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The financing of Roman city politics,
1050-1150*

by Chris Wickham

It was common knowledge in medieval western Europe that the papal court, which was crystallising as the Curia in the period of this article, was corrupt, and so was Rome in general. The papal judicial system, expanding rapidly from the 1130s, had a particularly bad name. John of Salisbury in the *Policraticus*, written in the 1160s, can speak for very many: in the Roman church, «iustitiam non tam veritati, quam pretio reddunt»1. And already around 1100, before that expansion, an unknown (plausibly Spanish) author penned a particularly goliardic satire, *De Albino et Rufino* or the *Tractatus Garsiae*, about the translation of Sts Silver and Gold by Pope Urban II in 1098-1099. Urban, «avidissimus pontifex», translated them to the shrine of St Cupidity, near that of her sister Avidissima and the church of her mother Avarice. «These are the two martyrs, who bravely defeated kings, emperors, dukes, tetrarchs, princes and other powers of the world ... these are the precious martyrs, through whom the Roman pope defeated Guiberto [*Clement III, the rival pope*], vanquished Henry [IV], curbed the senate, took over the state (*republicam*), ...bravely attacked the house of Crescenzo [*Castel Sant’Angelo*], powerfully laid open the Tarpeian seat, climbed the Capitol, opened the treasury of St Peter...» And in honour of this, the pope and his fat cardinals ate and drank uncontrollably, in a Terence-influenced parody of the last supper. In the middle of the Investiture Dispute, a period of papal history which otherwise seems notably humourless, a writer could poke fun at the way Urban had indeed, as we shall see, quite probably taken over Rome in 1097-10982.

*I am grateful to Sandro Carocci for a critique of this text and to Giuliano Milani for a useful discussion. In this text, I put names of Italians into modern Italian, except for popes, and Hildebrand before he became Gregory VII, who is less recognisable in English as Ildebrando.


I begin with these well-known texts simply to remind the reader how generalised was this sort of critique; indeed, not only was it “common knowledge” to medieval writers but it is also to modern historians, from Gregorovius to the present. And, although material of this kind mostly came from writers who lived a long way from Italy, we would be mistaken to see it as exclusively consisting of uncomprehending and inaccurate stereotypes; from the 1120s alone, the enthusiastic recounting in the Historia Compostellana of Diego Gelmierez’s benedictiones in gold and silver to the courts of Calixtus II, Honorius II and later Innocent II, or Caffaro di Caschifellone’s detailed account to the commune of Genoa of what he spent in 1120 to persuade Calixtus to take archiepiscopal powers over Corsica away from the church of Pisa, are precise instances of the practice of gift-giving on a large scale to members of the Curia and its beneficial results. The Roman church needed, or thought it needed, as much money or precious metals from as many people as possible, and was fairly relaxed about the means it used to get it. This amassing of money inside the church is relevant to my argument, and I shall return to it later. But the purpose of this article is not to discuss the rights and wrongs of papal “corruption”; rather, it is to analyse how money worked in the framework of Roman urban politics. Outside critics did not greatly distinguish between the Roman church and the city of Rome, but they were by no means the same – and certainly not in the first, uneasy, century of the international papacy, a period in which no pope until 1130 and few cardinals were of Roman origin. The Romans took money too; but they took it for different purposes, above all in return for political support inside the city. It is this which tells us most about the financing of the Roman political system in the decades either side of 1100. Giorgio Chittolini has always been interested in the internal structuring of states, and I hope that this case study from an earlier period will contribute to the development of the themes he pioneered.

3 Historia Compostellana, ed. E. Falque Rey, Turnhout 1988, II. 4, 10, 16, 20, etc.; Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de’ suoi continuatori, 1, ed. L.T. Belgrano, Roma 1890, pp. 20-21n. (pp. 18-22 for context). For a recent discussion, see J. Laudage, Rom und das Papsttum im frühen 12. Jahrhundert, in Europa an der Wende vom 11. zum 12. Jahrhundert, ed. K. Herbers, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 23-53, the best analytical account of the period from Paschal II to Calixtus II, with a large bibliography of previous work; for the gifts, pp. 49-52 (p. 50: «Korruption ist hier wohl das richtige Stichwort»); for the most recent narrative account, see M. Stroll, Calixtus II (1119-1124), Leiden 2004, esp. pp. 241-254, 301-312. Caffaro gave not only to ecclesiastics (2000 silver marks, mostly to the pope, 353 ounces of gold and £100 in Pavese denarii) but also to lay aristocrats from Rome: 155 marks to the Pierleoni and also jewellery, 100 to Pietro the urban prefect, 40 to Leone Frangipane, and 25 to Stefano Normanno.

