII, Clement III, Urban II, and Paschal II all sought payment of these dues, not always without success. Equivalent dues were sought from Bohemia and several of the vassal states, and Gregory VII attempted on the basis of a forgery to claim an equivalent

1. Pfaff's lists in his Der Liber Censuum von 1192, Vierteljahrschr. für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgesch., xlv (1957), pp. 78-96, 105-20, 220-42, 325-51, include many dues which were not recorded in the Liber Censuum.

2. Fabre, Étude, pp. 61f.


due from France. In these cases the sums involved could be considerable but the irregularity of payment which is indicated by the frequency of papal requests for the dues suggests that we should not over-estimate the income which they brought in. Among the largest such dues were those from southern Italy, established at Melfi in 1059. We know that Guiscard and Roger I of Sicily both made substantial payments to the Papacy during the siege of Rome and on the accession of Paschal II, but political difficulties with the Norman rulers may well have inhibited the popes from pressing too hard on this source of income.

Broadly, it was dues of this kind, from lay rulers and from the monasteries and churches under papal protection, which seem to have been the main object of interest among the compilators; Deusdedit's collection of documents includes little bearing on Rome itself and its environs. There were, of course, other sources of income from outside Rome which could not be codified because they were spontaneous, like oblations, or because they represented the payment for particular services — such as the fees for litigation and privileges. Fulcher of Chartres tells us that the oblations of the crusaders passing through Rome were disputed at sword-point between the supporters of Urban and Clement which shows that control of such revenue depended upon physical possession of the major shrines.

Furthermore we may note that a substantial proportion of the oblations


at both the Vatican and Lateran churches had already been yielded to
the resident canons and to the suburban bishops\(^1\). If the act of
cession indicates that the unallocated oblations were normally
regarded as due to the pope himself, it also indicates a reduction
in the sums which might be raised from them.

It may have been this partition of the offerings at the altar
of St. Peter which prompted Alexander II and Gregory VII to initiate
the payment of dues to the Lateran palace rather than to the Petrine
altar\(^2\). Certainly another source of income — the profits of justice —
owed little to the altar, even if there is evidence that they were
partitioned too. Most of our knowledge here takes the form of
polemic; the Papacy was already becoming the subject of satire for
its financial exactions\(^3\). Acceptance of bribes by papal officials
is attested by Guibert of Nogent\(^4\), while the Histoire Compostellana
states that immense sums were dispersed among the papal entourage in
the plea for the see's metropolitan status\(^5\). Yet much of this
material dates from the period of exile from Rome or of the heavy
military commitments locally of Paschal II, as well as of extensive
travel in France, so there may be ground for thinking the impression
it gives to be misleading. The popes were often enough indigent, and
one reason for this may well be that for all the flow of money from

\(^1\) Fabre, Les Offrandes dans la Basilique Vaticane en 1285,
Mélanges, xiv (1894), at pp. 226-7. Note also Benedict X's
alienation of altar dues to the mansiornarii of St. Peter's
and to the monks of the monasteries which served the church,
S. Pietro, ed. Schiaparelli, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxiv (1901),
no. xxii, pp. 484-5.

\(^2\) Fabre, Étude, pp. 150f.

\(^3\) E.g. Albinus/Rufinus in Lib. de lite, ii, 423-35.


outside Rome, it did not all go into the papal coffers. Certainly this is the impression given by the famous lawsuit between Pisa and Genoa concerning primacy over Corsica. When Calixtus II decided in favour of Genoa, he received by far the largest part of the Genoese gift in return for his judgement; yet substantial payments were also made to many others, including a considerable body of the Roman nobility.

