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*Notes on the causes and consequences of political exclusion in late medieval Italy**

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This essay, which discusses late medieval Italy at a time when communes were at their peak, is divided into two parts. The first examines the causes of political exclusion, by analysing the political evolution of the governments of the *popolo* which, with the help of armed violence and of judicial bans that followed the successful use of that violence against their opponents (with the exception of a few cases), organized themselves into despotic regimes. The second examines the consequences of such actions, by focusing on *fuoruscitismo*, namely the phenomenon connected with the forced concentration of magnate families in the *contado*. The justification for this approach is the fact that the political exclusion which occurred in Central and Northern Italy throughout the late medieval period was not simply the physical displacement of citizens from their city, but the result of an intricate series of causes and consequences. Being excluded from one's native land signified a new outlook on life, due to the fact that every individual who endured banishment was punished through public humiliations, deprived of his political rights, separated from businesses and properties, and, last but not least, separated from family and friends. This situation was difficult though manageable for an individual if he and his dependants could turn to members of their extended family for aid and comfort. However, if all male members of the family had been banished - and in most cases they were - the situation was potentially catastrophic.¹

My interest in this historical issue is due to the fact that during the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth Italian cities, among which Florence played a significant role, were greatly affected by the phenomenon of political exclusion. The commune enforced sentences of ban or confinement against their enemies, as occurred in the city of the Lily between 1268 and 1269 with the persecutions of the Ghibellines. This practice also took place in Bologna in 1274, as seen by the banishment of the Ghibelline Labertazzi, and then once again in Florence, in 1302, when the White Guelfs and the Ghibellines were persecuted by the Black Guelfs, namely those who were helped by Pope Boniface VIII and Charles of Valois. Thanks to these sentences, which are evidence of the significant changes which occurred in two of the most important Italian city-republics of the time, the new regime of the *popolo*, composed of merchant and banker families, was, in the name of Guelfism, able to take the place of the old ruling class.²

The campaign against magnates was part of a policy whose political instruments included sentences of confinement, bans, fines, executions, sequestering and confiscation of goods, loss of political rights, and penalties for political crimes, with most of these being passed *in absentia*. The ban was an element of the political and social process, and the conviction *in absentia*, through the *pro maleficio* ban, gave judges the power to condemn the guilty to the death penalty. The legal process of exclusion made it possible for those in power to attack the assets of certain families and to keep them entirely out of office. And, even if the judicial process allowed the banished to

* I would like to thank Humfrey Butters and Marcello Fantoni for having supervised every stage of my research with interest and attention.

¹ R. STARN, *Contrary Commonwealth. The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy*, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1982; J. HEERS, *L'esilio, la vita politica, la società nel Medioevo* [1995] Napoli, 1997; CH. SHAW, *The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy*, Cambridge, 2000.

² On Bologna see S. R. BLANSHEI, "Crime and Law Enforcement in Medieval Bologna", in *Journal of Social History*, 16, 1982, pp. 121-138 and G. MILANI, "Dalla ritorsione al controllo. Elaborazione e applicazione del programma antighibellino a Bologna alla fine del Duecento", in *Quaderni storici*, XXXII, n. 1, 1997, pp. 43-74. On Florence and the sentences against the "compagnia malvagia e scempia", cf. F. RICCIARDELLI, "Dal *Libro del Chiodo*: i registi delle condanne del 1302", in *Argomenti storici*, 5, 1998, pp. 7-30. On the first half of the fourteenth century Florence, cf. J. M. NAJEMY, *Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400*, Chapel Hill, 1982, pp. 43-165; F. FRANCESCHI, "Intervento del potere centrale e ruolo delle arti nel governo dell'economia fiorentina del Trecento e del primo Quattrocento", in *Archivio storico italiano*, CLI, 1993, pp. 863-909; A. ASTORRI, "Gli spazi politici dei mercanti a Firenze nel primo Trecento", in *Archivio storico italiano*, CLIX, 2001, pp. 289-311.

negotiate their sentences, anyone who had been convicted for political reasons was rarely granted amnesty and was almost never reintegrated into the political framework.³

Nevertheless, some examples can be found in which the ban was nullified and the exiled were readmitted into the city, as seen in the peace accords that characterized Bologna, Florence and Siena between 1270 and 1320.⁴ Such amnesties were an incentive for those who had been condemned *in absentia*, although it must be pointed out that these peace accords and re-admissions into the city were principally the reuniting of familial groups, and rarely concerned either the political arena or the pacification between Guelfs and Ghibellines.⁵

During the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth, exile was used in Florence, as everywhere, by the ruling group as a tool for governing the new city-states. Banishment occurred both as the result of legal enforcement on the part of the state, and also at the spontaneous initiative of individuals. In both cases, the political effect was the same. In the first, exile was legitimised by law, and enabled the ruling body to punish those who had not followed their orders. In the second, exclusion was brought about by precipitate flight, or, by a deliberate choice on the part of members of the defeated faction to avoid a fiercer punishment.⁶ This is the case of Dante Alighieri who, on March 27, 1302, was sentenced by Cante de' Gabrielli of Gubbio,⁷ *podestà* of Florence, to a fine of 5,000 florins, and on March 10 of the same year, by virtue of his absence, was sentenced to death. The fact that the fine assigned to Dante was completely disproportionate to his financial means and the fact that the Florentine poet received the death penalty *in absentia*, demonstrate that the only way to avoid paying the fine and to avoid death was escape.⁸

The case of Dante shows that there was essentially no real difference between being banned or condemned to death, and choosing to escape, given that the series of events which occurred in numerous Central and Northern Italian cities during the second half of the thirteenth century always resulted in the separation of citizens from their city.⁹ Those who had no choice other than to escape were joined by their children and descendants, because the expulsion from the city of those banned, condemned to death and willing to escape, did not involve only one person: it had a ripple effect which led to the consequent involvement of all of his relatives. Florentine statutes were very precise with regard to this matter, as demonstrated by the law regarding the crime of lese-majesty - an attempt to undermine the security of the city-republic - according to which, political enemies, bandits, and rebels would be persecuted along with their families and reduced, without pity, to a vagrant life.¹⁰

³ G. MILANI, "Prime note su disciplina e pratica del bando a Bologna attorno alla metà del XIII secolo", in *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, t. 109, 1997, pp. 504-509.

⁴ G. FASOLI, "La pace del 1279 tra i partiti bolognesi", in *Archivio storico italiano*, s. VII, XX, 1933, pp. 49-68; M. SANFILIPPO, "Guelfi e ghibellini a Firenze: la 'pace' del cardinal Latino (1280)", in *Nuova rivista storica*, LXIV, 1980, pp. 1-24; I. LORI SANFILIPPO, "La pace del cardinale Latino a Firenze nel 1280. La sentenza e gli atti complementari", in *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio evo e Archivio Muratoriano*, LXXXIX, 1980, pp. 227-230; P. R. PAZZAGLINI, *The Criminal Ban of the Sienese Commune. 1225-1310*, Milano, 1979, pp. 87-88 and doc. XXV.