4 See, very generally, K. Jordan, Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert, in «Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken», 25 (1933-1934), pp. 61-104. Calixtus II could be pretty explicit about his position here, according to Landolfo di San Paolo, who tried in 1120 to win a court case before him without any success: «frater, pecunia est res, de qua homo potest facere multum bonum. Tu pecunia non habes, nec tempus supersendi cause tue nunc est...» See Landulphi Junioris Historia Mediolanensis, ed. C. Castiglioni, Bologna 1934 (Rerum Italicarum scriptores, 2nd ed., V. 2), c. 48 bis.
Let us begin with some data, so as to build up a picture of the use of money in urban politics. One particularly clear source is from Rome itself, the Annales Romani. These annals, for the years 1044-1073, 1100-1121, and 1181-1187, are a heterogeneous group of separate texts (and the first is itself also probably not a single text), copied into a miscellany now in the Vatican in no particular order; but the twelfth-century hands are probably Roman, and the content is in each case written from a Roman point of view. The first two sets give some prominence to money. So in 1046, the exiled pope Benedict IX «divided the Roman populus», «per praemii cupiditatem», and took back the papacy; in 1058 Benedict X gained the fidelity of «the majority of the Roman populus» and the «comites» around the city (here, as elsewhere, the aristocracy of the Campagna Romana), «data pecunia». In 1059 Hildebrand sent «pecunya [sic]» to Rome to Leone di Benedetto Christiano (the ancestor of the Pierleoni) to divide the populus against Benedict X; in 1062 Hildebrand and Leone distributed «pecunia per urbem» all night long («tota nocte illa» – the implication is “in secret”) to prevent the coronation of Cadalo of Parma as pope the next day; after a stand-off, once Cadalo ran out of money («pecunia deficiente») his backers the comites left him, so he had to return to Parma. The antipopes against Paschal II were defeated in similar ways: Paschal gave pecunia to Giovanni di Oddolina, the main supporter of the bishop of the Sabina, and the latter’s papal project failed; his successor the archpriest Maginulfo was more successful, defeating Paschal’s forces in the Circo Massimo in 1105 with the support of a variety of powerful Romans, but once again «when Maginulfo’s pecunia ran out, all his coniuratio left him», and he had to flee. In 1120, the followers of Gregory VIII were similarly persuaded to give in by Pietro Leone, «accepta pecunia», on behalf of Calixtus II, who also gained the «fidelitas» of «plures equites hac pedites» in the city, «data pecunia».

The papal biographies written by two influential cardinals, Pandolfo in the 1130s and Bosone up to the 1170s, tell similar stories. Pandolfo’s biography of Paschal II relates that Paschal used 1000 unciae of gold sent from Count Roger of Sicily to getClement III out of Rome at the end of the latter’s life in 1099. The pope also in 1116 attempted to gain the support of Tolomeo of Tuscolo with the castle of Ariccia, and that of Tolomeo’s allies with gold, silver and jewels. Pandolfo’s detailed and bitter account of the accession of Honorius II in 1124 depicts the Frangipani and their allies imposing Honorius against the will of the cardinals, and then, by night («nocte»), buying off Honorius’s two main lay opponents, Pietro the urban prefect and Pietro Leone, with, respectively, the castle of Formello “with extra gifts” and

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6 LP, pp. 332, 334, 336-337, 345-347.
the city of Terracina (though this was later taken back). Honorius had the
opposition of the cardinals for two days but did not resign, "recordans ...
Romanorum profundam avaritiam", and the «cardinales venditi» backed
down. In later decades, Bosone uses the image of money in much the same
way, and moralises about it more generally. Anacletus II in 1130, «relying on
his multitude of wealth», attacked Innocent II in the houses of the
Frangipani, but failed; so he despoiled the treasuries of San Pietro in
Vaticano and Santa Maria Maggiore, and with this «sought to buy the major-
ity of the venal city, corrupting the maiores and oppressing the minores», 
with nearly complete success. Alexander III’s opponent Victor IV in 1161 sub-
orned some senators (we are now in the period of the formalised Roman
Senate) with pecunia to get them to imprison Alexander in Trastevere,
though this time the procedure failed. In 1165, during the wars with Frederick
Barbarossa, Alexander appointed a new papal vicar in Rome, to whom the
majority of the Roman populus swore the "customary fidelity" for "not a
small amount of money". In 1166, Barbarossa, since he could not subdue
Rome by arms, chose «pecuniarum largitio» instead, and, «since Rome, if it
finds a buyer, offers itself venally», many in the city happily fell for this, until
Alexander countered it with the money of the church. The following year,
during the German siege of Rome, the king of Sicily managed to get «pecunia
multa» into the city for Alexander, who used part of it to bind the Pierleoni
and Frangipani «more tightly» to him, so that they would organise the
defence of the city; he used the rest to pay for the defence of the city gates,
before Rome was saved by the plague that destroyed Barbarossa’s army.

These three texts are not always to be taken literally, of course; but they
certainly represent a forceful, and century-long, way of expressing the rules
for obtaining loyalty from Roman political players. And they are backed up by
many more sources, from outside the city, who may be expressing the
European “common knowledge” about Rome, but all the same write about it
in very similar ways. Let us follow them chronologically, again from 1050,
restricting ourselves to contemporaries or near-contemporaries. Pietro
Damiani, an eye-witness, accused both Benedict X in 1058 and Cadalo of
Parmain 1062 of paying pecuniain return for support. In 1059, according to the slightly later and ferociously anti-Gregorian
Benzone of Alba, Hildebrand “corrupted” the Romans with «multa pecunia»