The collections of Deusdedit and his successors give little idea of what dues and rents the Papacy enjoyed locally. Rather they give the impression that the popes' own lands and revenues were largely alienated, and we have to face once again the fact that the Ecclesia Romana was a term that could mean very different things in different contexts. Deusdedit recorded substantial Petrine properties from the Registers of Gregory I and other popes, and in the eighth century we know that substantial properties were formed in papal domuscultae to provide Rome. So far as we can tell, little remained of these estates by the eleventh century. Warfare, spoliation, re-grouping of properties around castles and villages built on the hills, and donations to the individual churches and monasteries of Rome and the Campagna destroyed the old pattern of administration and gave new titles of possession which were often enough ratified by the Papacy itself.


2. For the formation of the domuscultae, see Lib. Pont., i, 432, 501-2.

3. This process is admirably summarised by P. Partner, Notes on the Lands of the Roman Church in the Early Middle Ages, Papers of the British School at Rome, xxxiv, (1966), 68-78.
We cannot now tell what documents were at Deusdedit's disposal when he compiled his collection. Much may have been lost even then, for his reference to papal registers does not cover all periods, and is strikingly silent on the ninth and tenth centuries — the period which witnessed the dissolution of the domuscoltae. Thus the lease which John XIII made of Palestrina to the senatrix Stephania in 970 is missing from his collection, though Albinus was subsequently to find the document in S. Maria in Monastero. He is equally silent on the parts of the patrimony in Tuscany with which the see of Silva Candida had been endowed¹, as of the rights to oblations and ordinations conceded by John XIX to the bishop of Silva Candida and to the bishop of Porto². Deusdedit knew from the Liber Pontificalis that the domuscoltae had existed, but that source did not tell him just where they had been and any attempt at recuperation would doubtless have been hindered by lack of precise evidence, as also through the conflicting evidence of grants and confirmations which were made or ratified by the popes themselves. The patrimonies detailed in Gregory I's register were so long alienated, and so difficult to place, the boundaries often being defined in terms which were or which had become uncertain, that there could not be much prospect of recovering them particularly in a period which permitted a title of possession to become a title of ownership after twenty or thirty years³.

1. Notably in John XIX's confirmation of the see's possessions, MS. Arch. Vat., Reg. Vat. 18, fol 241V. Poor print by Marini, Paniri diplomatici, no. 46, p. 46.

2. As above, fol 242V; 241F.

3. See Chron. Farf., i, 67, where Crescentius claimed the ownership of Tribuco on the grounds that he had paid no rent for thirty years. An earlier case, Chron. Farf., ii, 87, involved the principle that thirty years undisturbed possession in Lombard law and twenty in Roman could establish ownership, though church property was excluded from the ruling.
The general impression to be gained from Deusdedit's collection is that little property remained to the Roman Church which had not become the property of another church, sometimes a constituent one, or been lost altogether. Thus there was no attempt to recover Palestrina when John XIII's lease expired, and this may well have been as much an act of discretion as a failure of knowledge. Here and there we may find isolated areas of land directly subject to the pope, but they are very much the exception, and often enough they represent fresh acquisitions rather than the old patrimonies either retained or recovered. Examples of this are the castra of Rocca Antica and Montasola, which both became papal property under Nicholas II. It is unlikely that such acquisitions represented a coherent system of papal strongpoints against the local aristocracy. There could be little system or importance when there seem to have been so few of them. Sometimes more important acquisitions seem to have been made. Thus Aricia is said to have been the price which Paschal II paid for Ptolemy I of Tusculum's support. If the story is true, it represented a papal acquisition during our period, since it was earlier held by the monastery of S. Ciriaco. Terracina, with which Pierleone was bribed on the election of Honorius II, was also a

1. Montasola in Vehse, Die päpstliche Herrschaft in der Sabina bis zur Mitte des 12 Jahrhunderts, Quellen, xxi (1929-30), 172-3; Rocca Antica, Ms. Arch. Vat., Reg. Avin. 201, fol 158V-9; poor print, Theiner, Cod. dipl. dominii temporalis S. Sedia, i, pp. v-vi.