⁵ A. ZORZI, *Negoziazione penale, legittimazione giuridica e poteri urbani nell'Italia comunale*, in *Criminalità e giustizia in Germania e in Italia. Pratiche giudiziarie e linguaggi giuridici tra tardo Medioevo ed età moderna*, M. BELLABARBA - G. SCHWERHOFF - A. ZORZI, Bologna, 2001, pp. 13-34.

⁶ On criminal ban, cf. D. CAVALCA, *Il bando nella prassi e nella dottrina giuridica medievale*, Milano, 1978, pp. 42-58; PAZZAGLINI, *The Criminal Ban*, pp. 1-19; C. GUIMBARD, *Exile et institution du comune à Florence dans la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle*, in *Exile et civilisation en Italie (XI^e-XVI^e siècle)*, Etudes réunies par J. HEERS - CHR. BEC, Nancy, 1990, pp. 21-31.

⁷ G. INZITARI, *Gabrielli da Gubbio, Cante de'*, in *Enciclopedia dantesca*, III, Roma, 1971, pp.81-82; G. CIAPPELLI, *Gabrielli, Cante*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 51, Roma, 1998, pp. 75-78.

⁸ RICCIARDELLI, "Dal Libro del Chiodo: i registi delle condanne del 1302", p. 11 and 13.

⁹ J. HEERS, *Partiti e vita politica nell'Occidente medievale* [1977], Milano, 1983, pp. 163-181; IDEM, *L'esilio, la vita politica*, pp. 23-34.

¹⁰ U. DORINI, *Il diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze nel sec. XIV*, Lucca, 1923, p. 173. On the "crimen lesae maiestatis", cf. F. COGNASSO, *L'Italia del Rinascimento*, Torino, 1965, II, pp. 638-640; C. GHISALBERTI, "Sulla teoria dei delitti di lesa maestà nel diritto comune", in *Archivio giuridico*, CXLIX, 1955, p. 171; IDEM, "La condanna al bando nel diritto comunale", in *Archivio giuridico*, 1960, p. 50; M. SBRICCOLI, "Crimen lesae maiestatis". *Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna*, Milano, 1974. On Florentine statutes, cf. A. ZORZI, *Le fonti normative a Firenze nel tardo Medioevo. Un bilancio delle edizioni e degli studi*, in *Statuti della Repubblica*

In Florence, as elsewhere, the phenomenon of political exclusion became widespread once the governing body of the consular commune divided. This event took place owing to a number of factors including the progressive rise of the *popolo* and the race for political office. Guelf and Ghibelline factions were dominated by noble families of feudal origins, whose pursuit of political power involved the use of armed violence in the streets; this was a feature of Florentine political life to which the emerging classes that made up the *popolo* had to adapt themselves!¹

Beginning in 1282, or more precisely, from the moment in which the guild government became a reality, the Florentine Republic enjoyed sporadic moments of peace. But even when the corporative structure was well established, the problems of internal politics did not disappear, and instead were projected outside the city. In fact, while throughout the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth political battles were normally resolved by street fights, throughout the course of the *Trecento* street fights were replaced by territorial disputes in which the methods, although not the objectives, were invariable.¹² Examples of this are numerous, therefore it would be sufficient to mention the case of the Milanese Torriani and Visconti families, the Pisan Lanfranchi Rosso and Lanfreducci families, and the Solari and Guttuari families from the Asti region.¹³

The fact that numerous intellectuals commented on social behavior which was the result of divisions between Guelfs and Ghibellines, magnates and *popolo*, as well as between cities, demonstrates that this battle between factions was perceived by contemporaries as a primary cause of political uprising, and a tool by which a new political structure could be created. These fights between families always resulted in some of them being banned, condemned to death, or forced to escape, and if we add to this the ordinances against the magnates, the plausible motives for excluding political enemies were numerous, and, as in the case of the *ammonizione* in Florence, could only be perfected through new methods.¹⁴

The fact that battles between factions were an everyday matter for intellectuals during the second half of the thirteenth century, confirms the central importance of this problem for contemporaries of the day. These struggles were seen as the reason for the fall of the popular regimes, principally to the incapacity of such governments to dispense just and unimpeachable punishments.¹⁵ Rhetorical and academic writers, for instance, insisted on the necessity of identifying the well-being of individual citizens with that of the city, and the fact that their advice no longer revolved around single citizens and the importance of rhetorical matters, but instead focused upon despotic forms

fiorentina, ed. by R. CAGGESE, II, *Statuto del Podestà dell'anno 1325*, New Edition ed. by G. PINTO - F. SALVESTRINI - A. ZORZI, Firenze, 1999, pp. LIII-CI.

¹¹ A general overview is printed in S. RAVEGGI, *Da Federico II a Carlo D'Angiò: l'Italia dei guelfi e dei ghibellini*, in *Storia della società italiana*, vol. VI, *La società comunale e il policentrismo*, Milano, 1986, pp. 255-278, and pertaining to Florence, cf. S. RAVEGGI - M. TARASSI - D. MEDICI - P. PARENTI, *Ghibellini, Guelfi e Popolo Grasso. I detentori del potere politico nella seconda metà del Duecento*, Firenze, 1978, pp. 167-229; E. SESTAN, *Società e istituzioni nei secc. IX e X: Firenze, Fiesole, Pistoia*, in IDEM, *Alto Medioevo*, Firenze, 1988, pp. 107-122; E. SESTAN, *Le origini del comune di Firenze*, in IDEM, *Italia comunale e signorile*, Firenze, 1989, pp. 113-125.

¹² Regarding factional discord, see *Aristocrazia cittadina e ceti popolari nel tardo medioevo in Italia e Germania*, ed. by R. ELZE - G. FASOLI, Bologna, 1984; G. M. VARANINI, *Istituzioni e società a Treviso tra comune, signoria e poteri regionali (1259-1339)*, in *Storia di Treviso*, II, *Il Medioevo*, ed. by D. RANDO - G. M. VARANINI, Venezia, 1991, pp. 135-211; G. MILANI, "Il governo delle liste nel comune di Bologna. Premesse e genesi di un libro di proscrizione duecentesco", in *Rivista storica italiana*, I, 1996, pp. 149-229; PH. JONES, *The Italian City-State. From Commune to Signoria*, Oxford, 1997, pp. 63-64 and 141-150.

¹³ A. ZORZI, "Ius erat in armis". *Faide e conflitti tra pratiche sociali e pratiche di governo*, in *Origini dello Stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna*, ed. by G. CHITTOLINI - A. MOLHO - P. SCHIERA, Bologna, 1994, pp. 623-628.