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7 *LP*, pp. 297, 303; *Liber pontificalis prout exstat in codice manuscripto Dertusensi*, ed. J.-M.
March, Barcelona 1925, pp. 203-206, also re-edited in *Liber pontificalis nella recensione di Pietro
at II, pp. 750-754. The latter editions of Pandolfo, based on an older and slightly fuller manuscript
from Tortosa, supersede Duchesne’s for all the popes after 1099, but I only cite them for Honorius,
for their textual changes are only significant for that pope, and the books are hard to find. Note
that March, pp. 41-60, does not consider Pandolfo to be the author of the Paschal life; the argu-
ment for Pandolfo seems more plausible to Přerovský, I, pp. 111 ff., and to me.
8 *LP*, pp. 380, 398, 412, 414, 416-417. Money for the “customary fidelity” was, however, by now
an established tradition: see below, text to note 37.
in order to get Nicholas II crowned (this matches the more neutral view of the *Annales Romani*), and did the same to get himself elected pope in 1075. For the equally ferocious Gregorian Bonizone of Sutri, Cadalo of Parma in 1062 with gold and silver again won over many Romans, «avari et cupidi», this time including aristocrats, *capitanei*, though he was foiled by the «magnifica dona» given against him by Goffredo of Tuscany; a year later, in his second period in Rome, by now restricted to Castel Sant’Angelo, he paid his main supporter Cencio di Stefano 300 pounds of silver to get away. Another pro-Gregorian commentator, Berthold, says that Henry sent gold and silver to Rome in 1080 to “corrupt” the Romans to his side; yet another, Bernold, tells us that Henry was accepted in Rome in 1083 «partly induced by *precium*, partly seduced by many promises», and that a year later the Byzantine emperor sent «maxima pecunia» to Henry to fight the Normans, but the latter spent it instead «ad conciliandum sibi vulgus Romanorum», so that he could enter the city to be crowned emperor. In the same period, according to Donizone the biographer of Matilde of Canossa, Matilde sent Gregory VII 200 pounds of silver (or alternatively 700 pounds of silver and 94 of gold) to help him combat Guiberto/Clement III. The French abbot Geoffroy of Vendôme was himself an actor in 1094, when Urban II was temporarily in Rome and restricted to the fortified Frangipani quarter near the Colosseum. While Geoffroy was there, Ferruccio, keeper of the Lateran palace for Clement III, offered it to Urban for money, which Urban and his cardinals could not afford; Geoffroy did have it, however, according to a letter of his written twenty years later, which claims he spent 13,000 *solidi* on the deal between gold, silver, money, mules and horses. Later, in 1099, following Donizone again, Clement III as one of his final acts «began to seduce the Roman citizens with *precium*» against Paschal II. Paschal himself in a letter of 1105 says that some Romans supported Maginulfo against him because they did not have access to munera from his curia. A letter from a later papal schism, in 1119-20, from the archbishop of Trier to Henry V, described the thesaurum et pecuniam which he distributed to Henry’s Roman clientes in favour of the imperial pope, Gregory VIII. In 1130, according to Falcone of Benevento, Anacletus II’s brother Leone Pierleoni gained the support of ‘nearly all’ the Roman *populus* by opening the


treasury, in an account which matches that of Bosone. In 1149, we return to John of Salisbury, who narrates that Eugenius III was honorably received by the Roman magnates, who «smelt the gold and silver of Gaul».

This list is certainly not complete; there are so many chronicles, large and small, for this troubled period, when Rome was more than usually the focus of historians’ attention all over the West. But the collection of references set out here are fairly homogeneous, and some of their common features deserve to be developed. The first point is that nearly all of them concern only money or treasure. It is very notable how seldom any pope rewards a Roman supporter with land in these texts; only Pandolfo’s references to Ariccia, Formello and Terracina stand out here. The second is that these rewards are above all for political support at times of papal schism or disputed election. This may not be that significant, since a rival pope was normally the focus of political dissidence in the city in this period. What is significant, on the other hand, as a third point, is that such cessions are almost always directed to the laity, rather than to the clergy, and after papal elections, not during them. Charges of simony are actually rather rare in these sources (Pandolfo leans over backwards not to say it for the actual election of Honorius II, although the Historia Compostellana says it for Anacletus II, Benzone of Alba says it with some verve for Gregory VII, and if one went back to Gregory VI one would find it without difficulty). It is essentially the Romans who can be “bought” in these narratives. That is to say, it is the stability of the position of popes in the city, rather than their actual holding of office, which is at stake – even though it is clear that popes whose Roman support has vanished have lost a lot, and several have to give up papal claims.

Less consistent is the status of these rewards. Words like donum are found in the sources, a gift in return for loyalty, but also pretium, indicating that the Romans have been literally, and much less honourably, bought. Given that our sources are hardly neutral pieces of sociology, one could reasonably conclude that the greater or lesser honour of such transfers of wealth depended on the political standpoint of the chronicler. (It should be noted that the word “bribe” does not exist in the Latin of this period; a donum or munus may be represented by writers as honourable or dishonourable/corrupt, more or less a “bribe” in our terms, but the word remains the same; only

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12 For Gregory VI, see the texts assembled and criticised in G.B. Borino, L’elezione e la deposizione di Gregorio VI, in «Archivio della Società romana di storia patria» [henceforth «ASRSP»], 39 (1916), pp. 141-252, 295-410, at pp. 208-222. For earlier popes, see for example Rodolfo il Glabro, Cronache dell’anno Mille, ed. G. Cavallo and G. Orlandi, Milano 1989, IV., 4, 17 for accusations of simony against John XIX and Benedict IX, neither of whom are very likely to have had to pay much for their effectively hereditary succession; the moral panic was beginning then.
the giving of a pretium, a much more charged word, can really be assimilated to what we would call bribery without question\textsuperscript{13}). What does, all the same, seem clear is that it was standard in the political practice of Rome in the century under discussion to reward political affiliation with money and precious metals. Otherwise put, Roman political actors expected to be paid, at least by 1050, and there are indications in our scarcer sources that this practice was at least a century old then too\textsuperscript{14}.