3. Tabularium, ed. Hartmann, i, nos. vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xiii, xiv, xvi, xx, xxv, are among the documents which show S. Ciriaco receiving and leasing land in the area. In 1079 a number of laymen renounced goods to S. Maria in Trastevere which included lands in Aricia, M.S. Archivio del Vicariato, Fondo S. Maria in Trastevere, no. 7; and no. 9 in my forthcoming edition of this material.
fresh acquisition, for it had been purchased by Calixtus II from a Count Monaldus\(^1\). Earlier documents indicate that the county had been papal property under Silvester II who leased it to Count Daliferius\(^2\); either Calixtus did not know of the papal proprietorship, or he thought it more politic to buy Monaldus out rather than assert his rights. Paschal II's difficulties with the Terracinesi over Circea certainly suggest that they were not his direct subjects\(^3\).

The popes derived some financial benefit from their lordship over the district as a whole as distinct from their specific property. Thus there seem to have been taxes from land at Albano payable to the Lateran before 1037\(^4\), on shipping in the Tiber\(^5\), on the gates of Tivoli\(^6\), and up till the time of Nicholas II on the see of Anagni\(^7\). This is not an exhaustive list, but it is reasonably illustrative of our evidence for such dues; it is also distinctive in that the main evidence for the dues consists of exemptions from them, so that it is impossible to tell whether or not they represent the concession of a local due, perhaps of a proprietary nature, or a release from a payment which was elsewhere still current. Even if the latter was the case, the practical benefit of the dues must have

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5. Kehr, It. Pont., viii, pp. 136, no. 69; 138, no. 79; 139, no. 81; 141, no. 88; 143, no. 96; 154, no. 141; 158, no. 157; 161, no. 170; 168, no. 201.
been seriously undercut by exemptions and immunities. Farfa and its vast territories claimed exemption and was able to produce witnesses who could claim that dues were paid on some of its properties only in the time of Gregory VII, and then under threat of force\(^1\).

The overall impression left by our knowledge of papal finance in this period is bewildering. Large sums might come from outside Rome, but did so fitfully, while the dominant impression of the local revenues on which the popes might rely is that they were largely alienated. This conforms with the picture which can be drawn from the literary evidence, in which we see the popes by turns expending quite considerable moneys, then reduced to poverty. We should record, however, that the general impression we may draw of the Roman Church is of wealth. Thus we find S. Blasio restored under Alexander II and S. Pudenziana under Gregory VII\(^2\). S. Frisca was only one of a number of churches restored under Paschal II; others included the church of the Quattro Coronati, among the casualties of the Normans in 1084\(^3\). Some of these restorations were effectually wholly new buildings, as can be readily surmised from a comparison of the upper and lower churches of S. Clemente, another of Guiscard's victims. At least one foundation, however, - the monastery of S. Saba - was not rebuilt until after 1145\(^4\). Farfa we know to have suffered extreme financial difficulty during the early twelfth

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century\(^1\), but that was largely due to difficulties with its tenants, a bitter struggle with the popes and the Octavian counts of the Sabina, and a disputed election in which the rival candidates were each able to secure a portion of the monastery's lands.

Given this situation, it is not surprising that the popes sometimes sought to turn the wealth of individual churches to their own account. Paschal II was able to have much of the plate of S. Maria in Trastevere mortgaged to pay his military expenses\(^2\). His predecessor, Gregory VII ran into more difficulty on just this point; a meeting of cardinals held during the siege of Rome declined to recognise that the property of their churches might be spent on war\(^3\). Example and counter-example probably illustrate the position quite well; sometimes the corporate nature of the Roman Church might enable the pope to draw on the goods of its individual churches, and sometimes its individual natures might debar him. We have no way of knowing which trend was predominant.

What did the popes do with their money in Rome? Here there is a wealth of evidence, and it need not surprise us that much of it relates to soldiers. The point at which the popes began to enlist their own troops remains uncertain, as does the basis on which they raised them. The abbots of Farfa and Subiaco both enjoyed the

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1. According to Gregory of Catino, Chron. Farf., ii, 206, the monks lacked the money to send an embassy to Henry IV to protest at a nomination to the abbacy made by Clement III.