¹⁴ L. ZDEKAUER, "Studi sulla criminalità italiana nel Duecento e Trecento", in *Bullettino senese di storia patria*, VIII (1901), pp. 310-332; E. VERGA, "Le sentenze criminali dei podestà milanesi, 1385-1429. Appunti per la storia della giustizia punitiva in Milano", in *Archivio storico lombardo*, XXVIII, 1901, pp. 96-142; G. S. PENE VIDARI, "Sulla criminalità e sui banni del Comune di Ivrea nei primi anni della dominazione sabauda (1313-1347)", in *Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino*, LXVIII, 1970, pp. 157-211; W. J. CONNELL, "Il commissario e lo Stato territoriale fiorentino", in *Ricerche storiche*, XVIII, 1988, pp. 591-617; H. MANIKOWSKA, "'Accorr'uomo'. Il popolo nell'amministrazione della giustizia a Firenze durante il XIV secolo", in *Ricerche storiche*, XVIII, 1988, pp. 523-549; A. ZORZI, "Giustizia e società a Firenze in età comunale: spunti per una prima riflessione", in *Ricerche storiche*, 1988, pp. 449-495.

¹⁵ ZDEKAUER, "Studi sulla criminalità italiana", pp. 320-330; D. RICCI, *Il processo di Dante*, Firenze, 1967, pp. 153-157.

of governing, demonstrates the significance of the changing situation. With the exception of a few cases, in fact, throughout the first decades of the fourteenth century the governments of the *popolo* gave way to *signorie*.¹⁶

Among the intellectuals there were those who aligned themselves with the new *signorie*, while others continued to support the governments of the *popolo*. Egidio Colonna, better known as Egidio Romano (1243-1316),¹⁷ composed a treatise entitled *De regimine principum* around 1270, which demonstrated the superiority of a monarchical system to popular government.¹⁸ This treatise, commissioned by the French king Phillip IV, was translated into a number of languages and enjoyed an incredible circulation throughout Europe. The treatise also played a significant role in Italy where, with its divine vision of the prince, it served as justification for the change from a government of the *popolo* to that of a *signore*.¹⁹ Although both of these forms of government were imposed, the policy of exclusion that resulted from armed conflict in the cities, according to Egidio the regime of the *signore*, contrary to that of the *popolo*, had the capacity to produce political stability.²⁰

The issuing of lists of proscriptions, the effect of political ban, along with other factors produced high social costs, and the fact that in most Central and Northern Italian cities the number of popular governments was decreasing, shows that the combination of factional battles and prohibitions contributed greatly to the affirmation of the new despotic regimes.²¹ In his *Defensor pacis*, for instance, Marsilius of Padua (1275/80-1342/3)²² identifies factionalism as the primary cause of political instability in Italian cities in the age of Dante.²³ According to Marsilius, in fact, peace and tranquillity were the necessary ingredients for stable governments, while disputes between men could only lead to division, war, and destruction. For Marsilius, in other words, factionalism represented a denial of liberty which always corresponded to the establishment of personal forms of power.²⁴

Concern about these new and common forms of government characterized the new generation of jurists, commonly known as annotators or writers of treatises, among whom Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1314-1357) was the most significant.²⁵ An undisputed promoter of the superiority of the *ad populum* regimes, the famous fourteenth-century jurist wrote the *Tractatus de Guelphis et Ghibellinis*,²⁶ in which he identified factionalism as the greatest danger for the good order of the

¹⁶ J. K. LAURENT, "The exile and the signory: the case of Ferrara", in *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, v. 11, n. 2, 1981, pp. 281-297.

¹⁷ F. DEL PUNTA - S. DONATI - C. LUNA, *Egidio Romano*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 42, Roma, 1993, pp. 319-341.

¹⁸ QUAGLIONI, *Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano*, p. 8 and p. 30 footnote 38.

¹⁹ J. MIETHKE, *Le teorie politiche del Medio Evo* [1991], Genova, 2001, pp. 94-104.

²⁰ Cf., for a comparison between Ferrara and Florence, LAURENT, "The exile and the signory: the case of Ferrara", pp. 281-185; RICCIARDELLI, "Dal Libro del Chioda: i registi delle condanne del 1302", pp. 1024.

²¹ W. ULLMANN, *Principi di governo e politica nel Medioevo* [1961], Bologna, 1972, pp. 373-383.

²² C. DOLCINI, *Introduzione a Marsilio da Padova*, Roma - Bari, 1995, pp. 85-112.

²³ N. RUBINSTEIN, *Marsilius of Padua and Italian Political Thought*, in *Europe in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. by J. R. HALE - J. R. HIGHFIELD - B. SMALLEY, London, 1965, pp. 44-75; C. VASOLI, *Introduzione*, in MARSILIO DA PADOVA, *Il difensore della pace. Primo discorso*, Venezia, 1991², pp. 9-62. See also Q. SKINNER, *Le origini del pensiero politico moderno*, 2 vols. [1978], Bologna, 1989, vol. 1, *Il Rinascimento*, pp. 126-140; C. J. NEDERMAN, *Community and Consent, The Secular Political Theory of Marsilio of Padua's Defensor Pacis*, Boston, 1995; A. GHISALBERTI, "Politica. Il governo della città in Tommaso d'Aquino e Masilio da Padova", in *Annali chieresi*, 1996, pp. 131-153; MIETHKE, *Le teorie*, pp. 161-169.

²⁴ "Et quoniam custos hic habet arcere iniuriosos excedentes et alios tam intrinsecus quam extrinsecus singulos turbantes aut communitatem opprimere temptantes, oportuit civitatem ad hos habere in se aliquid, quo resistat": MARSILIO DA PADOVA, *Il difensore della pace*, p. 96.

²⁵ C. N. S. WOLF, *Bartolus of Sassoferrato. His Position in the History of Medieval Political Thought*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1913; F. CALASSO, *Bartolo da Sassoferrato*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 6, Roma, 1964, pp. 640-669.

²⁶ BARTOLO DA SASSOFERRATO, *Tractatus de Guelphis et Gebellinis*, in D. QUAGLIONI, *Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano. Il "De tyranno" di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314-1357). Con l'edizione critica dei trattati "De Guelphis et Gebellinis", "De regimine civitatis" e "De Tyranno"*, Firenze, 1983, pp. 131-146.