This is important; for it was not at all common in the Europe of the period under discussion here. By the twelfth century, it is true, rulers all across Europe had come to see that warfare could not be waged without money, in large part at least. So, for example, when John of Salisbury, in his own account at least, represented himself as setting out a passionate denunciation of pretia and munera, including the quote I began with, and the dishonest and avaricious practices of many (though not all) of the leaders of the Roman church – and also improper gifts to the Romans – he was actually talking to his friend Pope Hadrian IV. The pope laughed, thanked him for his openness, and in reply told a parable of the parts of the body who were disgusted at the greed of the stomach, and went on strike so that it would not be fed; as a result, the whole body became weak. Look at it in the round, said Hadrian (according to John): if you don’t accumulate tributa, you can’t pay an army, «quia nemo potest sine stipendiis militare»\textsuperscript{15}. Some of our most important European political actors – like Henry IV, paid by the Byzantine emperor, or the Normans, paid by many – acted as mercenaries on occasion. But even in England (whence Hadrian came, and where John was writing), where the early monetisation of warfare is particularly well-attested, normal political loyalty was still expressed in terms of the service due in return for cessions of land and political rights\textsuperscript{16}. This was the standard currency of high politics everywhere in our period; this is what a political actor expected for his service. Not in Rome. It is scarcely surprising that there should often be a tone of hostility in our sources, for loyalty given so easily, and apparently often so flightily, for money. This was the age of the major moral panic over simony, after all, which was only one expression of a clear unease, indeed fear, in a

\textsuperscript{13} See most recently The languages of gift in the early middle ages, ed. W. Davies and P. Fouracre, Cambridge 2010, esp. the conclusion.

\textsuperscript{14} In Liutprand of Cremona, Historia Ottonis, in Liudprandi Opera cit., pp. 159-175, c. 17, John XII, «non ignorans quam facile Romanorum mentes pecunia posset corrumpere», promises money to the Romans if they will attack Otto I in 964; in Chronica pontificum et imperatorum S. Bartholomaei in Insula Romani, in MGH, Scriptores, XXXI, ed. O. Holder-Egger, Hannover 1903, pp. 189-223, at p. 214, a thirteenth-century addition to the text but plausibly using earlier material, Boniface VII, «sparsa per urbem pecunia», takes back the papacy in 984 from John XIV. Other early references focus on the more conventional sin of selling justice (see e.g. below, note 28).

\textsuperscript{15} Policraticus, ed. Webb cit., VI.24 (Webb, II, p. 72 for the quote). VI.25 ff. is John’s reply with esprit d’escalier.

more commercial world, that everything in politics could be bought\textsuperscript{17}. Rewarding people with land was normal and honourable; rewarding with money was dangerous and potentially polluting. Romans seemed not to care about this danger, and writers elsewhere condemned them for it. But for us as analysts, condemnation is (or should be) beside the point; what matters is to understand why the Romans dealt like this. The issue is not one of morality, but political economy. Why did the economy and society of Rome in our period favour a political practice based on money?

To answer this question, we have to look at it from two separate directions. First, and most important, the resources of the popes, who were seldom challenged as the formal rulers of the city of Rome in the period 1012-1143/44; and second, the interests of the Roman aristocracy itself, and more generally the urban middling élite which is what is mostly meant by the word populus\textsuperscript{18}. The popes were not poor. It is true that some sources claim they were; the \textit{Vita Leonis IX papae}, for example, says that there were no papal revenues when the pope took over in the city in 1049\textsuperscript{19}; but the monetary dealings listed above by themselves prove otherwise. All the same, it does seem that they did not in this period have access to lands in quite the way that other leading political powers did in our period in western Europe. The pope was the \textit{dominante} in Lazio, certainly, but his direct political control in most of the region was much less complete. The outlying territories to the north-west, north and south-east were by 1050 largely in the hands of autonomous aristocrats, the people whom the \textit{Annales Romani} generically call \textit{comites}, as a result of the patrimonialisation of office-holding and the localisation of political/judicial power into castle-based signorial territories, which was a common trend in eleventh-century Europe. The chaos of papal rivalry in the century after 1050 was not a favourable basis for the reversal of these processes. Only in the mid-twelfth century did popes, notably Eugenius III and Hadrian IV, begin to rebuild their proprietorial and political rights in parts of Lazio, castle by castle, often for payments in money; and it was only with Innocent III at the end of the century that the papacy re-established its control over most of Lazio as a public power\textsuperscript{20}. In our period, therefore, the standard


\textsuperscript{18} L. Mosiici, \textit{Alle origini del comune romano}, Roma 1980, pp. 24-27.


European political currency of cessions of castles and rural officeholding/judicial powers was not so readily available to popes. They probably always maintained as many lands and castles as any other major Italian bishop, but the stakes were higher in Rome, particularly once it became the focus of international interest. It took an alliance of most of the northern Italian cities twenty years to defeat Barbarossa, after all; so, when popes had to confront German armies on their own, they needed more resources than their surviving network of *castra specialia* could command.