2. MS. Rome, Archivio del Vicariato, Fondo di S. Maria in Trastevere, nos. 11 and 12; poor print by Moretti, Ritus dandi, pp. 378-80; no. 15 in my forthcoming edition of S. Maria in Trastevere material.

military service of their tenants\(^1\), and we know Benedict VIII to have had his own soldiers at the very beginning of our period, though it is not clear if they were his family's troops or not\(^2\). Sporadic references suggest that there was a general military obligation to the Papacy in the Patrimony. Thus Nicholas II was obliged to receive the fealty of the Roman nobility by their left hands, since their right ones had already been pledged to Benedict X\(^3\). Military service is among the obligations from which Alexander II exempted Velletri\(^4\). Certain noblemen and families may be seen fighting for the popes - the Corsi for Gregory VII and Gelasius II, the Pierleone for Nicholas II and Alexander II, and so on\(^5\); but in these cases a general obligation was supplemented by personal loyalties and probably by personal benefits too.

Whatever the general military obligation on which the popes might call, there is evidence enough that they paid troops as well. Paschal II, we have noted, had the plate of S. Maria in Trastevere mortgaged for warlike purposes, and our chroniclers tell us of his payments to soldiers\(^6\), of his use of siege machines\(^7\), and that his nephew Galfredus became head of the papal militia\(^8\). For an earlier period, we have a number of references to papal troops, though it is

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not clear how they were raised and maintained. Leo IX's biographer tells us of a military expedition against the Tusculans\(^1\), while Hildebrand was sent with soldiers to install an abbot at Subiaco and help him against the local inhabitants under Alexander II\(^2\). Wido of Ferrara claimed that Hildebrand collected cash to raise soldiers in order to recover church property, but his testimony is uncertain since this very conduct damned the pope in his own eyes\(^3\). He is, however, supported by the reported testimony of Hugh of Cluny\(^4\). By the end of our period there seems to have been a standing papal militia, for its leader, Cencius Frangipane, played a leading role in the election of Honorius II\(^5\).

The popes could turn their money to military benefit in other ways as well. Foremost of these methods was the direct bribery of their opponents. Sometimes we may wonder if our evidence is reliable; bribery could easily enough be equated with simony where elections were involved, as may have been the intention of a Roman annalist when he stated that Hildebrand won over the Romans to Nicholas II with money\(^6\). Sometimes, on the other hand, our evidence seems reasonably firm. Thus we know from Godfrey of Vendôme that Urban II recovered the Lateran by bribery in 1094, even if the immense sum paid—thirteen thousand shillings—and Godfrey's own

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contribution to it must remain more doubtful. A few years later the Castel S. Angelo was recovered in the same way while it was a gift from Roger I of Sicily which enabled Paschal II to expel Wibert finally from Rome. Sometimes the popes explained the opposition which they encountered on their inability to bribe their opponents; this seems to be the meaning of a letter in which Paschal II ascribed the Roman support for Silvester III to his own inability to reward the Romans. And certainly support for antipopes was sometimes won by money; Archbishop Bruno of Trier himself reported to Henry V that he had distributed money in Rome to gain support for Gregory VIII. Money indeed seems to have acted as a palliative on the Roman scene; Paschal II offered money to gain support during the Prefecture disturbances in 1116 while Gelasio II's return to Rome was non sine prato. Earlier Urban II had sought financial help from the French Church to recover the 'liberty of the apostolic see', and since we know him to have been opposed to the use of force in Rome, this money was probably intended for bribes rather than for soldiers. Money could soften differences

1. *Pat. Lat.,* olvii, ep. 8, col 47.
and heal wounds where force was only likely to exacerbate them.