Italian communes.²⁷ The fact that several Central and Northern Italian city-states, including Florence, were weak, meant that, according to him, urban societies were divided and unable to command adequate political consent.²⁸ In almost all of his works, Bartolus affirms that peace and unity are fundamental elements for avoiding the catastrophic effects of factious battles, although his method of describing political rivalries through street fighting and violent clashes, authorizes us to argue that he was convinced that the commune's political and territorial structure was rudimentary, semi-private and provisional.²⁹

In general, continual internal rivalries (as, for example, the Florentine conflicts between Guelfs and Ghibellines, magnates and *popolani*, and Whites and Blacks) demonstrated the instability of popular government and its inability to resolve its domestic political problems; and it is worth emphasizing that throughout the fourteenth century these social disputes took on territorial rather than city dimensions.³⁰ The expulsion from Central and Northern Italian cities was generally linked to the struggles between clans or individual families, and the fact that such battles were the cause of the internal instability of the city-state explains why numerous intellectuals devoted their attention to the issue.³¹

Such matters were also tackled by other intellectuals, as demonstrated, for instance, by the *lauda* which, written by the lay brother Bonvesin de la Riva (c. 1240-1313/5),³² emphasized the liberty and magnificence of Milan. In his work, the author denounced the absence of peace and harmony in the city due to factionalism. He also pointed out that the internal divisions caused by envy and cunning between influential citizens represented a true threat to the well-being and economic prosperity of the commune.³³ According to Bonvesin, therefore, factionalism was the main cause of political exclusion, and the pernicious consequence of a lacerated system for which peace could be the only salvation.³⁴

Tuscan chroniclers such as Giovanni Villani (ca. 1277-1348)³⁵ and Dino Compagni (1225-1324)³⁶ also represented factionalism in a negative manner, associating it with the violent customs of the

²⁷ A. MORONGIU, "Il regime bipartitico nel trattato sui Guelfi e Ghibellini di Bartolo da Sassoferrato", in *Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile*, 1959, p. 1019.

²⁸ "Sed in hiis que fierent contra extrinsecos et inimicos illius hominis sic precellentis, licet bene regat rem publicam, puto dicendum idem ac si tyranno factum esset": BARTOLO DA SASSOFERRATO, *Tractatus de Tyranno*, in QUAGLIONI, *Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano*, p. 212. Cf. also SKINNER, *Le origini del pensiero politico*, vol. 1, *Il Rinascimento*, pp. 114-140.

²⁹ G. CHITTOLINI, *The Italian City State and Its Territory*, in *City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*, ed. by A. MOLHO - K. RAAFLAUB - J. EMLÉN, Ann Arbor, 1991, pp. 602-588.

³⁰ F. SALVESTRINI, *Signori e contadini*, in *Storia della civiltà toscana*, I, *Comuni e Signorie*, ed. by F. CARDINI, Firenze, 2000, pp. 49-75.

³¹ M. CARVALE, *Ordinamenti giuridici dell'Europa medievale*, Bologna, 1994, p. 486. For a general overview, cf. E. OCCHIPINTI, *L'Italia dei comuni. Secoli XI-XIII*, Roma, 2000, pp. 88-95.

³² S. AVALLE, *Bonvesin de La Riva*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 12, Roma, 1970, pp. 465-469.

³³ "Iam vidistis tot et tanta talis et tante urbis magnalia, que de dono prospicit in melius et proficiet, nisi dentibus invidie sua sponte se ipsam discerpant": BONVESIN DE LA RIVA, *Grandezze di Milano*, ed. by A. PAREDI, Milano, 1967, p. 141.

³⁴ Cf. the Florentine situation in C. LANSING, *The Florentine Magnates. Lineage and Faction in a Medieval Commune*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1991, pp. 176-184.

³⁵ On Giovanni Villani see G. AQUILECCHIA, "Dante and the Florentine Chroniclers", in *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 48, 1965-1966, pp. 48-51; L. GREEN, *Chronicle into History*, London, 1972, pp. 9-43; F. RAGONE, "Le scritture parlate. Qualche ipotesi sulla redazione delle cronache volgari nel Trecento dopo l'edizione critica delle "Nuova Cronica" di Giovanni Villani", in *Archivio storico italiano*, CXLIX, 1991, pp. 783-810; IDEM, *Giovanni Villani e i suoi collaboratori: la scrittura delle cronache a Firenze nel Trecento*, Roma, 1998; G. PORTA, *La costruzione della storia in Giovanni Villani*, in *Il senso della storia nella cultura medievale italiana (1100-1350)*, Pistoia, 1995, pp. 125-138.

³⁶ On Dino Compagni see G. ARNALDI, "Dino Compagni cronista e militante "popolano"", in *La cultura*, XXI, 1983, pp. 37-82; IDEM, *Cronica delle cose occorrenti ne' tempi suoi*, in *Letteratura italiana. Le Opere*, I. *Dalle origini al Cinquecento*, Torino, 1992, pp. 331-350; IDEM, "Compagni Dino", in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, 27, Roma, 1982, pp. 629-647; F. RAGONE, "Dino Compagni e i suoi nemici. Linguaioli e archivisti nella Firenze postunitaria", in *Quaderni storici*, 82, 1993, pp. 39-60; D. CAPPI, *Del Lungo editore di Dino Compagni: il problema del testo della "Cronica"*, Roma, 1995.

milites.³⁷ A representative of the new mercantile ruling class, Villani, nonetheless, identified the *grassezza* (riches) that "gave birth to great corruption"³⁸ as the cause of the division of Whites and Blacks within the Guelf party, while Compagni, also writing about the disputes between Blacks and Whites, argued that the internal divisions and the opposing civic values of the common good and the peace of the commune brought the exile of some six hundred citizens, between Ghibellines and Guelfs of the White party, condemned with their goods and their persons to go "here and there throughout the world".³⁹

The root of political instability in the communal period, therefore, was factional struggle, and to this phenomenon was linked a sense of precariousness due to the economic uncertainty which consorted with the desire for revenge. Even when the majority of Central and Northern Italian cities became subject to *signori*, the effects of these battles, in varying degrees according to region, resounded throughout the country. Most of the men who had been uprooted from their social fabric had once been powerful figures, and upon being humiliated, deprived of their goods, and persecuted together with their relatives, they quickly became new enemies of the commune that had exiled them.⁴⁰

As a precaution against the threat posed by those they had expelled, Italian cities imposed tougher controls and tried to disperse those who had been exiled. However, it was inevitable that the exiled became a potential threat to the commune which had banished them, given both their desire to re-join the society to which they had once belonged, and their consciousness of an uncertain economic future if they were left without their assets.⁴¹ Those who were excluded found shelter in the palaces and towers of noble families of the *contado*, who, at the beginning of the consular phase of the commune, had taken up residence in the city, while maintaining their properties in the *contado*. As a matter of fact, these families of feudal origin who had established homes in the city, were often forced to return to the *contado*, given the frequent changes in internal politics of Italian city-republics. In their castles they could therefore provide the exiled with shelter, and above all, the hope of once again returning to the city.⁴²

These refuges varied according to area, and could be fortified *borghi* or isolated castles or towers. For the exiled finding shelter in such private fortresses, which exhibited strong feudal elements, and joining armed resistance groups was made possible by the socio-economic characteristics of the urban aristocracy of the time, and in particular by the fact that these powerful urbanized family groups also had large estates in the *contado*.⁴³ These fortified castles were kept in perfect running

³⁷ G. FASOLI, "Ricerche sulla legislazione antimagnatizia nei comuni dell'alta e media Italia," in *Rivista di storia del diritto italiano*, 1939, pp. 265-266.