Around Rome itself, in a wide zone stretching 20-25 kilometres from the city walls, in all some 1500 square kilometres in size, and also inside the city, the pope did keep large amounts of land, and here there were also few or no castles to break up the political hegemony of the city and its rulers. This large sub-region, the *agro romano*, was in fact almost wholly owned by the churches of Rome, with almost no lay landowning at all\(^1\). The pope did not by any means control all of these churches directly, but they certainly had a hegemony at least over San Giovanni in Laterano and San Pietro in Vaticano and their dependencies (San Pietro’s lands were very extensive; San Giovanni’s less so), and the papacy as an institution also seems plausibly to have owned most of the sector of land east of the Porta San Giovanni – as far as can be seen in the absence of the papal archive from this period\(^2\). But, outside the city and the belt of vineyards around it, these lands were mostly leased out in large blocks on long-term leases, to aristocrats and other important urban families. This does not mean that the church lost ultimate control of them, and it also kept at least part of the surplus which could be taken from them; they were secure bases for the wealth of the Roman churches as a group and the pope in particular\(^3\). But they were not lands that could easily be alienated for the immediate needs of a political crisis, as was the characteristic situation at times of papal schism. In the long run, Roman churches did redirect their leasing policies for political reasons, for example to rising urban families such as the Frangipani, but this was not much use if one needed to confront (say) the short-term danger posed by Cadalo of Parma in 1062 and 1063.

The movable resources of the papacy were, by contrast, extremely varied. One was, without doubt, the rents and other dues which came from the lands

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\(^3\) M. Lenzi, *La terra e il potere*, Roma 2000, pp. 48-66, 119-136. Rents were generally low, but made up for by the twelfth century by often substantial *entrunture* or entry-fines; I will argue elsewhere that these probably always existed, hidden by the stability of the formulae of emphiteusis in earlier centuries.
just mentioned. Rents and entry-fines from aristocrats were in money; rents from cultivators, when land was exploited directly by the church, were in kind, but grain and other produce could easily be turned into money by selling them in the city markets, given that Rome was one of the largest cities in Europe. Rome was also a major commercial and artisanal centre, and the church took its cut from this through urban ground rents and again entry-fines, as well as money from the sales of leases by their holders; and the pope, in particular, benefited from customs dues at the city gates and the Tiber ports.

Rome was furthermore, of course, a major focus for pilgrimage. Pilgrims brought so much money with them that Rome did not have to mint its own coins from the 980s to the 1180s, but never ever seems to have run short of cash for large-scale transactions. The pilgrim economy deserves a focussed study, but it is at least clear that it was overwhelmingly centred in the Civitas Leoniana, the future Borgo between San Pietro and Castel Sant’Angelo, which sees a concentration of shops in our documentary sources for the period; this highly lucrative area was essentially owned by San Pietro and its dependencies, even if other churches tried to get sections of it when they could. Pilgrims paid rent and bought food and drink; they often died in the Borgo, and San Pietro had the rights to the goods of the intestate; they also left very substantial donations on the altars of San Pietro, which Leo IX and Gregory VII made sure to take over from the “semi-lay” mansionarii who had controlled them hitherto. It is still possible to find books which claim that Rome was only prosperous because of the papal court and the pilgrim trade; this claim cannot be sustained. But the economy of the city must have been very substantially affected by the latter. Both the food marketing and the artisanal production of the city would have been influenced, and indeed reoriented, by this constant demand, as any tourist city, however otherwise eco-

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25 Toubert, Les structures cit., pp. 575-584, based on the documentary evidence. Rome’s excavations all the same show that less money was lost in this period than before the early eighth century or after c. 1200, implying that it was less widely used in daily life: see A. Rovelli, Monetary circulation in Byzantine and Carolingian Rome, in Early medieval Rome and the Christian West, ed. J.M.H. Smith, Leiden 2000, pp. 85-99, for a crisp summary. It is likely that much of the pecunia distributed about the city was not in the form of coins.

26 See e.g. SPV, nn. 12, 15, 16, 35, 42; Ecclesiae S. Maria in Via Lata tabularium, ed. L.M. Hartmann and (for vol. 3) M. Merores, 3 vols., Wien 1895-1913, nn. 36, 152.

27 SPV, nn. 16, 19 for intestacy and donations; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, Il clero di Roma nel medievo, Roma 2002, pp. 144-147 for the mansionarii.
nominically active, is today. And San Pietro, papally controlled, took a large share of the profit to be made from it.

To these local resources we have to add the international sources of money available to the popes. These have been better studied, from Karl Jordan onwards. The papacy had long-standing rights to annual gifts from the kings of England, to which were added the kings of Sicily in the early twelfth century, and Iberian rulers as well. They had annual renders from monasteries, not so much in most cases, but across Europe such sums mounted up. They had always taken money for the conferring of pallia, when this took place in Rome (as with the archbishops of Canterbury). They had also always taken money for papal privileges, and this practice developed substantially after 1100, as the cases of Caffaro and Diego Gelmírez both show; the same is true for papal justice, about which outsiders complained with regularity, and with ever greater insistence when this justice expanded so dramatically after the 1130s. These last two are, as we have seen, often seen as signs of the venality of particular popes; one can make that moral call if one wants, of course. The cost of papal justice, thanks to the munera necessary to make it work, indeed far outweighed that of judicial recourses elsewhere in Europe in the twelfth century – which did not, nonetheless, at all diminish the desire of litigants to use it. But the point is that these incomings were part of an established and long-lasting system, which hard-line critics (who included most of the writers of our narratives) wished to criticise, but which pragmatic popes like Calixtus II and Hadrian IV were happy to defend. They were a standard and stable, probably accountable, part of the papal Finanzverwaltung.