A similar moderation may be seen in the local handling of perhaps the most explosive issue to be raised in the Investiture Controversy—the lay ownership of churches and their revenues. Despite the assertion of the Lateran Council of 1059 that tithes should be renounced by laymen and despite the subsequent reinforcement of that decree in following councils, there is not much evidence that the laymen of the area were obliged to restore them, though those that they voluntarily renounced were doubtless received readily enough. At Ceprano in 1079 Gregory VII ruled that churches and their goods should not belong to laymen, but if this were the norm, it was not enforced and sometimes clearly broken. Thus we know that Cardinal Falco of S. Maria in Trastevere, sufficiently in Gregory VII's favour to be given the rectorship of S. Cosimato, leased lands without excluding the tithes from the benefits; subsequently the lease had to be bought back and the terms of the lease re-negotiated so that the tithes could be kept under ecclesiastical control. Equivalently, when a priest in Ceprano bestowed his church on the see of Veroli, he retained the right to retain it and its revenues for his own life and for that of his relations.

In the case of Cardinal Falco's lease, we see the typical way in which the Roman churches sought to recover their property and


3. Carte di Veroli, ed. Scaccia Scarafoni, no. lxxvii, pp. 100-1; the document dates from 1096.
rights; they did so with money. Justice, we shall see, could be uncertain and its results difficult to enforce. It could also be expensive; we know that Abbot John of Subiaco spent sixty pounds of silver in legal costs during the recovery of just one castrum. So a cash settlement had much to recommend it; it need not have been dearer, and it ensured some degree of amity with the laymen concerned. Equivalently, Calixtus II's recovery of Terracina, as we have already noted, was by purchase.

Ecclesiastical sentence against laymen is a rarity in the Rome of our period. We have notice of a few censures - the excommunication of Cencius de Praefecto after his kidnap of Gregory VII, as of two notable despoilers of Subiaco property are cases in point. But these sentences do not seem to have been typical; they followed dramatic acts of opposition and a state of effective warfare between the abbot and the local nobles.

If the detailed history of the relations between the popes and the major Roman noble families suggests a general state of amity and comparative tranquillity, and if we are right in suggesting that this tranquillity was based on the reluctance of the popes significantly to encroach upon noble interests, it will come as no surprise that this tendency may be seen also in the popes' local administration. The chief role in this administration consisted of secular offices - the Prefecture of Rome and the local Countships set up to administer different parts of the papal state. The Prefect was the main officer of criminal justice in Rome, with the power of

inflicting capital punishment. The office could also be important in civil justice. Thus we find that the prefect had the right to grant tutorships and guardianships. At the same time many of the most important civil cases were held under the prefect's presidency.

The rights of the office were not exclusive ones. Other papal officials can be found granting guardianships while the Tusculan popes regularly delegated important lawsuits to their relations. At the same time the office was too important for the popes to risk letting it out of their control. One of Nicholas II's first acts was to replace a hostile prefect with a Trasteverine supporter and the account of the disturbances in 1116 by Paschal II's biographer makes quite clear that the pope had a right of veto, and possibly a right of nomination, when the office was filled. The prefect's role as chief dispenser of criminal justice is reflected in the fact that his executioners were paid from oblations made to the Vatican. One such execution was that of Urban II's opponent, John Paganus, in 1096.

The office of Prefect could be limited by the exercise of its functions by other officials. It is striking, for example, that the prefect is not among the men to whom Paschal II entrusted Rome in

3. Tabularium, ed. Hartmann, i, no. lxiii, pp. 81-2.
7. Lib. Pont., ii, 293.
1106\(^1\). But generally relations between popes and prefects appear to have been good, no doubt because the popes controlled the prefects' appointment. Thus we find the Prefect Peter among the rescuers of Gelasius II, despite his earlier clash with Paschal II over his own appointment, and the same prefect later co-operated with Calixtus II in restricting the exactions of his subordinates\(^2\). If the Reformers sometimes entrusted some of the functions of the office to other men, they were functions which never seem to have been exclusive to it.