³⁸ "partorire superba corruzione": GIOVANNI VILLANI, *Nuova Cronica*, ed. by G. PORTA, 3 vols., Parma, 1990-1991, IX, 39.

³⁹ "i quali andarono stentando per lo mondo, chi qua e chi là": D. COMPAGNI, *Cronica delle cose occorrenti ne' tempi suoi*, ed. by I. DEL LUNGO, "Rerum Italicarum Scriptores", t. IX, part II, Città di Castello, 1913, II, 25.

⁴⁰ G. TABACCO, *Egemonie sociali e strutture del potere*, Torino, 1979, pp. 226-292; R. BORDONE, *Nascita e sviluppo delle autonomie cittadine*, in *La Storia. I grandi problemi dal Medioevo all'Età Contemporanea*, ed. by N. TRANFAGLIA - M. FIRPO, II, *Il Medioevo*, 2. *Popoli e strutture politiche*, Torino, 1986, pp. 427-460; E. ARTIFONI, *Città e comuni*, in *Storia Medievale*, Roma, 1998, pp. 363-386; J.-C. MAIRE VIGUEUR, *Regni, principati, città*, in *La società medievale*, Bologna, 1999, pp. 59-104.

⁴¹ S. RAVEGGI, *Protagonisti e antagonisti nel libero Comune*, in *Prato. Storia di una città*, vol. I, *Ascesa e declino del centro medievale (dal Mille al 1494)*, ed. by G. CHERUBINI, Prato, 1980, pp. 613-722.

⁴² S. RAVEGGI, *Gli aristocratici in città: considerazioni sul caso di Firenze (secc. XIII-XV)*, in *D'une ville à l'autre: structures matérielles et organisation de l'espace dans les villes européennes (XIII^e-XV^e siècle)*, Roma, 1989, pp. 69-86.

⁴³ R. ROMEO, *Il comune rurale di Origgio nel secolo XIII*, Assisi, 1970, p. 12; G. CHERUBINI, *Appunti sul brigantaggio in Italia alla fine del Medioevo*, in IDEM, *Il lavoro, la taverna, la strada. Scorci di Medioevo*, Napoli, 1997, p. 157. On the structure of castles as places of refuge, cf. A. A. SETTIA, "La struttura materiale del castello nei secoli X e XI. Elementi di morfologia castellana nelle fonti scritte dell'Italia settentrionale", in *Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino*, LXXVII, 1979, pp. 361-430. On road system and security, cf. I. MORETTI, "La via Francigena in Toscana", in *Ricerche storiche*, VII, 1977, pp. 383-406; G. SERGI, *Potere e territorio lungo la strada di Francia. Da Chambéry a Torino fra X e XIII secolo*, Napoli, 1981, pp. 187-289; T. SZABÓ, *Comuni e politica stradale in Toscana e in Italia nel Medioevo*, Bologna, 1992, pp. 113-149; P. GRILLO, "Vie di comunicazione, traffici e mercati nella politica intercittadina milanese fra XII e XIII secolo", in *Archivio storico italiano*, CLIX, 2001, pp. 265-269.

order by the *signori* who closely supervised their properties, who played the role of master over the peasants, and who expected them to use arms to defend the fortress from enemies, especially communal forces.⁴⁴ These *signori*, who always remained in their fortresses, surrounded by servants, clerics and other courtiers, continued to assemble vassals and followers around them, and did not change their life-style throughout the entire communal age and the late fourteenth century. On the contrary, they strengthened their ties with other noble families, maintaining their political weight in the mountain areas where they had established themselves.⁴⁵

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a large number of noble families who possessed fiefs and castles in the *contado* and had been exiled from the city, represented a threat to many Central and Northern Italian cities.⁴⁶ The communes used several different strategies in an attempt to establish the greatest security possible in their territories and streets. They sometimes took sides in conflicts within families, accentuating the already existing divisions within different branches of the *casate*. At other times they set about the creation of new settlements or attempted to defeat the exiled by establishing small groups of armed men to be positioned in the most dangerous streets. In the area of Florence, for instance, "new towns" were created in the Mugello and Valdarno, and new strongholds built as centres of defence against the Ubaldini, Guidi and Ubertini families - such as Terranuova, Scarperia, Firenzuola, Castel San Giovanni, Castelfranco - became new urban realities.⁴⁷

The most concrete threat to the Italian communes was represented by the rebel *signori*, as shown by the famous convention at San Godenzo, joined by Dante, at which the Florentine Whites and Ghibellines reached an agreement with the Valdarno and Apennine Ghibelline *signori* to wage war in the Valdarno itself.⁴⁸ Even if these old Florentine families, as Robert Davidsohn wrote, "would never again reach the level of their ancient splendor",⁴⁹ the communes were intent upon impoverishing the old noble *casate* of the *contado*, inciting their subjects against these old families, and confronting them in battle with the aim of gaining possession of strategic fortifications and securing the main arteries of transportation.⁵⁰

Despite this, between 1250 and 1290 the commune had neither conquered nor pacified the *contado*, and in fact, it was far from doing so, principally because the political exclusion of the magnate class from all significant political roles, as well as from the municipal magistracy, contributed to the strength of these noble *casate* of the *contado* who helped them.⁵¹ For their part, those *signori*, who were the most politically shrewd, sought alliances with other powerful figures, used their military power to take part in armed struggles within the city, and contributed to the instability of the city's internal politics. The city, hoping to defeat them, was ready to align with other cities, or, as in the case of Florence, with other foreign *signori*.⁵²

An example of this is the rivalry between the commune of Piacenza and Ubertino Landi, one of the last partisans of the Emperor Frederick II. Banned from Piacenza following the subjection of the city to Angevin power and the institutional authority of the mercantile class in 1271, Ubertino was

⁴⁴ A. A. SETTIA, "Castelli e strade del nord Italia in età comunale: sicurezza, popolamento, "strategia"", in *Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino*, LXXVII, 1979, pp. 231-260.