Finally, we must include the very substantial one-off gifts of money or treasure by political players in the different papal crises of our period. Beatrice and Matilde of Canossa paid for several of the papal financial interventions of the eleventh century listed earlier; the counts and then kings of Sicily paid for several in the twelfth. The kings of Sicily were particularly rich

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28 For all this see Jordan, Zur päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte cit.; D. Whitton, Papal policy in Rome, 1012-1124, D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1979, pp. 294-308; for later in the century, V. Pfaff, Aufgaben und Probleme der päpstlichen Finanzverwaltung am Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts, in «Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung», 64 (1956), pp. 1-24, including, pp. 2-13, a careful discussion of the monastic renders in the Liber Censuum (which is, however, by no means a full guide to papal resources). For the papal recourse to credit under Alexander III, see also F. Schneider, Zur älteren päpstlichen Finanzgeschichte, in «Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken», 9 (1906), pp. 1-37, at pp. 1-14. Paying for papal justice in an earlier period: e.g. the Acta concilii Causeiensis of 995, ed. G.H. Pertz, in MGH, SS, III, Hannover 1839, pp. 691-693, at p. 691, on a failed judicial hearing because of munuscula unwisely not given to Crescentius II; paying for privileges: e.g., The life of bishop Wilfrid by Eddius Stephanus, ed. B. Colgrave, Cambridge 1927, c. 34. But these are examples chosen at random out of many.
29 C. Wickham, Courts and conflict in twelfth-century Tuscany, Oxford 2003, e.g. p. 276.
benefactors; and they had lay Romans on their payroll too, as is shown, in
particular, by the survival of a formal document in which King Roger II in
1134 agreed a yearly payment to the Pierleoni of 240 unciæ of gold – a
notable sum, worth each year about 20% more than the one-off payment
made to the same family by Caffaro fourteen years before. Against the popes
and lay factions supported by these parties, the German king/emperors paid
the factions supporting their favoured popes in return. We cannot tell if these
gifts made up for the war damage carried out by the same powers, but, how-
ever partial a recompense, it was certainly a monetisation of such losses.

The papacy was therefore cash-rich (and treasure-rich), and relatively
short of land and other political rights to give to its clients. This made it high-
ly atypical among major European powers, all of which had firm landed
bases, and, however rich in gold and silver they were as well (as, evidently,
were the kings of Sicily), essentially gained all that wealth from the control of
land, which they could also dispose of for political purposes, and regularly
did. It also was atypical of Italian bishops, even of major commercial cities,
all of whom based their power – much smaller-scale than that of the popes –
on their networks of castles and estates. City communes in north-central
Italy, for their part, did have access to some of the resources the pope con-
trolled in Rome, but the pilgrim and international incomings of the pope put
it into a different league here too. Only Venice maintained a major commer-
cial and political operation with almost no land base at all; but even Venice
did not match the papacy in the scale of the resources routinely available to
it which were not based on the control of land, and other powers did not rem-
early do so. This made papal power different, even without counting in
the religious issues which structure the narratives of the period; different,
and, to the eyes of writers and political players from more “normal” polities,
 disturbing. This difference in papal resources was only reinforced by the fact
that outside powers, emperors or marquises of Tuscany or Normans, when
they intervened politically in Rome, had to do it with money, as they had no
land there to give.

Turning more briefly to the Roman aristocracy: this was a period in which
the major political players in the city were from relatively new families. The
Tuscolanî popes of the period 1012-46 had presided over a period in which
the old leading families of consules et duces of the tenth century – such as the
de Melioso, and the various families whom we call the Crescenzi – had, more
and more, left the papal court and begun to focus on the castle-based lord-
ships which were crystallising at the same time: in part because they were
becoming available, but largely precisely because the Tuscolanî now domi-
nated the papal power-structure so completely. So would the Tuscolanî them-
selves when they lost power in Rome. By contrast, the élite families which

31 P. F. Kehr, Diploma purpureo di re Roggero II per la casa Pierleoni, in «ASRSP», 24 (1901),
pp. 253-259; Caffaro, as above, n. 3, supplies the exchange rates for marks and unciæ.
32 See in general Toubert, Les structures cit., pp. 974-1000, 10151038. For the early history of
are newly visible in the city by 1050 – the Frangipani (the longest-attested),
the Pierleoni, the Corsi, the Tignosi, the Bracciuti, the Normanni, the
Sant’Eustachio, the family of Cencio di Stefano – did not yet have substantial
lands outside the Agro romano, and did not obtain them before the end of
the century. By the mid-twelfth century, the families which had survived all
had castles and wider lands, it is true. The Pierleoni in Isola Farnese, just out-
side the boundary of the agro romano, some time before 1107, seem to be the
earliest attested, although the heirs of Cencio di Stefano appear in Tuscia
Romana soon after, and the Frangipani would later follow them with greater
enthusiasm in Marittima – though the first known papal cessions of castles
to these families only begin with Honorius II’s gifts of Formello and
Terracina in 1124. Even then, they all continued to deal above all in a city-
based politics, and they continued to do so until well after our period ends. It
is important to stress that these newer families were above all landed; urban
and suburban possessions were was the basis of their wealth, as they were for
any other urban élite of the period. The importance of gifts of money for them
would have been as an important extra, a way of gaining and showing wealth
and power – and paying for retainers – and potentially changeable as politi-
cal status changed, rather than as a stable basis for social position on its own.
Perhaps they would have often been satisfied with further lucrative leases of
urban property; we do not have the right documentation to tell, and our nar-
ratives would not give it much stress; but, in a city with an active money econ-
omy, money would do very well as an alternative. And if this was all true for
the city’s leaders, it was still more true for the wider populus.