In the Campagna, the chief figures in papal rule were the local counts. The counts of the Sabina can be shown to have exercised judicial functions\(^3\), and if there was a tendency for lawsuits to come before other figures during the latter half of the eleventh century, that was largely the preference of the abbey of Farfa, normally the claimant, which was involved in bitter conflict with the Octavian counts rather than a deliberate attempt by the Papacy to restrict the comital office and by-pass it\(^4\). This conflict makes it difficult to know whether or not the office remained in being during the twelfth century. Certainly there is little beyond the absence of Farfa references to the counts to support the contention that Paschal II took the area under his direct administration\(^5\). South


3. Vehse, *papstliche Herrschaft*, *Quellen xxi* (1929-30), pp. 135-6 gives a well documented account of the counts' and rectors' functions.


of Rome, we find occasional references to counts of the Campagna.
Under the Tusculans the office was held by Amatus of Ceccano and we
later find the office entrusted by Alexander II to William of
Montreuil. Under Paschal II Berard of Marsi was imprisoned by
Peter Colonna while acting as count of the Campagna and he later
acted as apostolic legate in the Abruzzi—an indication both that
the office of count was not a permanent one, and that by this date
it could be entrusted to a cleric. During Berard's lifetime the
office was held by a Count Crescentius whose murderers were executed
by Calixtus II in 1123.

The picture which we may draw from this evidence is puzzling,
and must probably remain so. In the Campagna it is clear that the
office of count did not remain in the hands of the same family; a
whole series of men with different connections are found as counts,
and the appointment seems sometimes to have been only temporary. It
could also be limited by the appointment of other men to administer
the district, as happened when Paschal II entrusted the area to
Ptolemy I of Tusculum. In the Sabina, on the other hand, it seems
as if the office remained in the hands of the Octavians and the
period during which it passed to another family under Nicholas II can
as readily be attributed to a co-incidence of minorities within the

2. Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Chibnall, ii,
53, 96. Amatus, Storia de' Normanni, Fonti per la storia
5. Chron. Fossanovae, Cronisti e scrittori, ed. G. Del Re, i, 508.
family as to a deprivation. Under Gregory VII the Octavian counts of the Sabina were able to exact dues from Farfa lands in the name of the pope, and subsequently Pierleone, as a papal judge, wished to rule that this procedure was legitimate\textsuperscript{1}. So one reason for the contrast between the Sabina and the Campagna may simply be that the popes wished to use the power of the Octavians as a means of bringing the hostile monastery of Farfa under control.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that the popes did not in this period seek to eliminate the Roman element from their rule may be found in the conduct of justice in Rome and its environs. Tradition-ally the exclusion of the Palatine Judges from the business of the papal chancery is seen as an attempt to restrict their influence\textsuperscript{2}. In fact they became occupied with a role that was locally considerably more important. Justice was not anarchic in Rome; we find references to Justinian which show that ancient law was still followed consciously\textsuperscript{3}. The judge, however, had considerable authority in such matters as the granting of adjournements, as well as in the acceptance or rejection of evidence. The delegation of the case to a particular judge was therefore an important papal prerogative. We have already noted that the Tuscan popes delegated cases to their relatives, and subsequently prominent figures in the reform movement acted as judges – Hildebrand in an important Farfa case\textsuperscript{4}, Pierleone

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Chron. Farf.}, ii, 229-33.
\item e.g. Zema, Economic Reorganization, 140f, 168. The best account of justice in Rome during this period is T. Hirschfeld, Das Gerichtswesen der Stadt Rom vom 8 bis 12 Jahrhundert, Arch. für Urkundenforschung, iv (1912), 419-562.
\item Cosma e Damiano, ed. Fedele, Arch. Soc. Rom., xxii (1899), no. lxxii, pp. 399-401. This antedates the references given by Hirschfeld to show knowledge of Roman law at the end of the 11th century, \textit{ibid.}, 508.
\item Kehr, \textit{Ital. Pont.}, i, 106, no. 7.
\end{enumerate}
in the dispute between the counts of the Sabina and Farfa\(^1\). Prominent among the men to whom cases were delegated by the pope were the Lateran officials, the Palatine Judges, who represent the very body of men whom some historians would see as representing the vested local interests which the reformers set out to destroy\(^2\). That these officials did not invariably act as judges during this period need not surprise us, for they never had done so even during the Tusculan period\(^3\).