⁴⁵ J. LARNER, *Il potere signorile nelle campagne romagnole*, in *La crisi degli ordinamenti comunali e le origini dello stato del Rinascimento*, ed. by G. CHITTOLINI, Bologna, 1979, pp. 287-300; IDEM, *L'Italia nell'età di Dante, Petrarca e Boccaccio* [1980], Bologna, 1982, pp. 221-260; T. DEAN, *The Rise of the Signori*, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, V, ed. by D. ABULAFIA, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 458-478.

⁴⁶ SETTIA, "Castelli e strade", pp. 258-260.

⁴⁷ SALVESTRINI, *Signori e contadini*, p. 68. More in general, see D. FRIEDMAN, *Terre nuove. La creazione delle città fiorentine nel tardo medioevo* [1988], Torino, 1996, pp. 39-52.

⁴⁸ M. BICCHIERAI, *Il castello di Raggiolo e i Conti Guidi. Signoria e società nella montagna casentinese del Trecento*, Arezzo, 1994 p. 92.

⁴⁹ R. DAVIDSOHN, *Storia di Firenze* [1896-1927], 8 vols., Firenze, 1956-1968, IV, p. 295.

⁵⁰ SZABÓ, *Comuni e politica stradale in Toscana*, p. 133.

⁵¹ On the destiny of exiled Florentine families, cf. DAVIDSOHN, *Storia di Firenze*, IV, pp. 294-296; on the failure of commercial companies within the city of Florence due to exile of one or more members of the family, cf. *Ivi*, pp. 297-304.

⁵² A. DE VINCENZI, "Le signorie angioine a Firenze. Storiografia e prospettive", in *Reti Medievali. Iniziative on line per gli studi medievistici*, <http://www.storia.unifi.it/_RM/default.htm> [last updated 24/09/01].

condemned to death *in absentia* and, therefore, deprived of his assets.⁵³ However, given that his goods in the *contado* were never touched, he became a thorn in the side of the commune and an unyielding enemy. Thanks to his property, in fact, Ubertino was able to control enough land in the area of Piacenza, from the Val di Taro to the Val di Ceno, in the southeast, and the Val Tidone, in the west, to slow down the territorial expansion of Piacenza in favour of Milan in the fourteenth century.⁵⁴

From his castles and fiefs, therefore, Ubertino had control over wide areas, and the fact that these were relatively close to the city enabled the rebel to inspect, slow down and block the commercial traffic towards Piacenza through a "maximam guerram cum intrinsecis Placentiae".⁵⁵ The fortresses of this powerful *signore* were efficient and well protected, and were used as a place of refuge whenever threatened by the armies of either the commune or its allies.⁵⁶ They were also used as warehouses for arms and food supplies, refuges for armed people, and headquarters from which it was possible to attack and harass citizens; and the revenues from these properties enabled the *signore* to gain even more military power.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, there were still numerous attempts to conquer these impregnable fortresses, as, for instance, occurred between June and July 1269, when the consuls of the commune of Piacenza, aided by the army of the city together with military forces from Milan and Parma, decided to attack the Bardi castle, which was the headquarters of the rebels headed by Ubertino. This occurred again in 1283, when the city's army tried to reconquer the castle of Montepoggio in Val Tidone, which was occupied by several partisans of the Landi family.⁵⁸

The families which had been excluded from Florence during the proscriptions of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth also began to represent a constant threat to the city, as well as a further element of instability. Several examples of this, just to cite a few, are represented by the Guidi counts, the Pazzi of the Valdarno, the Ubertini and, above all, the Ubaldini, who, entrenched in the massive fortresses of the Mugello, were considered the most powerful and dangerous family.⁵⁹ The Ubaldini family, the most famous familial enemy of the city of the Lily,⁶⁰ possessed several bastions on high crags in the Mugello area, and obstructed the commercial traffic between Florence and Bologna, which was essential not only for Florence but also for other Tuscan cities.⁶¹ Even when the undisputed heads of the exiled Ghibellines received the sizeable sum of

⁵³ P. CASTIGNOLI, "L'alleanza tra Carlo d'Angiò e Piacenza e la nuova costituzione del comune (1271)", in *Bollettino storico piacentino*, 49, 1974, 1-38; P. RACINE, "Ville et contado dans l'Italie communale: l'exemple de Plaisance", in *Nuova rivista storica*, LXI, 1977, pp. 273-290; IDEM, "Le "popolo", groupe social ou groupe de pression?", in *Nuova rivista storica*, 73, 1989, pp. 133-150. On Ubertino, cf. L. CERRI, "Ubertino Lando, conte di Venafrò (sec. XIII)", in *Archivio storico per le province parmensi*, XVIII, 1918, pp. 1-27; P. RACINE, *Un fuoruscito de l'Italie septentrionale au XIII^e siècle: Ubertino Landi*, in *Exile et civilisation*, pp. 33-47.

⁵⁴ P. CASTIGNOLI - P. RACINE, "Due documenti contabili del comune di Piacenza", in *Studi di storia medievale e diplomatica*, 3, 1979, pp. 49-55.

⁵⁵ CERRI, "Ubertino Lando, conte di Vanafrò", p. 14.

⁵⁶ DEAN, *The Rise of the Signori*, p. 468.

⁵⁷ On the properties of the Landi family, cf. R. VIGNODELLI RUBRICHI, *Fondo della famiglia Landi. Archivio Doria Landi Pamphilj. Regesti delle pergamene, 865-1625*, Parma, 1984, numbers 751 and 752, pp. 193-194.

⁵⁸ CERRI, "Ubertino Lando, conte di Vanafrò", p. 15 and pp. 24-25.

⁵⁹ For a general overview, see G. CHITTOLETTI, *Signorie rurali e feudi alla fine del Medioevo*, in *Storia d'Italia*, ed. by G. GALASSO, IV, *Comuni e signorie: istituzioni, società e lotte per l'egemonia*, Torino, 1981, pp. 589-676. For Tuscany see G. CHERUBINI, *Una "terra di città": la Toscana nel basso Medioevo*, in IDEM, *Scritti toscani. L'urbanesimo medievale e la mezzadria*, Firenze, 1991, pp. 21-31; SALVESTRINI, *Signori e contadini*, pp. 49-75. For the relationship between the Ubaldini family and Florence see L. MAGNA, *Gli Ubaldini del Mugello: una signoria feudale nel contado fiorentino*, in *I ceti dirigenti dell'età comunale nei secoli XII e XIII*, Pisa, 1982, pp. 13-63; BICCHIERAI, *Il castello di Raggiolo e i Conti Guidi*, pp. 87-101; CH. WICKHAM, *La montagna e la città. L'Appennino toscano nell'alto medioevo* [1988], Torino, 1997, pp. 287-324; P. PIRILLO, *Le Signorie territoriali dell'Appennino fiorentino tra crisi e strategie di sopravvivenza*, in *La Toscana et les Toscans autour de la Renaissance. Cadres de vie, société et croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles M. de La Roncière*, ed. by J.-A. CANCELLIERI, Aix-en-Provence, 1999, pp. 207-216; IDEM, *Costruzione di un contado. I Fiorentini e il loro territorio nel Basso Medioevo*, Firenze, 2001, pp. 46-47

⁶⁰ CH. M. DE LA RONCIÈRE, "Fidélités, patronages, clientèles dans le contado florentin au XIV^e siècle. Les Seigneuries féodales, le cas des comtes Guidi", in *Ricerche storiche*, XV, 1985, p. 36.