It is also necessary to underline just how much richer the papal court was
than any of the newer Roman families. It attracted them, so much so indeed
that they sometimes sought to dominate it directly, most famously in the
sharp Pierleoni-Frangipani oppositions and disputed papal elections of the
period 1118-1138. After the end of that phase of schism, when put on the
defensive by Innocent II’s triumphant return, the Romanorum nobiliores were
keen to attend the papal tribunal, the consistorium, in their silks in 1141, as
Abbot Hariulf of Oudenburg put it in his account of his time there; and we see
much the same in San Gregorio in Celio’s account of its failed attempt to get

the Crescenzi, O. Gerstenberg, Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Adels im Ausgang des 10.
Jahrhunderts, in «Historische Vierteljahrschrift», 31 (1937), pp. 1-26, and Whitton, Papal poli-
cy in Rome cit., pp. 103-183, are both better than G. Bossi, I Crescenzi, in «Dissertazioni della
Pontificia accademia romana di archeologia», 2 ser., 12 (1915), pp. 49-126, though I doubt the
detail of the genealogies in all of them. Toubert stresses that the various political shifts came
without major changes in the office-holding personnel of Rome; this is certainly true, but does
not affect the point made here.

33 For the Pierleoni and the heirs of Cencio di Stefano, see respectively J. Ficker, Forschungen
zur Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte Italiens, 4 vols., Innsbruck 1864-1874, IV, n. 92; B. Trifone,
Le carte del monastero di S. Paolo di Roma dal secolo XI al XV, in «ASRSP», 31 (1908), pp. 267-
313, nn. 4-5; and for analysis Whitton, Papal policy cit., pp. 185-202, 233-236, 244-254. For the
Frangipani, M. Thumser, Die Frangipane, in «Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen
back the castle of Poli in a series of papal hearings in exactly the same period, 1140-1141.\textsuperscript{34} Families of this kind wished to play by papal rules, whenever they were allowed to, and papal rules in this period involved money as the main reward for loyalty and dependence. We can see this at moments of political stability, with the Pierleoni and Frangipani in 1120 taking a cut of Caffaro’s Genoese money; and we can see it, very evidently, at moments of crisis in our narratives, when rival papal patrons competed with cash.

I would argue, in fact, that the cash-based wealth of the papal court was the most important factor in the economic underpinning of the politics of the city in the period 1050-1150, the city- and money-focus of the urban \textit{élite} families being less determinant. For one, the older families too, now called \textit{comites} in Roman sources, were still, despite their castle-holding and land-based politics outside the agro romano, entirely happy to accept the monetary rewards offered by papal contenders, in just the same way as the urban \textit{élite}; indeed, the Tuscolani would never have preferred to rule Tuscolo rather than to have had proper access to papal resources. Furthermore, looking later, once Innocent III had recreated a Lazio-wide political system, the leading city families of the early thirteenth century (most of them newer still than those discussed here) took as much advantage as they could of the new regional lordships that their papal or cardinal relatives could offer them, and did so without leaving their firm bases in the city.\textsuperscript{35} Aristocrats always adapt quickly to the rules of the political game they find themselves in, so as to get the best advantage out of it. But there was at least no serious dissonance in our period, despite its air of generalised crisis, between what the popes could give and the economic horizons of the people in the city whom the popes needed most to reward.

Money also had a symbolic and religious role in Rome, in a context which seems not to have had any negative implications: the handing out of money was prominent in several of the main ceremonial moments of the city of Rome. The different (but related) \textit{ordines} written down between the 1140s and 1190s by Benedetto, Albino and Cencio, which describe the ritual life of the city in great detail, lay down the payments to be made to participants on numerous occasions. Often, these are simply payments to cardinals, priests and singers for their participation in the rituals (and often with money from the altar of San Pietro, which as we have seen was a secure source of revenues);\textsuperscript{36} but on major occasions the laity were involved too. In particular, at


papal elections, and every Christmas and Easter, a series of payments were made to all the orders of clergy, and also the urban prefect, the palatine judges, scriniarii and other officials, including, later, the city’s senators. The makers of the very numerous temporary arches put up on Easter Monday along the Via Sacra from the Vatican to the Lateran, essentially members of the laity, were rewarded annually with sums varying between a few denarii and 45 solidi (and, for the rione of Parione, £6); so were a wide variety of scolae of artisans at Christmas and Easter. At papal elections the pope twice was required to throw money into the crowd, for different liturgical reasons; so did several papal officials at different points in the procession through the arches every Easter Monday; by the late twelfth century the populus also took “customary gifts” for their swearing of fidelity to incoming popes. And in the laudes Cornomannie held on the Saturday after Easter, a carnivalesque occasion involving all the population of Rome assembled around the archpriests of each diaconia of the city in the campus in front of the Lateran palace, one of the events involved each archpriest sitting backwards on a donkey trying to stretch back and grab a bowl with 20 solidi in it – until Gregory VII cancelled the laudes «after the expense of the war grew». These practices plausibly had imperial (Roman or Byzantine) roots in many cases. The imagery of the ready availability of papal money can only have been reinforced by such events; the city’s inhabitants watched the handing over of large sums, and sometimes had access to them themselves. By the mid-twelfth century, in particular, the senators and populus also took substantial ‘customary gifts’ for their swearing of fidelity to incoming popes; it is hard to know how much this was part of any ceremonial, but it must have been linked somehow to the ritual sequences just described.

Finally, Rome was atypical in that it was, so to speak, a non-hereditary monarchy, while at the same time being a single city state. With the single exception of Venice, no other polities with long-term non-hereditary rulers existed in Europe. The papal monarchy over Rome was hugely profitable, but any senior cleric could become pope and thus control the profits for an indefinite period; papal elections were thus potential, and usually actual, scenes of intense contestation, including the use of every financial weapon available to rival popes. (This continued until the firmer bureaucratisation of the election procedure later in the twelfth century; the schism of 1159 was already a slightly better-behaved process). The fact that these rivals were almost never Romans, except in the disputed election of 1130, made no difference, for foreign popes were no less dependent on political support in the city.