Occasionally it is possible to see a dispute manipulated through the choice of judge. Pierleone's desire to recognise the Octavians' claims against those of Farfa represents perhaps the classic example of this. But a survey of the surviving lawsuits suggests that most cases were settled by compromise and exchange, and even when the judgement was favourable, the victorious party might compensate the victim to alleviate ill feeling and avoid future reprisals\(^4\).

To sum up, the local government of the popes helps to explain and to illustrate the prevailing concord between popes and Romans. The expansion and development of the administration into a court of European significance does not seem to have been at the expense of local interests, while the money which intermittently came from outside Rome enabled the reformers to follow their programme, so

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2. e.g. in the renunciation ordered in 1060 by four of the Lateran judges, *Tabularium*, ed. Hartmann, ii, no. lxxxviii, pp. 9-10; and a subsequent ruling in 1110 by the secundicerius, *Ibid.*, iii, no. cxxxviii, pp. 50-1. These are only two of a host of examples.


far as they pursued it, by conciliation, bribe, and re-purchase as much as by the sharper methods of warfare and lawsuit. These latter alternatives, we have seen, are ones which the Papacy did not neglect during our period; yet they are hardly predominant. Beneath the often stormy surface of Roman politics, there lay a deeper fibre of common interests which were not much disturbed even if they might be manipulated.

These interests can be identified for each of the families at which we have looked, and it is striking that the popes did not generally challenge them. The Colonna were allowed to keep Palestrina, and both the Octavians and the Tusculans were enrolled, the latter not too successfully, in the service of the Papacy. The fragmentation of the older families gave the popes a freer hand in dealing with them, but equally it may have been their very moderation which assisted that fragmentation. Newer families could in this context give a support which was probably out of proportion to their standing, but they had to be rewarded and it was perhaps the very inability of the popes to reward the Frangipane with the remains of the Tusculan dominions, as they did in the mid-twelfth century, which accounts for the savage attacks which they made on Gelasius II. The most dramatic actions of the Papacy against the nobility - the expulsion of the Stephanians, then of a branch of the Octavians from their castles around Farfa, and its bitter conflicts with Gerard of Galeria and Cencius de Praefecto - are probably best understood as having been forced on the Papacy, in the first case by the need to secure and retain the goodwill of the emperor as the patron of Farfa, in the latter by the domination of Duke Godfrey of Lorraine. There was no general challenge to the landed rights of the nobility, and property disputes were generally settled by a sensible compromise,
the church assuring its ownership, but the layman enjoying the fruits of the land on favourable terms as lessee. The resultant picture is a complex one, with many actors - not merely the numerous laymen themselves, but also the many cardinals, abbots, rectors and archpriests who were responsible for the property transactions of their churches. It is unlikely that the popes could follow all of these transactions, or indeed would have wished to do so. Insofar as they reveal a general pattern, of conciliation and moderation, they are unlikely to misrepresent the papal behaviour.

It is in this context that we can understand why the popes neither excluded the Roman laity from their elections nor sought to rely consistently on Norman aid against them. The interests of individual nobles and individual churches, the family rivalries, the fluctuating, interrelated fortunes of both churches and laity, the highly variable cohesion and membership of the families, suggest a world in which there was always scope for conflict over particular rights, but equally one in which there was no basic opposition of interests between nobles and Papacy so long as the popes themselves did not wish to challenge the property rights of the nobility in any widespread manner. The situation was thus volatile, and often turbulent, but at the same time inherently stable - for as far as we can see the Papacy issued no such challenge. Therein lay the basis for the popes' success as princes.
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