⁶¹ A. PALMIERI, *La montagna bolognese del Medio Evo*, Bologna, 1929, pp. 412-421; G. CHERUBINI, *Vita trecentesca nelle novelle di Giovanni Sercambi*, in IDEM, *Signori, contadini, borghesi. Ricerche sulla società italiana del basso*

5,000 golden florins from the Florentine commune in order that, as the chronicler Neri Strinati wrote,⁶² "everyone could go safely from Florence to Bologna",⁶³ the Ubaldini family continued to obstruct the peace and trade of the city of the Arno throughout the second half of the fourteenth century.⁶⁴ The raids carried out by the Ubaldini family - which can be compared to those carried out by the Malaspina family in Northern Italy⁶⁵ - should be distinguished from those effected by street predators, and must be recorded as true acts of war, as was demonstrated by the case of Girardo of Maghinardo, who was condemned to hanging as a Florentine rebel on February 27, 1366.⁶⁶

The importance of controlling feudal *signorie* is shown by the fact that throughout the fourteenth century the Florentine Republic gave important magistrates such as the *podestà* and the *capitano della guerra* the power to make laws on the construction, maintenance, restoration and demolition of fortified castles within its territory. The fact also that the Florentine Republic created special magistrates such as the *ufficiali delle Alpi*, in order to solve problems regarding the Apennine area, and particularly to wage war against the Ubaldini's territorial *signoria*, demonstrates the influence that these problems also had upon the constitution of a territorial state.⁶⁷ On March 11, 1364, for instance, the commune of Florence directed ser Pagano of ser Donato, *ufficiale delle Alpi*, to control the subversive activities of the Ubaldini family. This, along with the intent to maintain "strata segura et pro sotiando cives et mercatores florentinos",⁶⁸ demonstrates that raids and military actions carried out by members of this family - often only punished with fines although recognized as savage crimes - greatly hampered commercial traffic.⁶⁹

Therefore, riots and acts of war were often confused, and this confusion was further aggravated by a Florentine law that depicted the Ubaldini family according to a precise scheme of political propaganda. This law considered the family responsible for harassing travellers in that area, accused them of defending rebels, and held them guilty of savage street crimes, raids, violent acts and of "alia gravamina et enormia dampna".⁷⁰ Such a negative image was also portrayed by the chroniclers, as was the case on May 5, 1373, when Guglielmo Tedesco Ubaldini was captured and condemned to hanging, having been found guilty of stealing money and killing Florentine merchants bound for Bologna. Depicted as a common street thief he was dragged through the city tied to a donkey's tail before being killed.⁷¹

In general, literary, narrative, documentary and official sources insist on depicting these territorial *signori* - of whom the Ubaldini are the principal example - as behaving like brigands; they often came down from their mountain castles into the towns to attack and plunder merchants and travellers.⁷² Not only major centres, but also minor ones were affected by this problem, and in fact, they too could be the victims of military campaigns which would cause fear and destruction.⁷³ In *borghi* and small villages it was common for a part of the population to change its stance,

Medioevo, Firenze, 1974, pp. 22-29; G. PINTO, *Attraverso l'Appennino, rapporti e scambi tra Romagna e Toscana nei secoli XIII-XV*, in IDEM, *Toscana medievale*, Firenze, 1993, pp. 25-36; S. K. JR COHN, *Creating Florentine State. Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-1434*, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 31-36; PIRILLO, *Costruzione di un contado*, pp. 55-82. More in general see *Bande armate, banditi, banditismo e repressione di giustizia negli stati europei di antico regime*, ed. by G. ORTALLI, Roma, 1986.

⁶² NERI STRINATI, *Cronichetta di Neri Strinati*, in PACE DA CERTALDO, *Storia della guerra di Semifonte*, Firenze, 1753, p. 125.

⁶³ "ch'ognono andasse sicuro da Firenze a Bologna": *Ivi*, p. 129.

⁶⁴ COHN, *Creating Florentine State*, p. 31.

⁶⁵ SETTIA, "Castelli e strade", p. 259.

⁶⁶ ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI FIRENZE (hereafter ASF), *Provvisioni, Registri*, 66, ff. 112v-113r, 27 February 1366.

⁶⁷ PIRILLO, *Costruzione di un contado*, p. 6 and 64. See also COHN, *Creating Florentine State*, pp. 185-186.

⁶⁸ ASF, *Provvisioni, Registri*, 52, ff. 121v-122r, 11 March 1364.

⁶⁹ ASF, *Provvisioni, Registri*, 55, ff. 18r-19r, 24 March 1367, in which two members of the Ubaldini family, Giovanni and Bartolomeo of Antonio, were fined 500 *fiorini d'oro* because they committed delitti efferatissimi "in Villa Luchi".

⁷⁰ ASF, *Provvisioni, Registri*, 60, ff. 117r-v, 12 December 1372.

⁷¹ *Diario d'anonimo fiorentino dall'anno 1358 al 1389*, in *Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV*, ed. by A. GHERARDI, Firenze, 1876, pp. 299-300.

⁷² G. CHERUBINI, *La società dell'Appennino settentrionale (secoli XIII-XV)*, in IDEM, *Signori, contadini e borghesi*, pp. 121-124.

⁷³ COHN, *Creating Florentine State*, pp. 22 and 148.

becoming supporters of the exiles,⁷⁴ as had occurred in the southern area of the Valdarno, where minor communes of considerable political and demographic significance were to be found.⁷⁵ The anti-Florentine sentiment of the people from San Miniato al Tedesco is recorded in the words of the notary Giovanni of Lemmo from Camugnori, who wrote that on May 8, 1314 some strongholds of the Florentine commune were attacked by armed contingents composed of infantry and knights from rival cities, but above all of exiled Florentine Whites and Ghibellines.⁷⁶ Such attitudes can be found throughout the fourteenth century, and during that entire period the Florentine Republic was forced to deal with the problem of rioting in satellite cities. There were, in fact, numerous revolts against the city backed by *casate* of exiles, as was the case on July 18, 1314 when Colle Burnacchi rebelled against the commune of San Miniato (such treason on the part of the small village was publicly denounced throughout the city and registered in communal books).⁷⁷ There were also numerous revolts caused by too much interference by the regime, such as the uprisings of 1377 and 1381, which were a reaction to fiscal interference.⁷⁸