37 Le Liber Censuum cit., respectively I, pp. 291-292, II, pp. 124-125, 146-147 (prefect, etc.); I, pp. 299-300, 304 (arches and scolae); I, pp. 299, II, pp. 123-125 (throwing money); II, p. 171 (Cornomannia); with, for “customary gifts”, Codice diplomatico del Senato romano dal MCXLIV al MCCCXLVII, I, ed. F. Bartoloni, Rome 1948, n. 8, and Gesta Innocentii pp. III, in PL, CCXIV, Paris 1855, cols. XVII-CCXXVIII, c. 8. For one Byzantine payment ritual, see Liutprand, Antapodosis cit., VI.10.
Contrast city communes in Italy: they had a very different political practice, based on the opposition of factions, more or (usually) less successfully mediated through annually-changing collective rule or annual foreign podestà. Ideally, if a faction was defeated in any one year it could simply wait for the next. Even without that annual rhythm (which anyway often broke down into violence), the impulse of factional and family rivalry, with all its overtones of militarism and aristocratic honour, was quite sufficient as a motive in our communal narratives; twelfth-century city chronicles in the rest of Italy rarely put much weight on buying political support with money, however commercial the city. And, indeed, factional rivalry was often a sufficient explanation in Rome too, when there were no papal schisms, especially in the 1110s and 1120s – Pandolfo never says money had anything to do with the fight over the urban prefecture in 1116 or the kidnapping of Gelasius II in 1118.

This stress on faction rather than money became stronger, even in Rome, in the half-century after my period ends. It is significant that the Senate of 1144 onwards, the Roman city commune, was not associated in its formal dealings with narratives of buying support; and the popes were also largely absent from the city in the 1160s to 1180s. These narratives do continue, and sometimes involve individual senators, but they exist above all for papal reasons: because the papacy and its entourage, when it was in the city, was a rival to the Senate, still claiming monarchical powers, whether it could put them into practice or not; because there were still rival claimants to the papacy, until Italian politics quietened down in the 1180s; and because who was pope continued to have such enormous financial implications. But the way money was used after this period also changed. Gifts for papal justice and support certainly continued, and were indeed quasi-institutionalised. But as far as the Romans themselves were concerned, families more often got annual pensions from outside powers than single payments, in a generalisation of the Sicilian payments to the Pierleoni in the 1130s, which meant that political alliances were much more stable; and the actual beneficiaries of such monetary gifts were more often cardinals from leading families than their secular relatives. The rules of politics had shifted decisively by 1200, and the patterns outlined here were by then less relevant.

The papacy in our period was the major power in Europe whose wealth least depended on the direct control of territory and landed property, and was therefore most liquid, most based on money and treasure. The secular political actors in the city in our period were for the most part firmly based in the city, and ambitions to be territorial powers, and in political terms to deal less in money, had not yet emerged among them. There was a ceremonial rhetoric

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39 *LP*, pp. 301-313, 313-316.
of money of long standing in the city, which facilitated its acceptability as a political tool. And the non-hereditary nature of the papacy allowed rivalries to break out at each election, which gave plenty of space for the use of money to gain political support. These, particularly the first, seem to me to be the reasons why money mattered so insistently in the politics of Rome in the century 1050-1150. There was so much money visibly coming into the city that it is hardly surprising that lay political actors wanted a cut of it whenever they could. One could say that money was in Rome, in our period, simply the equivalent of land elsewhere; it looked less “honourable” as a recompense to outside observers, but that was simply because outside observers did not understand how Roman politics worked from the inside, and had no interest in knowing it – partly because they came from regions where such a politics simply seemed horrible, partly because if there was ever a period in which clerical writers were in a panic about money it was the age of “papal reform”.

But money was different from land, as well. If one was given land, on any terms, as outright property, on lease, or by some form of conditional tenure, it remained in one’s possession, and could be seen – and, in cases of disloyalty, could in principle be taken back again. Money was not like this; it was not visible (handing over money was a much less public act, and therefore potentially could be improper; the fact that it sometimes was said to happen by night is particularly significant, for night-time acts were often regarded as prima facie illegal); it also got spent, and thus both could not easily be given back and had to be renewed; and it was in our period a politically immediate, rather than a stable, resource. Hence the fact that money was given, not once, but often; and not just by one side in a dispute, but potentially by both. It looked all the worse to outsiders as a result. And it could run out. The lapidary phrase in the Annales Romani, which appears twice, as we saw, to describe events in 1062 and 1105, that once the money stopped they all went home, sums it up. Land did not run out for most rulers; money did; and politics could switch over when that happened. This inevitably meant that the politics of Rome was never as stable, in our period, as politics elsewhere. For reasons independent of praise or blame, just because of Rome’s peculiar economic and political structure, alliances were more fragile, and seemed more cynical to outside observers. But Hadrian IV was right, the stomach did have to eat. That was why no pope had the slightest intention of changing the system of Roman politics, for all the chorus of complaint; until the territorial politics of Innocent III and his successors opened the door to a land grab by Roman baronial families which both dwarfed the greed of the years around 1100 and normalised Roman political practice in the eyes of the outside world.


Wickham, Courts and conflict cit., e.g. p. 195.

So too Pfaff, Aufgaben und Probleme cit., p. 21.