In any case, throughout the fourteenth century, the subject of *fuoruscitismo* was always very controversial for the Florentine Republic. On the one hand, during certain periods of Florentine history, the state, in an attempt to obtain political consensus, reinserted into the social fabric those exiles who represented a concrete threat,⁷⁹ while on the other, the policy used against those who were forced to live outside the city walls became cyclically harder.⁸⁰ The fact that the guild government cyclically reinserted a certain number of exiles into the social framework does not signify that irredeemable social and political misdoings were not repressed, and that severe and exemplary punishments were not used, such as the death penalty, which, during the fourteenth century - not only in Florence -, represented one of the main reasons for flight and therefore exile.⁸¹ The Ubaldini case is once again emblematic, given that a Provision dated August 26, 1373 stipulated that Andrea, Guidone, Ugolino, all three sons of Attaviano Ubaldini, as well as Galiotto, should not only have their exile nullified, but have also obtained Florentine citizenship.⁸²

The death penalty was strictly linked with the problem of *fuoruscitismo* which had become a delicate issue in the creation of the territorial state. The frequent attacks by groups of exiles seeking revenge were often documented, as demonstrated by the words of Giovanni Sercambi, when, in August 1396, the exiled Luccans, along with "many horsemen and infantry who came from Lombardy",⁸³ launched a campaign against the city which had exiled them in order to "do

⁷⁴ D. HERLIHY, *Le relazioni economiche di Firenze con le città soggette nel secolo XV*, in *Egemonia fiorentina ed autonomie locali nella Toscana nord-occidentale del primo Rinascimento: vita, arte, cultura*, Pistoia, 1978, pp. 79-109; G. CHITTOLINI, *Ricerche sull'ordinamento territoriale del dominio fiorentino agli inizi del secolo XV*, in IDEM, *La formazione dello stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado. Secoli XIV e XV*, Torino, 1979, pp. 292-352.

⁷⁵ V. MAZZONI - F. SALVESTRINI, "Strategie e interessi economici nei rapporti tra la Parte guelfa e il comune di Firenze. La confisca patrimoniale ai "ribelli" di San Miniato (ca. 1368 - ca. 1400)", in *Archivio storico italiano*, CLVII, 1999, pp. 3-9.

⁷⁶ "venerunt in Valdarnum ad castrum Ficecli, credentes ipsum habere quia quidam ghibellini promiserant dare; set, dicitur quia venerunt nimis tarde et debebant venire ante diem, non potuerunt habere et recesserunt comburendo capannas et multum bladum in dicto Valdarno": GIOVANNI DI LEMMO DA CAMUGNORI, 'Diario di ser Giovanni di Lemmo da Camugnori dal 1299 al 1320', in *Cronache dei secoli XIII e XIV*, Firenze, 1876, pp. 184-185.

⁷⁷ "Comune de Colle Burnacchi rebellatum est a comuni sancti Miniatis die mercurii XVIII lulii MCCCXIII, indictione XI": *Ivi*, pp. p. 185.

⁷⁸ G. PINTO, "Controllo politico e ordine pubblico nei primi vicariati fiorentini: gli atti criminali degli ufficiali forensi", in *Ricerche storiche*, XLIX, 1982, pp. 234-236.

⁷⁹ Cf. how the Florentine *popolo* and the *Parte guelfa* justified the privilege of citizenship to exiled rebels in ASF, *Provvisoni, Registri*, 14, ff. 107r-v, 27 August 1311 and in ASF, *Provvisoni, Registri*, 20, f. 24r-v, 30 September 1323.

⁸⁰ Cf., for instance, a law against those who were banned from San Miniato in ASF, *Provvisoni, Registri*, 42, ff. 149r-150r, 22 October 1355.

⁸¹ A. ZORZI, *Rituali di violenza, cerimoniali penali, rappresentazioni della giustizia nelle città italiane centro-settentrionali (secoli XIII-XV)*, in *Le forme della propaganda politica nel Due e nel Trecento*, ed. by P. CAMMAROSANO, Roma, 1994, pp. 395-425.

⁸² ASF, *Provvisoni, Registri*, 61, ff. 101r-101v, 26 August 1373.

⁸³ "molta gente da cavallo e da piè, la quale condussono di Lombardia": GIOVANNI SERCAMBI, *Le cronache*, ed. by S. BONGI, 2 vols., Roma, 1892, I, p. 349

great damage in the Garfagnana area",⁸⁴ or when in 1397 the Pisans, also aided by the exiled Luccans, "arrived in Lucca, taking prisoners and prey, killing and burning".⁸⁵

The phenomenon of *fuoruscitismo* represented almost everywhere a concrete threat to the livelihood of city communities, and was confounded with the activity of street bandits who were a threat to the security of the transportation of goods and the travel of merchants.⁸⁶ These two phenomena became complementary, and the civil conflicts, with the exclusion of the defeated faction, united them, strengthening the everyday criminality which afflicted the streets of most Italian communes.⁸⁷ The banned, independent of social class, were condemned or excluded from the city for political or other reasons, and could either create a new life elsewhere, or take up banditry against former compatriots or others. Even if, in general, banditry for political reasons and waging war in order to re-enter one's city of birth are sufficiently distinguishable, banditry in gangs, when feudal nobles were involved, was often confused with retaliation or war for political reasons, especially in Central and Northern Italy.⁸⁸

The phenomenon of *fuoruscitismo*, as has been observed, was often confused with the phenomenon of petty crime, and also influenced diplomatic relationships between cities. If we use Florence and her relationships with other Tuscan cities as an example, it is clear that this was an everyday problem. On September 18, 1392, to conclude, the chancellery of the Florentine Republic, in an attempt to maintain the political rapport with Piero Gambacorti, the lord of rival Pisa, wrote: "Dearest friend and illustrious knight, a very grave matter has been brought to our attention by our ambassadors, namely that you are displeased by Florentine citizens who engage in quarrels and disturb the tranquillity of your city. It is our belief that these disturbances have not been caused by our merchants, but rather by our exiles and other men of base condition".⁸⁹

⁸⁴ "fare danno grandissimo in elle parti di Garfagnana": *Ibidem*.

⁸⁵ "piglando pregoni et prede, uccidendo e ardendo": *Ivi*, p. 360.

⁸⁶ A. ASTORRI, *La mercanzia a Firenze nella prima metà del Trecento*, Firenze, 1998, p. 31.

⁸⁷ CHERUBINI, *Appunti sul brigantaggio*, p. 145.

⁸⁸ *Ivi*, p. 155.

⁸⁹ G. A. BRUCKER. *The society of Renaissance Florence. A documentary study*, Toronto - Buffalo - London, 1998², pp. 115-116.